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Preface
In the late summer of 1998, the authors, a cognitive scientist and a logician,
started talking about the relevance of modern mathematical logic to the study of
human reasoning, and we have been talking ever since. This book is an interim
report of that conversation. It argues that results such as those on the Wason
selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual
human reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture
of logic current in psychology and cognitive science is completely mistaken.
We aim to give the reader a more accurate picture of mathematical logic and, in
doing so, hope to show that logic, properly conceived, is still a very helpful tool
in cognitive science. The main thrust of the book is therefore constructive. We
give a number of examples in which logical theorizing helps in understanding
and modeling observed behavior in reasoning tasks, deviations of that behavior
in a psychiatric disorder (autism), and even the roots of that behavior in the
evolution of the brain.
The manuscript was tried out by us in many courses over the past ﬁve years,
and has been much improved as a result of the insightful questions of our stu-
dents. Rineke Verbrugge and Bart Verheij also taught a course from a draft
and we thank them and their students for much insightful feedback. We also
thank the colleagues who commented on individual chapters or their precur-
sors: Theodora Achourioti, Jonathan Adler, Marian Counihan, Richard Cox,
Hartmut Fitz, Jim Greeno, Fritz Hamm, Wilfrid Hodges, Tikitu de Jager, Phil
Johnson-Laird, Hans Kamp, Alex Korzec, Max Roberts, Lance Rips, Heleen
Smid, and Martin Stokhof. Special thanks go to Bob Kowalski, who read and
commented on the entire manuscript. The mistakes are, of course, our own.
We dedicate this book to our children.

P A R T I
Groundwork

1 Introduction: Logic and Psychology
The purpose of this book is twofold. Our ﬁrst aim is to see to what extent the
psychology of reasoning and logic (more generally, semantics) are relevant to
each other. After all, the psychology of reasoning and logic are in a sense about
the same subject, even though in the past century a rift has opened up between
them. Very superﬁcially speaking, logic appears to be normative, whereas the
psychology of reasoning is descriptive and concerned with processing. The ﬁrst
question then is: what is the relation between these two ﬁelds of inquiry?
The psychology of reasoning as a ﬁeld currently adopts a particular view of
this relation: we propose a quite different one. The book therefore should be
relevant to students of logic who are interested in applications of logic to cogni-
tion. But the book should also be relevant to any psychologist who is interested
in reasoning or communication, or any other cognitive capacity where a cog-
nitive account has to be founded on an informational analysis of a cognitive
capacity. These two groups come to the topic with very different methodolog-
ical equipment. The logic student interested in cognition comes with an un-
derstanding of the level of abstraction that modern logical theories operate at,
but with possibly sparse knowledge of psychological observations of reasoning.
Students of psychology come with knowledge of the experimental literatures,
but those literatures are strongly formed by a different conception of logic – a
conception, current in the nineteenth century,1 in which logic is thought of as a
mechanism for reasoning, and a universal, normatively valid mechanism at that.
This presents us with an educational dilemma. The logical analyses presented
here are couched at a level which is intended to be comprehensible to nonlo-
gicians with sufﬁcient patience to digest logical formulas.2 From experience,
the problems encountered are not so much problems about the technicalities of
the systems (which are often not the main point here) but background assump-
tions about what logic is about and what such systems do and do not attempt
to provide. So our message to the psychology student venturing here would
1. Although already at that time more reﬁned conceptions existed; compare section 1.3 on Husserl.
2. Chapter 2 does duty as an introduction to those aspects of logic most important for our purposes.
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be that we promise to show that these analyses can make a real difference to
how empirical investigations are designed, so venturing is well worthwhile.
But understanding requires that many routine assumptions about logic are left
at the door. Modern logical theories provide a conceptual and mathematical
framework for analyzing information systems such as people’s reasoning and
communication. They do not settle mechanisms or processes of reasoning, but
without their conceptualization, it is impossible to know what are empirical and
what are conceptual questions.
To the student venturing from logic our message is that we obviously cannot
provide more than the very bare outlines of a few empirical results, along with
some pointers to the literature. So we need to warn against assuming that the
empirical phenomena are as simple or separable as they are bound to appear.
The immense contribution that psychology has made to understanding the mind
largely consists of bodies of empirical knowledge about what phenomena are
replicable under what range of conditions. Much of this knowledge is implicit
in the literature.
This educational dilemma leads naturally to our second wider aim, to dis-
cuss some of the theories offered in the literature from the point of view of
the philosophy and methodology of science. For instance, both mental models
theory and evolutionary psychology, which take their starting points in obser-
vations about the psychology of reasoning, have become hugely popular ex-
planatory paradigms in psychology. We will see that the experiments claimed
to support these theories are marred by conceptual confusions and attendant
methodological errors, and that the theories themselves show little awareness
of the subtleties of logic. Part of our purpose is therefore to propose a differ-
ent methodology for this ﬁeld, which takes Marr’s idea of “levels of analysis”
seriously.
1.1 Forms of Rationality
Traditionally, rationality is taken to be a deﬁning characteristic of human na-
ture: “man is a rational animal,” apparently capable of deliberate thought, plan-
ning, problemsolving, scientiﬁc theorizing and prediction, moral reasoning, and
so forth. If we ask what “rational” means here, we can read such things as: “In
rational discourse one strives to arrive at justiﬁed true belief,” a deﬁnition of ra-
tionality from an era oriented toward theory. Our more pragmatically oriented
age has extended this concept of rationality to actions. For instance, in the MIT
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, “rational agency” is deﬁned as a coherence
requirement:
[T]he agent must have a means-end competence to ﬁt its actions or decisions, according
to its beliefs or knowledge representations, to its desires or goal-structure.
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Without such coherence there is no agent. The onus here is on the term ﬁt
which seems to have a logical component. If an action is performed which is
not part of a plan derived to achieve a given goal, there is no ﬁt. In this sense
checking my horoscope before mounting the bike to go to work is not rational,
and neither is ﬁrst puncturing the tires.
Philosophy, then, studies the question: are there optimal rules for conducting
such activities? Various logics, scientiﬁc methodology, heuristics, probability,
decision theory, all have claims to normative status here, where normativity
means that everybody should obey the rules of these systems in all circum-
stances. As a consequence, there exists an absolute distinction between valid
arguments and fallacies. Judged by these standards, human reasoning in the
laboratory is very poor indeed (as shown by the seminal experiments of Wason
[295] for logic and Kahneman and Tversky [150] for probability), and it has
therefore been said that humans are actually not rational in the sense deﬁned
above.
It is usually assumed that the results obtained in the psychology of reasoning
tell us something about the rationality, or rather the absence thereof, of hu-
man reasoning. The following extended quotation from Peter Wason, one of
the founding fathers of the ﬁeld whose “selection task” will serve as our en-
trypoint below, exempliﬁes this attitude to perfection. He writes, concluding
an overview of his selection task paradigm for The Oxford Companion to the
Mind,
Our basic paradigm has the enormous advantage of being artiﬁcial and novel; in these
studies we are not interested in everyday thought, but in the kind of thinking which oc-
curs when there is minimal meaning in the things around us. On a much smaller scale,
what do our students’ remarks remind us of in real life? They are like saying “Of course,
the earth is ﬂat,” “Of course, we are descended from Adam and Eve,” “Of course, space
has nothing to do with time.” The old ways of seeing things now look like absurd preju-
dices, but our highly intelligent student volunteers display analogous miniature prejudices
when their premature conclusions are challenged by the facts. As Kuhn has shown, old
paradigms do not die in the face of a few counterexamples. In the same way, our volun-
teers do not often accommodate their thought to new observations, even those governed
by logical necessity, in a deceptive problem situation. They will frequently deny the facts,
or contradict themselves, rather than shift their frame of reference.
Other treatments and interpretations of problem solving could have been cited. For in-
stance, most problems studied by psychologists create a sense of perplexity rather than
a specious answer. But the present interpretation, in terms of the development of dogma
and its resistance to truth, reveals the interest and excitement generated by research in
this area. (Wason [300,p. 644])
What lies behind remarks such asWason’s is the view that reasoning, whether
logical or probabilistic, can be judged to be rational if certain reasoning rules
from a ﬁxed, given set are followed. If these rules are not followed, dire conse-
quences may result. A good example of this attitude is furnished by Stanovich’s
book Who is Rational? [254]. The following quotation gives some idea of the
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passions that infuse this approach. Stanovich considers irrationality to lead to
the occurrence of
wars, economic busts, technological accidents, pyramid sales schemes, telemarketing
fraud, religious fanaticism, psychic scams, environmental degradation, broken marriages,
and savings and loan scandals [254,p. 9]
and believes teaching good reasoning, that is, normatively correct rules, will go
some way toward improving this distressing situation.
Stanovich’s discussion of rules governing reasoning introduces a distinction
between normative, descriptive, and prescriptive rules. We give brief charac-
terizations of the three kinds, followed by representative examples.
• Normative rules: reasoning as it should be, ideally
– Modus tollens: ¬q, p→ q/¬p,
– Bayes’ theorem: P (D | S) = P (S|D)P (D)P (S) .
• Descriptive rules: reasoning as it is actually practiced
– Many people do not endorse modus tollens and believe that from ¬q, p→
q nothing can be derived.
– In doing probabilistic calculations of the probability of a disease given a
cluster of symptoms, even experts sometimes neglect the “base rate” and
put P (D | S) = P (S | D).
• Prescriptive3 rules: these are norms that result from taking into account
our bounded rationality, i.e., computational limitations (due to the computa-
tional complexity of classical logic, and the even higher complexity of prob-
ability theory) and storage limitations (the impossibility of simultaneously
representing all factors relevant to a computation, say, of a plan to achieve a
given goal).
– The classically invalid principle ¬q, p ∧ r → q/¬p ∧ ¬r is correct ac-
cording to closed–world reasoning, which is computationally much less
complex than classical propositional logic, and ameliorates storage prob-
lems.
– Chater and Oaksford’s “heuristic rules” for solving syllogisms. [36]
In terms of these three kinds of rules, Stanovich then distinguishes the following
positions on the relationship between reasoning and rationality [254,pp.4–9]:
• Panglossian. Human reasoning competence and performance is actually nor-
matively correct. What appears to be incorrect reasoning can be explained
3. The term is not very apt, but we will stick to Stanovich’s terminology.
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by such maneuvers as different task construal, a different interpretation of
logical terms, etc. (A famous defense of his point of view can be found
in Henle´ [122].) As a consequence, no education in “critical thinking” is
necessary.
• Apologist. Actual human performance follows prescriptive rules, but the
latter are in general (and necessarily) subnormal, because of the heavy com-
putational demands of normatively correct reasoning. This point of view was
defended by Oaksford and Chater [205, 36]. As a consequence, education in
“critical thinking” is unlikely to be helpful.
• Meliorist. Actual human reasoning falls short of prescriptive standards,
which are themselves subnormal; there is therefore much room for improve-
ment by suitable education (Stanovich’s own position).
• Eliminativist.4 Reasoning rarely happens in real life, and mainly in insti-
tutional contexts such as schools. By contrast, true rationality is adaptive-
ness: we have developed “fast and frugal algorithms” which allow us to
take quick decisions which are optimal given constraints of time and energy.
This position is defended by evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides
and Tooby[47, 48] and, in more constructive detail, by Gigerenzer [95].
It will be helpful for the reader if we situate our own position with respect to this
scheme. We are deﬁnitely not in the eliminativist camp, since we take the view
that reasoning is everywhere, most prominently in discourse comprehension.
This prime example is often overlooked because of the association of reason-
ing with conscious processing, but this association is wrong: some reasoning
is automatic.5 The same example leads us to think that human reasoning may
not be so ﬂawed after all, since it operates rather competently in this domain.
We are not Panglossians either, although we emphasize that interpretation is
of paramount importance in reasoning. But even if interpretation is important,
and interpretations may differ, people may reason in ways which are inconsis-
tent with their chosen interpretation. From a methodological point of view this
means that if one uses a particular interpretation to explain performance, one
must have evidence for the interpretation which is independent of the perfor-
mance. The apologist and meliorist positions introduce the distinction between
normative and prescriptive rules. Here it becomes clear that Stanovich’s scheme
is predicated on the assumption that reasoning is about following rules from a
ﬁxed, given set, say classical logic, rules which should apply always and every-
where. For if there is no given set of rules which constitutes the norm, and the
norm is instead relative to a “domain,” then the domain may well include the
4. Actually, this category does not occur in [254], but we have added it due to its increased prominence.
5. Chapter 5 has more on this.
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cognitive constraints that gave rise to the notion of prescriptive rules, thus pro-
moting the latter to the rank of norm. This is what we will argue for in several
places in the book, in particular in chapter 11.
In the next section we brieﬂy look at the role logic once played in cognitive
science, and the reasons for its demise.
1.2 How Logic and Cognition Got Divorced
The cognitive sciences really got off the ground after they adopted the information-
processing metaphor (Craik [52]):
1. Cognitive explanations must refer to models, conceived of as representa-
tional mechanisms
2. which function “in the same way” as the phenomena being represented
3. and which are capable of generating behavior and thoughts of various kinds.
The role of logic in this scheme was twofold: on the one hand as a formal, sym-
bolic, representation language (which is very expressive!), on the other hand as
an inference mechanism generating behavior and thoughts. It was furthermore
believed that these inference mechanisms are continuous with overt reasoning;
that is, the same processes can be applied both reﬂectively and automatically.
An extreme form of this attitude is of course Piaget’s “logicism” [216], which
maintains that the acquisition of formal-deductive operations is the crown of
cognitive development. Piaget did the ﬁrst studies to show that preschool chil-
dren do not yet master simple classical predicate logic; but he also assumed
that everyone gets there in the end. This proved to be the Achilles heel of
this form of logicism. Indeed, Wason’s selection task was inter alia directed
against this assumption, and its apparent outcome – a striking deviation from
classical logical reasoning – seemingly undermined the role of logic as an infer-
ence mechanism. A further criticism concerned the alleged slowness of logical
inference mechanisms, especially when search is involved, for example when
backtracking from a given goal. Thus, Newell and Simon style “production sys-
tems”[199], of which Anderson and Lebiere’s ACT-R [2], is the most famous
example, keep only the inference rule of modus ponens, allowing fast forward
processing, at the cost of considerable complications elsewhere.
Lastly, the advent of neural network theory brought to the fore criticisms of
the symbolic representational format given by logic: it would be tied to brittle,
all-or-none representations, uncharacteristic of actual cognitive representations
with their inherently fuzzy boundaries. As a further consequence of this brit-
tleness, learning symbolic representations would be unrealistically hard. As a
result, from the position of being absolutely central in the cognitive revolution,
which was founded on conceptions of reasoning, computation, and the analysis
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of language, the psychology of deduction has gone to being the deadbeat of cog-
nitive psychology, pursued in a ghetto, surrounded by widespread skepticism as
to whether human reasoning really happens outside the academy. “Isn’t what
we really do decision?” we increasingly often hear. Many eminent psychology
departments do not teach courses on reasoning. Imagine such a psychology de-
partment (or indeed any psychology department) not teaching any courses on
perception. Even where they do teach reasoning they are more likely to be fo-
cused on analogical reasoning, thought of as a kind of reasoning at the opposite
end from deduction on some dimension of certainty.
We will argue that logic and reasoning have ended up in this ghetto because of
a series of unwarranted assumptions. One of the tasks of this book is to examine
these assumptions, and show that they do not bear scrutiny. As a prelude, we
consider the vexed issue of the normative status of logic, through some of the
history of present day conceptualizations.
1.3 Two Philosophers on the Certainty of Logic: Frege andHusserl
Famously, Aristotle provided the ﬁrst rules for reasoning with quantiﬁers of the
form “All A are B,” “Some A are B,” “No A are B” and “Some A are not
B,” starting centuries of work on how to provide principled explanations for
the validity of some syllogisms, and the invalidity of others. This search for an
explanation turned to the notion of validity itself (u¨berhaupt, we are tempted to
say), and Kant opined in theCritique of Pure Reason that logical laws constitute
the very fabric of thought: thinking which does not proceed according to these
laws is not properly thinking.6
In the nineteenth century, this “transcendental” doctrine of logic was wa-
tered down to a naturalistic version called psychologism, which holds that all of
thinking and knowledge are psychological phenomena and that therefore log-
ical laws are psychological laws. To take an example from John Stuart Mill,
the law of noncontradiction ¬(A∧¬A) represents the impossibility of thinking
contradictory thoughts at the same time. Thus, normative and descriptive rules
coincide. What came after, a strong emphasis on normativity, can to a large
extent be seen as a reaction to this view. Gottlob Frege was the driving force
behind the reaction, and his views still exert their inﬂuence on the textbooks.
6. It is impossible to do justice here to Kant’s thinking on logic. It is still common to think of Kant’s logic
as primitive, and its role in the Critique of Pure Reason as an instance of Kant’s architectonic mania. This
is very far from the truth, and Kant’s thinking on, for instance, logical consequence remains relevant to this
day. In fact, our concluding chapter 11 has many afﬁnities with Kant, although it would require another
book to explain why. Be´atrice Longuenesse’s Kant and the Capacity to Judge [175] is an excellent guide to
the wider signiﬁcance of Kant’s logic. The reader may also consult Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Transcendental
Psychology [159] for an exposition of Kant’s relevance to cognitive science. Kitcher’s remarks on the simi-
larities between Kant’s ﬁrst Critique and Marr’s program in cognitive science [183] have inﬂuenced chapter
11. We thank Theodora Achourioti for pointing out these connections.
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1.3.1 Frege’s Idealism in Logic
Frege did not hesitate to point out the weak empirical basis of psychologism: is
it really true that we cannot simultaneously think contradictory thoughts? Wish
it were so! His chief argument, however, was theoretical, and consisted of two
main reservations about a naturalistic treatment of logic (and mathematics):
1. Psychologism makes logic pertain to ideas only, and as a consequence it
lacks resources to explain why logic is applicable to the real world.
2. Logical and mathematical knowledge are objective, and this objectivity can-
not be safeguarded if logical laws are properties of individual minds.
We now present a few extracts from Frege’s writings to illustrate his views
on psychologism.
As regards 1 we read:
Psychological treatments of logic . . . lead then necessarily to psychological idealism.
Since all knowledge is judgmental, every bridge to the objective is now broken off. (G.
Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften; see [85])
Neither logic nor mathematics has the task of investigating minds and the contents of
consciousness whose bearer is an individual person. (G. Frege, Kleine Schriften; see
[85])
The logicians . . . are too much caught up in psychology . . . Logic is in no way a part of
psychology. The Pythagorean theorem expresses the same thought for all men, while each
person has its own representations, feelings and resolutions that are different from those
of every other person. Thoughts are not psychic structures, and thinking is not an inner
producing and forming, but an apprehension of thoughts which are already objectively
given. (G. Frege, letter to Husserl; see 6, p. 113 of [135])
The last sentence is especially interesting: if “thinking is not an inner producing
and forming,” cognitive science has no business investigating thinking, logical
reasoning in particular. What the psychologist ﬁnds interesting in reasoning
is precisely what steps the mind executes in drawing an inference, i.e., in the
process more than the result. The quotation just given suggests that logic itself
has little to contribute to this inquiry, and indeed psychologists have generally
heeded Frege’s message, either by designing logics which are supposedly cog-
nitively more relevant (e.g., Johnson-Laird’s ‘mental models’ [145]. See Chap-
ter 10, especially 10.6.3), or by ignoring the contributions that formal logic
can make to theories of processing. This is a pity, since, as will be shown in
the body of the book, the technical apparatus of logic has much to offer to the
psychologist.
Here is an excerpt relevant to 2:
If we could grasp nothing but what is in ourselves, then a [genuine] conﬂict of opinions,
[as well as] a reciprocity of understanding, would be impossible, since there would be
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no common ground, and no idea in the psychological sense can be such a ground. There
would be no logic that can be appealed to as an arbiter in the conﬂict of opinions. (G.
Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik; the relevant part is reprinted in [85])
From the last quotation we gather that it is apparently highly desirable that
logic “can be appealed to as an arbiter in the conﬂict of opinions,” and that
therefore there must be a single, objectively valid logic. The second quotation
(from the letter to Husserl) provides a reason to believe there is one: logic is
as it were the physics of the realm of thought, since it studies the structure of
the “objectively given” thoughts. Psychologism is a threat to this normative
character of logic, and since a logic worthy of the name must give rise to norms
for thinking, psychologism is not a possible theory of logical validity. But,
as we have seen, Frege must invoke an objectively given realm of thought to
buttress the normative pretensions of logic, and this assumption seems hard to
justify. However, if one is skeptical about this objective realm of thought, the
specter of relativism rises again. At ﬁrst sight, the normativity of logic seems
to be bound up with the uniqueness of logic; and what better way to safeguard
that uniqueness than by positing some underlying reality which the logical laws
describe?
This is indeed a serious problem, and to solve it requires rethinking the sense
in which logic can be considered to be normative. In a nutshell, our answer
will be that norms apply to instances of reasoning only after the interpretation
of the (logical and nonlogical) expressions in the argument has been ﬁxed, and,
furthermore, that there are in general multiple natural options for such inter-
pretations, even for interpreting the logical expressions. Thus, the reasoning
process inevitably involves also steps aimed at ﬁxing an interpretation; once
this has been achieved, the norms governing logical reasoning are also deter-
mined. It will not have escaped the reader’s attention that the view of reasoning
just outlined7 is very different from the one implicitly assumed by the standard
paradigms in the psychology of reasoning. As this book goes to press, a spe-
cial issue on logical views of psychologism covering a range of contemporary
positions is published [171].
One aim of this book is to present a view of reasoning as consisting of rea-
soning to and reasoning from an interpretation, and to apply this view to ex-
perimental studies on reasoning. In philosophy, our precursor here is Husserl,
who is playing Aristotle (the metaphysician, not the logician) to Frege’s Plato.
Husserl’s views on logic never made the logic textbooks (at least explicitly), but
we nonetheless believe that one can ﬁnd in him the germs of a semantic con-
ception of logic, which comes much closer than Frege’s to how logic functions
in actual reasoning.
7. The outline is very rough indeed. For instance, the phrase “once this has been achieved” suggests that
the two stages are successive. As we will see in the experimental chapters, however, it is much closer to the
truth to view these stages as interactive.
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1.3.2 Husserl as a Forerunner of Semantics
It was Frege who converted Husserl to antipsychologism. When we read
Husserl’s criticism of psychologism in Logische Untersuchungen [134], we at
ﬁrst seem to be on familiar ground. If logical laws were empirical laws about
psychological events, they would have to be approximative and provisional,
like all empirical laws. But logical laws are exact and unassailable, hence they
cannot be empirical.8 Psychologism about logical laws also leads to skeptical
relativism: it is in principle possible that different people reason according to
different logical laws,9 so that what is true for one person may not be true for
another – truth, however, is absolute, not indexed to a person.
So far these arguments are question begging: we may have a strong desire
for logical laws to be exact and unassailable and objective, but we need a justi-
ﬁcation for assuming that they are. In trying to provide one, Husserl develops a
strikingly modern view of logic, and one that is much more conducive to play-
ing a role in cognitive science than Frege’s. Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen
brings the important innovation that logic must be viewed, not as a normative,
but as a theoretical, or as we would now say, mathematical, discipline. Logic
as a theoretical discipline is concerned with “truth,” “judgment,” and similar
concepts. Husserl grounds the normative status of logic via a combination of
the theoretical statement “only such and such arguments preserve truth” and
the normative statement “truth is good,” to conclude: “only such and such argu-
ments are good.” Splitting off the normative from the mathematical component
of logic is potentially beneﬁcial, since it focuses attention on what exactly jus-
tiﬁes the normative statement “truth is good,” and thus opens up space for a
relativized version such as “(this kind of) truth is good (for that purpose).”
In slightly more detail,10 Husserl introduces an essentially modern division
of logic as concerned with
1. “the pure forms of judgments” (i.e., the syntax of a formal language, but
here implying a Kantian delineation of what can be said at all);
2. “the formal categories of meaning” (i.e., the semantic study of concepts such
as “variable,” “reference,” “truth,” “proposition,” “consequence”11 );
8. Husserl remarks correctly that even if logical laws are considered empirical, psychologism is under the
obligation to explain how we can acquire them, and that no account of how logical laws are learned has been
forthcoming.
9. In modern times this is occasionally cheerfully accepted. The logician Dov Gabbay once said in an
interview: “Everybody his own logic!”
10. Here we are much indebted to David Bell’s Husserl [17], in particular pp. 85 –100. The quotes from
Husserl are taken from Bell’s monograph.
11. It is of some interest to observe here that for Frege, semantics, although intuitively given, was not
a proper ﬁeld of scientiﬁc study, since it involves stepping outside the system which is given a semantic
interpretation. See also footnote 12. We agree with Husserl that it is both possible and necessary to reﬂect
on semantic interpretation.
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3. “the formal categories of objects” – that is, what is known as “formal on-
tology,” the study of such concepts as “object,” “state of affairs,” “contin-
uum,” “moment.” This can be read as saying that part of logic must be
the characterization of the structures on which the chosen formal language
is interpreted; the next quotation calls these structures “possible ﬁelds of
knowledge”:
The objective correlate of the concept of a possible theory, determined exclusively in
terms of its form, is the concept of a possible ﬁeld of knowledge over which a the-
ory of this form will preside. [This ﬁeld] is characterized by the fact that its objects
are capable of certain relations that fall under certain basic laws of such-and-such a
determinate form . . . the objects remain entirely indeterminate as regards their mat-
ter. . . ([17,p. 90-1])
4. Lastly, rational thinking also involves systematization, and therefore pure
logic must also comprise a study of formal theories, not only of propositions
and their inferential relationships; in Husserl’s words
The earlier level of logic had taken for its theme the pure forms of all signiﬁcant
formations that can occur within a science. Now however, judgment systems in their
entirety become the theme (Formale und transzendentale Logik [17,p. 90-1]).
Modern logic has followed this last injunction, and studies what is known as
“metaproperties” of a logical system such as consistency, the impossibility of
deriving a contradiction in the system. Among the most important metaproper-
ties are metatheorems of the form “only such-and-such argument patterns pre-
serve truth,” which depend on a preliminary characterization of the notion of
truth in the “possible ﬁeld of knowledge” studied. Normativity comes in only
via a principle of the form “in this particular ﬁeld of knowledge, truth of such-
and-such a form is good, therefore only such-and-such arguments are good.”
This means that logical laws are unassailable in the sense that they are mathe-
matical consequences of the structure of the domain studied, but by the same
token these laws are relative to that domain. The reader will see in the body of
the book that this view of logic, as not providing absolutely valid norms but as
giving norms valid relative to a particular domain, sheds new light on results
in the psychology of reasoning which have traditionally been taken to show the
incompatibility of logic and actual reasoning.12
12. The preceding paragraphs are not intended as an exegesis of Husserl’s thought; our intention is only
to identify some strands in Husserl which we consider to be fruitful for thinking about logic. The contrast
drawn here between Frege and Husserl is a particular case of the more general distinction, ﬁrst proposed by
Jean van Heijenoort [281], between “logic as a universal language” and “logic as a calculus.” On the former
conception of logic, whose main champion is Frege, logic is concerned with a single universe of discourse,
and the semantic relation between logical language and that universe is ineffable. On the latter conception
(which ultimately gave rise to the modern “model–theoretic logics” [15]), there are many possible universes
of discourse, logical languages are reinterpretable to ﬁt these universes, and semantics is a legitimate object
of scientiﬁc study. Van Heijenoort’s contrast has been called “a fundamental opposition in twentieth century
philosophy” by Hintikka [125] and has been applied to Frege and Husserl in Kusch [165].
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For the mathematically inclined reader we include an example of Husserl’s
views as applied to the domain of arithmetic. If this domain is given a clas-
sical, Platonistic interpretation, that is, as concerned with objects which exist
independently of the human mind, then the following is not a logical law:
(1) (†) if A or B is provable (in system S), then A is provable (in system
S) or B is provable (in system S)
because on the one hand Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem has shown that there
is a sentence A such that neither A nor ¬A is provable in classical arithmetic,
whereas on the other hand the “law of excluded middle” A ∨ ¬A is a logical
law in classical arithmetic. If, however, the domain of arithmetic is conceptu-
alized as being about particular mental constructions, as mathematicians of the
intuitionistic persuasion claim, then it is a mathematical fact that (†) is a logical
law (and that therefore the law of excluded middle is not). Normative issues
arise, not at the level of logical laws (e.g., the law of excluded middle), but at
the level of what description to choose for the domain of interest. Changing
one’s logical laws then becomes tantamount to changing the description of the
domain.
Husserl’s view has the value of focusing attention on the relation between
mathematics and empirical phenomena in general, as one source of difﬁculty
in understanding the relation between logic and human reasoning. The relation
between mathematics and empirical phenomena is problematical in any do-
main, but it may be more problematical in this domain than most. Appreciating
the continuity of these problems, and identifying their source is one way for-
ward. Seeing logic as the mathematics of information systems, of which people
are one kind, is quite a good ﬁrst approximation to the view we develop here.
This view helps in that it makes clear from the start that one’s choice is never
between “doing psychology” and “doing logic.” Understanding reasoning is
always going to require doing both, simply because science does not proceed
far without mathematical, or at least conceptual apparatus.
So we see history turning circle, though not full circle. Like Mill and Husserl,
we see logic and psychology as very closely linked. Frege rejected this view.
Husserl developed a much more sophisticated view of the relation, which fore-
shadows our own in its emphasis on semantics. Later, Frege’s view of logic
foundered on Russell’s paradoxes which showed that logic couldn’t be univer-
sal and homogeneous. In response logic developed the possibility of explicitly
studying semantics, and still later, developed a multiplicity of logics. Much of
the technical development necessary for studying semantics took place in the
context of the foundations of mathematics which took logic very far from psy-
chology. In mid-twentieth century, Montague reapplied the much transformed
technical apparatus of logical semantics to the descriptive analysis of natural
languages. We now apply the availability of a multiplicity of logics back onto
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the subject matter of discourse and psychology. Of course psychology too has
changed out of all recognition since Mill – the whole apparatus of psychologi-
cal experiment postdates Mill’s view. So our “psychologism” is very different
from Mill’s, but the closeness of psychology and logic is something shared.
Our psychologism clearly requires an account of how logic in its modern guise
as mathematical system is related to psychology in its modern guise as experi-
mental science.
1.4 What the Reader May Expect
The remainder of the book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is a somewhat un-
orthodox introduction to logic, which tries to break the hold of classical logic
by showing it results from contingent assumptions on syntax and semantics.
Systematic variation of these assumptions gives rise to several logics that have
applications in actual human reasoning. This chapter in particular introduces
closed–world reasoning, a form of reasoning that will be very important in part
II of the book. In chapters 3 and 4 we study the Wason selection task from the
vantage point developed in this introduction and in chapter 2: as a task in which
subjects are mostly struggling to impose an interpretation on the experimental
materials instead of engaging with the materials as the experimenter intends
them to do. Chapter 3 contains many examples of tutorial dialogues with sub-
jects which show what interpretational difﬁculties they experience, and chapter
4 reports on experiments establishing that alleviating these difﬁculties by modi-
fying the task instructions leads to a vast increase in correct performance, when
measured against the classical competence model.
The selection task has played a major role in debates on evolutionary psy-
chology, with Cosmides [47] claiming that her results on facilitation of the task
with social contract materials show that the only abilities humans have in logical
reasoning are due to an innate module for “cheater detection.” We believe that
this highly inﬂuential point of view is mistaken, for two reasons: a faulty view
of logic, and a faulty view of evolution. chapter 5 considers the inﬂuence this
faulty logical paradigm has had on the psychology of reasoning, and chapter 6
is a lengthy discussion of the evolution of human cognition. The latter chapter
introduces a hypothesis that will play an important role in part II: that the origin
of the human ability for logical reasoning must be sought in the planning ca-
pacity, and that closed–world reasoning (which governs planning) is therefore
a very fundamental form of reasoning, stretching across many domains.
Chapter 7 applies this idea to the analysis of the suppression task (Byrne
[28]), which is standardly interpreted as providing evidence for “mental mod-
els” and against “mental rules.” We show that the data from this task can be
explained on the assumption that subjects assimilate the task to a discourse–
processing task, using closed–world reasoning, by presenting a rigorously for-
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mal model of subjects’ reasoning in a logical system called “logic program-
ming,” which we consider to be the most appealing form of closed–world rea-
soning. We also present data from tutorial dialogues corroborating our inter-
pretation of what subjects are doing. In chapter 8, it is shown that closed–world
reasoning has a revealing neural implementation and that there need not be an
opposition between logical and connectionist modeling. Chapter 9 applies the
ideas of chapters 7 and 8 to autism. We analyse several tasks on which autistic
people are known to fail, such as the false belief task and the box task, and ﬁnd
that these tasks have a common logical structure which is identical to that of the
suppression task discussed in chapter 7. This leads to a prediction for autistic
people’s behavior on the suppression task, which has been veriﬁed. This latter
result is analysed in terms of the neural implementation developed in chapter
8, which then allows us to make a connection to the genetics of autism. Chap-
ter 10 discusses syllogisms. These are, of course, the ﬁrst reasoning patterns
studied in psychology, but for us their interest lies in the necessity to apply sub-
stantial interpretational theories from linguistics and philosophy to explain the
data. This explains why syllogisms only occur near the end of the book: the
reader must ﬁrst be familiar with both interpretation processes of reasoning to
an interpretation and derivational processes of reasoning from the interpretation
imposed.
Lastly, chapter 11 makes explicit our view of logic and its relevance to actual
reasoning. The role of logic is to aid in “going beyond the information given”
when processing information. Just as in visual information processing, mathe-
matical structure (edges etc.) must be imposed upon the retinal array, because
this structure is not literally present in the data, so some logical form must ﬁrst
be imposed on a problem requiring reasoning before the actual reasoning can
take place.
In the end, we aim to convince the reader that using the formal machinery
of modern logic leads to a much more insightful explanation of existing data,
and a much more promising research agenda for generating further data. If we
succeed, then there are general morals to be drawn about what philosophy of
science is appropriate for the psychology of “higher” cognitive functions.
At present, experimental psychology is much inﬂuenced by a Popperian phi-
losophy which sees hypothesis testing as the central activity in science. We
will see that Wason himself was much inﬂuenced by this account of science in
explaining his subjects’ responses. But Popper’s account, important as it is, in
the intervening years has been shown to be a very partial account. If science is
hypothesis testing, where do hypotheses come from? Why test this one rather
than that? A great deal of science is exploration and observation which don’t
fall easily under the umbrella of hypothesis testing. Highly developed sciences
such as physics, which are overwhelmingly the cases studied by philosophers
of science, have powerful abstract bodies of theory which guide exploration
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and observation, and through them the selection of hypotheses, when the time
comes to test hypotheses. Psychology lacks such bodies of abstract theory, and
so one sees implicit theories playing important roles in choosing what hypothe-
ses to test. “Surprisingness” of a phenomenon as compared to some implicit
theory of that phenomenon is a crucial quality indicating when hypothesis test-
ing is worth the effort. If Wason’s observations of failures of rationality in the
selection task hadn’t been so counterintuitive, then we (and you) would never
have heard of them. We will expend considerable effort in chapter 3 in mak-
ing explicit Wason’s (implicit) background theory against which the results are
so surprising, and in showing how logic can provide explicit background ab-
stractions which change the way hypotheses can be chosen and experiments
designed.
A corollary of the lack of background abstract theories in psychology is the
use of direct operationalization of abstract concepts in experimental procedures:
data categories are assumed to be very closely related to their theoretical cat-
egories. As a consequence, the data observed are supposed to have a direct
bearing on the theoretical hypotheses. In mature sciences this doesn’t happen.
There are always ‘bridging’ inferences required between observation and the-
ory, and an apparent falsiﬁcation may direct attention to unwarranted auxiliary
assumptions. Especially in chapter 10, though also throughout, we will illus-
trate how logic can open up space for observation and exploration between data
and theory. Young sciences like psychology require lots of observation and ex-
ploration, so a methodology which opens up space for these activities is vital.
In the study of human cognition, this space between data and theory or hy-
pothesis is particularly broad because of our human capacity for multiple inter-
pretation. Indeed, some resistance to taking interpretation seriously in studying
reasoning comes from the belief that this space is too broad to be bridged. Once
we acknowledge the possibility of full human interpretive capacities, then, so
the argument goes, the possibility of science goes out the window. In partic-
ular it is often felt that the scientiﬁc study of reasoning is impossible once it
is allowed that the logical expressions are subject to the possibility of multiple
interpretations. Rejecting the possibility of multiple interpretation because it is
held to make science impossible is truly the logic of the drunk searching be-
neath the lamppost who prefers the illuminated circle to the dark space where
he knows he lost his keys. We take the general human capacity for multiple
interpretation to be as close to fact as it is possible to get in cognitive science,
and prefer to follow it where it leads in choosing our methods of investigation.
In fact, one sees this battle fought repeatedly in each area of human cognition.
It remains under control to some extent in perception, because there the exper-
imenter has “stimulus control” – she can twiddle the display, and observe what
the subject reports seeing.13 But in, for example, memory, the problem has been
13. In fact this is something of an illusion, because the subject brings preexisting knowledge to bear in
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recognized ever since Ebbinghaus [68] invented nonsense syllables in order to
eliminate the interpretive effects of subjects’ long-term knowledge which is be-
yond experimental control. In memory, the problem leads to a split between
the Ebbinghaus tradition of laboratory experimentation on abstracted materials,
and the Bartlettian tradition of studying, for example, autobiographical mem-
ory [12]. Both have contributions to make, but both require an understanding
of their distinctive approaches to assimilate those contributions.
The problem of treating “content” or “general knowledge” or “experience
prior to the experiment” is endemic in psychology, and the life of the psycho-
logical researcher is much taken up with getting around the barriers it throws
up. The psychology of reasoning’s adoption of “abstract tasks” can be seen as
following in the Ebbinghausian tradition, and reaction against those tasks as
Bartlettian rejection of that tradition. Logic itself is interpreted by psycholo-
gists as the most extreme form of the Ebbinghausian approach in which content
is banished entirely. However, our argument is that this is no longer true in
modern logic. The default logics we present here are actually interpretable as
modeling the relation between a working memory holding the experimental in-
put materials and a long-term memory holding “general knowledge.” So these
logics present a formalization of “content.” They thus attack psychology’s cen-
tral problem head-on. Of course, they do not offer a model of the long-term
memory of some actual adult human being (nor even an idealized adult hu-
man being at standard temperature and pressure). But they do offer precise
formal models of how large databases of default conditionals can control the
interpretation of richly meaningful input texts. Essentially similar computer ar-
chitectures are the basis for implementing real-world useful databases of gen-
eral knowledge in practical applications. Of course the philosophical problems
of “symbol grounding” remain. But nevertheless, here is the ﬁrst plausible
head-on approach to the formal modeling of content which offers to reconcile
Ebbinghaus with Bartlett.
It should be evident that these issues are close to the heart of problems about
the relations between the humanities and the sciences, and it is entirely ﬁtting
that they should come up when trying to do scientiﬁc research into the nature
of the human mind. It is interesting that representatives of more conservative
approaches to both sciences and the humanities have felt it important to try to
defeat the very possibility of cognitive science’s computational model of the
mind. We hope to explain just why that model is felt to be so threatening,
to defuse some of the concerns arising, and to show that one can avoid both
misplaced scientiﬁc reductionism and postmodern hyperrelativism by engaging
in a logically based and experimentally informed study of human interpretive
capacities.
making perceptual interpretations, but it is an illusion persistent enough to allow progress.
2 The Anatomy of Logic
We have seen that logic was once thought relevant to the study of cognition
both as a representational format and as an inference mechanism, and that de-
velopments in psychology (Wason, increasing prominence of neural network
modeling, decision theory) and in philosophy (concerns with normativity, anti-
psychologism) have led to the widely shared view that logic is irrelevant to cog-
nition. We have sketched a new view of logical reasoning, following Husserl,
in which reasoning is simultaneously formal and relative to a domain. On this
view, cognitive science needs to be much more attentive to semantics – because
meaning is often not given but constructed. Indeed, we will see that subjects’
behavior in reasoning tasks (e.g., Wason’s selection task) is much less irrational
than is commonly thought, once one takes into account that these subjects are
struggling to impose a meaning on the task. It is by no means obvious to the
subject that her reasoning must be based on the classical interpretation of the
conditional as material implication. In fact, the interest of the standard reason-
ing tasks lies precisely in the window it offers on subjects’ efforts to impose
meaning. As a ﬁrst step toward weaning the reader away from the idea that the
semantics of logical expressions is given by classical logic, this chapter presents
the reader with an overview of the semantic possibilities.
This chapter is organized as follows. We start from a popular conception of
logical reasoning according to which, to see whether an argument is valid, one
translates it into the formal language of classical logic and checks the resulting
pattern for classical validity. We argue that this conception is inadequate, and
oppose it to a formal version of Husserl’s view, in which one distinguishes rea-
soning from an interpretation and reasoning to an interpretation.1 We conceive
of the latter as a form of parameter setting. To illustrate the idea, we start from
the four parameter choices deﬁning classical logic, which is appropriate for the
1. We will use the verb “to interpret” in this book in its Oxford English Dictionary sense of “to make out
the meaning of,” and the noun “interpretation” as the result of that activity, or occasionally as the process
itself. This is not saying much if we do not explain what “to make out” and “meaning” mean. In fact, most
of this book is concerned with explaining what is involved in “making out the meaning of,” and no simple
explanation can be given at this stage.
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domain of classical mathematics, and by systematic variation of the parameters
obtain logics which are appropriate for other domains.
2.1 How Not to Think about Logical Reasoning
In the psychology of reasoning literature one commonly ﬁnds a picture of rea-
soning as proceeding according to preestablished logical laws, which can be
applied by anybody in any circumstances whatsoever.
It would not do to blame the psychologists for this, because it is a picture fre-
quently promulgated in the philosophical literature. To take just one example,
we see Ryle [239] characterizing logical constants (for example, all, some, not,
and, or, if ) as being indifferent to subjectmatter, or as it is sometimes callled,
topic neutral. Characterizations such as this are related to a superﬁcial reading
of the classical deﬁnition of validity, say for a syllogism such as
All A are B.
All B are C.
Therefore, all A are C.
The validity of this schema is taken to mean something like “whatever you sub-
stitute forA, B andC, if the premises are true for the substitution, then so is the
conclusion.” Analyzing an argument thus consists of ﬁnding the topic-neutral
expressions (the logical constants), replacing the topic-dependent expressions
by variables, and checking whether a substitution that veriﬁes the premises also
veriﬁes the conclusion. If so, one knows that the argument is correct for the
particular substitution one is interested in.
This schematic character of inference patterns is identiﬁed with the “domain-
independence” or “topic neutrality” of logic generally, and many take it to be
the principal interest of logic that its laws seem independent of subject matter.
In fact, however, logic is very much domaindependent in the sense that the valid
schemata depend on the domain in which one reasons, with what purpose. We
therefore view reasoning as consisting of two stages: ﬁrst one has to establish
the domain about which one reasons and its formal properties (what we will call
“reasoning to an interpretation”) and only after this initial step has been taken
can one’s reasoning be guided by formal laws (what we will call “reasoning
from an interpretation”).
2.2 Reasoning to an Interpretation as Parameter Setting
We should start with an informal illustration of what the process of interpreta-
tion involves, which falls into at least two questions – what things are actually
in the domain? and also: what kinds of reasoning will be done about them?
We start with the former question, which has been extensively studied in the
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formal semantics of natural languages. We illustrate the general distinction be-
tween the two questions with some homely examples of discourse understand-
ing, which will then introduce a particular distinction that will ﬁgure centrally
in the rest of the book.
Once upon a time there was a butcher, a baker, and a candlestick maker. One ﬁne morning,
a body was discovered on the village green, a dagger protruding from its chest. The
murderer’s footprints were clearly registered in the mud. . . .
Well, what follows from this discourse? For example, how many people are
there? If we take the most likely approach to interpreting this discourse outside
of logic class, we will assume that there are at least three people – a butcher,
a baker, and a candlestick maker. There are, of course also the corpse and the
murderer, but it is an active question whether these are identical with any of the
former three, and who else may there be in this dire place? These questions are
questions about what things, or people, or other entities are in the domain of
interpretation. Mundane as these questions are, they are absolutely central to
how natural language functions in progressively constructing interpretations as
discourse proceeds.
It should be made clear from the outset that discourse interpretation is not
at all exhausted by composing the meanings of the lexical items (as given by
the dictionary) in the way dictated by the syntax of the sentences. Contextual
information plays a crucial role. For instance, the question, what are the char-
acters in this discourse? is a question about what is in the current domain of
interpretation, and the answer to this question may well depend on discourse
context, as we shall see. Clearly our knowledge of the dictionary plays a role in
our answer to this question, but does not by itself provide the answer. Domains
of natural language interpretation are often very local, as they are here. They
often change sentence by sentence as the discourse proceeds. It is this sense of
interpretation, rather than the dictionary-level sense, which generally occupies
us here.
Suppose now we have instead a discourse that runs as follows:
Some woman is a baker. Some woman is a butcher. Some woman is a candlestickmaker.
Some person is a murderer. Some person is a corpse. All women are men.2, 3, 4
Now we are much more likely to entertain considerably more possibilities about
how many people there are, cued perhaps by the “logical puzzle” style of the
discourse. Now it becomes entirely possible that the butcher may turn out to
be the baker, or one person might pursue all three professions, even before we
2. NB. The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes, under its ﬁrst sense for man, “a human being irrespective of
gender.”
3. “Oh man!, these guys’ language is archaic!” addressed to a female human is an example of the Oxford
English Dictionary’s archaic usage hidden in modern oral vernacular English.
4. The previous two footnotes are irrelevant if this discourse is processed from a skeptical stance.
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start on the problem about who is dead and who has been nasty, and just who
else is in this village, if there is one.
The ﬁrst discourse is likely to be understood with what we will call a credu-
lous stance. As we interpret the discourse, we take our task to be to construct a
model of the story which is the same as the speaker’s “intended model,” and we
assume that we are to use whatever general and speciﬁc knowledge we have,
including the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative in constructing
her discourse, to help us guess which model this is. The second discourse is
likely to be understood with what we will call a skeptical stance in which we
do not use any information save the explicitly stated premises, and we are to
entertain all possible arrangements of the entities that make these statements
true. This stance explains already why the footnotes are completely irrelevant
to this interpretation and merely designed to lead us astray.
First note that these different stances lead to quite different numbers of peo-
ple in the domains of interpretations of the two texts. In the ﬁrst discourse we
know5 that there is no policeman although we also know, from general knowl-
edge, that this is likely to change rather soon. In the second we do not know
whether there is a policeman, but unless we are explicitly told that there isn’t
(or told something which explicitly rules it out) then we still do not know, even
though no policeman is ever mentioned. These “number-of-things” questions
are only the most tangible tip of the iceberg of differences between the domains
we get when we process with these two different stances, but they sufﬁce for
our present illustrative purposes.
Credulous and skeptical stances are good examples of the second kind of is-
sue about interpretations – what kinds of reasoning will we do about the things
in the domain? Credulous reasoning is aimed at ﬁnding ideally a single inter-
pretation which makes the speaker’s utterances true, generally at the expense
of importing all sorts of stuff from our assumed mutual general knowledge.
Skeptical reasoning is aimed at ﬁnding only conclusions which are true in all
interpretations of the explicit premises. These are very different goals and re-
quire very different logics, with, for example, different syntactic structures and
different concepts of validity. The differences in goals are socially important
differences. In credulous understanding we accept (at least for the purposes of
the discourse) the authority of the speaker for the truth of what is said. We are
only at an impasse when there appears to be a contradiction which leaves us
with no model of the discourse, and when this happens we try to repair our in-
terpretation in order to restore a model. In skeptical understanding, we consider
ourselves as on allfours with the speaker as regards authority for inferences, and
we may well challenge what is said on the basis that a conclusion doesn’t fol-
low because we can ﬁnd a single interpretation of the premises in which that
conclusion is false.
5. By what is known as “closed–world reasoning,” for which see section 2.3.
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A good illustration of the distinction between credulous and skeptical reason-
ing is furnished by legal reasoning in the courtroom, of which the following is a
concrete example (simpliﬁed from a case which recently gained notoriety in the
Netherlands). A nurse is indicted for murdering several terminally ill patients,
who all died during her shifts. No forensic evidence of foul play is found, but
the public prosecutor argues that the nurse must have caused the deaths, be-
cause she was the only one present at the time of death. This is an example of
“plausible” or “credulous” reasoning: an inference is drawn on the basis of data
gathered and plausible causal relationships.6
The defense countered the prosecutor’s argument with an instance of ‘skep-
tical’ reasoning, by arguing that the cause of death might as well have been
malfunctioning of the morphine pumps, and contacted the manufacturer to see
whether morphine pumps had had to be recalled because of malfunctioning –
which indeed turned out be the case (although in the end it did not help the
defendant). The move of the defence can be viewed as enlarging the class of
models considered, thus getting closer to the standard notion of logical conse-
quence where one considers all models of the premises instead of a restricted
class. Here is Ryle [239,p.116] again, this time with a very pertinent remark:
There arises, I suppose, a special pressure upon language to provide idioms of the [log-
ical] kind, when a society reaches the stage where many matters of interest and impor-
tance to everyone have to be settled or decided by special kinds of talk. I mean, for
example, when offenders have to be tried and convicted or acquitted; when treaties and
contracts have to be entered into and observed or enforced; when witnesses have to be
cross-examined; when legislators have to draft practicable measures and defend them
against critics; when private rights and public duties have to be precisely ﬁxed; when
complicated commercial arrangements have to be made; when teachers have to set tests
to their pupils; and . . . when theorists have to consider in detail the strengths and weak-
nesses of their own and one another’s theories.
We have chosen to illustrate the kinds of issues that go into deciding what
domain is adopted in an interpretation with this particular distinction because
it is the one that is at the center of many of the misunderstandings between
experimenter and subject in the psychology of reasoning experiments. The
what things are in the domain? question is always present in any process of
interpretation. The what kind of reasoning are we doing? question is rather
different for different distinctions.
So far we have been talking about domain in a rather loose manner, as roughly
synonymous with universe of discourse. For logical purposes it is important to
make a type-token distinction here. The domain mentally constructed while
interpreting a discourse is a concrete instance – a token – of a general kind –
6. A note for the logically minded reader: this can be viewed as an inference where the premises are inter-
preted on a very restricted class of models, namely models in which no “mysterious” events happen, neither
divine intervention nor unknown intruders.
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the type – which determines the logical properties of the token. It is very hard
to completely pin down this general notion of a type of domain itself; we will
try to do so in a later chapter on evolutionary approaches to reasoning, where
the notion of “domain speciﬁcity” of reasoning plays an important role. But we
can at least list some examples that will be treated in this book: actions, plans
and causality; contracts; norms; other people’s beliefs; mathematical objects;
natural laws. Slightly more formally, a domain is characterized by a set of
mathematical representations, called structures, of the main ingredients of the
domain (e.g., the objects in the domain, their relations, the events in which they
participate), together with a formal language to talk and reason about these
structures. The connection between structures and formal language is given by
what is technically known as a deﬁnition of satisfaction: a characterization of
how the formal language is interpreted on the relevant set of structures. This
notion of domain is extremely general, and instead of being more precise at this
point, we refer the reader to the different examples that will be given below.
The reader may wonder why language and logic should be relative to a do-
main: isn’t there a single language – one’s mother tongue – which we use to
talk and reason about everything? Much of the progress in mathematical logic
in the last century shows, however, that it is not useful to have a single language
(with a single semantics) for talking about everything. For instance, the vague
predicates that we will meet when discussing diagnostic reasoning in medicine
can perhaps be represented by fuzzy logic with its continuum of truth–values
(see section 2.2.3), but it would make no sense to use this semantics for clas-
sical mathematics. For another example, consider two radically different ways
of doing mathematics: classical and constructive mathematics. Very roughly
speaking, the difference is that the former tradition, unlike the latter, accepts
the principle of bivalence: a sentence is either true or false (see section 2.2.3 for
an explanation of why this principle is sometimes unwarranted). Constructive
mathematics is often useful in computer science, because the results it yields
have algorithmic signiﬁcance, while this is not guaranteed of results in classical
mathematics. It occasionally happens that the same mathematician may apply
both methods, depending on the domain she is working in. So does she believe
in bivalence, or doesn’t she? The answer is that sometimes she does, and some-
times she doesn’t, whatever is most appropriate to the domain of interest. In this
sense logics are local. One might want to argue that in such cases one should
adopt the weakest logic (in this case the one without bivalence) as one’s gener-
ally valid logic; after all, how can a principle such as bivalence be called logical
at all if it is considered to be false in some domains? One quick answer to this
argument is that this “weakest logic” soon trivializes when including more do-
mains, for example when considering also uncertain information instead of just
truth and proof. One may conclude from this that logic as a system of generally
valid inference principles has no role to play in actual reasoning. Another op-
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tion, and the one advocated here, is to give up the idea that logic must be such
a system. Clearly, however, if logic is not given, the question becomes how one
comes to reason in a particular logic. The answer argued for in the book, and
made explicit in chapter 11, is that mastering a particular domain essentially
involves mastering its logical laws. These brief indications must sufﬁce at this
stage, and we will return to the wider issues in the concluding chapter.
We are now ready to delve into the technicalities. The approach to logic
which we would like to advocate views logics from the point of view of possible
syntactic and semantic choices, or what we will call parameter settings. This
metaphor should not be taken too literally: we do not claim that a logic can be
seen as a point in a well-behaved many-dimensional space. The use of the term
parameter here is analogous to that in generative linguistics, where universal
grammar is thought to give rise to concrete grammars by ﬁxing parameters such
as word order.7 The set of parameters characterizing a logic can be divided in
three subsets
1. Choice of a formal language
2. Choice of a semantics for the formal language
3. Choice of a deﬁnition of valid arguments in the language
As we shall see, different choices for the parameters may be appropriate in dif-
ferent domains – each domain gives rise to a notion of structure, and in principle
each domain comes with its own language.8
To familiarize the reader with this idea, we ﬁrst present classical propositional
logic as resulting from four contingent assumptions, which are sometimes ap-
propriate, sometimes not. We will then vary these assumptions to obtain a host
of different logics, all useful in some context.
2.2.1 Classical Propositional Logic
The purpose of this section is to show that classical logic is inevitable once one
adopts a number of parameter settings concerning syntax, meaning and truth,
and logical consequence; and furthermore that these settings are open to debate.
The relevant parameter settings are:
1. [syntax] fully recursive language: if ϕ,ψ are formulas, then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ→
ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ, . . . 9;
7. This is just an analogy; we are not committed to anything like UG.
8. This approach to logic was pursued in the 1980s under the heading of “model theoretic logics”; see [14].
9. This deﬁnition generates formulas like (ϕ → θ) → ψ. The iteration of a conditional inside the an-
tecedent of another conditional illustrated by this last formula will turn out to be a distinctive property of this
language, which sets it off from the language we use to model credulous interpretation.
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2. [semantics] truth–functionality: the truth–value of a sentence is a function
of the truth–values of its components only;
(2′. as a consequence: evaluation of the truth–value can be determined in the
given model (the semantics is extensional));
3. [semantics] bivalence: sentences are either true or false, with nothing in
between;
4. [consequence] the Bolzano–Tarski notion of logical consequence10:
α1 . . . αn/β is valid iff β is true on all models of α1 . . . αn.
These assumptions force a unique formalization of the logical connectives not,
and, or, if . . . then, as given by the familiar truth–tables in ﬁgure 2.1.
p ¬p
1 0
0 1
p q p ∧ q
1 1 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
p q p ∨ q
1 1 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
p q p→ q
1 1 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 1
Figure 2.1 Truth–tables for classical logic.
It is instructive to see how our four assumptions (in conjunction with intu-
itive judgments about meaning) lead to the formalization of the conditional “if
. . . then” as the “material implication”→ deﬁned by the above truth–table.
Truth–functionality requires that if the truth–values of p, q are given, so is
that of p → q, and bivalence forces these to be either 0 or 1. We can see from
this that if p is true and q is false, then p → q must be false; for if it were true
then modus ponens (p, p → q |= q) would fail. Furthermore an application of
the deﬁnition of validity shows that the following argument patterns are valid :
p, q |= q and p,¬p |= q. From this it follows from the intuitive meaning of the
conditional that q |= p → q and ¬p |= p → q. Indeed, one may argue for an
implication p → q by assuming p and inferring from this (and given premises)
that q. But this reduces q |= p→ q to p, q |= q. The validity of ¬p |= p→ q is
established similarly.
The classical deﬁnition of validity is monotonic, that is, if α1 . . . αn |= β,
then also δ, α1 . . . αn |= β. It follows that the valid argument q |= p→ q forces
p → q to be true if p, q are true and if ¬p, q are true; in addition, ¬p |= p → q
forces p→ q to be true if ¬p,¬q are true. We have now justiﬁed all the lines of
the truth–table.
10. Whether this historical attribution is correct is debatable; see [71], also for elaborate discussion of the
ﬂaws of this particular deﬁnition of validity.
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Domains to which classical logic is applicable must satisfy the four assump-
tions. Classical mathematics is a case in point. Here it is assumed that all
statements are true or false – together with truth–functionality this gives the
celebrated principle of excluded middle p ∨ ¬p, which we will see in action
later. The deﬁnition of logical consequence is a very important feature of
modern mathematics: it implies that a counterexample to a theorem makes it
false. Trivial as this may seem nowadays, this has not always been the case; in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was not uncommon to conclude that
a purported counterexample did not belong to the “domain” of the theorem,
thus effectively restricting the class of models. One may consult the work of
Lakatos, in particular [167], for instructive examples.11
Are these four assumptions in general always fulﬁlled? The next sections
provide example domains in which various combinations of the assumptions
obviously fail, and we will indicate what logics are appropriate to these domains
instead.
2.2.2 Truth–Functionality without Bivalence
Why would every statement be either true or false? This depends of course very
much on what you want to mean by “true” and “false.” One could stipulate that
“not true” is the same as false, but such a stipulation is deﬁnitely inappropriate
if we consider “true” to mean “known to be true.” One example of where this
occurs in practice is a computerized primality test which checks whether the
input 21257787 − 1 is a prime number. One could say that, while the program
is running, the statement “21257787 − 1 is a prime number” is undecided; but a
decision may follow in the end, if the program halts.12
One possibility to formalise this idea, originated by [160] is to add a third
truth–value u for “undecided” or “not known to be true and not known to be
false”; u can (but need not) “evolve” toward “known to be true” or “known
to be false” when more information comes in. This uniquely determines the
truth–tables as given in ﬁgure 2.2.
The other three assumptions characterizing classical logic are still in force
here. The resulting logic is appropriate to the domain of computable functions,
and also to paradoxical sentences such as “I am false,” and more generally to
languages which contain their own truth predicate (such as natural language).
11. A note for the logically minded reader. In principle the language of classical mathematics is fully
recursive. In practice, restrictions apply, so that particular structures, for example the reals, are described in
a restricted language. One of the triumphs of mathematical logic is the use of these restrictions in language
to prove positive results about the structures that the language describes.
12. It does, and the number is prime.
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p ¬p
1 0
0 1
u u
p q p ∧ q
1 1 1
0 0 0
u u u
1 0 0
1 u u
0 1 0
0 u 0
u 1 u
u 0 0
p q p ∨ q
1 1 1
0 0 0
u u u
1 0 1
1 u 1
0 1 1
0 u u
u 1 1
u 0 u
p q p→ q
1 1 1
0 0 1
u u u
1 0 0
1 u u
0 1 1
0 u 1
u 1 1
u 0 u
Figure 2.2 Truth–tables for Kleene three-valued logic.
2.2.3 A Domain in which Bivalence is Truly Ridiculous
Here is an excerpt from a textbook on cancer, in a section on differential di-
agnosis. The reader should realise that this is the kind of text that guides a
physician in her decision making. We have distinguished typographically two
classes of expressions: in boldface vague expressions like “small,” “painful,”
“entire,” “changes,” “diffuse without sharp demarcation,” “feels like a tumour,”
. . . ; and in italic qualitative-probabilistic adverbs like “usually,” “often,” “ap-
proximately 15% of the cases,” “if A maybe B,” “infrequently – more often.”
Chronic cystic disease is often confused with carcinoma of the breast. It usually occurs
in parous women with small breasts. It is present most commonly in the upper outer
quadrant but may occur in other parts and eventually involve the entire breast. It is
often painful, particularly in the pre-menstrual period, and accompanying menstrual
disturbances are common. Nipple discharge, usually servous, occurs in approximately
15% of the cases, but there are no changes in the nipple itself. The lesion is diffuse
without sharp demarcation and without ﬁxation to the overlying skin. Multiple cysts are
ﬁrm, round and ﬂuctuant and may transilluminate if they contain a clear ﬂuid. A large
cyst in an area of chronic cystic disease feels like a tumour, but is usually smoother
and well-delimited. The axillary lymph nodes are usually not enlarged. Chronic cystic
disease infrequently shows large bluish cysts. More often, the cysts are multiple and
small. (J.A. del Regato. Diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. Pages 860–861. In L.V.
Ackerman (editor) Cancer 1970.
To ﬁnd logical regularities in this domain is challenging, to put it mildly. Vague
predicates have sometimes been formalized using many-valued logics, and there
have been attempts to model frequency adverbs using probability theory. The
reader is urged to compare the preceding piece of text with the formal systems
that follow, to see whether they add to her understanding.
It is also important to be aware that in real life vagueness may be treated by
being avoided. Consider the locus classicus for the rejection of logic in cog-
nitive science: Rosch and Mervis’s arguments for its inapplicability to human
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classiﬁcatory behavior in [233]. Classical logic represents the extension of a
predicate by a set, to which things either belong or they don’t. No half mea-
sures. But people classify things by shades. They represent typical members of
extensions. Red is typiﬁed by the color of blood and the color of red hair is a
peripheral red. There is cognitive structure here which there is not in a set. And
so, argue Rosch and Mervis, logic is inapplicable.
This is a good example of a levels confusion. Rosch and Mervis are con-
cerned with the dictionary meanings of vague words such as red. Logic is
concerned with meaning as it occurs at the discourse level and has very little
to say about the dictionary level; but the point is that it need not. Suppose we
start a conversation which includes the word red. It is unlikely that the vague-
ness of this term will become critical to our mutual interpretation – we may be
happy that we know how to classify all the relevant objects (perhaps three traf-
ﬁc lights) with regard to this term perfectly crisply. If it does become a problem
then we may resort to increased precision – “by red I mean crimson lake as
manufactured by Pigment Corp.” – which may or may not replace the word red
entirely. Practically all natural language words are vague, and they would be
useless if they weren’t, but if we design our discourse well, their vagueness will
be well tailored to the local communicative situation.
Another way to make the same point is with reference to Marr’s methodol-
ogy as outlined in [183,p. 357ff], in particular chapter 7, where he conducts a
dialogue with himself and asks
What do you feel are the most promising approaches to semantics?
The answer is
Probably what I call the problem of multiple descriptions of objects and the resolution of
the problems of reference that multiple descriptions introduce. . . . I expect that at the heart
of our understanding of intelligence will lie at least one and probably several important
principles about organizing and representing knowledge that in some sense capture what
is important about our intellectual capabilities, [namely:]
1. The perception of an event or object must include the simultaneous computation of
several different descriptions of it, that capture diverse aspects of the use, purpose, or
circumstances of the event or object.
2. That the various descriptions referred to in 1. include coarse versions as well as ﬁne
ones. These coarse descriptions are a vital link in choosing the appropriate overall
scenarios . . . and in establishing correctly the roles played by the objects and actions
that caused those scenarios to be chosen.
A coarse description of a vague predicate, using classical logic, may well be
able to model the avoidance of the vagueness which is endemic in discourse.
Alternatively, we may move to a ﬁner description, meet vagueness head-on,
and change our logic. We give two examples.
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Dealing with Vagueness: Łukasiewicz Logic
This logic also differs from classical logic in that it has a third truth–value (12 ),
but this value now means “intermediate between true and false,” and not “un-
decided, but possibly decided at some later time.” The reader may verify that
the truth–tables in ﬁgure 2.3 have been calculated according to the following
formulas: ¬p corresponds to 1− p, p ∧ q to min(p, q), p ∨ q to max(p, q), and
p → q to min(1, 1 + q − p). Once one has seen that the tables are calculated
p ¬p
1 0
0 1
1
2
1
2
p q p ∧ q
1 1 1
0 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 0 0
1 12
1
2
0 1 0
0 12 0
1
2 1
1
2
1
2 0 0
p q p ∨ q
1 1 1
0 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 0 1
1 12 1
0 1 1
0 12
1
2
1
2 1 1
1
2 0
1
2
p q p→ q
1 1 1
0 0 1
1
2
1
2 1
1 0 0
1 12
1
2
0 1 1
0 12 1
1
2 1 1
1
2 0
1
2
Figure 2.3 Łukasciewicz logic
using the above formulas, there is no reason to stop at three truth–values; one
might as well take a continuum of truth–values in [0, 1]. This system is called
fuzzy logic. The important point to remember is that fuzzy logic is still truth–
functional; in this respect it differs from our next example, probability theory,
which is not.
Probability: a Many-Valued, Non-truth–Functional Semantics
One could try to represent frequency adverbs like “usually,” “often” by means
of probabilities. For instance, if p is the proposition that “The axillary lymph
nodes are not enlarged,” then ‘usually(p)’ could mean “the probability of p
is greater than 60%,” where probability is here taken in the sense of relative
frequency. This idea leads to the following deﬁnition.13
A probability on a propositional language L is a function P : L −→ [0, 1]
satisfying
1. P (ϕ) = 0 if ϕ is a contradiction;
2. if ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent, P (ϕ) = P (ψ);
3. if ϕ logically implies ¬ψ, then P (ϕ ∨ ψ) = P (ϕ) + P (ψ).
13. Note that probability is used as a semantics only. One could also try to develop “probability logics”
where “the probability of p is c” is a statement of the object language.[113]
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The implicit assumption underlying this deﬁnition is that the formulas in L sat-
isfy the classical logical laws, so that “equivalence,” “contradiction” etc. are
uniquely deﬁned. It is in fact not so easy to deﬁne probability on nonclassi-
cal logics. This will be one of criticisms when discussing recent attempts to
explain logical reasoning by assuming underlying probabilistic reasoning pro-
cesses: probabilistic reasoning is too much tied to classical logic to be able to
encompass the wide variety of reasoning that actually occurs.
The reader may wish to show that this semantics is not truth–functional: the
only restriction on the values of P (ϕ ∧ ψ), P (ϕ) and P (ψ) is the a priori
restriction P (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≤ P (ϕ), P (ψ).
Non-Truth–Functional Semantics: Intuitionistic Logic
In classical mathematics one often ﬁnds proofs which appeal to the principle
of excluded middle, the syntactic analogue of bivalence. Mathematicians in
the constructivist or intuitionistic tradition have pointed out that the use of this
principle leads to proofs which are completely uninformative. Here is a toy
example of this phenomenon.
Deﬁnition 1 A rational number is one which can be written as pq for natural
numbers p, q; an irrational number is one which cannot be so written.
Suppose you want to prove:
Theorem 1 There are irrational numbers a, b such that ab is rational.
PROOF. It is known that
√
2 is irrational. Consider
√
2
√
2
.
• If √2
√
2
is rational, put a = b =
√
2 and we are done.
• If √2
√
2
is irrational, put a =
√
2
√
2
, b =
√
2, then ab = (
√
2
√
2
)
√
2 =√
2
2
= 2.
Either way you have the requisite a and b. 
But what have you proved? Do you now know how to construct irrational a, b
are such that ab is rational? Such uninformative proofs, which do not yield con-
crete constructions, are typical of the use of the principle of excluded middle,
which some therefore reject. If one characterises intuitionistic logic syntacti-
cally as classical logic minus the schema ϕ∨¬ϕ (for all ϕ), then one can indeed
show that proofs of existential statements in intuitionistic logic invariably yield
concrete witnesses.
The semantics of intuitionistic logic is very different from what we have seen
so far, where propositions took numbers as truth–values. The failure of the
principle of excluded middle does not mean truth–functionally adding a third
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truth–value, one reason being that ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is still a contradiction, and inspec-
tion of the truth–tables for Kleene logic or Łukasciewicz logic shows that this
is not the case there.14 Instead we have the non-truth–functional “provability
interpretation of truth,” of which the following are examples
1. e.g., ϕ ∧ ψ means: “I have a proof of both ϕ and ψ.”
2. ϕ ∨ ψ means: “I have a proof of ϕ or a proof of ψ.”
3. ϕ → ψ means: “I have a construction which transforms any given proof of
ϕ into a proof of ψ.”
4. special case of the previous: ¬ϕ means “any attempted proof of ϕ leads to a
contradiction.”
Clearly, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is not valid on this interpretation, because it would require us
to come up with a proof that ϕ or a proof that ϕ leads to a contradiction; and
often one has neither.
An Intensional Logic: Deontic Logic
Deontic logic is concerned with reasoning about norms, i.e., what one ought to
do; e.g., “if a person is innocent, he ought not to be convicted.” We shall see
in our discussion of the Wason selection task, however, that its scope extends
much wider. At the syntactic level, (propositional) deontic logic consists of
classical propositional logic plus the operator O, governed by the clause that if
ϕ is a formula, so is Oϕ. The intuitive meaning of Oϕ is “it ought to be the
case that ϕ.” Note that O cannot be a truth function, such as ¬; the truth of Op
depends on the meaning, not the truth–value, of p. That is, both the propositions
“my bike is grey” and “I don’t steal” are true, but the latter ought to be the case,
unlike the ﬁrst.
The intensional semantics for deontic logic computes ‘compliance’–values of
formulas in a given model by referring to other models. One assumes that every
model w has a “normatively perfect counterpart v”; this is formally represented
by a relation: R(w, v)). In such a “normatively perfect” world v only what is
permissible is the case; e.g., in w an innocent person may be convicted, but in
v with R(w, v) this same innocent person will not be convicted. We may now
put w |= Op if and only if for all v satisfying R(w, v): v |= p.
To see the difference with classical logic, compare the conditionals p → q
and p → Oq. If in a given world, p is true and q is false, then p → q is
simply false, whereas p→ Oq can be true, in which case the given world is not
“normatively perfect.”
14. Another reason is that one would also like to get rid of the principle of double negation elimination
¬¬ϕ → ϕ.
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Our last example, closed–world reasoning, is one in which the consequence
relation is the main focus. Since closed–world reasoning will occupy us much
throughout, it warrants a new section.
2.3 The Many Faces of Closed–World Reasoning
As we have seen above, the classical deﬁnition of validity considers all mod-
els of the premises. This type of validity is useful in mathematics, where the
discovery of a single counterexample to a theorem is taken to imply that its
derivation is ﬂawed. But there are many examples of reasoning in daily life
where one considers only a subset of the set of all models of the premises.
In this section we review some examples of closed–world reasoning and their
formalization.
One example is furnished by train schedules. In principle a schedule lists
only positive information, and the world would still be a model of the schedule
if there were more trains running than listed on the schedule. But the proper in-
terpretation of a schedule is as a closed world – trains not listed are inferred not
to exist. This is like our example of the butcher, baker, and candlestickmaker
on page 21. Note that there is a difference here with the superﬁcially similar
case of a telephone directory. If a telephone number is not listed, we do not
therefore conclude that the person does not have a telephone – she might after
all have an unlisted number. In fact a moment’s reﬂection suggests that such
examples can be found within the “train schedule” domain. From the point of
view of a prospective passenger, the inference that there is no train between two
adjacently listed trains may be valid, but for a train spotter interested in trains
passing through on the track, trains “not in service” may well occur between
listed services. Thus, world knowledge is necessary to decide which logic is
applicable.
2.3.1 Closed–World Reasoning, More Formally
Consider the Dutch database for public transportation www.9292ov.nl, which
you consult for planning a trip from Amsterdam to Muiden. The database con-
tains facts about trains and buses leaving at speciﬁc times, and also rules of the
form
1. if bus 136 leaves Naarden-Bussum at 10:06, it will arrive in Muiden at 10:30
2. if train from Amsterdam CS in direction Naarden-Bussum leaves at 9:39, it
will reach Naarden-Bussum at 10:00.
Backward chaining of the rules then generates a plan for getting from Amster-
dam to Muiden.
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Now suppose that www.9292ov.nl says that there is no trip that starts in Am-
sterdam at 9:10 and brings you to Muiden at 9:45. Then we will act as if there
is no such trip, but why? This is an example of closed–world reasoning, which
is appropriate if one may assume that the database lists all available positive
information.
Formally, closed–world reasoning (in the version we prefer) differs from clas-
sical logic in the syntactic, semantic, and consequence parameters.
Syntactically, the occurrence of→ is restricted to formulas of the form p1 ∧
. . . ∧ pn → q. This amounts to changing the recursive deﬁnition of the propo-
sitional language; iteration of implication is not allowed, and neither are occur-
rences of negation in antecedent and consequent.
Semantically, ∧, ∨ have their customary classical interpretation, but→ has a
special closed–world interpretation given by
1. if all of p1, . . . , pn are true, then so is q;
2. if one of p1, . . . , pn is false and there is no other implication with q as a
consequent, q is false;
3. more generally: if for i ≤ k, pi1 ∧ . . . ∧ pini → q are all the formulas with q
in the consequent, and if for each i ≤ k one of pi1, . . . , pin is false, then q is
also false.
The most important technical feature of closed–world reasoning is that the
associated consequence relation is nonmonotonic. We have encountered the
monotonicity property of classical logical consequence when discussing the
material implication; we repeat it here for convenience. As we have seen, the
Bolzano–Tarski deﬁnition of validity of an argument ϕ1, . . . , ϕn/ψ is: for all
models M such that M |= ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, also M |= ψ. Given this deﬁnition,
|= is monotone in the sense that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |= ψ implies ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, θ |= ψ
for any sentence θ. closed–world reasoning, however, is not monotonic in this
sense: the inference from the database
there is no trip which starts in Amsterdam CS at 9:10 and ends in Muiden before 9.45,”
licensed by closed–world reasoning, may be destroyed by additions to the data-
base (e.g., a fast Interliner bus).
2.3.2 Unknown Preconditions
Real-world actions come with scores of preconditions which often go unno-
ticed. My action of switching on the light is successful only if the switch is
functioning properly, the house is not cut off from electricity, the laws of elec-
tromagnetism still apply. It would be impossible to verify all those precondi-
tions; we generally do not even check the light bulb although its failure occurs
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all too often. We thus have a conditional “if turn switch then light on” which
does not become false the moment we turn the switch only to ﬁnd that the light
does not go on, as would be the case for the classical material implication. An
enriched representation of the conditional as a ternary connective shows more
clearly what is at issue here: “if turn switch and nothing funny is going on then
light on.” If we turn the switch but ﬁnd that the light is not on, we conclude
that something is amiss and start looking for that something. But – and this is
the important point – in the absence of positive information to the effect that
something is amiss, we assume that there is nothing funny going on. This is the
closed–world assumption for reasoning with abnormalities, CWA(ab).
This phenomenon can be seen in a controlled setting in an experiment de-
signed by Claire Hughes and James Russell ([131]), the “box task,” which lends
itself particularly well to a logical analysis using closed world reasoning. This
task was designed for analyzing autistic behavior, to which we return in Chapter
9 below.
Figure 2.4 Hughes and Russell’s box task. Reprinted from [236,p. 316] by permission of
Dunitz.
The task is to get the marble, which is lying on the platform, inside the box.
However, when the subject puts her hand through the opening, a trapdoor in
the platform opens and the marble drops out of reach. This is because there is
an infrared light beam behind the opening, which, when interrupted, activates
the trapdoor mechanism. The switch on the left side of the box deactivates the
whole mechanism, so that to get the marble you have to ﬂip the switch ﬁrst.
In the standard setup, the subject is shown how manipulating the switch allows
one to retrieve the marble after she has ﬁrst been tripped up by the trapdoor
mechanism.
Amore formal analysis of the box task could go as follows. The main premise
can be formulated as
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(1) If you reach for the marble through the opening and there is nothing
funny going on, you can retrieve the marble.
where the italicized conjunct is the variable, assumed to be present always, for
an unknown precondition. This conjunct occasions closed world reasoning of
the form
(2) I haven’t seen anything funny.
:: There is nothing funny going on.
Backward chaining then leads to the plan
(3) To get the marble, put your hand through the opening.
Now a problem occurs: the marble drops out of reach before it can be retrieved.
Premise (1) is not thereby declared to be false, but is now used to derive
(4) Something funny is going on.
To determine what’s so funny, the information about the switch is recruited,
which can be formulated as a rule “repairing” (1) as in (5a) or (5b)
(5a) If you reach for the marble, set the switch to the right position, and
there is nothing funny going on, then you can retrieve the marble.
(5b) If the switch is in the wrong position, there is something funny going
on.
Closed–world reasoning with (5b) now yields
(6) If the switch is in the wrong position, there is something funny going
on, but only then.
Backward chaining then leads to a new plan
(7) To get the marble, set the switch to the right position and put your hand
through the opening.
One interesting feature of this analysis is thus that the new plan (7) is con-
structed from the old one by utilising the variable for the unknown precondi-
tion.
This is not reasoning as it is usually studied in the psychology of reasoning,
but it is reasoning nonetheless, with a discernible formal structure, and appli-
cability across a wide range of domains. In fact CWA(ab) can be viewed as
a deﬁnition of validity, as follows. Suppose we have an enriched conditional
of the form p ∧ ¬ab → q, where ab is a proposition letter indicating some
abnormality. Suppose furthermore that we have as information about ab the
following implications: q1 → ab, . . . , qk → ab, and that this is all the available
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information about ab. Since the implication ⊥ → ab is always true,15 we may
include this (admittedly trivial) statement in the information available about ab.
We now want to say that, given p,¬q1, . . . ,¬qn, q may be concluded. This
is tantamount to replacing the information about ab by the single premise
ab↔ q1 ∨ . . . ∨ qk ∨ ⊥,
and applying classical validity. Note that as a consequence of this deﬁnition,
if there is no nontrivial information about ab, the right–hand side of the pre-
ceding bi-implication reduces to a falsehood (i.e., ⊥), and the bi-implication
itself to ab ↔ ⊥, which is equivalent to ¬ab. In short, if there is no nontrivial
information about ab, we may infer ¬ab. Note that although classical reason-
ing is used here in explaining the machinery, the closed-world inference itself
is non-classical: in classical logic nothing can be concluded from the premises
p,¬q1, . . . ,¬qn.
A famous observation can be illuminated from this point of view: Scribner’s
study of reasoning among the illiterate Kpelle tribe in Liberia (see [243]). Here
is a sample argument given to her subjects
All Kpelle men are rice farmers.
Mr. Smith16 is not a rice farmer.
Is Mr. Smith a Kpelle man?
Subjects refused to answer the question deﬁnitively, instead giving evasive an-
swers such as “If one knows a person, one can answer questions about him, but
if one doesn’t know that person, it is difﬁcult.” Scribner then went on to show
that a few years of schooling in general led to the classical competence answer.
This result, like those of Luria in the 1930s (see [177]) has been taken as
evidence that the illiterate subjects do not understand what is being asked of
them: to answer the question solely on the basis of (an inference from) the
premises given. Instead, so it is argued, they prefer to answer from personal
experience, or to refrain from answering if they have no relevant experience.
But this explanation presupposes that the Kpelle subject adopts the material
implication as the logical form of the ﬁrst premise. If, as is more plausible,
he adopts a meaning of the conditional which allows exceptions (as we did in
discussing the box task), he can only be charged with not applying closed–
world reasoning to Mr. Smith. That is, if the Kpelle subject believes he has too
little information to decide whether Mr. Smith is abnormal, he is justiﬁed in
refusing to draw the modus tollens inference. On this account, what the couple
of years elementary schooling teaches the child is a range of kinds of discourse
in which exactly what to close the world on, and what to leave open, varies with
some rather subtle contextual cues.
15. ⊥ stands for an arbitrary contradiction, while is a formula which is always true.
16. “Mr. Smith” is not a possible Kpelle name.
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2.3.3 Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning
Counterfactual reasoning occurs when one starts from an assumption known to
be false and tries to derive consequences. What would have happened if Hitler
had invaded Britain? is a famous example. Such reasoning involves causal
reasoning, because one needs to set up plausible chains of events. Counter-
factual reasoning has been investigated in preschool children with the aim of
establishing correlations with “theory of mind”
Riggs and Peterson [227] devised a “counterfactual” adaptation of the stan-
dard false belief task, in which a mother doll bakes a chocolate cake, in the
process of which the chocolate moves from the fridge (its original location) to
the cupboard. The question asked of the child is now
(*) Where would the chocolate be if mother hadn’t baked a cake?
This question is about alternative courses of events and hence seems to use
causal reasoning.
Pragmatically, the formulation of question (*) suggests it must have an an-
swer. The answer cannot come from classical logic, starting from the descrip-
tion of the situation alone: classical logic compels one to askWhat else could be
the case? reﬂecting the obligation to consider all models of the data. In partic-
ular there would be models to consider in which mother eats all the chocolate,
or in which the chocolate evaporates inside the fridge (an event of extremely
small, but still nonzero, probability). Of course nothing of the sort happens in
actual causal reasoning. There a “principle of inertia” applies, which roughly
says: “things and properties remain as they are, unless there is explicit infor-
mation to the contrary.” This can be further spelled out as the closed–world
assumption for reasoning about causality (CWA(c)):17
1. One assumes that only those events (affecting the entity of interest) occur
which are forced to occur by the data – here the only such event is the choco-
late’s change of location from fridge to cupboard.
2. One also assumes that events only have those causal effects which are de-
scribed by one’s background theory – e.g., turning on the oven does not have
a causal effect on the location of the chocolate.
3. No spontaneous changes occur, that is, every change of state or property can
be attributed to the occurrence of an event with speciﬁed causal inﬂuence.
Together these principles sufﬁce to derive an answer to (*). In fact this type
of reasoning can be fully formalized in the “event calculus” originally devel-
oped in artiﬁcial intelligence (see [282] for extensive treatment and references).
17. A fully formal analysis will be given in chapter 9.
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Its logical structure is similar to the one detailed in section 2.3.2 as regards
properties (1) and (2), but property (3) brings in a new ingredient relating to
development over time.
Formally, this can be viewed as yet another twist to the deﬁnition of validity:
one now obtains a notion according to which the conclusion is evaluated at a
later instant than the evaluation time of the premises. The classical deﬁnition of
validity assumes that the conclusion of an argument is evaluated on models of
the premises, thus validating a property like p |= p, that is, “on every model on
which p is true, p is true.” The deﬁnition of validity used in CWA(c) allows that
models of the conclusion are temporal developments of models of the premises,
and in this case we need no longer have p |= p. Suppose the models for the
premises are evaluated at time t, and the models for the conclusion are temporal
developments of these models considered at time t′ > t. Clearly, even if p is
true at time t, that same proposition p may be false at t′.
These considerations allow us to see the connection between closed world
reasoning and planning. One feature distinguishing human planning from that
of other species is the much increased capacity for ofﬂine planning. This in-
volves mentally constructing a model, a structure representing the relevant part
of the world, and computing the effect of actions in that model over time, tak-
ing into account likely events and the causal consequences of the actions per-
formed. The various forms of closed–world reasoning introduced so far have
to be combined here to enable the construction of the model and the compu-
tation of its development over time. What is interesting here for discussions
of domain speciﬁcity is that the procedures used to construct models in ofﬂine
planning can be used as well to construct models of linguistic discourse, for
instance the structure of the events described by the discourse (see [282]). It
is proposed in the reference cited that ofﬂine planning has been exapted18 for
the purposes of language comprehension, viewed as the ability to construct dis-
course models. If true, this would show an incursion of very general reasoning
procedures into the purportedly domain–speciﬁc language module. Issues of
modularity will crop up throughout.
2.3.4 Attribution of Beliefs and Intentions
An important step in cognitive development is the acquisition of a “theory of
mind,” the ability to understand that someone else may have beliefs different
from one’s own. A standard experimental paradigm to test theory of mind is
the “false belief task,” of which the following is an example (due to Wimmer
and Perner [305])
Children are ﬁrst told the story:“Maxi and Mummy are in the kitchen. They put some
chocolate in the fridge. Then Maxi goes away to play with his friend. Mummy decides to
18. See section 6.2.3 for a deﬁnition and discussion of the contrast between exaptation and adaptation.
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bake a cake. She takes the chocolate from the fridge, makes the cake, and puts the rest of
the chocolate in the cupboard. Maxi is returning now from visiting his friend and wants
some chocolate.” Children are then asked the test question: “Where does Maxi think the
chocolate is?”
Normally developing children will be able to attribute a “false belief” to Maxi
and answer “In the fridge” from around age 4 or so.
Another version19 uses an episode from the Bob the Builder children’s televi-
sion series, in which Bob climbs a ladder to do some repair work on the roof of
a house. While Bob is happily hammering, the series’ resident gremlin Naughty
Spud takes away the ladder to steal apples from a nearby apple tree. After Bob
has ﬁnished his work on the roof, he makes preparations to climb down. At this
point the video is stopped and the child who has been watching this episode is
asked: “Where does Bob think that the ladder is?” Again, children below the
cut-off age answer: “At the tree.”
It is illuminating to view the reasoning leading up to these answers as an
instance of closed–world reasoning. What is needed ﬁrst of all is an aware-
ness of the causal relation between perception and belief, which can be stated
in the form: “if ϕ is true in scene S, and agent a sees S, then a comes to be-
lieve ϕ,” where ϕ is a metavariable ranging over proposition letters p, q, . . ..
In other words, seeing is a cause of believing. Thus Maxi comes to believe
that the chocolate is in the fridge. An application of the principle of inertia (cf.
(3) above) yields that Maxi’s belief concerning the location of the chocolate
persists unless an event occurs which causes him to have a new belief, incom-
patible with the former. The story does not mention such an event, whence it is
reasonable to assume – using 1 and 2 – that Maxi still believes that the choco-
late is in the fridge when he returns from visiting his friend. Viewed in this
way, attribution of belief is a special case of causal reasoning, and some cor-
relation with performance on counterfactual reasoning tasks is to be expected.
The tasks are not quite the same, however. The causal relation between percep-
tion and belief is an essential ingredient in the false belief task, absent in the
counterfactual task. There are two sides to this: positively, that a belief may
form after seeing something, and negatively, that there are only a few speciﬁed
ways in which beliefs can form, e.g., by seeing, by being told, and by inference
– this negative aspect is an application of closed–world reasoning. Children
failing the false belief task could master causal reasoning generally, but fail on
the aspects just mentioned. So, assimilating the reasoning involved in theory of
mind tasks as a kind of defeasible reasoning potentially provides both a basis
for continuity with earlier developmental or evolutionary precursors, and a ba-
sis for discontinuity – it is causal reasoning by closed–world assumptions, but
causal reasoning by closed–world assumptions of a speciﬁc kind. Reasoning
19. Investigated experimentally by the van Lambalgen’s students David Wood and Marian Counihan.
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about minds is reasoning in a speciﬁc domain, but its characterization may be
possible by a rather small extension of a logical framework for other domains.
We viewed classical logic as resulting from setting parameters for syntax,
semantics, and the consequence relation. We have seen that these settings are
appropriate for the domain of classical mathematics, but that they cannot claim
universal validity. Other domains require different settings; e.g., closed–world
reasoning about databases has only bivalence in common with classical logic.
In fact, a wide range of everyday tasks involve closed–world reasoning: e.g.,
planning, and adapting to failures of plans during their execution, diagnosis
of causes, causal reasoning itself, reasoning about mental behavior and states,
interpreting speaker’s intentions underlying discourse. Each of these domains
leads to a logic especially suited to that domain. Reasoners have in general little
trouble in selecting the logic appropriate to a domain, although, as we shall see
in the course of this book, some psychiatric disorders are accompanied, and
perhaps even caused, by inappropriately applied reasoning schemes.
In the following chapters, we will look at several experimental reasoning
paradigms to discover evidence of parameter setting at work. It will turn out
that for a subject, discovering the right parameters is often the hardest part of a
laboratory reasoning task.
At this point, the psychologist reader, from our experience, is likely to be puz-
zled. “Subjects don’t know these logics! These formalisms are just theorists’
tools! All these squiggles don’t happen in minds! Anyway, all you are doing
is redescribing stuff which psychologists know about in terms of pragmatics!”
are among typical objections, so we had perhaps better attempt to defuse them.
Of course we agree that subjects don’t “know these logics” just in the sense
that they don’t know the grammar of English, but they do know these logics
just in the sense that they do know the grammar of English. Yes, they are also
theorists’ tools, but we take seriously the possibility that something computa-
tionally equivalent is implemented in the mind. In chapter 8 we will show that
that implementation doesn’t require squiggles. And yes, many of the phenom-
ena we are describing as applying reasoning in non-standard logics have been
given descriptions already by psychologists. Our claim is that those descrip-
tions remain ad hoc until they are systematized as we are trying to do here. It is
very important that the psychological reader takes us seriously when we claim
that these logics are in the mind, but equally important that they realise that that
claim does not bring all the baggage usually ascribed to it.

3 A Little Logic Goes a Long Way
The psychology of reasoning studies how subjects draw conclusions from prem-
ises – the process of derivation. But premises have to be interpreted before any
conclusions can be drawn. Although premise interpretation has received recur-
rent attention (e.g., Henle [122], Gebauer and Laming [92], Newstead [201],
Byrne [28]), the full range of dimensions of interpretation facing the subject has
not been considered. Nor has interpretation been properly distinguished from
derivation from an interpretation in a way that enables interactions between
interpretation and derivation to be analysed. Our general thesis is that integrat-
ing accounts of interpretation with accounts of derivation can lead to deeper
insight into cognitive theory generally, and human reasoning in particular. This
chapter exempliﬁes this general claim in the domain of Wason’s selection task
[295], an important reference point for several prominent cognitive theories of
reasoning. What is meant by interpretation in this context? Interpretation maps
representation systems (linguistic, diagrammatic, etc.) onto the things in the
world which are represented. Interpretation decides such matters as: which
things in the world generally correspond to which words; which of these things
are speciﬁcally in the domain of interpretation of the current discourse; which
structural description should be assigned to an utterance; which propositions
are assumed and which derived; which notions of validity of argument are in-
tended; and so on. Natural languages such as English sometimes engender the
illusion that such matters are settled by general knowledge of the language, but
it is easy to see that this is not so. Each time a sentence such as “The presi-
dents of France were bald” is uttered, its users must decide, for example, who
is included, and how bald is bald, for present purposes. In the context of the se-
lection task we shall see that there are quite a few such decisions which subjects
have to make, each resolvable in a variety of ways, and each with implications
for what response to make in the task.
Of course, interpretation, in this sense, is very widely studied in philosophy,
logic and linguistics (and even psycholinguistics), as we document in our ref-
erences throughout the chapter. Our thesis is that interchange between these
studies and psychological studies of reasoning has been inadequate. Perhaps
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because the methods of the ﬁelds are so divergent, there has been a reluctance
to take semantic analyses seriously as a guide to psychological processes, and
many of the concepts of logic are loosely employed in psychology, at best.
There are, of course, honorable exceptions which we will consider in our dis-
cussion.
In this chapter we take Wason’s selection task and argue that the mental pro-
cesses it evokes in subjects are, quite reasonably, dominated by interpretive
processes. Wason’s task is probably the most intensively studied task in the
psychology of reasoning literature and has been the departure point, or point
of passage, for several high–proﬁle cognitive theories: mental models theory
(Johnson-Laird and Byrne [144]), relevance theory (Sperber, Cara, and Girotto
[252]), “evolutionary psychology” (Cosmides [47]), rational analysis (Oaksford
and Chater [205]). We will argue and present empirical evidence that each of
these theories misses critical contributions that logic and semantics can make
to understanding the task. For various reasons the materials of the task exert
contradictory pressures leading to conﬂicting interpretations, and we argue that
what we observe are subjects’ various, not always very successful, efforts to
resolve these conﬂicts. The results of our experiments expose rich individual
variation in reasoning and learning and so argue for novel standards of empiri-
cal analysis of the mental processes involved.
3.1 The Mother of All Reasoning Tasks
Wason’s original task was presented by means of a form as depicted in ﬁgure
3.1. The reader, who has probably seen the task before, should realise that
this is all the information provided to the subjects, in order to appreciate the
tremendous difﬁculty posed by this task. We will later present a variant of the
task (the “two rule task”) which may recreate in the cognoscenti the feelings of
perplexity experienced by the untutored subject.
Below is depicted a set of four cards, of which you can see only the exposed face
but not the hidden back. On each card, there is a number on one of its sides and
a letter on the other.
Also below there is a rule which applies only to the four cards. Your task is to
decide which if any of these four cards you must turn in order to decide if the
rule is true. Don’t turn unnecessary cards. Tick the cards you want to turn.
Rule: If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on the other
side.
Cards: A K 4 7
Figure 3.1 Wason’s selection task
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This experiment has been replicated many times. If one formulates the rule
If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on the other
side.
as an implication p → q, then the observed pattern of results is typically given
as in table 3.1.
Thus, the modal response1 (around half of the undergraduate subjects) is to
turn A and 4. Very few subjects turn A and 7. Wason (and, until fairly recently,
the great majority of researchers) assumed, without considering alternatives,
that the correct performance is to turn the A and 7 cards only. Oaksford and
Chater’s inductive rational choice model [205] was the ﬁrst to challenge this as-
sumption, by rejecting deductive models entirely – more on this below. Wason
adopted this criterion of good reasoning from a classical logical interpretation
of the rule.
In a very real sense, however, Wason got his own task wrong in stipulat-
ing that there was a particular “obviously correct” answer. This holds on the
assumption that the rule is interpreted using the material implication, but noth-
ing in the experimental material itself forces this interpretation. Undergraduate
subjects come to this task with their own interpretation of the conditional “if
. . . then,” and more often than not this interpretation is as a defeasible rule ro-
bust to exceptions. In this case, the “competence” answer would be to respond
that no combination of card choices can falsify the rule, because any possible
counterexamples are indistinguishable from exceptions. And no ﬁnite combi-
nation of choices can prove the rule is true.2 Alternatively, subjects with other
plausible interpretations of the task and rule might reasonably want to respond
that several alternative sets of cards would test the rule equally well, and this
again is not an available response. There are of course many psychological rea-
sons why we should not expect subjects to make these kinds of responses even if
they were offered as possibilities. There are strong demand characteristics and
authority relations in the experimental situation. Furthermore, subjects are not
accustomed to reﬂecting on their language use and also lack a vocabulary for
talking about and distinguishing the elementary semantic concepts which are
required to express these issues. Taking interpretation seriously does not mean
we thereby assume reasoning is perfect, nor that we reject classical logic as one
(possibly educationally important) logical model. But the unargued adoption
of classical logic as a criterion of correct performance is thoroughly antilogical.
In our discussion we review some of the stances toward logic exhibited by the
prominent cognitive theories that have made claims about the selection task,
and appraise them from the viewpoint advocated here.
1. The mode of a data sample is the element that occurs most often in the sample.
2. It is true that Wason’s instructions explicitly state that the rule applies only to the four cards, but, as we
shall see below, this is not a reasonable restriction on one dominant interpretation, and is widely ignored.
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Table 3.1 Typical proportions of choices in the selection task
p p, q p,¬q p, q,¬q misc.
35% 45% 5% 7% 8%
3.2 A Preliminary Logical Distinction
The program of empirical investigation that ensued from Wason’s original ex-
periment can be seen as a search for those contents of rules that make the task
“easy” or “hard” according to the classical competence criterion. Differences in
accuracy of reasoning are then explained by various classiﬁcations of content.
For example, when the original “abstract” (i.e., descriptive) form of the selec-
tion task proved so counterintuitively hard, attention rapidly turned to ﬁnding
materials that made the task easy. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi [142]
showed that a version of the task using a UK postal regulation (“If a letter has
a second class stamp, it is left unsealed”) produced near-ceiling performance.
They described the facilitation in terms of familiarity of the materials. Griggs
and Cox [109] showed that reasoning about a drinking age law (“if you drink al-
cohol here, you have to be over 18”) was easy. Wason and Green[296] similarly
showed that a rule embedded in a “production-line inspection” scenario (e.g.,
“If the wool is blue, it must be 4 feet long”) also produced good performance.
Cosmides [47, 48] went on to illustrate a range of materials which produce
“good” reasoning, adding the claim this facilitation only happened with social
contract rules. Cosmides and her collaborators used the argument that only so-
cial contract material was easy, to claim that humans evolved innate modular
“cheating detector algorithms” which underpin selection task performance on
social contract rules. Note that nonsocial contract examples such as the “wool”
example just quoted were prominent in the literature before Cosmides made
these claims. Recent work has extended the evolutionary account by proposing
a range of detectors beyond cheating detectors which are intended to underpin
reasoning with, for example, precautionary conditionals (Fiddick, Cosmides,
and Tooby [81]).3 These observations of good reasoning were reported as ef-
fects of content on reasoning with rules of the same logical form. Cosmides
and Tooby are explicit about logic being their target:
On this view [the view Cosmides and Tooby attack], reasoning is viewed as the oper-
ation of content-independent procedures, such as formal logic, applied impartially and
uniformly to every problem, regardless of the nature of the content involved. (Cosmides
and Tooby [48,p. 166])
3. Cummins [53] has argued, against this proliferation, that the innate module concerned is more general
and encompasses all of deontic reasoning.
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Johnson-Laird equally claims that the effect of content on reasoning contradicts
the formal-logical model of reasoning:
[F]ew select the card bearing [7], even though if it had a vowel on its other side, it would
falsify the rule. People are much less susceptible to this error of omission when the
rules and materials have a sensible content, e.g., when they concern postal regulations ...
Hence the content of a problem can affect reasoning, and this phenomenon is contrary to
the notion of formal rules of inference (Johnson-Laird [146,p. 225])
Wason himself, discussing an example from [299] which used the rule: “If I go
to Manchester I go by train,” rejects the idea that there are structural differences
between thematic and abstract tasks:
The thematic problem proved much easier than a standard abstract version which was
structurally equivalent... ([300,p. 643]; emphasis added)
We argue here that by far the most important determinant of ease of reasoning
is whether interpretation of the rule assigns it descriptive or deontic logical
form, and we explain the effect of this interpretive choice in terms of the many
problems descriptive interpretation creates in this task setting, as contrasted
with the ease of reasoning with deontic interpretations.
Descriptive conditionals describe states of affairs and are therefore true or
false as those states of affairs correspond to the conditionals’ content. Deon-
tic conditionals, as described in the previous chapter, state how matters should
be according to some (perhaps legal) law or regulation, or preference.4 The
semantic relation between sentence and case(s) for deontics is therefore quite
different than for descriptives. With descriptives, sets of cases may make the
conditional true, or make it false. With deontics, cases individually conform
or not, but they do not affect the status of the law (or preference, or whatever).
This is of course a crude speciﬁcation of the distinction. We shall have some
more speciﬁc proposals to make below. But it is important for the empirical in-
vestigation to focus on these blunt differences that all analyses of the distinction
agree on.5
Returning to the examples given, we see that a rule like “if you drink alcohol
here, you have to be over 18” is deontic, not descriptive. If everybody drinking
whiskey in a particular pub is under 18, the rule may be massively violated, but
it is still in force. We have a different situation if the rule is intended to be de-
scriptive, an intention which can be suggested, but not ﬁxed, by the formulation
“if someone drinks alcohol here, he is over 18.” In this case a primary school
boy sipping his whiskey may be taken to falsify the rule. The other examples
can be analysed similarly.
4. There are a great variety of speciﬁc deontic stances which all share the feature that they deal in what is
ideal relative to some criterion.
5. This is an important invocation to be born in mind by the formalist concerned to contribute to experimental
investigation: “Use the bluntest formal analysis which is sharp enough to make the necessary distinctions!”
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In English, the semantic distinction between descriptives and deontics is not
reﬂected simply on the surface of sentences. Deontics are often expressed using
subjunctives or modals – should, ought, must – but are equally often expressed
with descriptive verbs. It is impossible to tell without consultation of context,
whether a sentence such as “In the UK, vehicles drive on the left” is to be inter-
preted descriptively or deontically – as a generalization or a legal prescription.
Conversely, subjunctive verbs and modals are often interpreted descriptively.
(e.g., in the sentence “If it is 10 am, that should (must) be John,” said on hear-
ing the doorbell, the modal expresses an inference about a description). This
means that we as experimenters cannot determine this semantic feature of sub-
jects’ interpretation of conditionals simply by changing auxiliary verbs in rules.
A combination of rule, content, and subjects’ knowledge inﬂuences whether to
assign a deontic or descriptive form.
Our proposal about the selection task at its simplest is that the semantic dif-
ference between descriptive and deontic conditionals leads to a processing dif-
ference when these conditionals are used in the selection task. In barest outline,
the semantic difference is this. Deontic conditionals such as the drinking age
law cannot be false, they can only be violated. Hence turning a card never af-
fects the status of the rule. Now, whether a given customer violates the drinking
age law is independent of whether another customer does so. This seems a triv-
ial observation, but a comparison with the case of descriptive rules will show
its importance.
A descriptive rule can be true or false, and here the purpose of turning cards
is to determine which is the case; in this case, unlike the previous one, the
result of turning a card can affect the status of the rule. A consequence of this
is a form of dependence between card choices, in the following sense: turning
A to ﬁnd 7 already decides the status of the rule by showing it to be false;
it does not seem necessary to turn the 7 card as well. On the other hand, if
upon turning A one ﬁnds a 4, it is necessary to turn the 7 as well. We will
see that this situation is confusing to subjects, who sometimes believe that the
task is unsolvable because of this dependence. It is not, of course, once one
realises that the cards are not real but depicted, and hence cannot be turned at all.
These blunt semantic differences mean that the original descriptive (abstract)
task poses many difﬁculties to naive reasoners not posed by the deontic task.6
A formal analysis of the differences will be given below, but these indications
should sufﬁce for the present.
We will derive a variety of particular difﬁculties to be expected from the inter-
6. Previous work has pointed to the differences between the deontic and descriptive tasks (e.g., Manktelow
and Over [180]; Oaksford and Chater [205]). Cheng and Holyoak [37] developed the theory that success
on deontic selection tasks was based on pragmatic reasoning schemata. Although they present this theory
as an alternative to logic-based theories, it arguably presents a fragmentary deontic logic with some added
processing assumptions (theorem prover) about the “perspective” from which the rule is viewed. However,
Cheng and Holyoak did not take the further step of analyzing abstractly the contrasting difﬁculties which
descriptive conditionals pose in this task.
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action of semantics and task, and the presentation of an experimental program
to demonstrate that subjects really do experience these problems. Deriving a
spectrum of superﬁcially diverse problems from a single semantic distinction
supports a powerful empirical generalization about reasoning in this task, and
an explanation of why that generalization holds. It also strongly supports the
view that subjects’ problems are highly variable and in doing so reveals an im-
portant but much neglected level of empirical analysis.
It is important to distinguish coarser from ﬁner levels of semantic analysis
in understanding our predictions. At ﬁner levels of analysis, we will display a
multiplicity of interpretive choices and insist on evidence that subjects adopt a
variety of them – both across subjects and within a single subject’s episodes of
reasoning. At this level we certainly do not predict any speciﬁc interpretation.
At coarser levels of analysis such as between truth–functional and non-truth–
functional conditionals, and between descriptive and deontic conditionals, it is
possible to predict highly speciﬁc consequences of adopting one or the other
kind of reading in different versions of the task, and to show that these conse-
quences are evident in the data. If they do appear as predicted, then that pro-
vides strong evidence that interpretive processes are driving the data. In fact,
many of these consequences have been observed before, but have remained un-
connected with each other, and not appreciated for what they are – the various
consequences of a homogeneous semantic distinction. The take-home message
is: semantics supplies an essential theoretical base for understanding the psy-
chology of reasoning.
The plan of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. We begin by pre-
senting in the next section what we take to be essential about a modern logical
approach to such cognitive processes as are invoked by the selection task. The
following section then uses this apparatus to show how the logical differences
between descriptive and deontic selection tasks can be used to make predic-
tions about problems that subjects will have in the former but not the latter. The
following section turns these predictions into several experimental conditions,
and presents data compared to Wason’s original task as baseline. Finally, we
discuss the implications of these ﬁndings for theories of the selection task and
of our interpretive perspective for cognitive theories more generally.
3.3 Logical Forms in Reasoning
The selection task is concerned with reasoning about the natural language con-
ditional “if . . . then.” The reasoning patterns that are valid for this expression
can only be determined after a logical form is assigned to the sentence in which
this expression occurs. The early interpretations of the selection task all as-
sumed that the logical form assigned to “if . . . then” should be the connective
→ with the semantics given by classical propositional logic. We want to argue
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that this easy identiﬁcation is not in accordance with the modern conception
of logic outlined in chapter 2. By this, we do not just mean that modern logic
has come up with other competence models besides classical logic. Rather, the
easy identiﬁcation downplays the complexity of the process of assigning logical
form. In a nutshell, modern logic sees itself as concerned with the mathemat-
ics of reasoning systems. It is related to a concrete reasoning system such as
classical propositional logic as geometry is related to light rays. It is impossi-
ble to say a priori what is the right geometry of the physical world; however,
once some coordinating deﬁnitions (such as “a straight line is to be interpreted
by a light ray”) have been made, it is determined which geometry describes
the behavior of these straight lines, and hypotheses about the correct geome-
try become falsiﬁable. Similarly, it does not make sense to determine a priori
what is the right logic. This depends on one’s notion of truth, semantic con-
sequence, and more. But once these parameters have been ﬁxed, logic, as the
mathematics of reasoning systems, determines what is, and what is not, a valid
consequence. In this view it is of prime importance to determine the type of pa-
rameter that goes into the deﬁnition of what a logical system is, and, of course,
the psychological purposes that might lead subjects to choose one or another
setting in their reasoning. This parameters setting generally involves as much
reasoning as does the reasoning task assigned to the subject. We are thus led to
the important distinction between reasoning from an interpretation and reason-
ing to an interpretation. The former is what is supposed to happen in a typical
inference task: given premises, determine whether a given conclusion follows.
But because the premises are formulated in natural language, there is room for
different logical interpretations of the given material and intended task. Deter-
mining what the appropriate logical form is in a given context itself involves
logical reasoning which is far from trivial in the case of the selection task.
We have seen in chapter 2 that the parameters characterizing logical form
come in at least three ﬂavors: pertaining to syntax, to semantics, and to the no-
tion of logical consequence. In short, therefore, the interpretive problem facing
a subject in a reasoning task is to provide settings for all these parameters –
this is what is involved in assigning logical form. It has been the bane of the
psychology of reasoning that it operates with an oversimpliﬁed notion of logi-
cal form. Typically, in the psychology of reasoning, assigning logical form is
conceived of as translating a natural language sentence into a formal language
whose semantics is supposed to be given, but this is really only the beginning:
it ﬁxes just one parameter. We do not claim that subjects know precisely what
they are doing; that is, most likely subjects do not know in any detail what the
mathematical consequences of their choices are. We do claim, however, that
subjects worry about how to set the parameters, and below we offer data ob-
tained from tutorial dialogues to corroborate this claim. This is not a descent
into postmodern hermeneutics. This doomful view may be partly due to earlier
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psychological invocations of interpretational defenses against accusations of ir-
rationality in reasoning, perhaps the most cited being Henle [122]: “there exist
no errors of reasoning, only differences in interpretation.” It is possible, how-
ever, to make errors in reasoning: the parameter settings may be inconsistent,
or a subject may draw inferences not consistent with the settings.
From the point of view of the experimenter, once all the parameters are ﬁxed,
it is mathematically determined what the extension of the consequence relation
will be; and the hypotheses on speciﬁc parameter settings therefore become
falsiﬁable. In particular, the resulting mathematical theory will classify an in-
ﬁnite number of reasoning patterns as either valid or invalid. In principle there
is therefore ample room for testing whether a subject has set his parameters
as guessed in the theory: choose a reasoning pattern no instance of which is
included in the original set of reasoning tokens. In practice, there are limita-
tions to this procedure because complex patterns may be hard to process. Be
that as it may, it remains imperative to obtain independent conﬁrmation of the
parameter settings by looking at arguments very different from the original set
of tokens. This was, for instance, our motivation for obtaining data about the
meaning of negation in the context of the selection task (more on this below):
while not directly relevant to the logical connectives involved in the selection
task,7 it provided valuable insight into the notions of truth and falsity.
Psychology is in some ways harder once one acknowledges interpretational
variety, but given the overwhelming evidence for that variety, responding by
eliminating it from psychological theory is truly the response of the drunk be-
neath the lamppost. In fact, in some counterbalancing ways, psychology gets a
lot easier because there are so many independent ways of getting information
about subjects’ interpretations – such as tutorial dialogues. Given the existence
of interpretational variety, the right response is richer empirical methods aimed
at producing convergent evidence for deeper theories which are more indirectly
related to the stimuli observed. What the richness of interpretation does mean
is that the psychology of reasoning narrowly construed has less direct implica-
tions for the rationality of subjects’ reasoning. What was right about the earlier
appeals to interpretational variation is that it indeed takes a lot of evidence to
conﬁdently convict subjects of irrationality. It is necessary to go to great lengths
to make a charitable interpretation of what they are trying to do and how they
understand what they are supposed to do before one can be in a position to as-
sert that they are irrational. Even when all this is done, the irrational element
can only be interpreted against a background of rational effort.
7. Though see [74] to see how negation is not far away.
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3.4 Logical Forms in the Selection Task
We now apply the preceding considerations to the process of assigning a logical
form to the standard selection task. An important component of this process is
determining a meaning of the conditional, but this is not all there is to logical
form in the selection task. To see this, it is useful to reformulate the task as
an information processing task as intended by Marr [183].8 Here we run into
an immediate ambiguity: the information–processing task may be meant as the
one intended by the experimenter, or as understood by the subject. In both
cases the input consists of the form with instructions, but the output can be very
different.
The intentions of the experimenter are clear: the output should consist of
checks under the cards selected. The output in the subject’s interpretation of
the task can vary considerably. Some subjects think the output can be a plan
for showing the rule to be true or false. Other subjects interpolate a process of
information gathering and view the task as “what information do I require to
decide the rule, and how do I obtain that information.” This gets them in con-
siderable trouble, since they tend to rephrase the minimality condition “do not
turn unnecessary cards” as the condition “determine the minimum information
necessary to decide the rule,” which is importantly different. In this section we
will describe several formal models corresponding to different understandings
of the task.
Wason had in mind the interpretation of the conditional as a truth–functional
implication, which together with bivalence yields the material implication.
Truth–functional, because the four cards must decide the truth–value of the
conditional; bivalent, because the task is to determine truth or falsity of the
conditional, implying that there is no other option. All this is of course obvious
from the experimenter’s point of view, but the important question is whether
this interpretation is accessible to the subject. Given the wide range of other
meanings of the conditional, the subject must infer from the instructions, and
possibly from contextual factors, what the intended meaning is. Reading very
carefully, and bracketing her own most prominent meanings for the key terms
involved, the subject may deduce that the conditional is to be interpreted truth–
functionally, with a classical algebra of truth–values, hence with the material
implication as resulting logical form. (Actually the situation is more compli-
cated; see the next paragraph.) But this bracketing is what subjects with little
logical training typically ﬁnd hard to do.
The subject ﬁrst has to come up with a formal language in which to translate
the rule. It is usually assumed that the selection task is about propositional
logic, but in the case of the “abstract” rule 1 actually needs predicate logic,
8. Marr’s ideas will be explained in greater detail in chapter 5 in section 5.1.4 and in chapter 11.
3.4 Logical Forms in the Selection Task 53
mainly because of the occurrence of the expression “one side . . . other side.”
One way (although not the only one) to formalise the rule in predicate logic
uses the following predicates:
V (x, y) “x is on the visible side of card y”
I(x, y) “x is on the invisible side of card y”
O(x) “x is a vowel”
E(x) “x is an even number”
and the rule is then translated as the following pair:
∀c(∃x(V (x, c) ∧O(x)) → ∃y(I(y, c) ∧E(y)))
∀c(∃x(I(x, c) ∧O(x)) → ∃y(V (y, c) ∧E(y)))
This might seem pedantic were it not for the fact that some subjects go astray
at this point, replacing the second statement by a biconditional
∀c(∃x(I(x, c) ∧O(x)) ↔ ∃y(V (y, c) ∧E(y))),
or even a reversed conditional
∀c(∃x(V (x, c) ∧E(x)) → ∃y(I(y, c) ∧O(y))).
This very interesting phenomenon will be studied further in section 3.5.5.9
For simplicity’s sake, in the following we will focus only on subjects’ prob-
lems at the level of propositional logic.
3.4.1 The Big Divide: Descriptive and Deontic Conditionals
It was noticed early on that facilitation in task performance could be obtained
by changing the abstract rule to a familiar rule such as
If you want to drink alcohol, you have to be over 18
though the deontic nature of the rule was not initially seen as important, in
contrast to its familiarity. This observation was one reason why formal logic
was considered to be a bad guide to actual human reasoning. Logic was not
able to explain how statements supposedly of the same logical form lead to
vastly different performance – or so the argument went. However, using the
expanded notion of logical form given above one can see that the abstract rule
and the deontic rule are not of the same form.
Descriptive Interpretation of the Task
We assume ﬁrst that the subject views the task descriptively, as determining
whether the rule is true or false of the four cards given, no exceptions allowed.10
9. The fact that Gebauer and Lamming [92] accept this reversed reading in this context provides a timely
reminder that subjects and experimenters are sometimes equally prone to accept interpretations which would
be held to be quite incongruous in a more neutral context.
10. Some subjects have a descriptive interpretation which does allow exceptions; see section 3.5.2.
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We also assume that cards with false antecedent (i.e., a consonant) are viewed
as complying with the rule11 This dictates an interpretation of the descriptive
conditional as material implication.
Wason viewed his task in terms of bivalent classical logic, but even in the
descriptive case this holds only for an omniscient being, who can view both
sides of the cards. The human subject who comes to this task is at ﬁrst con-
fronted with a lack of information, and may apply a logic which is appropriate
to this situation: a semantics which is sensitive to the information available to
the subject. It will turn out that there are two subtly different ways of taking into
account the incomplete information, which will be seen to correspond to dif-
ferent behaviors of subjects. In the process of formalization, we will also have
occasion to introduce two different notions of truth that persistently confuse
subjects.
The ﬁrst formalization of the selection task views it as an information–
processing task whose output is the information the subject requires for de-
ciding the rule. Suppose for simplicity that the letters on the cards can only
be A,K, and the numbers only 4,7. Deﬁne a model, consisting of “informa-
tion states” as follows. For brevity, we will sometimes call information states
“states.” There are four states corresponding to the visible sides of the cards;
denote these by A,K, 4, 7. These correspond to incomplete information states.
Then there are eight states corresponding to the possibilities for what is on the
invisible side; denote these by (A, 4), (A, 7), (K, 4), (K, 7), (4, A), (4,K),
(7, A), and (7,K). These correspond to complete information states (about
a single card). This gives as domain W of the model twelve states in all,
each pertaining to a single card. Starting from W one may deﬁne the set W4
consisting of all consistent information states relating to the four cards simul-
taneously. W4 contains sets such as {(A, 4),K, 4, 7}, {A,K, (4, A), (7, A)},
{(A, 4),K, (4, A), 7}, or {(A, 7), (K, 4), (4,K), (7,K)}. On W4 one can de-
ﬁne an ordering  by w  v if the information contained about a given card
in v is an extension of, or equal to, the information about that card in w. So
we have, e.g., {(A, 4),K, 4, 7}  {(A, 4),K, (4, A), 7} and {A,K, 4, 7} 
{(A, 7), (K, 4), (4,K), (7,K)}, but {(A, 4), (4, A),K, (7, A)}  {A, (4, A),K,
(7, A)}.
To represent the different relations of truth that cards and rule can bear toward
each other, we introduce a support-relation  and the standard “makes true”
relation |=. The latter relation is in a sense symmetric: if for a model A and
a formula ϕ one has A |= ϕ one may say equivalently that A makes ϕ true,
or that ϕ is true of A. This is different for the support-relation , holding
between a “piece of information” v and a formula ϕ: v  ϕ must be read as the
asymmetric relation “v contains evidence for ϕ.” It is the interplay between the
asymmetric and the symmetric relation that causes many subjects a headache.
11. It would not be appropriate to give the implication the truth–value “undecided” (as in Kleene’s three–
valued logic) in this case, since no amount of additional information can affect this truth–value.
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The support-relation w  ψ is deﬁned between states in W4 and formulas ψ
as follows. Let p be the proposition “the card has a vowel,” and q the proposition
“the card has an even number.” The referent of the expression “the card” is
determined by the information state on which p, q are interpreted; we assume
that in an expression p∧ (¬)q the referent of “the card” in q is bound by that in
p. Then we have
1. A  p, K  ¬p, p undecided on 4 and 7 (i.e., neither 4  p nor 4  ¬p, and
similarly for 7);
2. 4  q, 7  ¬q, q undecided on A and K;
3. (A, 4)  p ∧ q, (A, 7)  p ∧ ¬q, . . . (4, A)  p ∧ q, (4,K)  ¬p ∧ q, etc.
For a state v in W4, deﬁne v  p ∧ ¬q as: “there is a card (x, y) in u such that
(x, y)  p ∧ ¬q.” We say that the rule is supported by a piece of information
v, and write v  p → q, if v  p ∧ ¬q. Lastly we say that v makes the
rule true, and write v |= p → q, if for all u  v : u  p → q. Clearly
v |= p → q implies v  p → q, but the converse does not hold, and this
is one source of confusion for subjects, as we will see in section 3.5.2. In
this “information-seeking” version of the task the subject now must compute
the information states that decide the rule. A combinatorial exercise involving
the truth–table for→ shows that these are: {(A, 7),K, 4, 7}, {A,K, 4, (7, A)},
{(A, 4),K, 4, (7,K)} and their extensions. Suppose the subject now views
the task as: “what information must I gather in order to decide the rule,” and
interprets the instruction not to turn unnecessary cards in this light, thus looking
for minimal information states only. The subject must then perform an action,
or actions, which bring her from {A,K, 4, 7} to one of the desired minimal
information states. The trouble is that sometimes turning a single card sufﬁces
to achieve a minimal information state, and that sometimes turning two cards
is necessary, and it depends on the unknown hidden side of the cards which
situation one is in. Subjects interpreting the task in this way therefore think
that it is unsolvable. To make the task solvable, a different interpretation is
needed, in which the subject does not think in terms of the information which
must be gathered, but in terms of information which becomes available. The
formalization appropriate to this interpretation involves a game in which the
subject plays against an adversary who makes the information available; the
subject’s optimal choice corresponds to a winning strategy in this game. A
formal characterization goes as follows.
The game is played between two players, I (the subject) and II (the experi-
menter). The game is played on sixteen boards simultaneously, corresponding
to what can be on the back of the cards whose visible sides areA,K, 4, 7. Player
I selects a set of cards which she claims will decide the rule on every board.
Player II has two options:
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(a) II picks a card outside I’s selection and chooses a board;
(b) II picks a card in I’s selection and chooses two boards.
In case (a), II’s move is winning if I’s selection makes the rule true, but II’s
card makes it false on the chosen board. In case (b), II’s move is winning if
II’s selected card has different values on the two boards, but the rule is true on
both. Player I wins if II does not win. Clearly a winning strategy for player I
consists in the selection of A and 7. Less, and player II can win via a move of
type (a); more, and II can win via a move of type (b). To compute the winning
strategy is again a combinatorial exercise.
It is essential for this version of the task that the game is played on sixteen
boards simultaneously. If the game were to be played on a single board about
which player I knows nothing, the concept of strategy would not make sense,
and we ﬁnd subjects saying that it is only luck that a selection turns out be
relevant; see for instance, subject 5 in section 3.5.3. Hence if the game corre-
sponding to the selection task is formalized as being played on one board only,
the subject must consider the task to be unsolvable.
There is thus much more to the descriptive selection task than a simple com-
putation in propositional logic which subjects cannot do because they are partly
irrational, or have no general logical competence. Indeed, that subjects ﬁnd the
purely propositional part easy is witnessed by the fact that they do not have
trouble evaluating the impact of a card correctly (e.g., subject 3 in the introduc-
tion to section 3.5). It is the choosing that creates the difﬁculty, and here the
instructions provide little guidance on how to construct the proper information–
processing task, or they may even actively interfere with the construction.
Deontic Interpretation of the Task
The logic appropriate to a deontic interpretation of the task is very different.
One difference is in the structure of the models associated with deontic state-
ments.
As we have seen in chapter 2, a deontic modelA is given by a set of “worlds”
or “cases” W , together with a relation R(w, v) on W intuitively meaning: “v
is an ideal counterpart to w.” That is, if R(w, v), then the norms posited in w
are never violated in v. The relation R is used to interpret the modal operator
O (“it ought to be the case that”). On such a model, we may deﬁne a deontic
conditional by writing O(p → q), but it is convenient to introduce a special
notation for this conditional, namely p ≺ q, and to deﬁne for any world w ∈W
w |= p ≺ q iff for all v such that R(w, v) : v |= p implies v |= q,
and
A |= p ≺ q iff for all w in W : w |= p ≺ q.
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The satisfaction relation for atomic propositions is the same as that in the de-
scriptive case.
The deﬁnition thus introduces an additional parameter R. If W is the set of
worlds deﬁned above, deﬁne R on W by R(A, (A, 4)), R(7, (7,K)),
¬R(A, (A, 7)), ¬R(7, (7, A)), R(K, (K, 4)), R(K, (K, 7)), R(4, (4, A)), and
R(4, (4,K)).12 R encodes the evaluation of each card against the norm, and
this is what subjects can easily do.
As the reader will have no trouble verifying, the deontic model (W,R, |=)
then satisﬁes p ≺ q, i.e., for all w in W : w |= p ≺ q. For example, to
verify that A |= p ≺ q, one notes that the only world v satisfying R(A, v)
is (A, 4), which satisﬁes both p and q. That is, in contrast to the previous
case the rule is true from the start, hence there is no need to gather evidence
for or against the rule, and the conﬂicts between |= and , and between two
views of information, cannot arise in this case. The information–processing
task becomes rather different: the output is the set of cases which possibly
violate the norm, and inspection of the deﬁnition of R shows that only A and
7 are candidates. Turning 7 to ﬁnd A just means that (7, A) is not an ideal
counterpart to 7, in the sense that it does not satisfy the norms holding in 7. The
computation is accordingly just a simple lookup. The set W4 and the strategic
choices it gives rise to do not enter into the picture.13
Deontic Connectives
This is actually a general phenomenon, which is not restricted to just condi-
tionals. As we shall see, if one gives subjects the following variation on the
selection task,
There is a vowel on one side of the cards and there is an even number on
the other side,14
they typically respond by turning the A and 4 cards, instead of just replying
“this statement is false of these four cards” (see below, section 4.1.5). One
reason for this behavior is given by subject 22 in section 3.5.6, who now sees
the task as checking those cards which could still satisfy the conjunctive rule,
namely A and 4, since K and 7 do not satisfy in any case. Such a response is
only possible if one has helped oneself to a predicate such as R. Formally, one
may deﬁne a deontic conjunction p  q by putting, for all w in W ,
w |= p  q iff for all v such that R(v, w): v |= p ∧ q.
12. We shall assume that if v is an ideal counterpart to w, then v is maximally ideal, that is, v is the ideal
counterpart of itself. Thus we assume ∀w∀v(R(w, v) → R(v, v)).
13. In the psychological literature one may sometimes ﬁnd a superﬁcially similar distinction between de-
scriptive and deontic conditionals. See, e.g., Oaksford and Chater [205], who conceive of a deontic condi-
tional as material implication plus an added numerical utility function. The preceding proposal introduces a
much more radical distinction in logical form.
14. Emphasis added.
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In this case the worlds (K, 4) and (K, 7) are both non-ideal counterparts to
the partial world K, and similarly for the partial world 7. In other words, no
completion of K or 7 can be ideal, and therefore the subject has to turn only A
and 4, to see whether perhaps these worlds are ideal.
Domains
Above we have seen that subjects may be in doubt about the structure of the
relevant model: whether it consists of cards, or of cards plus a distinguished
predicate. An orthogonal issue is, which set of cards should form the domain of
the model. The experimenter intends the domain to be the set of four cards. The
subjects may not grasp this; indeed there are good reasons why they shouldn’t.
Section 3.5.2 gives some reasons why natural language use suggests consider-
ing larger domains, of which the four cards shown are only a sample, and it
presents a dialogue with a subject who has a probabilistic concept of truth that
comes naturally with this interpretation of the domain.
Other Logical Forms
Some subjects believe a conditional allows exceptions, and cannot be falsiﬁed
by a single counterexample (see section 3.5.2). These subjects’ concept of con-
ditional is more adequately captured by the following pair of statements
1. p ∧ ¬e → q
2. p′ ∧ ¬q′ → e
Here e is a proposition letter standing for “exception,” whose deﬁning clause is
(2). (In the second rule, we use p′, q′ rather than p, q to indicate that perhaps
only some, but not all, cards which satisfy p but not q qualify as bona ﬁde ex-
ceptions.) Condition (1) then says that the rule applies only to nonexceptional
cards. There are no clear falsifying conditions for conditionals allowing ex-
ceptions, so (1) and (2) are best viewed as premises. This of course changes
the task, which is now seen as identifying the exceptions. These robust default
conditionals were mentioned above in chapter 2, section 2.3 and will be used
below in chapter 7 to model discourse interpretation in the suppression task.
This concludes our survey of what is involved in assigning logical form in
this task. We now turn to the demonstrations that subjects are indeed troubled
by the different ways in which they can set the parameters, and that clearer task
instructions can lead to fewer possibilities for the settings.
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3.5 Giving Subjects a Voice
A standard selection task experiment consists in giving subjects a form which
contains the instructions and shows four cards; the subjects then have to mark
the cards they want to select. The type of data obtainable in this way is highly
abstracted from the reasoning process. The subjects’ approach to the task may
be superﬁcial in the sense of not engaging any reasoning or comprehension
process which would be engaged in plausible real-world communication with
the relevant conditionals. One loses information about subjects’ vacillations
(which can be very marked) and thus one has little idea at what moment of their
deliberations subjects make a choice. It is also possible that the same answer
may be given for very different reasons. Furthermore, the design implies that
the number of acceptable answers is restricted; for instance, some subjects are
inclined to give an answer such as “A or 4,” or “any card,” or “can’t say, because
it depends on the outcomes,” and clearly the standard design leaves no room for
such answers. Early on, Wason and Johnson-Laird [297] investigated the rela-
tionship between insight and reasoning by also using dialogue protocols. They
distinguished two kinds of feedback: (1) feedback from hypothetical turnings
–“suppose there is an A on the back of the 7, what would you then conclude
about the rule?”; (2) actual feedback in which the subject turns the 7 card and
ﬁnds the A – “are you happy that you did/didn’t select the 7 card?.” It seems
to us that this type of design is much more conducive to obtaining information
about the whys and wherefores of subjects’ answers.
We report here excerpts from Socratic tutorial dialogues with subjects en-
gaged in the task, to illustrate the kinds of problems subjects experience.15 Ob-
servational studies of externalized reasoning can provide prima facie evidence
that these problems actually are real problems for subjects, although there is,
of course, the possibility that externalizing changes the task. Only a controlled
experiment can provide evidence that the predicted mental processes actually
do take place when subjects reason in the original noninteractive task. A con-
trolled experiment whose hypotheses derive from a combination of the present
material with a logical analysis will be reported in the next chapter.
We present these observations of dialogues in the spirit of providing plau-
sibility for our semantically based predictions. We assure the reader that they
are representative of episodes in the dialogues – not one-offs. But rather than
turn these observations into a quantitative study of the dialogues which would
still only bear on this externalized task, we prefer to use them to illustrate and
motivate our subsequent experimental manipulations which do bear directly on
the original task. We acknowledge that we cannot be certain that our interpre-
tations of the dialogues are correct representations of mental processes – the
15. Some of these excerpts were reported in [264] and [265]. Others come from a tutorial experiment
performed by the our student Marian Counihan.
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reader will often have alternative suggestions. Nevertheless, we feel that the
combination of rich naturalistic, albeit selective observations with controlled
experimental data is more powerful than either would be on its own. At the
very least, the dialogues strongly suggest that there are multiple possible con-
fusions, and often multiple reasons for making the very same response, and so
counsel against homogeneous explanations.
As an appetiser we present two examples of dialogues, both of kinds observed
by Wason. The ﬁrst example would be considered a case of “irrationality”
by Wason (but not by us), the second shows a possibly related and initially
perplexing dissociation between logical evaluation and selection of cards which
Wason also found striking.
The ﬁrst example shows that subjects may fail to understand the implication
of the 7/A combination. Here, as in the sequel, we denote by “7/A” the card
which has 7 on the visible face and A on the invisible back.
Subject 14
S. I would just be interested in As and 4s, couldn’t be more than that.
E. So now let’s turn the cards, starting from right to left. [Subject turns 7 to ﬁnd A.]
E. Your comments?
S. It could be an A, but it could be something else. E. So what does this tell you about the
rule?
S. About the rule . . . that if there is an A then maybe there is a 7 on the other side.
E. So there was a 7.
S. But it doesn’t affect the rule.
The second example shows that a subject sometimes hypothesises (or discov-
ers) an A on the back of the 7, and notes that this would mean the rule was false
of the card, but then declines to choose the card (or revise an earlier failure to
choose it).
Subject 3
E. OK. Lastly the 7.
S. Well I wouldn’t pick it.
E. But what would it mean if you did?
S. Well, if there is an A then that would make the rule false, and if there was a K, it
wouldn’t make any difference to the rule.
Following the theory outlined in chapter 2 and section 3.3, we view these con-
fusions as a consequence of subjects’ trying to ﬁx one of the many parameters
involved in deciding upon a logical form. Here is a list of the interpretational
problems faced by subjects, as witnessed by the experimental protocols. Illus-
trations will be provided below.
What is truth?
What is falsity?
Pragmatics: the authority of the source of the rule
Rules and exceptions
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Reasoning and planning
Interaction between interpretation and reasoning
Truth of the rule vs. “truth” for a case
Cards as viewed as a sample from a larger domain
Obtaining evidence for the rule vs. evaluation of the cards
Existential import of the conditional
Subjects’ understanding of propositional connectives generally
Interestingly, most of these problems simply cannot occur on a deontic inter-
pretation of the task, and we take this to be the reason why performance on this
task is so much ‘better’ than on the descriptive task.
3.5.1 The Design of the Tutorial Experiment: High-Energy
Phenomenology16
The experiment to be reported in the next section17 consisted of two parts. First
we gave subjects a booklet with the standard Wason task and the two–rule task
(for which see below), which also contained a so–called paraphrase task, in
which the subjects were asked to judge entailment relations between sentences
involving propositional connectives and quantiﬁers. This task continues the
classical work of Fillenbaum [82] on subjects’ understandings of natural lan-
guage connectives. For example, the subject could be given the sentence “if a
card has a vowel on one side, it has an even number on the other side,” and then
be asked to judge whether “every card which has a vowel on one side, has an
even number on the other side” follows from the given sentence. This exam-
ple is relatively innocuous,18 but we will see below that these judgments can
be logically startling. The results of this task gave us some information about
subjects’ understanding of logical connectives, which could then be related to
their performance in the selection task.
The second part of the experiment consisted of a series of dialogues with the
subject while she or he was engaged in solving the Wason task or one of its
variants. The dialogues were recorded on video and transcribed. In the case of
the standard task, the setup was as follows. The subject received a form giving
the same instructions as we saw in ﬁgure 3.1, except that the pictures of the
card were replaced by real cards, again showing A,K, 4, and 7. We ﬁrst asked
the subjects to select cards. We then asked them to reﬂect on what might be
on the other side, given the instructions, and to evaluate the imagined outcomes
with respect to the truth–value of the rule. Subjects were then allowed to revise
16. We ﬁrst came across this phrase in an ad for a physics job, but it seemed to capture the feeling of Wason’s
materials scattering into a thousand interpretations when they impinged on the subjects’ expectations, as well
as the amount of effort expended by both E and S in struggling to understand events.
17. The experiment was performed in 1999 in Edinburgh by us together with Magda Osman.
18. Although not quite, as it brings to the fore issues about the existential import of the conditional, to which
we will return in section 3.5.6.
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their initial selection. Lastly, we asked them to turn each card and to explain to
us what the result implies for the truth–value of the rule. We also followed this
procedure for variants of the standard task, such as the one explained next.
A Two–Rule Task
This task, whose standard form is given as ﬁgure 3.2, is the ﬁrst in a series of
manipulations which try to alleviate some of the difﬁculties subjects have in
interpreting the task. The classical logical competence model speciﬁes that cor-
Below is depicted a set of four cards, of which you can see only the exposed face
but not the hidden back. On each card, there is an 8 or a 3 on one of its sides and
a U or I on the other.
Also below there are two rules which apply only to the four cards. It is given
that exactly one rule is true. Your task is to decide which if any of these four
cards you must turn in order to decide which rule is true. Don’t turn unnecessary
cards. Tick the cards you want to turn.
1. If there is a U on one side, then there is an 8 on the other side.
2. If there is an I on one side, then there is an 8 on the other side.
Cards:
U I 8 3
Figure 3.2 Two–rule task.
rect performance is to turn just the 3 card. We conjectured that explicitly telling
the subject that one rule is true and one false, should background a number of
issues concerned with the notion of truth, such as the possibility of the rule
withstanding exceptions. The experimental manipulation turned out to be un-
expectedly fruitful; while struggling through the task, subjects made comments
very suggestive of where their difﬁculties lay. Below we give excerpts from the
tutorial dialogues which highlight these difﬁculties. In the tutorial version of
this experiment, subjects were presented with real cards lying in front of them
on the table. The cards shown were U, I, 8 and 3. In this case, both U and I
carried an 8, 8 carried an I, and 3 a U.
The task is pragmatically somewhat peculiar in that the two rules different in
the antecedent, not the consequent, and are still said to be mutually exclusive.
Naturally occurring mutually exclusive rules seem to have the same antecedent
but different consequents. The antecedent of a conditional often acts as a topic
(in the linguistic sense), and the two conditionals then say something different
of this topic. It is much less common to have two topics, each corresponding to
an antecedent. Occasionally one therefore observes pragmatic normalization in
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the dialogues, which inverts the conditionals to “if 8 then U” and “if 8 then I.”
We are now in a position to present subjects’ musings, insights and perplexities
while working through the various tasks.
3.5.2 Subjects’ Understanding of Truth and Falsity
‘Truth’ and ‘falsity’ are among the most important parameters to be set, and
the reader should recall from chapter 2 that they can be set independently: only
classical logic forces “not true” to be the same as “false.” This stipulation corre-
sponds to a deﬁnition of semantics, in which one deﬁnes only “true on a model”
(|=), not “false on model” (|=). It is, however, equally possible to give a recur-
sive deﬁnition of semantics in which |= and |= are deﬁned by simultaneous
recursion. We therefore give ‘true’ and ‘false’ separate headings.
The Logic of ‘True’
On a classical understanding of the two–rule task, the competence answer is to
turn the 3; this would show which one of the rules is false, hence classically
also which one is true. This classical understanding should be enforced by
explicitly instructing the subjects that one rule is true and the other one false.
Semantically this means, for a given model A that if not A |= p → q, then
A |= p → q. Interestingly, some subjects refuse to be moved by the explicit
instruction, insisting that “not-false” is not the same as “true.” These subjects
are thus guided by some nonclassical logic.
Subject 17.
S. [Writes miniature truth–tables under the cards.]
E. OK. so if you found an I under the 3, you put a question mark for rule 1, and rule 2 is
false; if you turned the 3 and found a U, then rule 1 is false and rule 2 is a question mark.
So you want to turn 3 or not?
S. No.
E. Let’s actually try doing it. [First] turn over the U . . . you ﬁnd a 3, which rule is true
and which rule is false?
S. (Long pause)
E. Are we none the wiser?
S. No, there’s a question mark.
E. It could have helped us, but it didn’t help us?
S. Yes.
...
E. OK, and the 3.
S. Well if there is a U then that one is disproved [pointing to the ﬁrst rule] and if there
is an I then that one is disproved [pointing to the second rule]. But neither rule can be
proved by 3.
...
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E. Turn over the last card [3] and see what’s on the back of it... so it’s a U. What does that
tell us about the rule?
S. That rule 1 is false and it doesn’t tell us anything about rule 2?
E. Can’t you tell anything about rule 2?
S. No.
The subject thinks falsifying rule 1 does not sufﬁce and now looks for ad-
ditional evidence to support rule 2. In the end she chooses the 8 card for this
purpose, which is of course not the competence answer even when “not-false”
is not equated with “true” (this answer may reﬂect the pragmatic normalization
of the two conditionals referred to above). Here are two more examples of the
same phenomenon.
Subject 8.
S. I wouldn’t look at this one [3] because it wouldn’t give me appropriate information
about the rules; it would only tell me if those rules are wrong, and I am being asked
which of those rules is the correct one. Does that make sense?
Subject 5.
E. What about if there was a 3?
S. A 3 on the other side of that one [U]. Then this [rule 1] isn’t true.
E. It doesn’t say. . . ?
S. It doesn’t say anything about this one [rule 2].
E. And the I?
S. If there is a 3, then this one [rule 2] isn’t true, and it doesn’t say anything about that
one [rule 1].
The same problem is of course present in the standard Wason task as well,
albeit in a less explicit form. If the cards are A, K, 4, and 7, then turning A
and 7 sufﬁces to verify that the rule is not false; but the subject may wonder
whether it is therefore true. For instance, if the concept of truth of a conditional
involves attributing a law-like character to the conditional, then the absence of
counterexamples does not sufﬁce to establish truth; a further causal connection
between antecedent and consequent is necessary.19 Since the truth of p → q
cannot be established on the model w in W4, the semantics implicitly adopted
by these subjects for p → q is a form of intensional semantics, following the
terminology introduced in chapter 2. That is, to determine w |= p→ q one has
to refer to information extraneous to w, for example a much larger population
of cards. A subject faced with this difﬁculty will be unable to solve the task as
given, because of lacking information.
Let us note here that this difﬁculty is absent in the case of deontic rules such
as
If you drink alcohol in this bar, you have to be over 18.
19. Such a causal connection is present in the “production line scenarios” which ask the subject to imagine
that there is a machine producing cards which on one side . . . , etc.
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Such a rule cannot, and in fact need not, be shown to be true by examining
cases; its truth is given, and the subjects need only establish that it is not vi-
olated. So in the deontic case, subjects have no worries about the meaning of
“truth.”
Another twist to the concept of truth was given by those subjects, who, when
reading the rule(s) aloud, actually inserted a modality in the conditional:
Subject 13. [Standard Wason task]
S. . . . if there is an A, then there is a 4, necessarily the 4. . . [somewhat later]. . . if there is
an A on one side, necessarily a 4 on the other side. . . .
If truth involves necessity, then the absence of counterexamples is not sufﬁcient
for truth. Again this leads to an intensional semantics for p→ q.
The Logic of ‘False’
Interesting things happen when one asks subjects to meditate on what it could
mean for a conditional to be false. As indicated above, the logic of “true” need
not determine the logic of “false” completely; it is possible to give a separate
deﬁnition of w |= p→ q.
The paraphrase task alluded to above showed that a conditional p→ q being
false is often (> 50%) interpreted as p→ ¬q! (We will refer to this property as
strong falsity.) This observation is not ours alone: Fillenbaum [82] observed
that in 60% of the cases the negation of a causal temporal conditional p →
q (“if he goes to Amsterdam, he will get stoned”) is taken to be p → ¬q;
for contingent universals (conditionals, such as the rule in the selection task,
where there is no salient connection between antecedent and consequent) the
proportion is 30%. In our experiment the latter proportion is even higher. Here
is an example of a subject using strong falsity when asked to imagine what
could be on the other side of a card.
Subject 26 [Standard Wason task; subject has chosen strong falsity in paraphrase task]
E. So you’re saying that if the statement is true, then the number [on the back of A] will
be 4. . . .What would happen if the statement were false?
S. Then it would be a number other than 4.
Note that strong falsity encapsulates a concept of necessary connection between
antecedent and consequent in the sense that even counterexamples are no mere
accidents, but are governed by a rule. If a subject believes that true and false in
this situation are exhaustive (i.e., that the logic is bivalent), this could reﬂect a
conviction that the cards have been laid out according to some rule, instead of
randomly. It is interesting to see what this interpretation means for card choices
in the selection tasks. If a subject has strong falsity and applies the (classical)
tautology (p→ q) ∨ (p→ ¬q), then (in the standard Wason task) either of the
cards A, 4 can show that p → q is not-false, hence true. Unfortunately, in the
standard setup ‘either of A, 4’ is not a possible response offered.
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In the tutorial experiment involving the two–rule task subjects were at liberty
to make such choices. In this case strong falsity has the effect of turning each
of the two rules into a biconditional, “U if and only if 8” and “I if and only if
8” respectively. Any card now distinguishes between the two rules, and we do
indeed ﬁnd subjects emphatically making this choice:
Subject 10
E. OK, so you want to revise your choice or do you want to stick with the 8?
S. No no . . . I might turn all of them.
E. You want to turn all of them?
S. No no no just one of them, any of them.
Perhaps the customary choice of p, q in the standard task is the projection of
“either of p, q” onto the given possibilities. These considerations just serve to
highlight the possibility that a given choice of cards is made for very differ-
ent reasons by different subjects, so that by itself statistical information on the
different card choices in the standard task must be interpreted with care.
Truth and Satisfaction
Subjects are persistently confused about several notions of truth that could pos-
sibly be involved. The intended interpretation is that the domain of discourse
consists of the four cards shown, and that the truth–value of the rule is to be
determined with respect to that domain. This interpretation is, however, re-
markably difﬁcult to get at. An alternative interpretation is that the domain
is some indeﬁnitely large population of cards, of which the four cards shown
are just a sample; this is the intuition that lies behind Oaksford and Chater’s
Bayesian approach [205]. We will return to this interpretation in section 3.5.2
below. The other extreme is that each card deﬁnes a domain of its own: each
card is to be evaluated against the rule independently.
This interpretation is the one suited to deontic conditionals, though it is also
possible with descriptive interpretations and is sometimes encouraged by “seek
violations” instructions (see [308]). What is perhaps most tantalizing reading
the early literature on the task is how little the experimenters themselves noticed
that deontic interpretation was critical. There was a good deal of attention to
the effects of “seek violators” instructions, but these were interpreted against
the background of Wason’s focus on falsiﬁcation, not on their effect of making
the cards independent of each other, or of removing the ambiguity between
judging the cases and judging the truth of the rule.
An intermediate position is that there are cards which by themselves sufﬁce
to determine the truth–value of the rule; we saw an instance of this while dis-
cussing examples of “strong falsity,” where the A and 4 cards are each decisive.
The phenomenon may be more general, however, a failure to appreciate the
relativity of the relation “the rule is true of the card.” That is, even if a card
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satisﬁes the rule (what we called ‘support’ in section 3.4.1), it need not make it
true.
Subject 10.
E. If you found an 8 on this card [I], what would it say?
S. It would say that rule 2 is true, and if the two cannot be true then rule 1 is wrong....(Subject
turns 8.)
E. OK. so it’s got an I on the back, what does that mean?
S. It means that rule 2 is true.
E. Are you sure?
S. I’m just thinking whether they are exclusive, yes because if there is an I then there is
an 8. Yes, yes, it must be that.
One experimental manipulation in the tutorial dialogue for the two–rule task
addressed this problem by making subjects ﬁrst turn U and I, to ﬁnd 8 on the
back of both. This caused great confusion, because the subjects’ logic (equating
truth with satisfaction) led them to conclude that therefore both rules must be
true, contradicting the instruction.
Subject 18 [Initial choice was 8].
E. Start with the U, turn that over.
S. U goes with 8.
E. OK. now turn the I over.
S. Oh God, I shouldn’t have taken that card, the ﬁrst ...
E. You turned it over and there was an 8.
S. There was an 8 on the other side, U and 8. If there is an I there is an 8, so they are both
true. [Makes a gesture that the whole thing should be dismissed.]
Subject 28.
E. OK, turn them.
S. [turns U, ﬁnds 8] So rule 1 is true.
E. OK, for completeness’ sake let’s turn the other cards as well.
S. OK. so in this instance if I had turned that one [I] ﬁrst then rule 2 would be true and
rule 1 would be disproved. Either of these is different. [U or I]
E. What does that actually mean, because we said that only one of the rules could be true?
Exactly one is true.
S. These cards are not consistent with these statements here.
On the other hand, subjects who ultimately got the two–rule task right also
appeared to have an insight into the intended relation between rule and cards.
Subject 6.
E. So say there were a U on the back of the 8, then what would this tell you?
S. I’m not sure where the 8 comes in because I don’t know if that would make the U one
right, because it is the opposite way around. If I turned that one [pointing to the U] just
to see if there was an 8, if there was an 8 it doesn’t mean that rule 2 is not true.
We claim that part of the difﬁculty of the standard task involving a descriptive
rule is the possibility of confusing the two relations between rule and cards.
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Transferring the “truth of the card” to the “truth of the rule” may be related to
what Wason called “veriﬁcation bias,” but it seems to cut deeper. One way to
transfer the perplexity unveiled in the above excerpts to the standard task would
be to do a tutorial experiment where the A has a 4 on the back, and the 7 an
A. If a subject suffering from a confusion about the relation between cards and
rule turns the A and ﬁnds 4, he should conclude that the rule is true, only to be
rudely disabused upon turning 7.
It is clear that for a deontic rule no such confusion can arise, because the
truth–value of the rule is not an issue.
Exceptions and Brittleness
The concept of truth Wason intended is that of “true without exceptions,” what
we call a brittle interpretation of the conditional. It goes without saying that
this is not how a conditional is generally interpreted in real life. And we do ﬁnd
subjects who struggle with the required transition from a notion of truth which
is compatible with exceptions, to exceptionless truth.
In terms of logical form, this is the issue of the formal expression into which
the natural language conditional is translated. As we observed in section 3.4,
the proper formal correlate is a formula p ∧ ¬e → q, where e is a proposition
letter denoting an exceptional state of affairs, which can be given further content
by a clause of the form “. . .→ e.”
Subject 18.
S. [Turns 3 and ﬁnds U] OK.. well no...well that could be an exception you see.
E. The U?
S. The U could be an exception to the other rule.
E. To the ﬁrst rule?
S. Yes, it could be an exception.
E. So could you say anything about the rule based on this? Say, on just having turned the
U and found a 3?
S. Well yes, it could be a little exception, but it does disprove the rule so you’d have to...
E. You’d have to look at the other ones?
S. Yes.
Similarly in the standard Wason task:
Subject 18.
S. If I just looked at that one on its own [7/A] I would say that it didn’t ﬁt the rule, and
that I’d have to turn that one [A] over, and if that was different [i.e., if there wasn’t an
even number] then I would say the rule didn’t hold.
E. So say you looked at the 7 and you turned it over and you found an A, then?
S. I would have to turn the other cards over . . . well it could be just an exception to the
rule so I would have to turn over the A.
Clearly, if a counterexample is not sufﬁcient evidence that the rule is false,
then it is dubious whether card turnings can prove the rule to be true or false
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at all. Subjects may accordingly be confused about how to interpret the in-
structions of the experiment. In our data, the term “(possible) exception” was
reserved for the ¬q card; the p card qualiﬁed as a potential falsiﬁer. We have
no explanation for this phenomenon, but if it is pervasive, it would give yet an-
other reason why subjects don’t bother to look at the ¬q card, even when they
are clear about its logical meaning.
The Cards as Sample
Above we noted that there are problems concerning the domain of interpreta-
tion of the conditional rule. The intended interpretation is that the rule applies
only to the four cards shown. However, the semantics of conditionals is such
that they tend to apply to an open-ended domain of cases. This can best be seen
in contrasting universal quantiﬁcation with the natural language conditional.
Universal quantiﬁcation is equally naturally used in framing contingent con-
textually determined statements as open-ended generalizations. So, to develop
Goodman’s example [102], “All the coins in my pocket this morning are cop-
per” is a natural way to phrase a local generalization with a ﬁxed enumerable
domain of interpretation. However, “If a coin is in my pocket this morning, it’s
copper” is a distinctly unnatural way of phrasing the same claim. The latter
even invites the fantastical interpretation that if a silver coin were put in my
pocket this morning it would become copper – that is an interpretation in which
a larger open-ended domain of objects is in play.
Similarly in the case of the four–card task, the clause that “the rule applies
only to the four cards” has to be explicitly included. One may question whether
subjects take this clause on board, since this interpretation is an unnatural one
for the conditional. It is further unnatural to call the sentence a rule if its ap-
plication is so local. Formally, this means that the set W of possible worlds
introduced in section 3.4.1 must be replaced by a much richer structure.
A much more natural interpretation is that the four cards are a sample from a
larger population. Indeed this is the point of purchase of Oaksford and Chater’s
proposals [205] that performance is driven by subjects’ assumptions about the
larger domain of interpretation. Some subjects raise this issue explicitly.
Subject 3.20 [in standard Wason task; has chosen A, 4.]
S. Well in that case you would have to turn all the cards, if you couldn’t work with just a
start point. Because then if you turned.... take a random set of cards, imagine a random set
of cards. If you had three A faces, and ﬁve 7 faces, but you couldn’t have any assumption
that that was a starting point, you would have to turn all the cards, because then you
might get a 60%, 40% divide, and you would have to take an average, and say the rule
isn’t right, but the majority of cards suggest that if there’s an A on one side then there’s a
4. A likelihood, in that case.
20. In Marian Counihan’s experiment.
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E. But if there was a likelihood, what would that mean?
S. It wouldn’t be a rule, it would be invalidated.
Here is another subject who thinks that truth or falsity can only be established
by (crude) probabilistic considerations.
Subject 26.
S. [has turned U,I, found an 8 on the back of both] I can’t tell which one is true.
E. OK, let’s continue turning.
S. [turns 3] OK, that would verify rule 2. [. . . ] Well, there are two cards that verify rule
2, and only one card so far that veriﬁes rule 1. Because if this [3] were verifying rule 1, it
should be an I on the other side.
E. Let’s turn [the 8].
S. OK, so that says that rule 2 is true as well, three of the cards verify rule 2 and only one
veriﬁes rule 1.
E. So you decide by majority.
S. Yes, the majority suggests rule 2.
It is interesting that 3/U is described as verifying rule 2, rather than falsifying
rule 1; U→8 is never ruled out:
S. It’s not completely false, because there is one card that veriﬁes rule 1.
Asked to describe her thought processes, the subject later comments
S. Well, when there’s two rules then you can’t say that they should both be true because
they are mutually exclusive . . . so depending on which way the cards are there is basically
a 50 per cent probability that either one is going to be true. . . .With one rule I think it
will be true or if it wouldn’t be true, then it seems more likely that it would be true.
3.5.3 Dependencies between Card Choices
The tutorial dialogues suggest that part of the difﬁculty of the selection task
consists in having to choose a card without being able to inspect what is on the
other side of the card. This difﬁculty can only be made visible in the dialogues
because there the subject is confronted with real cards, which she is not allowed
to turn at ﬁrst. It then becomes apparent that some subjects would prefer to
solve the problem by “reactive planning,” i.e., by ﬁrst choosing a card, turning
it, and deciding what to do based on what is on the other side. This source
of difﬁculty is obscured by the standard format of the experiment. The form
invites the subjects to think of the cards depicted as real cards, but at the same
time the answer should be given on the basis of the representation of the cards
on the form, i.e., with inherently unknowable backs. The instruction “Tick the
cards you want to turn ...” clearly does not allow the subject to return a reactive
plan.
The tutorials amply show that dependencies are a source of difﬁculty. Here
is an excerpt from a tutorial dialogue in the two–rule condition.
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Subject 1.
E. Same for the I, what if there is an 8 on the back?
S. If there is an 8 on the back, then it means that rule 2 is right and rule one is wrong.
E. So do we turn over the I or not?
S. Yes. Unless I’ve turned the U already.
And in a standard Wason task:
Subject 10.
S. OK, so if there is a vowel on this side then there is an even number, so I can turn A
to ﬁnd out whether there is an even number on the other side or I can turn the 4 to see if
there is a vowel on the other side.
E. So would you turn over the other cards? Do you need to turn over the other cards?
S. I think it just depends on what you ﬁnd on the other side of the card. No I wouldn’t
turn them.
...
E. If you found a K on the back of the 4?
S. Then it would be false.
...
S. But if that doesn’t disclude [sic] then I have to turn another one.
E. So you are inclined to turn this over [the A] because you wanted to check?
S. Yes, to see if there is an even number.
E. And you want to turn this over [the 4]?
S. Yes, to check if there is a vowel, but if I found an odd number [on the back of the A],
then I don’t need to turn this [the 4].
E. So you don’t want to turn . . .
S. Well, I’m confused again because I don’t know what’s on the back, I don’t know if this
one . . .
E. We’re only working hypothetically now.
S. Oh well, then only one of course, because if the rule applies to the whole thing then
one would test it.
...
E. What about the 7?
S. Yes, the 7 could have a vowel, then that would prove the whole thing wrong. So that’s
what I mean, do you turn one at a time or do you . . . ?
...
E. Well if you needed to know beforehand, without having turned these over, so you think
to yourself I need to check whether the rule holds, so what cards do I need to turn over?
You said you would turn over the A and the 4.
S. Yes, but if these are right, say if this [the A] has an even number and this has a vowel
[the 4], then I might be wrong in saying ”Oh it’s ﬁne,” so this could have an odd number
[the K] and this a vowel [the 7] so in that case I need to turn them all.
E. You’d turn all of them over? Just to be sure?
S. Yes.
Once one has understood Wason’s intention in specifying the task, it is easy
to assume that it is obvious that the experimenter intends subjects to decide
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what cards to turn before any information is gained from any turnings. Alterna-
tively, and equivalently, the instructions can be interpreted to be to assume the
minimal possible information gain from turnings. However, the obviousness of
these interpretations is possibly greater in hindsight, and so we set out to test
whether they are a source of difﬁculty in the task. Note that no contingencies of
choice can arise if the relation between rule and cards is interpreted deontically.
Whether one case obeys the law is unconnected to whether any other case does.
Hence the planning problem indicated above cannot arise for a deontic rule,
which might be one explanation for the good performance in that case.
In this connection it may be of interest to consider the so-called reduced
array selection task, or RAST for short, due to Wason and Green [296] and
discussed extensively by Margolis [182]. In its barest outline21 the idea of the
RAST is to remove the p and ¬p cards from the array of cards shown to the
subject, thus leaving only q and ¬q. The p and ¬p cards cause no trouble in the
standard task in the sense that p is chosen almost always, and ¬p almost never,
so one would expect that their deletion would cause little change in the response
frequencies for the remaining cards. Surprisingly, howevers, the frequency of
the ¬q response increases dramatically. From our point of view, this result
is less surprising, because without the possibility to choose p, dependencies
between card choices can no longer arise. This is not to say that this is the only
difﬁculty the RAST removes.
Getting Evidence for the Rule vs. Evaluation of the Cards
A related planning problem, which can, however, occur only on a nonstandard
logical understanding of the problem, is the following. Some subjects interpret
the instruction not to choose unnecessary cards as the injunction not to choose
a card whose turning may yield a nondecisive outcome.
In a few early tutorial dialogues involving the two–rule experiment, the back-
ground rule incorrectly failed to specify that the cards have one side either U or
I and on the other side either 3 or 8, owing to an error in the instructions. In this
case the competence response is not to turn 3 only, but to turn U, I, and 3. But
several subjects did not want to choose the 3 for the following reason.
Subject 7.
S. Then I was wondering whether to choose the numbers. Well, I don’t think so because
there might be other letters [than U,I] on the other side. There could be totally different
letters.
E. You can’t be sure?
S. I can’t be sure. I can only be sure if there is a U or an I on the other side. So this is not
very efﬁcient and this [3] does not give me any information. But I could turn the U or the I.
21. The actual experimental setup is much more complicated and not quite comparable to the experiments
reported here.
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Apparently the subject thinks that he can choose between various sets of
cards, each sufﬁcient, and the choice should be as parsimonious as possible
in the sense that every outcome of a turning must be relevant. To show that this
is not an isolated phenomenon, here is a subject engaged in a standard Wason
task:
Subject 5.
E So you would pick the A and you would pick the 4. And lastly the 7?
S. That’s irrelevant.
E. So why do you think it’s irrelevant?
S. Let me see again. Oh wait, so that could be an A or a K again [writing the options for
the back of 7 down], so if the 7 would have an A then that would prove me wrong. But if
it would have a K then that wouldn’t tell me anything.
E. So?
S. So these two [pointing to A and 4] give me more information, I think.
E. . . . You can turn over those two [A and 4].
S. [turns over the A]
E. So what does that say?
S. That it’s wrong.
E. And that one [4]?
S. That it’s wrong.
E. Now turn over those two [K and 7].
S. [Turning over the K] It’s a K and 4. Doesn’t say anything about this [pointing to the
rule]. [After turning over the 7] Aha.
E. So that says the rule is . . . ?
S. That the rule is wrong. But I still wouldn’t turn this over, still because I wouldn’t know
if it would give an A, it could give me an a K and that wouldn’t tell me anything.
E. But even though it could potentially give you an A on the back of it like this one has.
S. Yes, but that’s just luck. I would have more chance with these two [referring to the A
and the 4].
These subjects have no difﬁculty evaluating the meaning of the possible out-
comes of turning 3 (in the two–rule task), or 7 (in the standard Wason task), but
their choice is also informed by other considerations, in particular a perceived
tradeoff between the ‘information value’ of a card and the penalty incurred by
choosing it. Here is a subject very explicit about the trade-off.
Subject 3. [Standard Wason task; he realises the meaning of the 7 card, but that doesn’t
change his choice of only A]
S.... if there’s an A on this side (pointing to the underside of the 7), it would invalidate
the rule.
E. OK. So would that mean that you should turn the 7, or not?
S. Well you could turn the 7, but it says don’t turn any cards you don’t have to, and you
only have to turn the A.
E. OK. So the 7 could have an A on it, which would invalidate the rule, but..
S. [interrupting] It could have, but it could also have a K on it, so if you turned that [the
7]) and it had a K, it would make no difference to the rule, and you would have turned a
card that was unnecessary, which it says not to do.
E. But what if it had an A on it?
S. But what if it had a K on it?
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Of course this does not yet explain the observed evaluation of the 4/K card as
showing that the rule is wrong, and simultaneously taking the K/4 card to be
irrelevant. The combined evaluations seem to rule out a straightforward bicon-
ditional interpretation of the conditional, and also the explanation of the choice
of 4 as motivated by a search for conﬁrmatory evidence for the rule, as Wason
would have it. This pattern of evaluations is not an isolated phenomenon, so
an explanation would be most welcome. Even without such an explanation it is
clear that the problem indicated, how to maximise information gain from turn-
ings, cannot play a role in the case of deontic conditionals, since the status of
the rule is not an issue.
3.5.4 The Pragmatics of the Descriptive Selection Task.
The descriptive task demands that subjects seek evidence for the truth of a
statement which comes from the experimenter. The experimenter can safely
be assumed to know what is on the back of the cards. If the rule is false its ap-
pearance on the task sheet amounts to the utterance, by the experimenter, of a
knowing falsehood, possibly with intention to deceive. It is an active possibility
that doubting the experimenter’s veracity is a socially uncomfortable thing to
do.
Quite apart from the possible sociopsychological effects of discomfort, the
communication situation in this task is bizarre. The subject is ﬁrst given one
rule to the effect that the cards have letters on one side and numbers on the
other. This rule they are supposed to take on trust. Then they are given another
rule by the same information source and they are supposed not to trust it but
seek evidence for its falsity. If they do not continue to trust the ﬁrst rule, then
their card selections should diverge from Wason’s expectations. If they simply
forget about the background rule, the proper card choice would be A,K, and 7;
and if they want to test the background rule as well as the foreground rule, they
would have to turn all cards. Notice that with the deontic interpretation, this
split communication situation does not arise. The law stands and the task is to
decide whether some people other than the source obey it. Here is an example
of a subject who takes both rules on trust:
Subject 3. [Standard Wason task; has chosen A and 4]
E. Why pick those cards and not the other cards?
S. Because they are mentioned in the rule and I am assuming that the rule is true.
Another subject was rather bewildered when upon turning A he found a 7:
Subject 8.
S. Well there is something in the syntax with which I am not clear because it does not say
that there is an exclusion of one thing, it says “if there is an A on one side there is a 4 on
the other side.” So the rule is wrong.
E. This [pointing to A] shows that the rule is wrong.
S. Oh, so the rule is wrong, it’s not something I am missing.
3.5 Giving Subjects a Voice 75
Although this may sound similar to Wason’s “veriﬁcation bias,” it is actually
very different. Wason assumed that subjects would be in genuine doubt about
the truth–value of the rule, but would then proceed in an “irrational,” veriﬁca-
tionist manner to resolve the issue. What transpires here is that subjects take it
on the authority of the experimenter that the rule is true, and then interpret the
instructions as indicating those cards which are evidence of this.
Subject 22.
S. Well, my immediate [inaudible] ﬁrst time was to assume that this is a true statement,
therefore you only want to turn over the card that you think will satisfy the statement.
The communicative situation of the two–rule task is already much less bizarre,
since there is no longer any reason to doubt the veracity of the experimenter.
The excerpts also suggest that a modiﬁed standard task in which the rule is
attributed not to the experimenter but to an unreliable source might increase the
number of competence responses. It hardly needs emphasising anymore that
these problems cannot arise in the case of a deontic rule.
3.5.5 Interaction between Interpretation and Reasoning
The tutorial dialogues reveal another important source of confusion, namely the
interpretation of the anaphoric expression “one side . . . other side” and its inter-
action with the direction of the conditional. The trouble with “one side . . . other
side” is that in order to determine the referent of “other side,” one must have
kept in memory the referent of “one side.” That may seem harmless enough,
but in combination with the various other problems identiﬁed here, it may prove
too much. Even apart from limitations of working memory, subjects may have
a nonintended interpretation of “one side . . . other side,” wherein “one side” is
interpreted as “visible side” (the front, or face of the card) and “other side” is
interpreted as “invisible side” (the back of the card). The expression “one side
. . . other side” is then interpreted as deictic, not as anaphoric. That is, both “one
side” and “other side” can be identiﬁed by direct pointing, whereas in the case
of an anaphoric relationship the referent of “other side” depends on that of “one
side.” This possibility was investigated by Gebauer and Laming [92], who ar-
gue that deictic interpretation of “one side . . . other side” and a biconditional
interpretation of the conditional, both singly and in combination, are prevalent,
persistently held, and consistently reasoned with. Gebauer and Laming present
the four cards of the standard task six times to each subject, pausing to actually
turn cards which the subject selects, and to consider their reaction to what is
found on the back. Their results show few explicitly acknowledged changes
of choice, and few selections which reﬂect implicit changes. Subjects choose
the same cards from the sixth set as they do from the ﬁrst. Gebauer and Lam-
ing argue that the vast majority of the choices accord with normative reasoning
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from one of the four combinations of interpretation achieved by permuting the
conditional/biconditional with the deictic/anaphoric interpretations.22
We tried to ﬁnd further evidence for Gebauer and Laming’s view, and pre-
sented subjects with rules in which the various possible interpretations of ‘one
side . . . other side’ were spelled out explicitly; e.g., one rule was
(1) If there is a vowel on the face of the card, then there is an even number
on the back.
To our surprise, subjects seemed completely insensitive to the wording of the
rule and chose according to the standard pattern whatever the formulation; for
discussion see Stenning and van Lambalgen [264]. This result made us curious
to see what would happen in tutorial dialogues when subjects are presented with
a rule like (1), and indeed the slightly pathological (2)
(2) If there is a vowel on the back of the card, there is an even number on
the face of the card.
After having presented the subjects with these two rules, we told them that the
intended interpretation of “one side. . . other side” is that “one side” can refer to
the visible face or to the invisible back. Accordingly, they now had to choose
cards corresponding to
(3) If there is a vowel on one side (face or back), then there is an even
number on the other side (face or back).
We now provide a number of examples, culled from the tutorial dialogues,
which demonstrate the interplay between the interpretations chosen for the
anaphora and the conditional. The ﬁrst example shows us a subject who ex-
plicitly changes the direction of the implication when considering the back/face
anaphora, even though she is at ﬁrst very well aware that the rule is not bicon-
ditional.
Subject 12. [experiments (1), (2), (3)]
E. The ﬁrst rule says that if there is a vowel on the face of the card, so what we mean by
face is the bit you can see, then there is an even number on the back of the card, so that’s
the bit you can’t see. So which cards would you turn over to check the rule?
S. Well, I just thought 4, but then it doesn’t necessarily say that if there is a 4 that there is
a vowel underneath. So the A.
E. For this one it’s the reverse, so it says if there is a vowel on the back, so the bit you
can’t see, there is an even number on the face; so in this sense which ones would you
pick?
S. [Subject ticks 4] This one.
E. So why wouldn’t you pick any of the other cards?
22. Four combinations, because the deictic back/face reading of “one side . . . other side” appeared to be too
implausible to be considered. But see below.
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S. Because it says that if there is an even number on the face, then there is a vowel, so it
would have to be one of those [referring to the numbers].
...[Now in the standard Wason task]
E. [This rule] says that if there is a vowel on one side of the card, either face or back, then
there is an even number on the other side, either face or back.
S. I would pick that one [the A] and that one [the 4].
E. So why?
S. Because it would show me that if I turned that [pointing to the 4] over and there was
an A then the 4 is true, so I would turn it over. Oh, I don’t know. This is confusing me
now because I know it goes only one way.
...
S. No, I got it wrong didn’t I? It is one way, so it’s not necessarily that if there is an even
number then there is a vowel.
The second example is of a subject who gives the normative response in ex-
periment (3), but nonetheless goes astray when forced to consider the back/face
interpretation.
Subject 4. [experiments (1), (2), (3)]
E. OK. This says that if there is a vowel on the face [pointing to the face] of the card, then
there is an even number on the back of the card. How is that different to ...
S. Yes, it’s different because the sides are unidirectional.
E. So would you pick different cards?
S. If there is a vowel on the face . . . I think I would pick the A.
E. And for this one? [referring to the second statement] This is different again because it
says if there is a vowel on the back . . .
S. [completes sentence] then there is an even number on the face. I think I need to turn
over the 4 and the 7. Just to see if it [the 4] has an A on the back.
E. OK. Why wouldn’t you pick the rest of the cards?
S. I’m not sure, I haven’t made up my mind yet. This one [the A] I don’t have to turn over
because it’s not a vowel on the back, and the K is going to have a number on the back so
that’s irrelevant. This one [the 4] has to have a vowel on the back otherwise the rule is
untrue. I still haven’t made up my mind about this one [the 7]. Yes, I do have to turn it
over because if it has a vowel on the back then it would make the rule untrue. So I think
I will turn it over. I could be wrong.
[When presented with the rule where the anaphor has the intended interpretation]
S. I would turn over this one [the A] to see if there is an even number on the back and this
one [the 7] to see if there was a vowel on the back.
Our third example is of a subject who explicitly states that the meaning of the
implication must change when considering the back/face anaphora.
Subject 16. [experiments (1), (2), (3); subject has correctly chosen A in condition (1)]
E. The next one says that if there is a vowel on the back of the card, so that’s the bit you
can’t see, then there is an even number on the face of the card, so that’s the bit you can
see; so that again is slightly different, the reverse, so what would you do?
S. Again I’d turn the 4 so that would be proof but not ultimate proof but some proof . . .
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E. With a similar reasoning as before?
S. Yes, I’m pretty sure what you are after . . . I think it is a bit more complicated this time,
with the vowel on the back of the card and the even number, that suggests that if and only
if there is an even number there can be a vowel, I think I’d turn others just to see if there
was a vowel, so I think I’d turn the 7 as well.
[In condition (3) chooses A and 4]
And here is the most striking example, in which the interaction can clearly be
seen to go both ways.
Subject 23. [Standard Wason task]
S. Then for this card [4/K] the statement is not true.
E. Could you give a reason why it is not?
S. Well, I guess this also assumes that the statement is reversible, and if it becomes the
reverse, then instead of saying if there is an A on one side, there is a 4 on the other side,
it’s like saying if there was a 4 on one side, then there is an A on the other.
...
E. Now we’ll discuss the issue of symmetry, you said you took this to be symmetrical.
S. Well, actually it’s effectively symmetrical because you’ve got this either exposed or
hidden clause, for each part of the statement. So it’s basically symmetrical.
E. But there are two levels of symmetry involved here. One level is the symmetry between
visible face and invisible back, and the other aspect of symmetry is involved with the
direction of the statement “if . . . then.”
S. Right, OK. so I guess in terms of the “if . . . then” it is not symmetrical . . . In that case
you do not need that one [4], you just need [A]. . . . [while attempting the two-rule task he
makes some notes which indicate that he is still aware of the symmetry of the cards]
S. For U, if there is an 8 on the other side, then rule 1 is true, and you’d assume that rule 2
is false. And with I, if you have an 8, then rule 1 is false and rule 2 is true. . . . [the subject
has turned the U and I cards, which both carry 8 on the back, and proceeds to turn the 3
and 8 cards]
S. Now the 3, it’s a U and it’s irrelevant because there is no reverse of the rules. And the
8, it’s an I and again it’s irrelevant because there is no reverse of the rules. . . .Well, my
conclusion is that the framework is wrong. I suppose rules one and two really hold for
the cards.
E. We are deﬁnitely convinced only one rule is true . . .
S. Well . . . say you again apply the rules, yes you could apply the rules again in a second
stab for these cards [3 and 8] here.
E. What do you mean by “in a second stab?”
S. Well I was kind of assuming before you could only look at the cards once based on
what side was currently shown to you. . . . This one here [8] in the previous stab was
irrelevant, because it would be equivalent to the reverse side when applied to this rule, I
guess now we can actually turn it over and ﬁnd the 8 leads to I, and you can go to this
card again [3], now we turn it over and we apply this rule again and the U does not lead
to an 8 here. So if you can repeat turns rule 2 is true for all the cards.
E. You ﬁrst thought this card [3] irrelevant.
S. Well it’s irrelevant if you can give only one turn of the card.
What’s interesting in this exchange is that in the ﬁrst experiment the variable,
“symmetric” reading of the anaphora seems to trigger a symmetric reading of
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the implication, whereas in the second experiment asymmetric readings of the
anaphora and the implications are conjoined, even though he was at ﬁrst aware
that the intended reading of the anaphora is symmetric. (The fact that the sub-
ject wants to turn the cards twice is evidence for the constant (asymmetric)
reading of the anaphora.)
We thus see that, in these subjects, the direction of the conditional is related
to the particular kind of deixis assumed for “one side . . . other side.” This shows
that the process of natural language interpretation in this task need not be com-
positional, and that, contrary to Gebauer and Laming’s claim, subjects need not
have a persistent interpretation of the conditional, at least when asked to justify
themselves. Two questions immediately arise:
1. Why would there be this particular interaction?
2. What does the observed interaction tell us about performance in the standard
Wason task?
Question (2) can easily be answered. If subjects were to decompose the
anaphoric expression “one side. . . other side” into two deictic expressions
“face/back” and “back/face” and were then to proceed to reverse the direction
of the implication in the latter case, they should choose the p and q cards. Also,
since the expression “one side . . . other side” does not appear in a deontic rule
such as “if you want to drink alcohol, you have to be over 18,” subjects will not
be distracted by this particular difﬁculty.
Question (1) is not answered as easily. There may be something pragmat-
ically peculiar about a conditional of which the consequent, but not the an-
tecedent, is known. These are often used for diagnostic purposes (also called
abduction): if we have a rule which says “if switch 1 is down, the light is on,”
and we observe that the light is on, we are tempted to conclude that switch 1
must be down. This, however, is making an inference, not stating a conditional;
but then subjects are perhaps not aware of the logical distinction between the
two.
It is of interest that the difﬁculty discussed here was already identiﬁed by
Wason and Green [296] albeit in slightly different terms: their focus is on the
distinction between a uniﬁed and a disjoint representation of the stimulus (i.e., a
card). A uniﬁed stimulus is one in which the terms referred to in the conditional
cohere in some way (say as properties of the same object, or as ﬁgure and
ground), whereas in a disjoint stimulus the terms may be properties of different
objects, spatially separated.
Wason and Green conjectured that it is disjoint representation which accounts
for the difﬁculty in the selection task. To test the conjecture they conducted
three experiments, varying the type of uniﬁed representation. Although they
use a reduced array selection task (RAST), in which one chooses only between
q and ¬q, relative performance across their conditions can still be compared.
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Their contrasting sentence rule pairs are of great interest, partly because they
happen to contain comparisons of rules with and without anaphora. There are
three relevant experiments numbered 2 to 4. Experiment 2 contrasts uniﬁed
and disjoint representations without anaphora in either, and ﬁnds that uniﬁed
rules are easier. Experiment 3 contrasts uniﬁed and disjoint representations with
the disjoint rule having anaphora. Experiment 4 contrasts uniﬁed and disjoint
representations but removes the anaphora from the disjoint rule while adding
another source of linguistic complexity (an extra tensed verb plus pronominal
anaphora) to the uniﬁed one. For a full discussion of their experiments we refer
the reader to Stenning and van Lambalgen [264]; here we discuss only their
experiment 2.
In experiment 2, cards show shapes (triangles, circles) and colors (black,
white), and the two sentences considered are
(4) Whenever they are triangles, they are on black cards.
(5) Whenever there are triangles below the line, there is black above the
line.
That is, in (4) the stimulus is taken to be uniﬁed because it is an instance of
ﬁgure/ground, whereas in (5) the stimulus consists of two parts and hence is
disjoint. Performance for sentence (5) was worse than for sentence (4) (for
details, see Wason and Green [296,pp. 604-607]).
We would describe the situation slightly differently, in terms of the contrast
between deixis and anaphora. Indeed, the experimental setup is such that for
sentence (5), the lower half of the cards is hidden by a bar, making it analogous
to condition (2), where the object mentioned in the antecedent is hidden. We
have seen above that some subjects have difﬁculties with the intended direction
of the conditional in experiment (2). Sentence (5) would be the “difﬁcult half”
of the anaphora-containing sentence “Whenever there are triangles on one side
of the line, there is black on the other side of the line.” Sentence (4) does not
contain any such anaphora. With Wason and Green we would therefore predict
that subjects ﬁnd (5) more difﬁcult.
3.5.6 Subjects’ Understanding of Propositional Connectives
We have discussed some aspects of the interpretation of the conditional above,
in particular those which are connected with the interpretation of the task, such
as the distinction between descriptive and deontic conditionals. This section is
devoted to some of the wilder shores of the semantics of conditionals: the exis-
tential import of the conditional, and the related interpretation of the conditional
as a conjunction.
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Existential Import of the Conditional
In a second set of tutorial experiments23 all the interpretational difﬁculties re-
viewed above were apparent. This is encouraging, because it points to the sta-
bility of the factors identiﬁed. Interestingly, a new difﬁculty surfaced while
subjects went through condition (2), which involves the rule “if there is a vowel
on the back of the card, there is an even number on the face of the card.” To
understand what is going on here, it is important to make the quantiﬁcation over
cards in the rule explicit: “for all cards, if there is a vowel on one side of the
card, there is an even number on the other side of the card.” A well-known issue
in the semantics of the universal quantiﬁer, ﬁrst raised by Aristotle, is whether
this quantiﬁer has “existential import”: if “all A are B” is true, does this entail
that there are As which are Bs? Aristotle thought so, and he makes his point
by means of two examples: of the two statements, “Some man is white” and
“Some man is not white” one or the other must be true; and “Every pleasure
is good” implies “Some pleasure is good.” The examples show that Aristotle
takes subjects and predicates to denote nonempty sets. This is precisely what
our subjects appear to be doing, in requiring that, in order for the conditional
to be true, there must be at least one card which satisﬁes both antecedent and
consequent. They consider the rule to be undecided if there is no such instance,
even in the absence of counterexamples.24
Subject 1. [in experiment (2)].
S. In this case I think you would need to turn the 7. And... that would be the only one you
need to turn. ... ’Cause, these two [A and K] have to have numbers on the back, so they
don’t apply ... Which leaves these two [4 and 7]. Erm. And if there’s an A on the back
then it ﬁts the rule [pointing to the 4] and if there is a K on the back then it doesn’t apply
to the rule, so it doesn’t matter, which leaves this one [pointing to the 7], ’cause if there’s
an A on the back of here, and it’s a 7, then you’ve disproved the rule.
E. OK, and if there is not an A on the back of that [the 7]?
S. If there’s not an A on the back. [thinks] then ... maybe you do need to turn that one
[pointing to the 4]. If there’s not an A on the back [of the 7], then it doesn’t disprove the
rule and it doesn’t prove it. So you’d have to turn the 4 I think.
E. And what if the 4 also didn’t have an A on the back - what would that mean for the
rule?
S. Well then ... for this set of cards, the rule... it would disprove the rule I suppose. Cause
if there is not an A on the back of this card [pointing to the 4], [pause] then... there isn’t
a 4 on the face of it. OK, if there’s not an A on the back, then none of these cards have an
A on the back, and a 4 on the face, which is what the rule states. So for this set of cards
it’s disproved, it’s not true.
It is abundantly clear that the subject considers existential import to be a nec-
essary requirement for the truth of the conditional. The next subject expresses
this insight by means of the modal “could” :
23. Performed in Edinburgh in 2003 by the our student Marian Counihan. The design was the same as that
of the ﬁrst experiment.
24. We will have more to say on this phenomenon in section 3.5.6 below.
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Subject 7. [in experiment (2)].
S. If there’s a A on the back of this card [the 7] then it’s ﬁnished, you basically don’t care
anymore. Whereas if there’s a K, all it seems to prove really is that this [the rule] could
be true. ... I suppose we do... need to turn this card [the 4], just to afﬁrm the rule.
The next subject has a slightly different interpretation, and says that if there is
no card instantiating the rule (and no falsifying card), the rule is still undecided.
This probably reﬂects a different understanding of what the domain of the rule
is: the cards on the table, or a wider set of cards.
Subject 2. [in experiment (2): has stated he wants to turn 4 and 7]
E. OK, now say you turned both of those [pointing to 4 and 7] and you found an A on
both.
S. Then the rule would be . . . wrong. Because if there’s an A on the back of both of them,
then the rule says that there would be a 4 on the front of both of them, but, there’s not, so,
I mean there’s a 4 on one of them, but then there is also a 7 on one of them, so, the rule’s
wrong, I mean, it doesn’t always follow, so it’s wrong. [Pause] Although it doesn’t say
always, there [pointing at the rule], but I am presuming it means always. I don’t know
[laughs].
E. Yes, it is meant to apply to any of them.
S. Yeah, OK, so the rule would be wrong if there’s an A on both [4 and 7].
...
S. ... hang on, with an A and 7 there [on the 7 card], and an A and a 4 there [pointing
to the 4] it would be wrong, still ... because of the A and 7, yeah, the A and the 4’s
correct, but because that [pointing to the 7 card] is incorrect, that’s, the whole rule would
be incorrect.
E. So, in either case, if there was an A on this side [pointing to the overturned 7 card],
this other side of the 7, it would make the rule incorrect?
S. Yeah.
E. And despite what was on the [pointing to the 4]?
S. Oh, yeah, yeah. No OK, so you only need to turn that one [the 7]. Do you? [looks at
rule] No you don’t. No, sorry, no [indicates 4 and 7 cards again] you do need to turn them
both, because if that is a K [turning over the 7], then you need to turn that one to check
that one [the 4] to check that that is not a K as well.
E. And if that was a K as well?
S. Then the rule ... [pause] then you wouldn’t know ... because ... there’s nothing saying
you can’t have a K and a 4, but all it is saying is whether or not there’s an A on the back,
if there’s a K on the back of both of these [the 4 and the 7] then you don’t know, the rule
might be right, or might be wrong.
These observations have some relevance to performance in the standard task.
Suppose again, as we did in section 3.5.5, that subjects split the rule into the
components (1) and (2). The ﬁrst component yields the answer A; this card
simultaneously establishes existential import. Interestingly, existential import
as applied to the second condition yields the answers 4,7, so that we have found
yet another way to justify the mysterious p, q,¬q response in the original task.
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Interpreting the Conditional as a Conjunction
We now return to the possible interpretations of conditionals and their rele-
vance to subjects’ understanding of the task. In the literature on Wason’s task
only two types are distinguished: the unidirectional material implication, and
the biconditional. When one turns to the linguistics literature, the picture is
dramatically different. An interesting source here is Comrie’s paper Condition-
als: A Typology [44], where conditionals are distinguished according to the
degree of hypotheticality of the antecedent. In principle this is a continuous
scale. Viewed cross-linguistically, the degree of hypotheticality ranges from
certain, a case where English uses when (“when he comes, we’ll go out for
dinner,” 25 via neutral (“if a triangle is right-angled, it satisﬁes Pythagoras’ the-
orem”) to highly unlikely (“if we were to ﬁnish this paper on time, we could
submit it to the proceedings”) and even false, the counterfactual (“if we had
ﬁnished this paper on time, we would have won the best paper prize”). If con-
ditionals come with expectations concerning the degree of hypotheticality of
the antecedent, this might affect the truth condition for the conditional that the
subject implicitly applies. For example, we have seen in section 3.5.6 that some
subjects claim the conditional has existential import; this may be viewed as the
implicature that the antecedent of the conditional is highly likely.
Indeed we claim that, in order to understand performance in Wason’s task, it
is imperative to look into the possible understandings of the conditional that a
subject might have, and for this, language typology appears to be indispensable.
An interesting outcome of typological research is that the conditional ostensibly
investigated in Wason’s task, the hypothetical conditional, where one does not
want to assert the truth of the antecedent, may not even be the most prevalent
type of conditional. We include a brief discussion of the paper Typology of if-
Clauses by Athanasiadou and Dirven [4] (cf. also [5]) to corroborate this point;
afterward we will connect their analysis to our observations.
In a study of 300 instances of conditionals in the COBUILD corpus [42], the
authors observed that there occurred two main types of conditionals, course of
event conditionals, and hypothetical conditionals. The hypothetical condition-
als are roughly the ones familiar from logic; an example is
If there is no water in your radiator, your engine will overheat immediately. [42,17]
A characteristic feature of hypothetical conditionals is the events referred to in
antecedent and consequent are seen as hypothetical, and the speaker can make
use of a whole scale of marked and unmarked attitudes to distance herself from
claims concerning likelihood of occurrence. The presence of “your” is what
makes the interpretation more likely to be hypothetical: the antecedent need
not ever be true for “your” car. Furthermore, in paradigmatic cases (temporal
25. Dutch, however, can also use the conditionals marker “als” here.
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and causal conditionals) antecedent and consequent are seen as consecutive. By
contrast in course–of– event conditionals such as
If students come on Fridays, they get oral practice in Quechua (from [44])
or
If there is a drought at this time, as so often happens in central Australia, the fertilised
egg in the uterus still remains dormant [42,43]
the events referred to in antecedent and consequent are considered to be gener-
ally or occasionally recurring, and they may be simultaneous. Generic expres-
sions such as “on Fridays” or “as so often happens ...” tend to force this reading
of the conditional. e.g., the ﬁrst example invokes a scenario in which some stu-
dents do come on Fridays and some don’t, but the ones who do get oral practice
in Quechua. The generic expression “on Fridays,” together with implicit as-
sumptions about student timetables and syllabuses, causes the sentence to have
the habitual “whenever” reading. It is also entailed that some students do come
on Fridays, generally. These examples also indicate that course–of–event con-
ditionals refer to events situated in real time, unlike hypothetical conditionals.
It should now be apparent that the logical properties of course–of–event condi-
tionals are very different from their hypothetical relatives. For example, what
is immediately relevant to our concerns is that course–of–event conditionals re-
fer to a population of cases, whereas hypothetical conditionals may refer to a
single case; this is relevant, because it has frequently been claimed that sub-
jects interpret the task so that the rule refers to a population of which the four
cards shown are only a sample (cf. section 3.5.2 ). Interestingly, Athanasiadou
and Dirven estimated that about 44% of conditionals in COBUILD are of the
course–of–events variety, as opposed to 37% of the hypothetical variety. Need-
less to say, these ﬁgures should be interpreted with caution, but they lend some
plausibility to the claim that subjects may come to the task with a nonintended,
yet perfectly viable, understanding of the conditional. We will now discuss the
repercussions of this understanding for subjects’ card selections.
One of the questions in the paraphrase task asked subjects to determine which
of four statements follow from the rule “Every card which has a vowel on one
side has an even number on the other side.” More than half of our subjects
chose the possibility “It is the case that there is a vowel on one side and an
even number on the other side.” Fillenbaum [82] already observed that there
are high frequencies for conjunctive paraphrases for positive conditional threats
(“if you do this I’ll break your arm” becomes “do this and I’ll break your arm”)
(35%), positive conditional promises (“if you do this you’ll get a chocolate”
becomes “do this and I’ll get you a chocolate”) (40%) and negative conditional
promises (“if you don’t cry I’ll get you an ice cream” becomes “don’t cry and
I’ll get you an ice cream”) (50%). However, he did not observe conjunctive
paraphrases for contingent universals (where there is no intrinsic connection
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between antecedent and consequent) or even law-like universals. Clearly, the
statements we provided are contingent universals, so Filenbaum’s observations
on promises and threats are of no direct relevance. However, if the course–
of–event conditional is a possible reading of the conditional, the inference to a
conjunction observed in many of our subjects makes much more sense. Clearly
the truth–conditions for conditionals of this type differ from the intended inter-
pretation; to mention but one difﬁcult case, when is a generic false? Thus, a
generic interpretation may lead to different evaluations and selections. Here is
an example of what a conjunctive reading means in practice.
Subject 22. [subject has chosen the conjunctive reading in the paraphrase task]
E. [Asks subject to turn the 7]
S. That one . . . that isn’t true. There isn’t an A on the front and a 4 on the back. . . . you
turn over those two [A and 4] to see if they satisfy it, because you already know that those
two [K and 7] don’t satisfy the statement.
E. [bafﬂed] Sorry, which two don’t satisfy the rule?
S. These two don’t [K and 7], because on one side there is K and that should have been
A, and that [7] wouldn’t have a 4, and that wouldn’t satisfy the statement.
E. Yes, so what does that mean . . . you didn’t turn it because you thought that it will not
satisfy?
S. Yes.
Clearly, on a conjunctive reading, the rule is already falsiﬁed by the cards as
exhibited (since the K and 7 cards falsify); no turning is necessary. The subject
might, however, feel forced by the experimental situation to select some cards,
and accordingly reinterprets the task as checking whether a given card satisﬁes
the rule. This brings us to an important consideration: how much of the prob-
lem is actually caused by the conditional, and how much is caused by the task
setting, no matter what binary logical connective is used?
The literature on the selection task, with very few exceptions, has assumed
that the problem is a problem speciﬁc to conditional rules. Indeed, it would
be easy to infer also from the foregoing discussion of descriptive conditional
semantics that the conditional (and its various expressions) is unique in causing
subjects so much difﬁculty in the selection task, and that our only point is that
a sufﬁciently rich range of interpretations for the conditional must be used to
frame psychological theories of the selection task.
However, the issues already discussed – the nature of truth, response to ex-
ceptions, contingency, pragmatics – are all rather general in their implications
for the task of seeking evidence for truth. One can distinguish the assess-
ment of truth of a sentence from truthfulness of an utterer for sentences of
any form. The robustness or brittleness of statements to counterexamples is
an issue which arises for any generalization. The sociopsychological effects of
the experimenter’s authority, and the communicative complexities introduced
by having to take a cooperative stance toward some utterances and an adver-
sarial one toward others is also a general problem of pragmatics that can affect
statements of any logical form. Contingencies between feedback from early
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evidence on choice of subsequent optimal evidence seeking are general to any
form of sentence for which more than one case is relevant. What would hap-
pen, for example, if the rule were stated using the putatively least problematical
connective, conjunction? Chapter 4 gives the answer.
3.6 Matching Bias: the “No-Processing” Explanation
We have paid scant attention to more traditional interpretations of the selection
task, focusing instead on the logical difﬁculties experienced by subjects in the
descriptive task. This is not to imply that the traditional explanations are com-
pletely without foundation. We provide one example here: Evans’s “matching
strategy.” This was proposed as a shallow processing strategy, operating auto-
matically. We will have more to say on the distinction between shallow and
deep processing in chapter 7 on the suppression task; but for now we give some
examples showing that this type of response also occurs when subjects fully
engage with the task.
Evans (see, for example, the review in Evans, Newstead, and Byrne [76])
deﬁnes the “matching strategy” as the choice of cards which match the atomic
parts of the content of a clause in a rule. So for the rule If p then q, p and q
cards match: for the rule If p then not q still p and q cards match: and the same
for If not p then q. Here is a particularly striking example.
Subject 9. [experiment (1)]
E. [This rule] says that if there is a vowel on the face, then there is an even number on the
back. So what we mean by face is the bit you can see, and by back the bit you can’t see.
Which cards would you need to turn over to check if the rule holds?
S. This one [ticks A] and this one [ticks 7]
E. So why would you pick those two?
S. One has a vowel on the face and the other one an even number. If you turn it, if it’s
true, then it should have an even number [pointing to the A] and this should have a vowel
[pointing to the 7].
E. [bafﬂed] So you picked, Oh you were saying if there was a vowel underneath [pointing
to the 7]
S. That’s because I’m stupid. Even number is 1,3,5, . . .
E. No, 2,4,6, . . .
S. [Corrects 7 to 4, so her ﬁnal choice was A and 4] OK. So these.
The next example is straightforward:
Subject 3. [Standard Wason task; has chosen A and 4]
E. Why pick those cards and not the other cards?
S. Because they are mentioned in the rule and I am assuming that the rule is true.
Evans conceptualises the use of this strategy as a “superﬁcial” response to both
rule and task which subjects adopt prior to processing the information to the
level of a coherent interpretation of the whole sentence. As such, the strategy
may be applied prior to or alongside other processing strategies. It is taken to
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explain the modal response of turning the p and q cards in the abstract task. It
must assume that something else is going on (perhaps superimposed on match-
ing) when subjects adopt other responses. Thematic effects have to be explained
in terms of contentful processes engaging other processes at deeper levels than
matching.26
3.7 The Subject’s Predicament
So what is the upshot of this extended semantic analysis of the range of sub-
jects’ interpretations and factors inﬂuencing them which were revealed by these
Socratic dialogues? We feel the need to provide some more synoptic integra-
tion of this mass of rich observations, though what we offer here should be
understood as a very partial view.
Some effects are global. For example, content may strongly shift subjects to-
ward a deontic interpretation, and then few interpretational problems arise. The
two cards Wason expected to be turned are the only possible violators of the
“law.” To produce an integrated sketch of some of these global effects, table 3.2
presents some of the global parameters an interpretation must ﬁx, and hints at
their relations. Under descriptive interpretations, robust ones (tolerating excep-
tions) lead immediately to conﬂict with ﬁnite sets of cases determining truth–
value, and problems of distinguishing exceptions from counterexamples, which
in turn may lead to the “cards as sampled from a population” interpretation.
Brittle interpretation allays these problems but raises the issue of contingencies
between card choices. Both robust and brittle interpretations are susceptible
to both kinds of reversibility – of physical cards, and of logical rule. Deontic
interpretations suffer from none of these problems: cards are independent of
each other, only cases are judged (not rule), the veracity of the experimenter is
not at stake. The content triggering a deontic reading generally makes for log-
ical irreversibility, and there are no anaphors to interact with card reversibility
issues.
But many of the factors affecting interpretation are local and interact with
other parameters in determining the interpretive outcome, defying tabulation. A
useful supplementary way to draw together the complex threads is to tabulate
some ranges of interpretations which can lead to each of the four dominant
choice combinations in table 3.1, which jointly account for 92% of the subjects.
Table 3.3 lays out some of the parameters leading to these common choice
combinations.
26. Oaksford and Stenning [204] by investigating a full range of clause negations in both selection and
evaluation tasks, showed that matching is not a particularly good explanation of performance with the full
range of negated conditionals. They argue that a better summary of the data is in terms of the degree
to which the material and instructions allow negative clauses to be processed as corresponding positive
characterizations.
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Table 3.2 Global parameters as they contrast between descriptive and deontic interpretation
descriptive deontic
robust brittle
conﬂict with task dependencies between cards independent cards
“population” reading judging cases–not rule
reversibility no reversibility
of cards of rule
discomfort with challenging E no calling E a liar
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Table 3.3 Some interpretation features and the main choice-combinations to which they may
lead in the descriptive selection task: some choices on other tasks are mentioned with their
interpretational feature.
Main card choice combinations Interpretational Feature
p p, q p,¬q p, q,¬q (in italics)
strong negation:
x x choose either (both) letter(s),
or ¬q in two–rule task
not-false doesn’t mean true:
x ruling out counterexamples,
but also seeking positive case
truth vs. satisfaction ambiguity:
x if resolved, removes contingency issues
if unresolved in two-rule task, reject materials
robustness:
immediate conﬂict with task,
x may invoke sample reading
choice contingencies:
x choose true antecedent ﬁrst
RAST and two-rule tend to remove problem
can’t call E a liar!:
x assume rule true,
seek cases that make rule true
in conjunction task:
x test cards of unknown truth–value
existential import of universal
x rule out counterexamples
but positive instance required too
assume cards irreversible:
x maintain logical irreversibility,
x or convert and conjoin conditional
superﬁcial mention in rule
x determines relevance
“matching”
deontic conjunctive interpretation
x or one-card-at-a-time
descriptive interpretation
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3.8 Conclusion
The explorations by dialogue reported here have cast their net somewhat wider
than is customary, to obtain information about subjects’ processing and seman-
tic understanding of the task. The picture that emerges is complex. The dif-
ferences between subjects, even when they make the same selection, are huge
and defy any single explanation. All choice combinations reﬂect more than one
interpretation and some combinations we are still struggling to explain. For
example, there appears to be no explanation for a very common pattern of eval-
uation and selection: p, q is selected, q/¬p is evaluated as falsifying, and ¬p/q
is evaluated as irrelevant, although we ventured a hypothesis in section 3.5.5. It
does not seem very helpful to dismiss such behavior as “irrational.” It is more
interesting to relate this and other behavior to subjects’ understanding of the
task, but much richer data are required than the four “bits” received from each
subject in the classical task. We have seen that understanding interpretation
sometimes leads to clariﬁcation of what subjects are trying to do, and that often
turns out to be quite different than the experimenter assumes.
The granularity of these data is very much ﬁner than experimental psychol-
ogists have deemed necessary for the analysis of this task (though this ﬁne
granularity is rather ordinary in lots of areas of psychology such as visual per-
ception). A common reaction is that this interpretational variety is all very well
for linguistics, but surely it is obvious that this is not what is going on in the few
seconds that subjects think about what cards to turn over in the original task,
and besides, if this is what is going on, it’s far too hard to study. This attitude
was crystallized for KS by a remark made after he had given a talk on the mate-
rial (ironically in Wason’s old department). “You have given a very interesting
analysis of the task from a semantic point of view,” the questioner commented,
“but what we need is a psychological explanation.” The questioner seemed to
assume that when linguists and logicians substantiate an analysis, that they are
claiming “ordinary speakers” have conscious access to the analysis within its
own terminology. Equally, they assume that even demonstrating the formal se-
mantics is correct doesn’t have the implication that ordinary speakers actually
mean by the expression, what the analysis says they mean.
We would be the ﬁrst to acknowledge that our analysis isn’t more than a
beginning, but what is striking here is the idea that it is not a “psychological”
analysis. Cognitive psychology is founded on the idea that people interpret their
fresh experience in the light of their long–term knowledge and that the resulting
rich structures furnish them the wherewithal to reason to their decisions. If we
don’t know how subjects interpret a task, or its materials, then how are we
to start understanding what they do? And if they do lots of different things
which are each comprehensible on the basis of their different interpretations,
then hadn’t we better have different explanations for their different acts? In
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some subﬁelds of psychology, the questioner’s comment might have been taken
to mean that what is needed is a mental process model and that that is what sets
semantics off from psychology. We have some sympathy since we agree that
process models would be really nice to have, and we certainly don’t have one,
although the logical models in section 3.4 are an essential prerequisite for a
process model. None of the theories of this task are any more process theories
than the approach offered here – most of them less so. And if reasoning to
an interpretation among a rich set of possibilities is the mental process going
on, then how can we get a process model without any account of the range of
interpretations in play? In the next chapter we will bring evidence that the gap
between the interpretational problems appearing in these dialogues and what
goes on in the traditional controlled experiments is not so great as it might at
ﬁrst appear.
These dialogues may also provide challenges to natural language semantics.
While it is of course possible to attribute the vacillations in interpretation (of
conditionals and anaphora, for example) to performance factors, it seems more
interesting to look into the structure of the linguistic competence model to see
how the observed interferences may arise. It seems to us that dialogues such
as these provide a rich source of data for semantics and pragmatics, which
promises to yield deeper insight into interpretation and processing of natural
language.
What we hope to have demonstrated in this chapter is that the data do not
warrant abandoning the search for formal models to provide bases for explain-
ing subjects’ reasoning behavior. Instead, formal models embodying insights
from neighboring ﬁelds are useful guides for a richer program of empirical ex-
ploration and testing. There is a danger that deceptively simple models obscure
the phenomena in need of explanation, and in so doing likewise obscure the
educational relevance of the logical competence models and their highly objec-
tiﬁed stance toward language. Stanovich [254] shows how closely related this
stance is to other educational achievements. The tutorial dialogues presented
here provide some insight into the variety of students’ problems which may be
of some help to those involved in teaching reasoning skills.

4 From Logic via Exploration toControlled Experiment
In chapter 2 we presented logical analysis suggesting a wide range of pos-
sibilities for interpreting conditionals, and in chapter 3 this was followed by
prima facie evidence that subjects experience severe interpretational problems
in the original descriptive selection task and that they respond to these prob-
lems in many different ways. The analysis uncovered a range of difﬁculties
with abstract descriptive conditionals that do not arise if deontic interpretation
is strongly suggested by familiar content. But the fact that these problems sur-
face in Socratic dialogues does not mean that they occurred in the original ex-
periments. This chapter examines how to get from the evidence of exploration
to evidence of controlled experiment. We present experimental evidence, but
we are just as much concerned with the process of design of such experiments.
In accordance with our comments in chapter 1 about the need for exploration,
and the establishment and bridging of substantial gaps between theory and data,
the issues that go into designing experiments to interact with formal theories are
more important than this particular task.
The backbone of this chapter is an experiment reported in [265], augmented
with some material from subsequent experiments. The results of several exper-
imental manipulations are compared with baseline performance on the classical
descriptive task. Each manipulation is designed to assess contributions of dif-
ferent interpretational problems proposed by semantic analysis, and found in
the subjects’ dialogues, to Wason’s original results. So the logic of the research
plan is rather simple. We proposed that Wason did not understand the conﬂicts
that his subjects experienced between their initial interpretations of instructions
and materials, and that these interpretational conﬂicts can explain why their
behavior does not conform to the classical logical model which Wason unques-
tioningly assumed to be the relevant competence model for performance.
So our research plan will be to design manipulations which alleviate sev-
eral interpretational conﬂicts and show that each alleviation produces more of
the responding which Wason expected. Our second important claim is that the
chief factor determining whether subjects conform to Wason’s expectations is
whether they adopt a descriptive or a deontic interpretation – we claim that
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the “easy tasks” are easy because they invoke deontic interpretation. This claim
presents our ﬁrst design choice: we elect to study how to makeWason’s original
descriptive task “easy” i.e., to get a descriptive task to invoke the classical in-
terpretation he assumed. We could instead have chosen to systematically make
the deontic tasks “hard” by introducing the factors which produce problems of
interpretation. Why do we choose the ﬁrst fork? There are important issues
about deontic reasoning, so the second path is not without interest.1 But the
overwhelmingly most important factor in our choice is that we want to study de-
scriptive conditionals, and in particular robust non-truth-functional descriptive
conditionals, because we claim they are crucial for understanding a wide range
of other tasks in the psychology of reasoning. So we will present in chapter 7
a range of logical models of these robust conditionals applied to understanding
human interpretation. In chapter 9 we study the very distinct attitudes of autistic
people toward descriptive rules, and these rules will be central again in chapter
11 when we return to the relation between interpretation and derivation.
If this is the long-term strategy, what are the tactics? We have to design ma-
nipulations to alleviate each of several interpretational problems. We cannot do
them all. Why choose the ones we choose? This is a partly pragmatic question.
One may have a feeling for which are the most important problems – important
theoretically, and important in terms of what difﬁculty of problem they present
to what proportion of subjects. One’s wish list of manipulations may be or-
dered but still one needs inspiration as to how to test. However elegant one’s
description of an interpretational problem, there is no guarantee that there is a
simple way of testing whether subjects actually experience the problem. One
can but try to design such manipulations. Good experimentalists are, among
other things, good at designing workable tests. Even having designed what
looks like the perfect test, there is no guarantee that it will produce a result ei-
ther way. It may not engage subjects in a way that impinges on their responses,
and of course it may be hard to tell from a negative result that subjects don’t
experience the problem the manipulation was designed to exhibit. Negative
evidence is weak evidence, and means hard work ruling out the alternatives.
Of course our design problems are not ﬁnished once we have found workable
manipulations which produce the predicted effects. Having insisted on the need
for abstract theory and its distance from the data, we need bridging theory to
get from observation to theoretical conclusion. Our manipulations may have
1. We have pilot data which bear on this issue. We tried to make a version of the deontic task (the drinking
age rule) harder by introducing some of the difﬁculties found in the descriptive task. For instance, the
instruction “Your task is to decide which if any of these four cards you must turn in order to decide if a
customer violates the law” was replaced by “Your task is to decide which if any of these four cards you must
turn in order to decide whether the rule is violated.” The idea was that in the second formulation the attention
is directed away from the customers (i.e., the cards) and toward the rule; a single card would now sufﬁce to
show that the rule is violated. This manipulation could therefore reintroduce the problems with dependencies
that are usually absent in the deontic task. Indeed, we found a decrease in correct answers to 50%. Since the
design contained some ﬂaws, these results are at most suggestive.
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the predicted effect, but for some reason other than the one intended.
All this laboratory wisdom is very obvious, but for logic students unused to
experimentation, it is easy to forget, and they will not be reminded by what
appears in psychological journals since most of this process of discovery and
design is concealed, along with practically all negative results. The problems
of bridging will be discussed with our results.
4.1 Designing Experiments Following Observations
This section describes the experiment reported in [265], with particular atten-
tion to the why and wherefore of the design. In what follows we describe each
manipulation we settled on as a condition in the experiment, and then present
the results together. In each case we try to motivate the design choices.
4.1.1 Conditions: Classical “Abstract” Task
To provide a baseline of performance on the selection task with descriptive
conditionals, the ﬁrst condition repeats Wason’s classical study [295] with the
following instructions and materials (see instructions in section 3.1). The other
conditions are described through their departures from this baseline condition.
This is obviously important to get an exact baseline for behavior in the original
task in this population of subjects. For example, it is not unusual for absolute
frequencies of Wason’s “correct” response to vary between 4% and 10% in
different undergraduate populations.
4.1.2 Conditions: Two–Rule Task
The motivation for introducing this manipulation was twofold. First, we saw
robustness of natural language conditionals as central to the problems subjects
have in descriptive tasks. Presenting the task as a comparison of two rules,
and explicitly telling the subjects that one rule is true and one false should
background a number of issues concerned with the notion of truth, such as the
possibility of the rule withstanding exceptions. If we are right that robustness is
a problem, and in these assumptions about the effects of the manipulation, then
this should move performance toward Wason’s classical logical competence
model where the conditionals are treated as truth–functional.
Second, we wanted to estimate the contribution of a Bayesian information–
gain explanation to subjects’ behavior, an explanation introduced in section
3.5.2. This second purpose does not seek to remove an obstacle to classical
logical interpretation, but rather to explore the power of an alternative explana-
tion of subjects’ behavior based on a different competence model than Wason’s.
The information-gain model postulates that in solving the standard Wason task,
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subjects always compare the rule given to the unstated null hypothesis that its
antecedent’s and consequent’s truth–values are statistically independent in a
population of cards. We were thus interested in seeing what would happen if
subjects were presented with explicit alternative non-null hypotheses. Informa-
tion gain must make different predictions in this case. Although elaborations of
the information-gain theory might make prediction complicated, it seems that
in its simple application, it must predict that the ¬q card offers the most infor-
mation, and that subjects will therefore pick this as the competence response on
this theory.
After repeating the preliminary instructions for the classical task, the instruc-
tions continued as follows:
Also below there appear two rules. One rule is true of all the cards, the
other isn’t. Your task is to decide which cards (if any) you must turn in
order to decide which rule holds. Don’t turn unnecessary cards. Tick the
cards you want to turn.
Rule 1: If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on
the other side.
Rule 2: If there is a consonant on one side, then there is an even number
on the other side.
Normative performance in this task, according to the classical logical compe-
tence model, is to turn only the not-Q card. The rules are chosen so that the
correct response is to turn exactly the card that the vast majority of subjects
fail to turn in the classical task. This has the added bonus that it is no longer
correct to turn the P card which provides an interesting comparison with the
original task. This is the only descriptive task we know of for which choosing
the true-antecedent case is an error.
By any obvious measure of task complexity, this task is more complicated
than the classical task. It demands that two conditionals are processed and that
the implications of each case is considered with respect to both rules and with
respect to a distribution of truth–values. Nevertheless, our prediction was that
performance should be substantially nearer the logically normative model for
the reasons described above.
4.1.3 Conditions: Contingency Instructions
The “contingency instructions,” designed to remove any difﬁculties in under-
standing that choices have to be made ignoring possible interim feedback, after
an identical preamble, read as follows, where the newly italicized portion is the
change from the classical instructions:
Also below there appears a rule. Your task is to decide which of these
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four cards you must turn (if any) in order to decide if the rule is true.
Assume that you have to decide whether to turn each card before you get
any information from any of the turns you choose to make. Don’t turn
unnecessary cards. Tick the cards you want to turn.
If the contingencies introduced by the descriptive semantics are a source of
difﬁculty for subjects, this additional instruction should make the task easier.
In particular, since there is a tendency to choose the P card ﬁrst, there should be
an increase in not-Q responding.
After conducting this experiment we found a reference in Wason [300] to
the use of essentially similar instructions in his contribution to the Science Mu-
seum exhibition of 1977, and there are mentions in other early papers. Clearly
he had thought about assumed contingencies between card choices as a possi-
ble confusion. Wason reports no enhancement in his subjects’ reasoning, but he
does not report whether any systematic comparison between these and standard
instructions was made, or quite what the population of subjects was. He cer-
tainly did not observe that this problem for subjects doesn’t arise under deontic
interpretations.
4.1.4 Conditions: Judging Truthfulness of an Independent Source
We chose to investigate the possible contribution of problems arising from the
authoritative position of the experimenter and the balance of cooperative and
adversarial stances required toward different parts of the task materials through
instructions to assess truthfulness of the source instead of truth of the rule, and
we separated the source of the rule from the source of the instructions (the
experimenter). The instructions read as follows:
Also below there appears a rule put forward by an unreliable source. Your
task is to decide which cards (if any) you must turn in order to decide if
the unreliable source is lying. Don’t turn unnecessary cards. Tick the
cards you want to turn.
With these instructions there should be no discomfort about seeking to falsify
the rule. Nor should any falsity of the rule throw any doubt on the truthfulness
of the rest of the instructions, since the information sources are independent.
These “truthfulness” instructions are quite closely related to several other
manipulations that have been tried in past experiments. In the early days of
experimentation on this task, when it was assumed that a failure to try and
falsify explained the correct response, various ways of emphasizing falsiﬁcation
were explored. Wason [295] instructed subjects to pick cards which could break
the rule and Hughes [132] asked them whether the rule was a lie. Neither
instruction had much effect. However, these instructions fail to separate the
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source of the rule from the experimenter (as the utterer of the rule) and may fail
for that reason.
Kirby [158] used a related manipulation in which the utterer of the rule was a
machine said to have broken down, needing to be tested to see if it was working
properly again after repair. These instructions did produce signiﬁcant improve-
ment. Here the focus of the instruction is to tell whether the machine is “bro-
ken,” not simply whether the utterance of the rule is a falsehood. This might be
expected to invoke a deontic interpretation involving comparisons of the actual
world with an ideal world in which the machine works correctly (Kirby’s con-
dition is akin to the “production line inspection scenarios” mentioned before),
and so it might be that the improvement observed is for this reason.
Platt and Griggs [217] explored a sequence of instructional manipulations in
what they describe as abstract tasks which culminate in 81% correct respond-
ing. One of the changes they make is to use instructions to “seek violations”
of the rule, which is relevant here for its relation to instructions to test the truth
of an unreliable source. Their experiments provide some insight into the condi-
tions under which these instructions do and don’t facilitate performance. Platt
and Griggs study the effect of “explications” of the rule and in the most ef-
fective manipulations actually replace the conditional rule by explications such
as: “A card with a vowel on it can only have an even number, but a card with
a consonant on it can have either an even or an odd number.” Note that this
explication removes the problematic anaphora (see above, section 3.5.5), ex-
plicitly contradicts a biconditional reading, and removes the conditional, with
its tendency to robust interpretation. But more signiﬁcantly still, the facilitation
of turning not-Q is almost entirely effected by the addition of seek violations
instructions, and these instructions probably switch the task from a descriptive
to a deontic task.
In reviewing earlier uses of the ‘seek violations’ instructions, Platt and Griggs
note that facilitation occurs with abstract permission and obligation rules but
not with the standard abstract task. So, merely instructing to seek violations
doesn’t invoke a deontic reading when the rule is still indicative, and the con-
tent provides no support for a deontic reading – “violations” presumably might
make the rule false. But combined with an “explication” about what cards can
have on them (or with a permission or obligation schema) they appear to invoke
a deontic reading. As we shall see, 80% seems to be about the standard rate of
correct responding in deontically interpreted tasks regardless of whether they
contain material invoking social contracts.
So the present manipulation does not appear to have been explored before.
We predicted that separating the source of the rule from the experimenter while
maintaining a descriptive reading of the rule should increase normative re-
sponding.
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4.1.5 Conditions: Exploring Other Kinds of Rules than Conditionals
This condition of the experiment was designed to explore the malleability of
subjects’ interpretations of rules other than conditionals. In particular we chose
a conjunctive rule as arguably the simplest connective to understand. As such
this condition has a rather different status from the others in that it is not de-
signed to remove a difﬁculty from a logically similar task but to explore a log-
ical change. Since it was an exploration we additionally asked for subjects’
justiﬁcation of their choices afterward.
A conjunctive rule was combined with the same instructions as are used in
the classical abstract task.
Rule: There is a vowel on one side, and there is an even number on the
other side.
The classical logical competence model demands that subjects should turn
no cards with such a conjunctive rule – the rule interpreted in the same logic
as Wason’s interpretation of his conditional rule can already be seen to be false
of the not-P and not-Q cards. Therefore, under this interpretation the rule is
already known to be false and no cards should be turned.
We predicted that many subjects would not make this interpretation of this
response. An alternative, perfectly rational, interpretation of the experimenter’s
intentions is to construe the rule as having deontic force (every card should have
a vowel on one side and an even number on the other) and to seek cards which
might ﬂout this rule other than ones that obviously can already be seen to ﬂout
it. One factor making this interpretation more salient may be that in a card-
turning experiment, there is what psychologists call a “demand characteristic”
to turn something. If this interpretation were adopted, then the P and Q cards
would be chosen. Note that this interpretation is deontic even though the rule is
syntactically indicative.
4.1.6 Subjects
Subjects were 377 ﬁrst–year Edinburgh undergraduates, from a wide range of
subject backgrounds.
4.1.7 Method
All tasks were administered to subjects in classroom settings in two large lec-
tures. Subjects were randomly assigned to the different conditions, with the
size of sample in each condition being estimated from piloting on effect sizes.
Adjacent subjects did different conditions. The materials described above were
preceded by the following general instruction:
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The following experiment is part of a program of research into how peo-
ple reason. Please read the instructions carefully. We are grateful for your
help.
4.1.8 Results
Those subjects (twelve across all conditions) who claimed to have done similar
tasks before or to have received any instruction in logic were excluded from
the analysis. Table 4.1 presents the data from all of the conditions. Subjects
were scored as making a completely correct response, or as making at least
some mistake, according to the classical logical competence model. For all the
conditions except the two–rule task and the conjunction condition, this ‘com-
petence model’ performance is choice of P and not-Q cards. For the two–rule
task the correct response is not-Q. For the conjunction condition it is to turn no
cards.
Table 4.1 Frequencies of card choice combinations by conditions: classical logical competence
responses are marked *. Any response made by at least three subjects in at least one condition is
categorized: everything else is miscellaneous.
Condition P Q Q P P ¬Q ¬Q ¬P,Q P,Q, ¬Q ¬P,¬Q all None Misc. Total
Classical 56 7 8 4* 3 7 1 2 9 8 5 108
Two-rule 8 8 2 1 9* 2 1 0 0 2 4 37
Contingency 15 0 3 8* 1 6 4 8 3 0 3 51
Truthfulness 39 6 9 14* 0 7 3 6 8 15 5 112
Conjunction 31 2 9 7 2 0 0 1 0 9* 8 69
Table 4.2 presents the tests of signiﬁcance of the percentages of correct/incorrect
responses as compared to the baseline classical condition. Of subjects in the
baseline condition 3.7% made the correct choice of cards.
The percentages completely correct in the other conditions were two-rule
condition, 24%; “truthfulness” condition, 13%; in the “contingency” condition,
18%; and in the conjunction condition, 13%. The signiﬁcance levels of these
proportions by Fisher’s exact test appear in table 4.2.
The two–rule task elicits substantially more competence model selections than
the baseline task. In fact the completely correct response is the modal response.
More than six times as many subjects get it completely correct even though su-
perﬁcially it appears to be a more complicated task. The next most common
responses are to turn P with Q, and to turn just Q. The former is the modal
response in the classical task. The latter appears to show that even with unsuc-
cessful subjects, this task shifts attention to the consequent cards – turnings of
P are substantially suppressed: 32% as compared to 80% in the baseline task.
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Table 4.2 Proportions of subjects completely correct and signiﬁcances of differences from
baseline of each of the four manipulations
Condition Wrong Right p Percent Correct
Classical baseline 104 4 3.7
Two-Rule 28 9 .004 24
Contingency 37 8 .005 18
Truthfulness 98 14 .033 13
Conjunction 60 9 .022 13
Contingency instructions also substantially increase completely correct re-
sponding, and do so primarily at the expense of the modal P–with–Q response.
In particular they increase the not-Q choice to 50%.
Instructions to test the truthfulness of an unreliable source have a smaller
effect which takes a larger sample to demonstrate, but nevertheless 13% of
subjects get it completely correct, nearly four times as many as the baseline
task. The main change is again a reduction of P–with–Q responses, but there is
also an increase in the response of turning nothing.
Completely correct performance with a conjunctive rule was 13% – not as
different from the conditions with conditional rules as one might expect if con-
ditionals are the main source of difﬁculty. The modal response is to turn the
P and Q cards – just as in the original task. Anecdotally, debrieﬁng subjects
after the experiment reveals that a substantial number of these modal responses
are explained by the subjects in terms construable as a deontic interpretation of
the rule, roughly paraphrased as “The cards should have a vowel on one side
and an even number on the other.” The P-with-Q response is correct for this
interpretation.
4.2 Discussion of Results
Each of the manipulations designed to facilitate reasoning in the classical de-
scriptive task makes it substantially easier as predicted by the semantic/prag-
matic theories that the manipulations were derived from. The fact that subjects’
reasoning is improved by each of these manipulations provides strong evidence
that subjects’ mental processes are operating with related categories in the stan-
dard laboratory task. Approaches like those of Sperber’s relevance theory and
Evans’s matching theory propose that the subjects solve the task “without think-
ing.” The fact that these instructional manipulations have an impact on subjects’
responses strongly suggests that the processes they impact on are of a kind to
interact with the content of the manipulations. This still leaves the question, at
what level of awareness? But even here, the tutorial dialogues suggest that the
level is not so far below the surface as to prevent these processes being quite
easily brought to some level of awareness.
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It is important to resist the idea that if subjects were aware of these problems,
that itself would lead to their resolution, and the conclusion that therefore sub-
jects can’t be suffering these problems. Extensive tutoring in the standard task
which is sufﬁcient to lead subjects to make their problems quite explicit gener-
ally does not lead, at least immediately, to stable insight. This is as we should
expect. If, for example, subjects become aware that robustness to counterex-
amples makes the task instructions uninterpretable, that itself does not solve
their problem of how to respond. Or, for another example, if subjects become
aware of being unable to take account of contingencies between choices in their
responses, that does not solve the problem of what response to make. General
questions of what concepts subjects have for expressing their difﬁculties and
in what ways they are aware of them are important questions, especially for
teaching. These questions invite further research through tutoring experiments,
but they should not be allowed to lead to misinterpretation of the implications
of the present results. We take each condition in turn
4.2.1 The Two–Rule Task
There are other possible explanations as to how the novel task functions to
facilitate competence model responding. If subjects tend to confuse the two
situations, “this rule is true of this card” and “this card makes this rule true”
then it may help them that the two–rule task is calculated to lead them early to
a conﬂict that a single card (e.g., the true consequent card) “makes both rules
true” even as the instructions insist that one rule is true and one false. Although
some subjects may infer that there must therefore be something wrong with the
instructions, others progress from this impasse to appreciate that cases can com-
ply with a rule without making it true – the semantic relations are asymmetric
even though the same word “true” can, on occasion, be used for both direc-
tions. This confusion between semantic relations is evidently closely related to
what Wason early on called a “veriﬁcation” strategy (searching for compliant
examples) in that it may lead to the same selections, but it is not the strategy as
understood by Wason. This confusion between semantic relations is in abun-
dant evidence in the dialogues.
The two–rule task makes an interesting comparison with at least three other
ﬁndings in the literature. First, the task was designed partly to make explicit
the choice of hypotheses which subjects entertain for the kind of Bayesian
information–gain modeling proposed by Oaksford and Chater. Providing two
explicit rules (rather than a single rule to be compared with an assumed null
hypothesis of independence) makes the false-consequent card unambiguously
the most informative card and therefore the one which these models should
predict will be most frequently chosen. In our data for this task, the false-
consequent card comes in third, substantially behind the true–antecedent and
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true–consequent cards.
For a second comparison, Gigerenzer and Hug [96] studied a manipulation
which is of interest because it involves both a change from deontic to descrip-
tive interpretation and from a single to a two–rule task. One example scenario
had a single rule that hikers who stayed overnight in a hut had to bring their
own ﬁrewood. Cards represented hikers or guides and bringers or nonbringers
of wood. As a single-rule deontic task with instructions to see whether people
obeyed the rule, this produced 90% correct responding, a typical result. But
when the instructions asked the subject to turn cards in order to decide whether
this rule was in force, or whether it was the guides who had to bring the wood,
then performance dropped to 55% as conventionally scored. Gigerenzer and
Hug explain this manipulation in terms of “perspective change,” but this is both
a shift from a deontic task to a descriptive one (in the authors’ own words
“to judge whether the rule is descriptively wrong” (our emphasis), and from a
single–rule to a two–rule task, albeit that the second rule is mentioned but not
printed alongside its alternative. Gigerenzer and Hug’s data appear to show a
level of performance higher than single rule abstract tasks but lower than deon-
tic tasks, just as we observe. Direct comparison of the two subject populations is
difﬁcult, however, as Gigerenzer and Hug’s subjects score considerably higher
on all the reported tasks than ours, and no baseline single-rule descriptive task
is included.
The third comparison of the two–rule task is with work on “reasoning illu-
sions” by Johnson-Laird and colleagues mentioned above (Johnson-Laird and
Savary [147]; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto and Legrenzi [149]; Johnson-
Laird and Byrne [143]. Johnson-Laird and Savary [147,p. 213] presented ex-
actly comparable premises to those we used in our two–rule task but asked their
subjects to choose a conclusion, rather than to seek evidence about which rule
was true and which false. Their interest in these problems is that mental models
theory2 assumes that subjects “only represent explicitly what is true,” and that
this gives rise to “illusory inferences.” The following material was presented
with the preface that both statements are about a hand of cards, and one is true
and one is false:
1. If there is a king in the hand, then there is an ace.
2. If there is not a king in the hand, then there is an ace.
Select one of these conclusions:
i. There is an ace in the hand.
ii. There is not an ace in the hand.
iii. There may or may not be an ace in the hand.
2. At this stage it is not necessary to know the ins and outs of this theory. Details will be supplied in chapter
5, section 5.1.2 and and chapter 10, section 10.6.
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Johnson-Laird and Savary [147] report that ﬁfteen out of twenty subjects con-
cluded that that there is an ace in the hand, and the other ﬁve concluded that
there might or might not be an ace in the hand. They claim that the ﬁfteen
subjects are mistaken in their inference.
Hence, apart from one caveat to which we will return, there is no reasonable interpretation
of either the disjunction or the conditionals that yields a valid inference that there is an
ace [147,p. 204].
The caveat appears to be that there are interpretations on which the premises
are inconsistent and therefore anything (classically) logically follows, including
this conclusion [147,p. 220].
What struck us initially is that our subjects show some facility with reason-
ing about assumptions of the same form even when our task also requires added
elements of selection rather than merely inference. Selection tasks are gener-
ally “harder” on classical notions of what is correct. Speciﬁcally, our two–
rule task introduces the circumstance which Johnson-Laird and Savary claim
mental models predicts to introduce fundamental difﬁculty, i.e., reasoning from
knowledge that some as yet unidentiﬁable proposition is false. This introduc-
tion makes the selection task much easier for subjects than its standard form in
our experiment.
On a little further consideration, there is at least one highly plausible inter-
pretation which makes the “illusory” conclusion valid and is an interpretation
which appears in our dialogues from the two–rule task. Subjects think in terms
of one of the rules applying and the other not, and they confuse (not surpris-
ingly) the semantics of applicability with the semantics of truth. This is exactly
the semantics familiar from the IF . . . THEN . . . ELSE construct of imperative
computer languages. If one clause applies and the other doesn’t, then it follows
that there is an ace. Whether the alternativeness of the rules is expressed met-
alinguistically by saying one is false and one true) or object-linguistically (with
an exclusive disjunction), and whether the rules are expressed as implications
or as exclusive disjunctions, thinking in terms of applicability rather than truth
is a great deal more natural and has the consequence observed. Johnson-Laird
(personal communication) objects that this interpretation just is equivalent to
the mental models theory one. But surely this is a crisp illustration of a dif-
ference between the theories. If an interpretation in terms of applicability is
taken seriously, subjects should draw this conclusion, and should stick to it
when challenged (as many do). In fact, failure to draw the inference is an error
under this interpretation. Only mental models theory’s restriction to a range of
classical logical interpretations makes it deﬁne the inference as an error. We
put our money on the subjects having the more plausible interpretation of the
conditionals here and the experimenters suffering an illusion of an illusion.
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4.2.2 Contingency Instructions
As mentioned above, investigations of this manipulation have been reported by
Wason in early studies, but his theory of the task did not assign it any great
importance, or lead him to systematically isolate the effect, or allow him to see
the connection between descriptive interpretation and this instruction. In the
context of our hypothesis that it is descriptive vs. deontic interpretation which
is the main factor controlling difﬁculty of the task through interactions between
semantics and instructions, this observation that contingency has systematic and
predicted effects provides an explanation for substantial differences between
the abstract task and content facilitations which invoke deontic interpretations.
None of the other extant theories assign any signiﬁcant role to this observation.
The effectiveness of contingency instructions presents particular difﬁculties
for current “rational analysis” models (the approach using Bayesian informa-
tion gain [205]; see section 3.5.2), since the choice of false-consequent cards
rises so dramatically with an instruction which should have no effect on the
expected information gain. Indeed, the rational analysis approach assumes that
subjects adopt a “sampling one card at a time from a population” interpretation
and it is hard to see why contingencies between responses should arise as a
problem on such interpretations.
Going further: Engaging Interactive Planning
To illustrate how any of the conditions of this experiment could give rise to
further investigations, we here brieﬂy present, with his kind permission, an ex-
periment designed by our student Misha van Denderen, who used the resources
of the web to investigate the role of “reactive planning” as a source of difﬁculty
in the standard selection task ([280]; more on this experiment in section 4.2.5).
Going beyond a simple instructional change, this experiment investigates what
happens if subjects are actually allowed to really engage in reactive planning
i.e., by ﬁrst choosing a card, turning it, and deciding what to do based on what
is on the other side. It is interesting to investigate whether more subjects end up
giving the classical answer if they are given the opportunity to actually turn the
cards and see what is on the other side. The question is therefore: if subjects
get the opportunity to solve the task by reactive planning, will they continue to
turn until they ﬁnd a falsifying card?
The experiment presents the task in a graphical software interface, using
graphical tokens of the kind that people have become familiar with. The four
cards are presented with a check box beneath each and an OK button to submit
the answers. Subjects can actually turn each card and are invited to do so until
they think they can decide whether the rule is true or false. Here it is clear to
subjects that they can only tick and see one card at a time. They can click the
check boxes on and off as they please. Only when they press the OK button and
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conﬁrm that they are sure are the answers recorded.
Apart from the clariﬁcation of the classical task, it is interesting to observe the
behavior of subjects if they can actually turn the cards. Will subjects continue
turning cards until they ﬁnd a falsifying card? If, for example, subjects decide
to turn the A/4 card and therefore show that the case ﬁts the rule, will they
continue to turn the 7 card in search of possible falsiﬁcation? And will subjects
draw the conclusion that the rule is false if they did ﬁnd a falsifying card on the
ﬁrst turn? Or true if they found a case that ﬁt?
To maximize the information, a tweak must be included in the software to
ensure that falsiﬁcation of the rule is never immediate after the ﬁrst card turned.
The experiment is therefore set up as follows. Each card can be clicked. When
a subject clicks a card, he is asked: “You want to see the< 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th >
card to judge whether the claim is true or false. Correct? [Y/N].” If the subject
answers N, the invisible side is not revealed. If he answers Y, the invisible side
is revealed and the number or the letter is shown. If the subject clicks the 7
before the A, the 7/K-card is shown. If he clicks the A before the 7, the A/4
card is shown. Only if the subject clicks the 7 after the A or the A after the 7,
is the A/7-card shown. If the user clicks the K, the K/7-card is shown and if he
clicks the 4, the 4/K card is shown.
This online experiment drew 103 subjects. The population is likely to be dif-
ferent from the standard undergraduate population, since these subjects were
recruited through a marketing agency. The results given in table 4.3 therefore
may not be quite comparable, but they replicate even in the substantial subsam-
ple who are students. The results are striking: Wason’s “competence” choice
combination is now the modal response. There is a very marked decrease in
“just p” and “p and q” answers, accompanied by an equally marked increase
in “p and not-q” answers, together with a spreading out of the miscellaneous
category. The results seem to suggest that in the standard task, the desire to
do the task by reactive planning is indeed a considerable issue. As always, this
variation changes the task in several ways. For example, it decreases working
memory load. Perhaps this is why subjects reason “better”. This is possible,
but the experiment has most direct force for two points. The ﬁrst is Wason’s
“veriﬁcationalist” explanation in terms of subjects’ failure to seek falsiﬁcation.
Given the a clearly understood opportunity, subjects do seek falsiﬁcation. The
second is that the experiment illustrates vividly how the descriptive task differs
from the deontic one in which no contingencies of response arise. We return to
this experiment below in section 4.2.5 when we consider the joint impact of the
subjsects’ several problems.
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Table 4.3 Scores in the web-based selection task with reactive planning
p p, q p,¬q p, q,¬q misc.
7% 23% 26% 10% 34%
4.2.3 Truthfulness Instructions
As described above, the truthfulness condition differs from past attempts to cue
subjects to seek counterexamples. Its success in bringing about a signiﬁcant if
small improvement may have resulted from effects of the manipulation other
than the sociopsychological effects or the more general pragmatic effects of the
balance of cooperative and adversarial stances described above. For example
it may well be that at least some subjects are more adept at thinking about
the truthfulness of speakers than the truth–values of their utterances abstracted
from such issues as ignorance or intent to deceive. We return to this issue when
we consider experiments on illiterate subjects in chapter 5.
4.2.4 The Conjunctive Rule
The purpose behind the conjunctive version of the task was rather different from
the other manipulations, namely to show that many features of the task militate
against the adoption of Wason’s intended interpretation of his instructions quite
apart from difﬁculties speciﬁc to conditionals. The interpretation of sentence
semantics is highly malleable under the forces of task pragmatics. The results
show that a conjunctive rule is treated very like (even if signiﬁcantly differently
from) the if . . . then rule. A higher proportion of subjects make the ‘classically
correct’ response than in the baseline task (13% as compared to 3.7%) but the
modal response is the same (P and Q) and is made by similar proportions of
subjects (45% conjunctive as compared to 52% baseline). One possibility is
that a substantial number of subjects adopt a deontic interpretation of the rule
and are checking for the cards that might be violators but are not yet known to
be.
It is also possible that these results have more speciﬁc consequences for inter-
pretation of the standard descriptive task. We know from Fillenbaum [82] and
from our own paraphrase tasks [264] that about a half of subjects most readily
entertain a conjunctive reading of if . . . then sentences. The developmental lit-
erature reviewed in Evans, Newstead, and Byrne [76] reveals this interpretation
to be even commoner among young children. It is most implausible that this
interpretation is due merely to some polysemy of the connective “if . . . then.”
Much more plausible is that the conjunctive reading is the result of assum-
ing the truth of the antecedent suppositionally, and then answering subsequent
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questions from within this suppositional context.
Be that as it may, if subjects’ selections in the conditional rule tasks corre-
spond to the selections they would make given an explicit conjunction in the
conjunction condition, and we are right that these selections are driven in this
condition by an implicitly deontic interpretation of the conjunction, then this
suggests a quite novel explanation of at least some “matching” responses in
the original conditional task. Perhaps the similar rate of choice of P and Q in
the conjunction and “if . . . then” conditions points to a substantial number of
subjects applying a deontic conjunctive interpretation in the standard task.
This hypothesis in turn raises the question how such a reading would interact
with negations in the “negations” paradigm which is the source of the evidence
for Evans’s ‘ ‘matching” theory [73] (see also section 3.6) and therefore the
source of one leg of the “dual process” theory (Evans and Over [75], Evans
[72]; see section 5.3). If interpretations stemming from deontic readings tend
strongly toward wide scope for negation, then one would predict that the rule
with negated antecedent (“not P and Q”) would be read as “It’s not the case that
there is a vowel on one side and an even number on the other” which would
lead to the same choices of A and 4, though for opposite reasons. That is, K
and 7 are now seen as already compliant, and the A and the 4 have to be tested
to make sure they don’t have an even number or a vowel respectively. Pur-
suing this line of thought further suggests that negations in the second clause
may not be interpretable in this framework because of their interactions with
the anaphors (“if there is a vowel on one side then there is not an even number
on the other side” gets interpreted as “if it’s not the case that there is a vowel
on one side, then there is an even number on the other”) and subjects might be
forced to interpret them with the same wide scope, again leading to the same
card choices, and potentially explaining why “matching” appears to be unaf-
fected by negation. Providing a semantic explanation, of course, leaves open
the questions about what processes operate. Evidently, further research will be
required to explore these possibilities. The semantic analyses may seem com-
plex but they make some rather strong predictions about how subjects should
react to card turnings. This is an interesting line for future research holding out
the possibility of a semantic basis for matching behavior.
One objection to these various interpretations of the conjunction condition
results might be that there are other interpretations of the rule used. Subjects
might, for example, have interpreted the rule existentially, as claiming that
at least one card had a vowel on one side and an even number on the other.
This would lead normatively to the same A and 4 selections. Accordingly, in a
follow-up experiment, we revised the conjunctive rule to
Rule: There are vowels on one side of the cards and even numbers on the
other.
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It is implausible that this rule might be interpreted existentially. We ran this
rule in another condition with its own baseline condition to ensure comparabil-
ity of the new population. Table 4.4 shows the results of this experiment, with
the earlier results repeated for convenient comparison. The result was slightly
more extreme with this version of the conjunctive rule: 70% of subjects (rather
than 45%) chose the P and Q cards. The proportion of classical logical com-
petence model responses was identical to that for the baseline conditional task,
and the baseline condition showed the population was comparable. The re-
wording raised the proportion of subjects giving the modal P and Q response.
This rewording of the conjunctive rule appeared to make the universal deontic
reading even less ambiguously the dominant reading.
Table 4.4 Frequencies of card choice combinations by conditions: the modiﬁed conjunction
task and its new baseline condition are below the earlier results which are repeated here for
convenience. Classical logical competence responses are marked *. Any response made by at
least three subjects in at least one condition is categorized: everything else is miscellaneous
Condition P Q Q P P ¬Q ¬Q ¬P,Q P,Q, ¬Q ¬P,¬Q all None Misc. Tot
Classical 56 7 8 4* 3 7 1 2 9 8 5 108
2-rule 8 8 2 1 9* 2 1 0 0 2 4 37
Contingency 15 0 3 8* 1 6 4 8 3 0 3 51
Truthfulness 39 6 9 14* 0 7 3 6 8 15 5 112
Conjunction 31 2 9 7 2 0 0 1 0 9* 8 69
Baseline 2 10 2 10 1* 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 30
Conjunction 2 21 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1* 2 30
Subjunctive 13 2 8 3* 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 31
The results on the conjunctive rule illustrate several general issues: how easy
it is to invoke a deontic reading of indicative wording; how unnatural it is for
naive subjects to adopt an “is this sentence literally true?” perspective rather
than a “what are the experimenter’s intentions?” perspective; that the difﬁculty
of classical interpretation can be as great with conjunction as with implication.
Although the difﬁculties may be different difﬁculties, there is a real possibility
that they are closely related through conjunctive suppositional interpretations
of the conditional.
Finally, we explored one other obvious manipulation designed to follow up
the malleability of subjects’ interpretations exposed by the conjunctive rule.
This is worth discussing as a “failed” negative result as much as for its own
interest. If subjects’ difﬁculties in the original descriptive task follow from the
complexities of descriptive semantics, is it possible to restore deontic levels of
performance in the abstract task merely by simply formulating the rule in the
subjunctive mood? We ran a further condition in which the rule used was
If a card has a vowel on one side, then it should have an even number on
the other.
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and the instruction was to choose which of the four cards you must turn in order
to decide if the card complies with the rule.
The results of this condition are shown in table 4.4 in the “Subjunctive” row.
Three of thirty-one subjects turned P and not-Q, as compared to one of thirty in
the baseline. If this is a facilitation it is a small one (the probability of getting
this facilitation by chance is 0.32, i.e., statistically insigniﬁcant). Merely using
subjunctive wording may be insufﬁcient to invoke a deontic reading. This is
not so surprising since there is an alternative “epistemic” interpretation of the
subjunctive modal here which might still be used with a descriptive semantics
for the underlying rule. Imagine that the rule is clearly a robust descriptive
scientiﬁc law (perhaps “All ravens are black”), then one might easily state in
this context, that a card with “raven” on one side should have “black” on the
other, implying something about what the cards have to be like to comply with
the scientiﬁc law (still with a descriptive semantics underlying), rather than
what the birds have to do to comply with a legal regulation. This possibility
of interpretation may make it hard to invoke a deontic interpretation without
further contentful support. Contentful support is, of course, what the various
“quality inspector” scenarios provide (e.g., [252]). Contentful support is also
what permission and obligation schemas, and the “seek violations” instructions
in combination with modal explications of the rule provide, as reported by Platt
and Griggs [217].
This failure of what is about the simplest direct manipulation that could test
the theory (that it is deontic interpretation which achieves most of the facili-
tations reported in the literature) is a very common kind of failure. Our inter-
pretation is that the manipulation unfortunately fails to achieve its goal. An
opponent of our theory might claim it as evidence the theory is wrong. To set-
tle this dispute one would need to get further evidence that the manipulation
doesn’t succeed in invoking a deontic reading. Trying such direct tests is im-
portant – if they work they provide dramatic evidence. Generally when they
fail they are not reported. The problem is a problem of constructing a bridge
from a theory of interpretation to the effects of manipulations, and bridging is
unavoidable if theory is to be brought to bear on data.
4.2.5 Putting It All Together?
In summary of all the conditions, these results corroborate the ﬁndings of the
tutoring experiments, also reported in [264], that our manipulations alleviate
real sources of difﬁculty with interpretation for subjects in the original descrip-
tive task – sources of difﬁculty which do not apply in the deontic task. This
evidence suggests that far from failing to think at all, subjects are sensitive to
several important semantic issues posed by the descriptive task. Since our ma-
nipulations only help to alleviate problems piecemeal in some subjects, they
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cannot be expected to install a classical logical interpretation of the task and
materials in all subjects, nor to produce performance levels comparable with
the deontic tasks. It is difﬁcult to assess what proportion of problems have been
dealt with here. Several that we discussed in chapter 3 have not been treated
(anaphora, card reversibility). It is an even harder methodological problem to
ﬁnd a way of estimating how much of the difﬁculties these problems jointly ac-
count for, because simply applying all the manipulations concurrently produces
complicated instructions which themselves introduce their own problems.
Rather than presenting a complete model of what subjects are doing in this
task, the experiment provides strong evidence that several of the major sources
of interpretation problems identiﬁed by semantic analysis do contribute to sub-
jects’ difﬁculties in the original task. This is sufﬁcient to make it very hard to
defend any theory which assumes both that the correct interpretation is clas-
sical logic, and that it is the interpretation that subjects adopt. This includes
all theories except the information-gain theory. As discussed above, both the
two-rule and contingency conditions provide considerable evidence that the
information–gain theory has its own problems.
The ingenious experiment by van Denderen [280], part of which was dis-
cussed in section 4.2.2, was actually aimed at the difﬁcult task of assessing how
many of these problems can be simultaneously alleviated. How many subjects
can be induced to adopt the material implication interpretation Wason’s crite-
rion of correct reasoning requires, by simply simultaneously removing prob-
lems Wason strews in the subjects’ path? And how many subjects then reason
as their chosen interpretation requires? Platt and Griggs [217] induced very
high selections of A and 7 cards in the descriptive task by focusing subjects on
possibly noncompliant cases. But van Denderen’s aim was to see what could
be achieved without this focusing. The manipulations he used are as follows:
(1) the task was run interactively on the web so that subjects could actually turn
cards and alleviate the problems of wanting to make responses contingent on
the feedback of early turns (this manipulation was discussed in section 4.2.2
above); (2) the conditional is not described as a rule (with the result of en-
gendering a defeasible interpretation of the relevance of a larger population of
cards) but rather as a simple expression of an observer’s belief about four cards;
(3) the conditionality (as opposed to biconditionality) of the rule is emphasized
by inclusion of a clause explicitly disavowing the biconditional reading; (4) the
source of the conditional was separated from the experimenter to avoid issues
of the need to accuse an authority ﬁgure of lying; and (5) subjects are required
to conﬁrm their understanding of the instructions by answering some simple
questions about the task before proceeding to the experiment.
The design of the experiment divided subjects into a group with a simple
conditional (original conditional), and a group with the clause rejecting the bi-
conditional added (extended rule). All subjects did two versions of the task:
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one including all the enhancements just listed except for the possibility of inter-
acting with the cards (noninteractive), and the other with this interaction (inter-
active) , in that order. After these two selection tasks, subjects did an ‘evalua-
tion task’ [297] where they judged each of the four card types as complying, not
complying, or irrelevant to the conditional, in order to gather data on their inter-
pretation. Armed with these data about individual interpretation, it is possible
to assess not only whether subjects adopt Wason’s intended interpretation of
the conditional but also whether they reason correctly from it, or from whatever
other interpretation they do adopt.
The results show a huge convergence on Wason’s desired interpretation of
the conditionals. Whereas with the original conditional, only a ﬁfth of subjects
chose the material implication interpretation (even with all the clariﬁcations),
with the extended rule this rose to 80%. There was a similarly large increase
of A and 7 selections, from around 5% making this choice in Wason’s original
experiment, to 32% of subjects in the extended rule interactive task who chose
just A and 7, and a further 16% chose A, 7, and 4. All told, 60% turned the 7
card compared to about 9% in Wason’s original task. About 55% of subjects
made all the card choices in the complex interactive task which normatively
corresponded with their chosen interpretation, although more than half of these
chose one or more cards they strictly need not have turned.
These results are a strong vindication of the theory we have proposed here.
There is much interpretive variability, but a large majority of subjects can be
induced to adopt the interpretation Wason intended, and when they do, a large
proportion of them reason adequately from that interpretation. Reasoning is by
no means perfect, but the hard part is getting to the interpretation which Wason
hid. This experiment is rather revealing of the forest of problems the subject
encounters, and therefore suggestive of why the ability to ﬁnd Wason’s inter-
pretation and turn the A and 7 cards should be predictive of academic success,
as Stanovich showed.
4.3 What Does This Say about Reasoning More Generally?
What implications do these results have for theories of reasoning, and for the
place of interpretation in cognitive theory more generally? What do they tell
us about the way the ﬁeld has viewed the relation between logical and psycho-
logical analyses of reasoning, and how that relation might be construed more
productively? Each theory is a somewhat different case.
These results remove the founding evidence for “evolutionary” theories which
propose that the difference in performance on “social contract” conditionals
and descriptive conditionals needs to be explained by innate cheating detec-
tion modules evolved in the Pleistocene. This topic will be discussed at greater
length in chapter 6. As we will see, this reappraisal of the selection task pro-
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vides a good example of how arguments for “massive modularity” in cognition
should be treated with some skepticism (for further arguments, see [268]). The
original experiments found variation in performance as a function of difference
in materials. Sweeping generalizations were then made from the laboratory task
without any consideration of the relation between that task and subjects’ other
communication and reasoning abilities. Just as our analysis directs attention
to the differences between variations on the selection task and the continuities
between natural language communication inside and outside the selection task,
so our proposals return attention to the issue of how humans’ generalized com-
munication capacities arose in evolution. The interactions between logic’s dual
apparatus of interpretation and of derivation constitute an exquisitely context–
sensitive conceptual framework for the study of human reasoning and commu-
nication, whether in evolution, development, or education. Chapter 5 takes up
these themes.
The nonevolutionary theories of human reasoning are most generally affected
by the present results through their implications for the relation between logic
and psychology. We focus here particularly on relevance theory, mental models
theory, and rational analysis models.3
Relevance Theory Inasmuch as relevance theory [251, 99, 252] assumes that
human reasoning and communication abilities are general abilities which inter-
act with the speciﬁcs of the context, our general drift is sympathetic to relevance
theory’s conclusions. We agree with relevance theory, that the goal must be to
make sense of what subjects are doing in the very strange situation of labo-
ratory reasoning tasks – in a memorable phrase, to see subjects as “pragmatic
virtuosos” (Girotto et al. [99]) – rather than to see them as logical defectives.
Our divergences from relevance theory are about the granularity of interaction
between semantic and pragmatic processes in subjects’ reasoning; in the range
of behavior we believe to be of theoretical concern; and in the program of re-
search.
Relevance theory explains pragmatic effects in terms of very general factors
– relevance to the task at hand and cost of inference to reveal that relevance.
These factors must always operate with regard to some semantic characteriza-
tion of the language processed. Condensing analysis into these two pragmatic
factors, however, seems, in this case at least, to have led to relevance theorists
missing the critical semantic differences which drive the psychological pro-
cesses in this task – the differences between deontics and descriptives and their
consequences for interpretation in this task’s setting. Relevance theory’s con-
clusion has been that not much reasoning goes on when undergraduate subjects
get the abstract task “wrong.” Our combination of tutoring observations and
3. The remainder of this section is therefore most useful to readers familiar with these theories. Other readers
may skip ahead to the paragraph entitled “General Implications.”
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experiment strongly suggests that a great deal goes on, however speedily the
“precomputed” attitudes are brought to bear in the actual task, and that the exact
nature of the processes is highly variable from subject to subject. Taking logic
more seriously leads us to seek more detailed accounts of mental processes.
Mental Models Theory The current results have rather wide-ranging implica-
tions for mental models theory [144, 143]. Some implications speciﬁc to the
theory’s application to the selection task have already been discussed. Oth-
ers are more general, about mental models theory’s relation to logic and se-
mantics. Since Johnson-Laird’s early work with Wason on the selection task
[297, 148, 298] mental models theory has been elaborated by a complex the-
ory of the meanings of conditionals and the overlay of semantics by “pragmatic
modulation,” and the theory has been much exercised by the issue whether sub-
jects’ interpretations of the rule in the selection task is truth–functional or not
[143]. However, this consideration of semantic possibilities has been divorced
from any consideration of their implications for the subjects’ interpretation of
the task. If subjects’ reading of the rule is non-truth–functional (by whatever
semantic or pragmatic route), then the subjects should experience a conﬂict be-
tween their interpretation and the task instructions. This conﬂict has never been
acknowledged by mental models theorists. What justiﬁcation can there then
be for applying the classical logical competence model as a criterion of correct
performance while simultaneously rejecting it as an account of how subjects
interpret the conditional? We shall return to some of the general logical issues
raised by mental models in chapter 5, insection 5.1.4 and chapter 10, section
10.6.
BayesianModels Finally, where do our ﬁndings leave the Bayesian information–
gain models of selection task behavior as optimal experiment (Oaksford and
Chater [205, 206])? We applaud these authors’ challenge to the uniqueness of
the classical logical model of the task, and also their insistence that the deon-
tic and descriptive versions of the task require distinct accounts. Their theory
is clearly more sophisticated about the relations between formal models and
cognitive processes than the theories it challenges. However, our proposals are
quite divergent in their cognitive consequences. The rational analysis models
reject any role for logic, claiming that the task is an inductive one. But this
move smuggles logic in the backdoor. Applying optimal experiment theory re-
quires assigning probabilities to propositions, and propositions are speciﬁed in
some underlying language. The logic underlying the rational analysis model is
the same old classical propositional calculus with all its attendant divergences
from subjects’ interpretations of the task materials. This has direct psychologi-
cal consequences. The rational analysis models treat subjects’ performances as
being equally correct as measured by the two distinct competence models for
descriptive and deontic tasks. Our analysis predicts that the descriptive task will
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be highly problematical and the deontic task rather straightforward. The tuto-
rial evidence on the descriptive task and its experimental corroboration support
our prediction about the descriptive task. Approaching through interpretation
predicts and observes considerable variety in the problems different subjects
exhibit in the descriptive task, and even variety within the same subject at dif-
ferent times. We can agree that some subjects may adopt something like the
rational analysis model of the task, but disagree about the uniformity of this or
any other interpretation. Most of all we do not accept that everyone is doing the
same thing at the relevant level of detail.
General Implications This situates our approach with regard to some promi-
nent psychological theories of reasoning, and illustrates similarities and differ-
ences with extant approaches in the context of this one particular task. But
our proposals also have general implications for how cognitive theories of rea-
soning relate to logical and linguistic theories of language and communication
more generally. If we are anything like right about the selection task, it is both
possible and necessary to bring the details of formal accounts of natural lan-
guages (semantics of deontics and descriptives, variable and constant anaphora,
tense, deﬁniteness, domain of interpretation, scope of negation) to bear in ex-
plaining the details of performance in laboratory reasoning tasks. This is nec-
essary because subjects’ behavior in these tasks is continuous with generalized
human capacities for communication, and possible because although strange
in many ways, laboratory tasks have to be construed by subjects using their
customary communicative skills.
In fact laboratory tasks have much in common with the curious commu-
nicative situation that is formal education, and another beneﬁt of the current
approach is that it stands to reconnect the psychology of reasoning with ed-
ucational investigations. With very few exceptions (e.g., Stanovich and West
[253]), psychologists of reasoning have not asked what educational signiﬁcance
their results have. They regard their theories as investigating “the fundamental
human reasoning mechanism” which is independent of education. On our ac-
count, the descriptive selection task is interesting precisely because it forces
subjects to reason in vacuo and this process is closely related to extremely
salient educational processes which are aimed exactly at equipping students
with generalizable skills for reasoning in novel contexts more effectively. For
example, the balance of required cooperative assumption of the background
rule and adversarial test of the foreground rule in the descriptive selection task
is absolutely typical of the difﬁculties posed in the strange communications
involved in examination questions (cf. the quote from Ryle on p. 23). Many
cross–cultural observations of reasoning can be understood in terms of the kinds
of discourse different cultures invoke in various circumstances (see chapter 5).
The discourses established by formal education are indeed a very distinctive
characteristic of our culture (see, e.g., [20], [124]).

5 From the Laboratory to the Wildand Back Again
Instead of patiently explaining the state of the art in the psychology of reason-
ing, this book has started in medias res by taking one well-known experimental
paradigm – the selection task – and showing both how traditional psychology of
reasoning has treated it and what a cognitive science of reasoning might aspire
to. It is now time to step back and introduce the most important concerns of the
psychology of reasoning as it has been practiced. It has been argued by many
outside the ﬁeld that the kind of reasoning studied in this branch of psychology
is totally irrelevant to real life, and this brings us to the question whether logical
reasoning occurs in the wild, and more generally, whether it is a trick acquired
by schooling or, on the contrary, a natural endowment.
5.1 The Laboratory
The psychology of reasoning is concerned with the experimental study of rea-
soning patterns also of interest to logicians, and in the literature we ﬁnd exper-
imental research on, for example,
• reasoning with syllogisms in adults,
• reasoning with propositional connectives in adults,
• acquisition of connectives and quantiﬁers in children,
• reasoning in subjects with various psychiatric or cognitive impairments,
• brain correlates of reasoning,
• reasoning in “primitive” societies.
As an example of the second area, an adult subject may be presented with the
premises
If Julie has an essay, she studies late in the library.
Julie does not study late in the library.
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and is then asked: what, if anything, follows? In this case (modus tollens) it
may happen that half of the subjects reply that nothing can be concluded. In
contrast, the analogous experiment for modus ponens, with the minor premise
Julie has an essay.
typically yields “success” scores of around 95% drawing the conclusion. The
psychologist is then interested in explaining the difference in performance, and
believes that differences such as this actually provide a window on the cognitive
processes underlying logical reasoning.1 What is distinctive about the psychol-
ogy of reasoning is that it views its task as uncovering the mechanism of logical
reasoning: what goes on in the brain (and where) when it makes an inference?
This issue can be framed in terms of what psychologists call the representa-
tions employed by reasoning, although we prefer the term implementation here.
This level is concerned with how the abstract structures of informational anal-
ysis – discourses, sentences, models, proofs – are implemented, both in the
world and in the mind. Is there something like a diagram or like a text imple-
mented in the mind? Or perhaps on the paper the subject is using? Here one
is concerned with memory, both long-term and working memory, with modali-
ties (visuospatial, phonetic, orthographic), with the environment (as it functions
representationally), and eventually with the brain – all the paraphernalia of psy-
chological analysis. Here differences may certainly be expected between how
the information speciﬁed in sentences and the information speciﬁed in models
gets implemented. But remarkably little study has been aimed at this level until
very recently, and much of what has been aimed at it has been based on dubious
informational-level analyses. We will return to this issue after introducing three
well-known “schools” in the psychology of reasoning, each identiﬁed by what
it takes to be the mechanism underlying reasoning.
5.1.1 Mental Logic
This school, also known as the “mental rules” school [228], maintains that log-
ical reasoning is the application of formal rules, which are more or less similar
to natural deduction rules. Here is an example (from [229]): the theory tries to
explain why humans tend to have difﬁculty with modus tollens, by assuming
that this is not a primitive rule, unlike modus ponens; modus tollens has to be
derived each time it is used; therefore it leads to longer processing time. Rea-
soning is thus assumed to be implemented as a syntactic process transforming
sentences into other sentences via rewrite rules. Since on this view reasoning is
similar to language processing, it has sometimes been maintained that it should
be subserved by the same brain circuits:
1. We will in fact have something to say about this particular phenomenon in chapter 7.
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[Mental logic claims] that deductive reasoning is a rule governed syntactic process where
internal representations preserve structural properties of linguistic strings in which the
premises are stated. This linguistic hypothesis predicts that the neuro-anatomical mecha-
nisms of language (syntactic) processing underwrite human reasoning processes . . . (Goel
et al.[101,p. 504])
This would allow us to distinguish between “mental logic” and its foremost
competitor, discussed next.
5.1.2 Mental Models
The founding father of the “mental models” school is Johnson-Laird [145];
applications of “mental models” to logic can be found in Johnson-Laird and
Byrne [144]. The main claim of this school is that reasoners do not apply
content-independent formal rules (such as, for example, modus ponens), but
construct models for sentences and read off conclusions from these, which are
then subject to a process of validation by looking for alternative models. Er-
rors in reasoning are typically explained by assuming that subjects read off a
conclusion from the initial model which turns out not to be true in all models
of the premises. The “mental models” school arose as a reaction against “men-
tal logic” because it was felt that formal, contentless rules would be unable
to explain the so-called “content effects” in reasoning, such as were believed
to occur in the selection task. It was also inﬂuenced by simultaneous devel-
opments in formal semantics, namely Kamp’s discourse representation theory
[152], which emphasized the need for the construction of “discourse models”
as an intermediary between language and world.
On the representational side, “mental models” seems to point to spatial pro-
cessing as the underlying mechanism.
[Mental models claims] that deductive reasoning is a process requiring spatial manipu-
lation and search. Mental model theory is often referred to as a spatial hypothesis and
predicts that the neural structures for visuo-spatial processing contribute the basic repre-
sentational building blocks used for logical reasoning. (Goel et al.[101,p. 504])
It then seems possible to set up an experiment to distinguish between the two
theories, by using experimental evidence that language processing is localized
in the left hemisphere, and spatial processing in the parietal cortex (chieﬂy on
the right). If a subject shows no activation in the parietal cortex while reason-
ing, this is taken to be evidence against the involvement of spatial processing,
and hence ultimately against mental models. A result of this kind was indeed
obtained by Goel and colleagues [100]. Another example is Canessa et al. [30]
which claims to identify the locations of social contract reasoning, and of ab-
stract logical reasoning, in the brain on the basis of a scanning experiment of
descriptive and deontic selection tasks. We will return to such arguments later,
showing that the route from hypothesized mechanism to brain area is consider-
ably less direct than claimed by Goel and other neuroscientists.
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5.1.3 Darwinian Algorithms
Evolutionary psychology has also tried to shed its light on logical reasoning, be-
ginning with the famous (or notorious) paper “The Logic of Social Exchange:
Has Natural Selection Shaped how Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason
Selection Task” by Leda Cosmides [47]. Here the main claim is that there is
no role for (formal, domain–independent) logic in cognition; whenever we ap-
pear to reason logically, this is because we have evolved strategies (“Darwinian
algorithms”) to solve a problem in a particular domain. The ﬁrst application
is also the most vivid: the difference between bad performance on the abstract
selection task and good performance on the drinking age rule is hypothesized
to be due to the fact that the latter is a “social contract,” and that we have
evolved a mechanism for policing social contracts, the so-called cheater detec-
tor. This is just a very special instance of evolutionary psychology’s general
claim that the mind must be viewed as a collection of dedicated mechanisms
(called “modules”) each engineered by natural selection. We will discuss evo-
lutionary psychology much more extensively in chapter 6, section 6.3; for the
moment these brief indications sufﬁce.
On the representational side, the picture is again a bit different. The hypoth-
esis implies that there is a very speciﬁc brain area, located in the limbic system,
dedicated to the vigorous pursuit of cheaters, and it has indeed been claimed
by Cosmides and colleagues that this area can be identiﬁed from neuropsycho-
logical studies of selective impairments to the limbic system [272] (see also
[30]).
5.1.4 Cold Water
There are more “schools” than have been mentioned here. But for now the most
important point is that talk about the mechanism is apt to be highly misleading,
because it does not take into account that any cognitive phenomenon can be
studied at various levels. The classical discussion of this issue is David Marr’s
[183], where he points out that cognitive science should distinguish at least the
following three levels of inquiry
1. identiﬁcation of the information–processing task as an input–output func-
tion,
2. speciﬁcation of an algorithm which computes that function,
3. neural implementation of the algorithm speciﬁed.
These distinctions between levels are of course familiar from computer science,
as is the observation that there is no reason to stick to three levels only, since a
program written in one language (say Prolog) may be implemented in another
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language (say C), and so on all the way down to an assembly language, ma-
chine code, and the several levels of analysis of hardware. What is important
about Marr’s three levels is that for any phenomenon analysed as an information
system, three levels related in this way will ﬁgure. Furthermore, it is tempting
to think that the neural implementation provides some kind of rock bottom,
the most fundamental level of inquiry; but of course the neural implementation
uses a model of what actual neurons do, and not the real things themselves.
Neuroscience provides several further levels below the neuron.
The upshot of this discussion is that it makes no sense to ask for the mecha-
nism underlying reasoning without ﬁrst specifying a level at which one intends
to study this question. As a consequence, a superﬁcially sensible distinction
such as that between mental logic and mental models may turn out to be em-
pirically meaningless, at least in the form it is usually stated. The fact that
the argument patterns studied by psychologists typically come from logics with
a completeness theorem should already give one pause: at the input–output
level manipulations with rules and manipulations with models cannot be distin-
guished in such systems. One can look at subtler measures such as error rates
or reaction times; e.g., mental modelers like to point to a correlation between
the difﬁculty of a syllogistic ﬁgure (as measured by error rate), and the number
of models that the premises of the ﬁgure allow, but proof-theoretic rule sys-
tems often consider a series of “cases” which mimic these models, and so cast
doubt on any empirical separation between rules and models at this level (see
Stenning [258, 269] for discussions of this type of argumentation).
5.2 A View with No Room
Should the psychology of deduction be about these few well-known laboratory
tasks in which subjects are presented with logical puzzles and asked to solve
them: the selection task, syllogisms, the suppression task, conditional reason-
ing? And if our capacity of deduction is not just for performing these tasks,
what is it for? What everyday functions does it serve? How are theoretical
analyses of deductive performance in these laboratory tasks related to analyses
of other cognitive functions?
As we remarked in the introduction, reasoning fell from the position of being
absolutely central in the cognitive revolution, which was founded on concep-
tions of reasoning, computation, and the analysis of language, to become the
deadbeat of cognitive psychology, pursued in a ghetto, surrounded by
widespread skepticism as to whether human reasoning really happens outside
the academy. Within the ghetto, the issue with the highest visibility has been
about the nature of the mental representations underlying deduction – is it
“rules” or is it “models”? There has been almost universal acceptance that
the goal of the ﬁeld is the characterization of “the fundamental human (de-
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ductive) reasoning mechanism,” and that it must work on one or the other of
these two kinds of representation. Along with conﬁdence that there is a sin-
gle fundamental human reasoning mechanism goes conﬁdence that classical
logic is the unchallenged arbiter of correct reasoning, although classical logic
is often simultaneously rejected as a useful guide to mental representation or
process. It is assumed that the classical logical form of the materials used in
the experiments lies very near to their surface without any substantial interpre-
tive process. This idea of interpretation as the superﬁcial translation of natural
language into logical form carries over into neglect of the processes whereby
artiﬁcial logical languages are interpreted – assigned a mapping onto the world.
Natural languages do not come with this mapping in anything like the detail
required for discourse interpretation – artiﬁcial languages still less so (consider
the introduction of our notion of interpretation in p. 21).
As we saw earlier in this chapter, there have been rejections of the appropri-
ateness of logical deductive models of reasoning in favour of inductive
information–gain models which turn reasoning into decision. But even those
who have departed from accepting classical logic as the relevant competence
model [205] have continued to accept that it makes sense to treat all subjects as
“trying to do the same thing” and so the goal might be described as changing to
that of characterizing the “fundamental human information–gain mechanism.”
But as both chapter 7 and the beginning of this chapter argue, even this appar-
ently radical move to a completely different competence model still smuggles
classical logic in at the backdoor.
The dissatisfactions of the ghetto have led even some prominent community
members to depart entirely, claiming that once the ecological context of real
life is considered seriously, what we ﬁnd are decision processes, not reasoning
processes, and that fast and frugal heuristics without any reference to compe-
tence models can replace logic, probability, and all other cumbersome systems
of reasoning [95]. Reasoning is the idle pastime of the academy, but not the
bread and butter of the real world. In fact several of the prominent researchers
who earlier made much of their analyses of the selection task now claim the
task is uninteresting.
As the last chapter suggested, the route out of this ghetto lies in taking inter-
pretation seriously. In fact we believe that the mental processes mainly evoked
by the laboratory tasks mentioned are interpretive processes – the processes of
reasoning to interpretations. Modern logic provides a rich landscape of possi-
bilities and we believe the empirical evidence is that subjects are engaged in
setting a series of parameters in this space in order to formalise their under-
standing of what it is they are being asked to do. The evidence is that in these
abstracted and unnatural settings student subjects are error-prone – so rich in-
terpretation does not mean infallible reasoning. However, recasting the phe-
nomena as interpretive provides a bridge between the laboratory and the wild.
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Laboratory tasks force interpretation in a vacuum, and the scattering that results
can tell us much about what happens at more normal pressures. Furthermore,
the wild, at least in “developed” societies with extended formal schooling, is
full of tasks which are abstracted in ways rather closely related to the labora-
tory tasks, which were, after all, originally collected or adapted from various
teaching sources. The nature of this bridge is then a good guide to the tasks in
the wild which most bring reasoning into play.
An immediate corollary of the formal stance of taking the multiplicity of
interpretations seriously is the empirical consequence of needing to take indi-
vidual differences seriously. Subjects do different things in the experiments,
and this has so far been treated as simply stringing them out along a dimen-
sion of intelligence. They are all deemed to be trying to do the same thing,
but succeeding or failing in different degrees. If there are many interpretations
and each poses a qualitatively different task, then subjects are not even trying
to do the same thing (at least at any ﬁner grain than understanding what the hell
they are being asked to do), and suddenly the data and the theoretical demands
become far richer. And most important of all, the working relation between
formalization and experiment changes entirely. Taking interpretation seriously
and separating semantic from representational issues offers a room with a view
quite panoramic enough to serve as foundations for human cognition.
The gulf of incomprehension between the logical and psychological com-
munities is a source of great personal sadness. We must get away from the
idea that these two disciplines are in competition and realise that logic is a the-
ory at a much more abstract level than psychologists suppose, but nevertheless
one that is indispensable for formulating empirical psychology. Trying to do
without it is comparable to trying to study visual perception without geometry
(only worse because of the variety of logics that are plainly required), and this
analogy should make it clear that once one has done all one’s geometry, visual
perception still remains to be done. Logic is not about to replace psychology.
Logic is about the speciﬁcation of abstract systems, and is an indispensable
guide to how those systems might or might not be implemented, at a number
of different levels, in the mind. Of course, inappropriate logical analyses lead
to bad psychological explanations (cf. the last chapter), but if logic analysis
and psychological work are reasonably coupled, then that should become evi-
dent rather quickly, and a better logical analysis found. One moral of the last
35 years of the psychology of reasoning has been that the penalty of divorcing
logic has been the reinvention of several pale imitations which have served only
to confuse.
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5.3 The Literate Wild
Psychology devised laboratory paradigms for reasoning, presumably on the as-
sumption that reasoning is in some sense a natural cognitive capability, and
therefore worth studying. Since there is room for doubt whether these experi-
ments test what they were designed to test, it is useful to brieﬂy adopt a more
phenomenological approach and ask ourselves what can plausibly be classi-
ﬁed as reasoning in natural environments. Here it is useful to introduce (and
eventually adapt) the distinction between “system 1” and “system 2” processes
discussed in dual process theories of reasoning [72]:
system 1 is . . . a form of universal cognition shared between animals and humans. It is
actually not a single system but a set of subsystems that operate with some autonomy.
System 1 includes instinctive behaviors that would include any input modules of the kind
proposed by Fodor . . . The System 1 processes that are most often described, however, are
those that are formed by associative learning of the kind produced by neural networks.
. . . System 1 processes are rapid, parallel and automatic in nature; only their ﬁnal product
is posted in consciousness [72,p. 454].
In these theories, logical reasoning is considered to belong to “system 2” which
is
slow and sequential in nature and makes use of the central working memory system.
. . . [72,p. 454]
It is also sometimes said that system 1 and system 2 processes invoke different
concepts of rationality [254]. This view of reasoning grew out of, and fed into,
the standard experimental paradigms where subjects are given premises with
the instruction to reason to a conclusion starting from the given premises only.
We believe that it is a mistake to maintain that fast and automatic processes
are thereby not logical processes, as is implicit in the above quotation. On our
view, the prime counterexample is discourse interpretation, which is by and
large automatic and proceeds according to logical laws (albeit nonclassical),
and involves the construction of representations in central working memory.
Chapter 7 will treat this topic in detail; here we discuss what the wild looks like
from the perspective of a different conceptualization of the boundary between
system 1 and system 2 processes. In a nutshell, different goals require different
assessments of what constitutes rational action, and accordingly determine an
appropriate logic. The formal properties of this logic then determine what kind
of implementations are possible, and whether they can process quickly and au-
tomatically or only slowly and laboriously. We conceptualise the part that logic
plays in system 1 as being the foundation of routine discourse interpretation,
when a suitable knowledge base already exists in long-term memory. When
the routine process of interpretation meets an impasse, then system 2 comes
into operation, albeit often brieﬂy, before system 1 can resume interpretation.
On the other hand, some impasses may require substantial conceptual learning,
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or argument between the parties to the discourse, and in this case resumption
won’t be so quickly achieved.
When discussing the phenomenology of reasoning, we distinguish between
literate and illiterate people; the classical results of Luria and Scribner have ex-
hibited considerable phenomenological differences in reasoning styles in these
subgroups, and it is useful to discuss these differences from our interpretive
perspective.
5.3.1 The Literate Wild: System 1 Processes
We have argued that much of the psychology of reasoning is (albeit unwittingly)
about interpretation, and that we should reinterpret an important subset of sys-
tem 1 processes as automatic, but defeasible, reasoning to interpretations. We
further claim that much planning is an important system 1 process subserving
interpretation. For the construction of discourse models this has been shown
in [282], and chapter 7 will establish the formal relation between planning and
reasoning. Here we stay at the phenomenal level, and discuss what forms plan-
ning can take in the wild. Before we start out, a distinction must be made.
We perhaps tend to think ﬁrst of conscious deliberate planning – a form of
problem solving – rather than the sort of effortless automatic planning involved
in, say, planning motor actions. The connection between planning and system 1
is through the latter kind of planning, though relations to the former deliberate
kind are important in considering relations between system 1 and system 2. The
fundamental logical connection between interpretation and planning is that both
are defeasible. When we plan (deliberately or automatically) we plan in virtue
of our best guess about the world in which we will have to execute our plan.
We may plan for what to do if we miss the bus, but we don’t plan for what
to do if the bus doesn’t come because the gravitational constant changes, even
though that is a logical possibility. If we used classical logic throughout our
planning, we would have to consider all logically possible worlds, or at least
make explicit exactly what range of worlds we consider. This necessity is what
gives rise to the notorious frame problem in AI [223].
Closed–world reasoning (as introduced in chapter 2) is a particular logic
for planning designed to overcome the frame problem.2 It does so with a
vengeance: it is now sufﬁcient for a single model of the discourse to be main-
tained at every point of its development. Maintaining a single model of our
best guess about the current situation and its relevance to current goals is a very
much more plausible biological function than reasoning about all logically pos-
sible models of our current assumptions. As we brieﬂy mentioned in chapter 2,
and will see in greater detail in chapter 8, along with biological plausibility of
function comes efﬁciency of computation – the model is derived from the repre-
2. For this reason, planning logics are also used in robotics for planning motor actions (see, e.g., [246]).
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sentation of the assumptions in linear time. Focusing on biologically plausible
automatic planning is helpful in connecting this approach to other cognitive
processes. In particular, we may call an automatic process such as planning an
instance of closed–world reasoning if it can be viewed as the construction of a
(representation of a) model from which conclusions are read off.
The neuropsychological literature on “executive function” has much to offer
to understanding planning, and, obliquely, also reasoning too. Lots of cate-
gories of patients have planning problems, often to do with inhibiting prepotent
responses,3 managing goals and subgoals, balancing top-down and bottom–
up inﬂuences, and so forth. This literature straddles automatic and deliberative
planning and control. In chapter 9 we shall see how these planning problems are
related to peculiarities in reasoning often found in autistic people; but there are
many other disorders to which the approach may have something to contribute:
a substantial set of psychiatric conditions – anxiety, depression, schizophrenia,
attention–deﬁcit disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder – are now seen as be-
ing accompanied by problems of executive function. These problems may or
may not be central causes, and they may be different problems in different dis-
orders, but it seems that understanding executive function and dysfunction has
a contribution to make.
Perhaps the moral of this literature of most current relevance here is that al-
though human system 1 processes include our biological heritage from nonhu-
man cognition, system 1 is also distinctively changed in humans. Our system
1 not only keeps a model of our best interpretation of our current real-world
circumstances but can also maintain models of our best interpretation of, at the
other extreme, completely ﬁctional discourses where relation to the real world
is totally unspeciﬁed, and any number of situations in between. It is under-
standing such ﬁctional discourses in the laboratory that provides the data that
we began by discussing, as well as the new data discussed in chapter 7. It is
always a salutary exercise to rehearse the many levels of ﬁction involved in lab-
oratory experiments, right down, for an example from the selection task, to the
fact that turning the diagram of the cards yields a blank piece of paper. Even
this has been shown to affect subjects’ reactions, relative to considering real
cards on the table in front of the subject. On the account of the nature of system
1 processes as defeasible automatic reasoning to an interpretation, they have
of course already received considerable attention in a range of psychological
literatures. Closest to reasoning is the psycholinguistics literature [93]. Here
the whole enterprise is to ask how subjects defeasibly derive interpretations for
discourses, culminating in successful understanding.4 Psycholinguistics has re-
cently branched out beyond the interpretation of purely linguistic input to treat
3. The prepotent response is the response which is strongest when stimuli with different, conﬂicting, re-
sponses occur together.
4. Studies of the evolution of human language and cognitive skills also exploit this relation between planning
and language skills [3], [107], [256].
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situations in which visual perception of the nonlinguistic world goes on in par-
allel with linguistic interpretation of relevant utterances [275]. Indications are
that linguistic and nonlinguistic interpretations are about as integrated as it is
possible to be. Visual evidence can be used “immediately” to resolve linguistic
choices in interpretation. This should serve to remind us that defeasible pro-
cesses modelled by closed–world reasoning are not particularly linguistic.
One thing that is special about interpreting discourse (as opposed to present
perceptual circumstances) is that it requires reasoning about others’ intentions
and meanings. One sees this made concrete in pragmatic frameworks, such
as Grice’s [108], where credulous interpretation of discourse involves assump-
tions of cooperativeness, knowledge, and ignorance, for example. The “theory
of mind” reasoning that has been studied in the developmental literature pro-
vides further examples. In chapter 2 we have seen how “theory of mind” can
be analysed as closed world reasoning. The key idea here is to analyse com-
munications, perceptions, and beliefs, as causes and consequences of a speciﬁc
kind, and the reasoning as a variety of causal reasoning. In chapter 9 we will
study how breakdown of this system leads to failures on “false–belief tasks.”
Conscious deliberate planning has been studied in normal subjects in the con-
text of problem solving, and indeed it is strange that this literature is regarded
as so separate from the psychology of reasoning literature. When subjects have
to solve a Tower of Hanoi problem [199], reasoning seems to be what is called
for. This, at ﬁrst experience, evokes system 2 planning. But the surprising
outcome of Simon and Newell’s empirical studies and theoretical conclusions
was that expertise resulted in system 2 processes “going underground” and be-
ing compiled into system 1 skills. The expert chess player or physician has to
a large extent automated the planning process and indeed may have done so to
the extent that the skill is no longer accessible to reﬂective analysis – a hallmark
of system 1 processes. This change was indeed conceptualized by Simon and
Newell as the acquisition of very large databases of “productions” – conditional
rules.
This same turn toward the study of learning and acquisition of reasoning
skills has not happened in the psychology of reasoning. As long as the goal
is characterization of the fundamental human reasoning mechanism, learning,
acquisition, and even skill are deemed irrelevant, and as processes which are
“educational,” rather than part of the nature of human cognition in the wild.
Stenning [258] shows how differences between subjects’ reasoning and learn-
ing can be explained in terms of their representational strategies, developed by
slow deliberate system 2 learning. It is a ﬁne irony that professors, of all people,
should come to the view that conceptual learning is not a part of human nature,
but merely a cultural oddity.
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Summary
The standard laboratory tasks for reasoning embody a prejudice inherited from
classical logic, that reasoning is a conscious process starting from explicitly
given premises. Taking a wider view of what reasoning consists in, by incor-
porating certain automatic processes as well, provides one with a much better
vantage point from which to study the grandeur et mise`re of classical reasoning.
5.3.2 The Literate Wild: System 2 Processes
A breakdown of mutual interpretation in credulous processing interrupts a dis-
course if the hearer’s interpretation yields an interpretational impasse. Here,
however much the hearer is willing in general to accept the speaker’s assertions,
a contradiction or other divergence of new utterances from the hearer’s model
of the speaker’s intentions to this point, means that no model can be found,
and no model means no “intended model.” The hearer now has to engage in
repair, and may interrupt the speaker to ﬁnd out how to repair understanding.
Such repair of contradiction is based on interludes of skeptical reasoning from
interpretations (or broken attempts at interpretation), embedded in credulous
reasoning to interpretations.
On this story, classical logic is a good account of some reasoning that does
occur in the wild under particular circumstances – the circumstances of “ad-
versarial” communication (in a technical sense of adversarial to be made clear
in what follows). The credulous interpretation of discourse assumes a certain
asymmetry of authority between speaker and hearer. The hearer accepts that
speaker’s authority for the truth of the discourse, at least for the purposes of
the current episode of communication. The purest case is where a speaker tells
a novel ﬁctional story to the hearer who patently accepts he has no grounds
for disagreement. But as we have just seen, this acceptance of asymmetry of
authority breaks down when contradiction is encountered, and can only be re-
stored by repair. The discourses of adversarial communication are cases where
breakdown of mutual interpretation is much more widely spread.
In full-ﬂedged argument, the parties may be unwilling to accept offered re-
pairs. They may explore for reinterpretations of the explicitly stated assump-
tions on which they can agree, or they may resort to less communicative tactics.
Here it is plausible that the logic governing the derivations from assumptions
is classical – demanding that conclusions be true in all logically possible inter-
pretations of the assumptions. Here is what lies behind the statement of Ryle
[239] quoted above on page 23, and repeated here for convenience:
There arises, I suppose, a special pressure upon language to provide idioms of the [log-
ical] kind, when a society reaches the stage where many matters of interest and impor-
tance to everyone have to be settled or decided by special kinds of talk. I mean, for
example, when offenders have to be tried and convicted or acquitted; when treaties and
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contracts have to be entered into and observed or enforced; when witnesses have to be
cross-examined; when legislators have to draft practicable measures and defend them
against critics; when private rights and public duties have to be precisely ﬁxed; when
complicated commercial arrangements have to be made; when teachers have to set tests
to their pupils; and . . . when theorists have to consider in detail the strengths and weak-
nesses of their own and one another’s theories.
One of the hallmarks of formal adversarial communication is that reasoning
is intended to proceed from the explicit assumptions negotiated to deﬁne the
‘admissible evidence’ (usually as written down). Introduction of extraneous
assumptions not formally entered in the record is strictly impermissible. This
making explicit of what is assumed for reasoning classically from interpreta-
tions contrasts with the vagueness of what long-term knowledge is in play in
defeasible reasoning to interpretations. In adversarial communication, reason-
ing is not defeasible, at least when the rules are followed literally, and ﬁnding
some interpretation which makes the premises true and the opponent’s desired
conclusion false is sufﬁcient to defeat it. What combination of classical or
defeasible logics provides the best model of how real legal and parliamentary
practice works is a complex question, but an albeit highly idealized core of
adversarial legal reasoning arguably provides one model for classical logical
reasoning in the wild. A purer example of adversarial communication involv-
ing skeptical classical reasoning is the discourse of mathematical proof. Yet
another example of adversarial communication is argument about the correct
interpretation of religious texts – the context which seems to have been particu-
larly important in the emergence of Indian logical theory. Of course, we assume
that capacities for skeptical reasoning preceded these theories of it.
Conceptual learning in educational dialogue has many of the same features.
Teacher and student start out, by deﬁnition, conceptually misaligned – the
teacher knows some concepts that the student doesn’t. The abstract concepts
of secondary and tertiary education are not teachable by ostension, and require
teaching indirectly through rehearsal of their axioms and applications of those
axioms in argument. For example, to teach a student to differentiate the physical
concepts of amount, weight, density, volume, and mass it is no good pointing
at an instance of one, because any instance of one is an instance of all the oth-
ers. Instead one has to rehearse the transformations which leave them invariant
and the ones that change them. For example, compression changes density and
volume but not weight or mass. Going to the moon changes weight but not
mass. (Stenning [261] discusses the close analogy between learning abstract
physical concepts and learning logical concepts such as truth, validity, conse-
quence, inference rules, etc.). The relation between adversarial communication
and logic was traditionally very much the focus of late secondary and tertiary
education, at least of the elites who were trained for performance in law court
and parliament (and later scientiﬁc laboratory). We have already made refer-
ence to legal reasoning on page 23. The tasks of the psychology of reasoning
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are directly taken from, or derived by small extensions from, the curriculum of
this tradition of education [258].
Summary
On this account, classical deductive reasoning is important not because an im-
plementation of it is the “universal deductive reasoning mechanism,” but rather
because classical reasoning is important for aligning and repairing mutual in-
terpretation across some gulf of understanding or agreement, and that learning
more explicit control over system 2 processes, and their relation to system 1
processes, can have a large impact on many students’ interpretation, learning
and reasoning processes. The skills of skeptical reasoning are then one ex-
tremely important set of concepts and skills for learning to learn.5
5.3.3 The Relation between System 1 and System 2
System 1 and system 2 processes work together from early on in human devel-
opment. The relevant parts of system 1 processes are rather direct implemen-
tations of a range of nonmonotonic logics. System 2 processes start as repair
processes when a system 1 process meets an impasse and gradually shade into
full blown adversarial discourses, perhaps with their underlying logic being
classical.
Questions arise at two different levels about the relation between systems 1
and 2. At the level of ontogeny there are questions about how the two systems
develop and the role of formal education in these relations. At the evolutionary
level, there are questions about the history of the two systems: did the cogni-
tive capacities for system 2 reasoning come into being at some point roughly
coincident with the advent of developed societies and the ﬁrst formulations of
theories of system 2 reasoning (i.e., with the development of logical theory),
or did the system 2 processes exist long beforehand? At the educational level,
there are questions about the level of transfer of the learning of classical logic
to the students’ reasoning practices. We approach these issues through what
is known about reasoning in less developed societies among illiterate subjects,
and then move on to consider evolutionary questions in chapter 6.
5.4 The Illiterate Wild
It has sometimes been maintained that logical reasoning, if not exactly a party
trick, is an ability acquired only in the course of becoming literate, for instance
by going to school, or worse, by attending a logic class. This is grist to the
5. For ease of exposition we have in the above more or less identiﬁed skeptical and classical reasoning. For
a more subtle approach, the reader may consult Dung, Kowalski, and Toni [67].
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mill of those who believe that, evolutionarily speaking, logical reasoning is
not a basic human ability. It is indeed true that the fundamental fact to be
explained about reasoning in illiterate subjects is their obstinate refusal to draw
conclusions from premises supplied by the experimenter, as in Luria’s famous
example [177,p. 108]:
E. In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. Novaya Zemlya is in the Far
North and there is always snow there. What color are the bears there?
S. I don’t know what color the bears are there, I never saw them.
E. But what do you think?
S. Once I saw a bear in a museum, that’s all.
E. But on the basis of what I said, what color do you think the bears are there?
S. Either one-colored or two-colored . . . [ponders for a long time]. To judge from the
place, they should be white. You say that there is a lot of snow there, but we have never
been there!
Here Luria is talking to an illiterate peasant from Kazakhstan. He attributed
the peasant’s refusal to answer, to an overriding need to answer from personal
knowledge only, interfering with the deductive inference.
A careful analysis of this and related data shows, however, that the situation
is considerably more complicated. For one thing, the subject does draw the in-
ference when he says “To judge from the place, they should be white’; but he
refuses to consider this an answer to the question posed by the experimenter. It
seems one cannot blame him. Why should someone be interested in truth rela-
tive to assumptions, instead of absolute truth? There are plenty of circumstances
in our societies where refusing hypothetical reasoning is a common move – one
has only to listen to a politician interviewed. The reason for refusing to answer
may only be because the subject does not know whether the premises are really
true, not because of an inability to draw the correct inference. This point can be
ampliﬁed in several ways.
The ﬁrst thing to observe is that sometimes the refusal to answer may be mo-
tivated by a piece of logical (meta-)reasoning, as in Scribner’s studies of rea-
soning among the illiterate Kpelle tribe in Liberia [243,p.112], reprinted from
[244]. Here is a sample argument given to her subjects:
All Kpelle men are rice farmers.
Mr. Smith is not a rice farmer.
Is Mr. Smith a Kpelle man?
Consider the following dialogue with a Kpelle subject:
S. I don’t know the man in person. I have not laid eyes on the man himself.
E. Just think about the statement.
S. If I know a man in person, I can answer that question, but since I do not know him in
person I cannot answer that question.
E. Try and answer from your Kpelle sense.
S. If you know a person, if a question comes up about him you are able to answer. But if
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you do not know a person, if a question comes up about him, it’s hard for you to answer
it.
Under the plausible assumption that in the dialogue “if” means “if and only if,”
the Kpelle subject actually makes the modus tollens inference in the meta argu-
ment (in his second turn) that he refuses to make in the object argument! Luria
concluded that subjects’ thinking is limited to the concrete and situational, that
of which they have personal knowledge: Scribner tended to the conclusion that
subjects fail because they don’t understand the problem, or what kind of dis-
course “game” is intended. If this means that subjects do not understand what
the experimenter wants from them, one can only agree, as long as this is not
taken to imply that there is some deﬁciency in the subjects’ logical reasoning.
Many of these examples bear the hallmarks of moral scruples about bearing wit-
ness on the basis of hearsay. One may well imagine that these subjects viewed
the experimenters as authority ﬁgures and perhaps assimilated their questions
to those of ofﬁcial inquisitors, and this may explain their scruples.
In line with our analysis of the selection task, we may note here that the ex-
perimenter intends the subject to understand the task (“assume only these two
premises, nothing more”), the interpretation of the conditional as the material
implication, and last but not least to keep in mind the literal wording of the
premises. As regards the ﬁrst, it may very well be that this requires under-
standing of a discourse genre, roughly that of an exam question, which is not
available to the unschooled. Imagine, for example, the confusion the subject
gets into if he interprets the experimenter’s question as a sincere request for
information not already known.
In chapter 2 we have already remarked that the experimenters make the un-
warranted assumption that the conditional is material implication. If it is as-
sumed instead to be represented as a rule allowing exceptions, formalized as
p ∧ ¬e → q, then the subject must decide whether Mr. Smith, or Novaya
Zemlya, constitutes an exceptional situation, and in the absence of personal in-
formation he may not be able to do so. It may also be difﬁcult to memorise
the literal wording of the premises instead of the image they convey. Here is
another example from Luria [177,p. 108]:
E. Cotton can only grow where it is hot and dry. In England it is cold and damp. Can
cotton grow there?
S. I don’t know
...S. I’ve only been in Kashgar country; I don’t know beyond that.
E. But on the basis of what I said to you, can cotton grow there?
S. If the land is good, cotton will grow there, but if it is damp and poor, it won’t grow. If
it’s like the Kashgar country, it will grow there too. If the soil is loose, it can grow there
too, of course.
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Luria interpreted this phenomenon as a reﬁtting of the premises according to
convention; it seems better to describe it as the construction of a discourse
model of the premises using general knowledge (‘cold and damp implies poor
soil’) and solving the task by describing the model, in line with the famous
experiments on sentence memory by Bransford et al. [24].
Our student Marian Counihan has recently (2005) done a similar experiment
among the Xhosa tribe in South Africa. Although Luria-type answers were not
common, she got some, such as the subject’s ﬁrst response:
[Susan, 80 years, illiterate]
E. First story is about a girl, Ntombi. If Ntombi wants to see her boyfriend then she goes
to East London. And we know that Ntombi does want to see her boyfriend. Then will she
go to East London?
S. How will I know? I don’t know.
E. If you just listen to the words, and to the situation they are describing, and [repeats
question], will she go then?
S. I don’t think she will go because her mother is watching her and not letting her go.
It turned out that Susan lived together with (indeed raised) her granddaughter,
whom she forbade to see her boyfriend; her reasoning can be viewed as activat-
ing the exception clause in the default with material from her own experience.
The following example from [244,205] by contrast exhibits some classical
reasoning in the ﬁrst exchange, but reasoning with exceptions takes over when
classical reasoning becomes counterintuitive:
[Nonkululeko, 56 years, illiterate. Presented material is]
E.All people who own houses pay house tax. Sabelo does not pay house tax. Does he
own a house?
S. He doesn’t have a house if he’s not paying.
E. And now suppose that none of the people in Cape Town pay house tax. Do they own
houses or not?
S. They have houses.
E. Why?
S. They can have houses because there are places where you don’t pay tax, like the squat-
ter camps.
E. So they can have houses and not pay?
S. They may, they can live at the squatter camps.
Scribner argued that results such as those outlined above do not indicate defec-
tive logical skills, but rather point to a tendency not to apply logical skills to
familiar material of which the subject has knowledge beyond that stated in the
premises. If that knowledge does not sufﬁce to settle the issue, the subject will
refrain from giving an answer. By contrast, subjects would have no trouble rea-
soning from completely new material where they do not have an opportunity to
consult their own knowledge. This hypothesis was corroborated in a study by
Tulviste [278], who showed that Nganasan6 children attending primary school
6. A tribe in Northern Eurasia.
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failed on logical reasoning tasks involving daily activities, but did well on tasks
involving typical school material (his example featured the metal molybdenum,
with which the children would have little acquaintance). Leevers and Harris
[169] provide a comparable example where 4–year–old European subjects can
be induced to reason hypothetically when given a science ﬁction context.
5.4.1 Excursion: Electroconvulsive Therapy and Syllogistic Reasoning
Evidence suggestive of effects of this kind of detachment, or the lack of it, from
context, this time from a clinical population, was obtained by an experiment in-
volving electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) performed by Deglin and Kinsbourne
[61]. Bipolar disorder and schizophrenic patients were given arguments of the
form ∀x(Ax → Bx), Aa/?Ba?7 to solve, after having received ECT to one
of the hemispheres only. Sometimes the premises were familiar, sometimes
unfamiliar, and sometimes plainly false. Here are some examples:
[familiar] All rivers contain ﬁsh.
The Neva is a river.
Does the Neva contain ﬁsh?
[unfamiliar] All countries have ﬂags.
Zambia is a country.
Does Zambia have a ﬂag?
[false] All countries have ﬂags.
Quetzal is a country
Does Quetzal have a ﬂag?
The pattern of results was consistent. When the right hemisphere is suppressed,
subjects calmly accepted the premises and afﬁrmed that the conclusion follows,
sometimes showing irritation at being asked such a simple question. When the
left hemisphere was suppressed,8 however, the experimenters obtained answers
such as
There used to be lots of ﬁsh in the Neva, but the river is now so polluted
it is completely dead!
Is there really such a state, Zambia? Where is it? Who lives there?
How can I know? I don’t even know that country [i.e., Quetzal]!
7. This type of material is customarily called a “syllogism,” although it is not a syllogism in the Aristotelian
sense. We shall follow custom here.
8. Since subjects could still comprehend natural language, the suppression cannot have been total.
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Note that for these Russian subjects from St. Petersburg, the Neva is part of
their autobiographical experience, whereas Zambia and Quetzal are not. So
the ﬁrst example constitutes a rejection of the premise’s truth, whereas the sec-
ond and third represent expressions of ignorance. The authors conclude from
this that the left hemisphere is capable of performing formal logical operations
independent of truth-value; in contrast, the right hemisphere seems incapable
“of the willing suspension of disbelief” and in any case unable to abstract from
truth-value. Note the similarity of the answers of the lefthemisphere-suppressed
patients to those given by subjects in Luria’s and Scribner’s experiments. This
study is perhaps to be interpreted with some caution since it is far from clear
how patients with ECT suppression of their left hemisphere were able to re-
spond verbally.
Our interpretation of the data from illiterate reasoners makes us skeptical of
the idea that system 2 reasoning arrives with literacy and formal schooling. The
range of relations between discourse and world may greatly expand with formal
schooling, but we believe that even the least developed societies provide enough
scope and demand for interpretive capacities to require system 2 reasoning in
some contexts. Indeed, as soon as human system 1 discourse interpretation ca-
pacities became capable of interpreting discourses about situations distant in
time or space, there would have been a need for system 2 capacities to reason
about breakdowns of mutual interpretation. We think it very unlikely that sys-
tem 2 had to wait for the advent of societies with formal schooling. The division
of labour which is, after all, one of the driving forces behind the institution of
formal education, vastly expands the need for system 2 supervision of system 1
interpretations, but it does not create that need from scratch. Once the question
is approached from this perspective, evidence does emerge of system 2 reason-
ing in traditional societies. Perhaps some of the best examples can be found in
Hutchins’s work on legal reasoning in Polynesia [136]. This perspective might
also help to resolve the puzzle posed by anthropological observations such as
that of Evans-Pritchard [79] of the great sophistication displayed, for exam-
ple, by Azande cosmology, coupled with the refusal to reason hypothetically or
theoretically about other matters.
This leaves the ontogenetic question: what part does formal schooling play
in the arrival of system 2 reasoning capacities? Answers to the evolutionary
and the ontogenetic questions tend to correlate. If one thinks of the advent of
system 2 as happening in historical time with the arrival of the social institutions
of debate, then it is natural to think of system 2 as dependent in ontogeny on
formal education. The correlation also tends to be true of how the content of
educational practices is viewed.
If the very capacities required for reasoning in something approaching clas-
sical logic are acquired in formal education, the mental processes acquired tend
to be thought of as implementations of patterns of reasoning explicitly taught –
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implementation of a novel formalism of “Ps and Qs,” or mnemonics for valid
syllogisms, say. If system 2 is thought of as pre-dating formal education, then it
is more natural to think of effective education as operating at a more semantic
and pragmatic level where the skill of detecting misalignments of communi-
cation is central. Certainly the traditional teaching of logic at some times in
history focused on teaching students the skill of detecting equivocations in ar-
guments – cases where the same word is used in different interpretations.
There are several well-known empirical studies of the teaching of (classical)
formal logic which show little transfer to general reasoning ability [38, 170].
However, Stenning [258] reviews these studies as seeking transfer at inappro-
priate levels, and presents empirical evidence from real classroom logic learn-
ing that logic teaching can transfer to improvements of general reasoning if the
teaching objective is transfer at plausible levels. It isn’t new inference rules
(modus ponens, modus tollens, etc.) that transfer (perhaps because these rules
aren’t new, being shared with defeasible logics), but the much more general
semantic skills of insulating the “admissible evidence” (current assumptions)
from “general knowledge” and exploring all interpretations rather than just the
most plausible ones, along with a much more explicit grasp of (and terminol-
ogy for) discussing the contrasts between credulous and skeptical stances. Not
to speak of the need to unlearn the inﬂuences of the information packaging of
natural languages designed to focus the credulous interpreter’s understanding
on the intended model. All this suggests that the reasoning skills involved in
system 2 must be viewed (and hence tested!) as strategies for the repair of rapid
defeasible conclusions, not as the knowledge of particular argument schemata.
In chapter 1, we noted that Piaget’s theory of formal operational thought
based on classical logical competences was one of Wason’s targets in what
he thought was his demonstration that many intelligent undergraduates did not
reach the formal operational stage. It should now be evident that the situation is
somewhat deeper than Wason originally estimated. His undergraduate subjects,
rather analogously to the illiterate subjects just discussed, do not immediately
interpret his materials classically, and both sets of subjects have good reason on
their side. Of course, Piaget perhaps underestimated how much was involved
in ﬂexibly imposing a classical logical interpretation on materials across do-
mains in general as cued by appropriate content, and perhaps underestimated
how much young children could be induced to apply system 2 reasoning with
suitable contextual support. However, Piaget seems nearer to the mark than
Wason. In particular, his hypothesis that it is at adolescence that ﬂexible con-
trolled grasp of system 2 reasoning capacities becomes available for teaching
ﬁts suggestively with our proposal that system 2 processes come to the fore
when attempting to communicate across substantial misalignments of interpre-
tation.
5.4 The Illiterate Wild 137
In summary, system 2 is related to system 1 through the need for repair to
interpretations that arises because of the ﬂexibility with which human system
1 interpretive machinery operates. This capacity for reﬂective reasoning for
repair is central to what turned apes into human beings. It is much magniﬁed
by the development of the division of labour that came much later, in more
complex societies. These societies support the learning of ﬂexible control over
system 2 processes in formal education, and they do so by teaching new skills at
the level of the semantics of discourse interpretation rather than by implanting
new proof-theoretical machinery. This account of where the psychology of
reasoning ﬁts into the study of cognition provides a quite different account of
where different species of reasoning are important in the wild, and a different
view of the evolutionary processes to which we now turn.

6 The Origin of Human ReasoningCapacities
The last chapter set out to shift the focus of the psychology of reasoning from
a single derivational apparatus working on an assumed classical logic interpre-
tation of natural language, toward a multiplicity of defeasible logical interpre-
tations necessary for planning action in the world. It argued that this change of
focus changed the perceived relations to all the surrounding ﬁelds of the study
of cognition. It also changed the view of where skeptical reasoning comes to the
fore in the wild – in the establishment of mutual interpretation across misalign-
ments in communication. Here classical logic may have a role, but that role can
only be understood as it is embedded in the business of credulous interpretation.
In section 5.1.3 we brieﬂy introduced evolutionary psychology’s view of log-
ical reasoning: there is no role for (formal, domain–independent) logic in cog-
nition; whenever we appear to reason logically, this is because we have evolved
strategies (“Darwinian algorithms”) to solve a problem in a particular domain.
A particularly important domain is that of “social contracts,” infringement of
which has to be monitored by an innate “cheater detection module.” Evolution-
ary psychology’s claim is that instances of successful reasoning are all due to
the action of such modules. Thus, the difference between bad performance on
the abstract selection task and good performance on the drinking age rule is hy-
pothesized to be due to the fact that the latter is a social contract which triggers
the involvement of the cheater detection module.
Evolutionary psychology is quite popular, and there are few critical discus-
sions of its founding psychological evidence (as opposed to its biological rea-
soning) in the literature. This chapter examines that evidence in some detail,
starting from the analysis of the selection task given in chapters 3 and 4. The
chapter also looks carefully at evolutionary psychology’s view of the theory of
evolution, a view that will be found wanting. We outline our own view of the
evolution of human cognition, and draw out its implications for the study of
reasoning. Part II of the book then studies these implications in much greater
detail, both in terms of experiments and of formal models.
But the arguments of the evolutionary psychologists about the selection task
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are not the only applications of biology to cognition which strike us as unbio-
logical. When cognitive scientists discuss evolution they often do so in terms
of processes of adaptation through the addition of innate modules. This pic-
ture is profoundly at odds with modern views of evolutionary processes. What
has come to be known as the “evo devo” movement in biology sees evolution
in terms of the tweaking of old modules by changes to the controlling genetic
“switches” that alter the timing and spatial expression of cascades of genes,
and thus change developmental processes (see [31] for a highly readable in-
troduction). This relation between development and evolution is central to un-
derstanding human cognitive evolution but hardly seems to have impinged on
cognitive science’s big picture.
We start our evolutionary excursion with some prehistory, before sketching a
more biological approach and returning to reassess evolutionary psychology.
6.1 Crude Chronology
Many of the problems of explaining human evolution stem from the briefness of
the particular evolutionary episode which split us off from the apes. Nonethe-
less, the tale of human evolution goes back a long way, and long-standing trends
in primate evolution are a key to the particularities of the ﬁnal steps of the hu-
man case.
Mammals are distinguished by their heavier investment in a smaller number
of young, and the consequent expense of offspring has far-reaching effects on
mammals’ social organization, and even, as we shall see, on their molecular
genetics. The following chronology of primate social evolution (adapted and
condensed from Foley [83]) sets the story in its large–scale context:
• 35M years – primate sociality;
• 25M years – social space and kinship as bases of matrilocal1 social organi-
zation;
• 15M years – male kin bonding in catarrhines (old-world monkeys);
• 5M years – out of the trees, bipedal locomotion, patchy resources, and the
origin of group breeding;
• 2M years – expensive offspring, eating of meat, larger brains;
• 300K years – use of ﬁre, increase in social group size, phatic functions of
language2, helpless kids, delayed maturity;
1. “Matrilocal” here means that spatially cohesive groups contain genetically related females and genetically
unrelated males. The phenomenon is almost certainly not continuous with the anthropological concept of
social organization of some modern humans.
2. The term phatic is due to the anthropologist Malinowski and designates speech, utterances, etc., that serve
to establish or maintain social relationships rather than impart information or communicate ideas.
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• 100K year – geodispersal and population increase but little behavioral change,
loss of skeletal and dental robustness, then the emergence of art, intensiﬁed
inter-group conﬂict, and territoriality;
• 30K year – “end” of genetically based evolution.
Somewhere between old world monkeys and apes, primates switched from ma-
trilocal to patrilocal social organization, probably because of changes in the
evenness of distribution of resources. This had fundamental implications for
issues of social coordination. The following quotation is a nice encapsulation
of this long–term trend in the evolution of primate social organization:
The paradox of hominid evolution is that the context in which very expensive offspring
have evolved is a social environment where females do not live in female kin-bonded
groups and therefore one where their options for recruiting female kin-bonded allo-mothers
and helpers is limited. The major question that arises is how have females been able to
cope? (Foley [83,p. 111])
Many researchers agree that many human cognitive innovations are adaptations
to pressures of the increasing social complexity that results from increasing
group size [133]. Big brains support big social groups. The nutritional conse-
quences of big brains may demand meat, which simultaneously allows small
guts (the other energy–hungry tissue), and big social groups enable various co-
operative activities such as big–game hunting, warfare, division of labour, but
big social groups also demand more social coordination and communication.
There are various positive feedback loops. These are the kinds of backdrops to
the commonly held theory that language is the central human innovation, and
that all else follows from that. This is also a form of adaptationism, now with
regard to a language module. Closer inspection suggests that different views of
language yield very different ideas about what is in this module.
To put some ﬂesh on this alternative adaptation-as-module approach we take
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch [119] who propose a framework for studying the
evolution of the ‘broad language faculty’ which distinguishes three subfaculties
and three issues for research. The three capacities are: the peripherals (acoustic
processors, motor control specializations, etc.), the “conceptual-intentional sys-
tem” (what one might think of as mentalizing capacities and for which “theory
of mind” is a useful shorthand), and the “narrow language faculty.” This last
is, negatively characterized, the broad language faculty minus the other two.
Its positive characterization is as “recursion.” The three issues for research for
each capacity can be paraphrased as: whether the capacity is shared with an-
cestors or whether it is unique to modern humans (continuity in function across
species); gradual vs. saltational in arrival (continuity in time); and whether it is
an adaptation or an exaptation (continuity of selection pressure).
Several aspects of this doubly tripartite scheme are striking. The “conceptual
intentional” capacities are already imported within the broad language faculty.
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If this is intended to reﬂect the fact that these are necessary capacities underpin-
ning language, then that is a useful marker that meaning is important. But talk
of them as a (sub)faculty rather strongly suggests that conceptual-intentional
capacties are novel and modular – reasons for skepticism on both counts will
come shortly. But the real purpose of the scheme is to place syntax at the heart
of human evolutionary innovation (which is of course where it may belong,
though again, more skepticism presently).
A generic problem with such explanations is that since they almost always
pick changes to the adult phenotype as their focal innovation, they explain, if
anything, cognitive adaptations to the adult. These adaptations would then have
to travel backward down the developmental sequence to explain the modern
human infant. We can be conﬁdent that mammoth hunting just isn’t something
human infants ever did. Warfare similarly. This is particularly true of explana-
tions by sexual selection – language as the peacock’s tail [119]. Darwin already
marshaled formidable evidence that sexually selected characters appear at sex-
ual maturity. And if they later migrated all the way down the developmental
sequence to where we ﬁnd them in today’s infants, there wasn’t a lot of time
for that to happen. Babies don’t seem to wait for adolescence to get stuck into
language.
One importance of Foley’s paradox is that it turns attention to a different part
of the life cycle and a different set of selective pressures – the old mammalian
problem of investment in the next generation, only now greatly magniﬁed by
circumstances. Pressure on female investment in child rearing as a focus of
human innovation has the great advantage that it may also get the peacock’s
tail of language attached to the right sex. As well as emphasizing how individ-
ual cognitive changes brought about changed circumstances of mother-infant
communication, the paradox also focuses attention on changes in social orga-
nization required to cope with group breeding. We will return to this presently
when we sketch our speciﬁc proposals, but ﬁrst we revisit the basics of evolu-
tionary theory in order to stand on ﬁrmer ground when discussing modularity
and the twin problems of identifying bases of continuity and innovation.
6.2 Evolutionary Thinking: From Biology to Evolutionary Psy-
chology
We assume the reader is familiar with the broad outlines of the theory of evolu-
tion. To state precisely what the theory of evolution is immediately involves us
in a number of conceptual puzzles. For instance: what is selected? Genes, cells,
traits,3 organisms (phenotypes), groups of organisms? Evolutionary psycholo-
gists believe that human cognition is in toto a product of adaptation. This claim
3. A “trait” is an aspect of an organism’s phenotype, particularly an aspect that can have effects in the
environment, and interesting traits especially have effects which have an inﬂuence on reproductive success.
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may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight, since humans have impressive learning
abilities. Certainly evolutionary psychologists would claim that learning abili-
ties are also the result of adaptation and that they are composed of specialized
learning abilities rather than generalized ones. The evolutionary psychologists’
view is that human cognition consists of a number of adaptations, which have
been useful for survival at one stage or another of the environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation (EEA), the Pleistocene, when (proto-)humans lived in small
bands as hunter-gatherers. Since this time period is much longer than the agri-
cultural period (which started some twelve thousand years ago), such traits as
humans have must have evolved either as part of their common ancestry with
primates or in the EEA. This “adaptationist” view of evolution means that two
concepts are critical in assessing their claims – modularity and innateness.
6.2.1 Analogy and Disanalogy with Language
In this respect the hotly debated issue of the origin of language is of particu-
lar interest. As is well–known, Chomsky advanced the poverty of the stimulus
argument in support of his view that the language capacity must somehow be
innate. In outline, the argument is this: children reach grammatical competence
in language very quickly, at about age 8. This competence includes complicated
constructions of which they will have heard few examples; more importantly,
the recursive nature of language cannot be inferred only from the linguistic
data presented to the child. But if that is so, some construction principles (uni-
versal grammar) must be innate; the role of the linguistic input is to set some
parameters in universal grammar (hence principles and parameters). Chomsky
wishes to remain agnostic about the possible evolutionary origins of universal
grammar. Some followers (Pinker, more recently Jackendoff) have been less
inhibited and have argued that humans must have evolved a speciﬁc “language
module,” a genetically determined piece of wetware speciﬁcally dedicated to
the processing of language. They argue that Chomsky should have followed his
own argument to its logical conclusion, by identifying “innate” with “geneti-
cally determined.” This leads us into two interesting issues: (1) is the identiﬁ-
cation of “innate” with “genetically determined” really unproblematic? and (2)
what is this notion of a “module”?
6.2.2 Innateness
We should make it clear that we have no doubt that humans are the product of
evolution; that many if not most cognitive structures are at least partially geneti-
cally determined; and that the implementations of human cognitive abilities are
organized in at least a somewhat modular fashion. Our substantive argument
here is that the evidence presented for particular modularizations is defective
evidence in a large number of ways; that adaptations have to be distinguished
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from exaptations, with substantial implications for methodology; and that in-
nateness is not a concept current in modern biology, for good reason.
Talk of the innateness of traits cannot be related to talk of genetic deter-
mination of traits without relativizing to an environment. Modern geneticists
understand that the heritability of phenotypic traits can be radically different in
different environments. The classical example is Waddington’s demonstration
[293] that patterns of wing veining inDrosophila are 0% genetically determined
in one environment and 100% determined in another (the relevant environmen-
tal dimension here is humidity). It is also often forgotten that, as far as the
calculation of heritability of a trait by a target gene or genes goes, all the other
genes are part of the environment. As heritability is used in biological research,
it is usefulness is understood as highly contextually determined. Innateness is
a ﬁxed property of a trait in an organism. This picture of apportioning the de-
termination of the cognitive phenotype between a percentage caused by genetic
factors and a percentage caused by other factors, across all environments, is
defective – and has been assigned to the dustbin of history by modern biology.
Of course, innate might not be taken to mean “under total genetic control,”
or even “under total genetic control in environment X.” Innate might just be
intended to mean “present in 100% of the population,” or “developing without
rote learning,” or “developing as a result of common experiences shared by the
whole population.” But if we are going to talk evolution, then none of these
senses of “innate” are going to be useful in relating phenotypic traits to genetic
control in whatever environments. Innateness is a prescientiﬁc concept pre-
served in the discourse of psychology by unacknowledged ideological needs.
Chomsky’s argument from the poverty of the stimulus about language ac-
quisition was historically extremely important. Faced with extreme theories
holding that all behavior consists in rote-learned conditioned reﬂexes, Chom-
sky’s argument cleared space for cognitive scientists to consider a wide range of
other causes of behavior. But Chomsky’s use of “innate” is adequately served
by the negative characterization – “not learned by conditioning.” Chomsky was
careful not to claim that “innate” meant “genetically determined” in all environ-
ments. Chomsky’s argument now stands in need of reappraisal in the resulting
more catholic environment. For example, the demonstration of abstract struc-
ture in language raises the question to what degree development of language
relies on structure in the environment, or structure in other knowledge and be-
haviors.
Remember that none of this is an argument against the involvement of genes
in the causal determination of behavior. We ﬁrmly believe that genes are as
involved in the determination of behavior as they are in the determination of
morphological traits. Behavioral traits pose much more severe problems of
speciﬁcation than morphological ones, as we shall see when we consider “lan-
guage” as a human phenotypic trait (see section 6.3.4 for discussion of the
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general problem of identifying insightful phenotypic descriptions). But the dif-
ﬁculty of ﬁnding the right speciﬁcation does not militate against genetic inﬂu-
ences. Few interesting traits are known to be either 0% or 100% controlled by
any combination of genes in every environment (remember that for calculations
of heritability, other nontarget genes are environment). The situation has been
further complicated in the last 10 years by the proliferation of epigenetic4 fac-
tors now understood to control the expression of genes. Among these genetic
“imprinting” is of particular relevance, to which we return in chapter 9. The job
of the biologist or the evolutionary cognitive scientist ought to be to account for
how genes and environment interact to bring about phenotypic traits and their
development in evolution.
6.2.3 Adaptationism and its Discontents
Evolutionary psychologists tend to hold that all traits of interest, including cog-
nitive traits, are adaptations. In fact, they claim that only an evolutionary per-
spective can give cognitive science theories of any explanatory power, where
“evolution” is taken to be tantamount to “adaptation to the pressures of natural
selection.” Accordingly, they advocate that cognitive science’s methodology
should proceed as follows:
1. analyse the information processing task (in the sense of Marr) that corre-
sponds to a particular cognitive trait;
2. ﬁnd the highly specialized mechanism that is able to execute this task;
3. explain how this mechanism came about as an adaptation.
A quotation from [50,p. 72-83] gives the ﬂavor:
An organism’s phenotypic structure can be thought of as a collection of “design features”–
micro-machines such as the functional components of the eye and the liver. The brain
can process information because it contains complex neural circuits that are functionally
organized. The only component of the evolutionary process that can build complex struc-
tures that are functionally organized is natural selection. And the only kind of problems
that natural selection can build complexly organized structures for are adaptive problems,
where “adaptive” has a very precise, narrow technical meaning. Natural selection is a
feedback process that “chooses” among alternative designs on the basis of how well they
function. By selecting designs on the basis of how well they solve adaptive problems,
this process engineers a tight ﬁt between the function of a device and its structure. [Cog-
nitive] scientists need to realize that while not everything in the designs of organisms is
the product of selection, all complex functional organization is.
4. Epigenetic factors are environmental inﬂuences on the expression of genes. As an example, imprinting is a
phenomenon whereby the alleles of genes of one parent are suppressed (often by the process of methylation).
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This “radical adaptationism” of evolutionary psychologists is not typical of
biologists, and was indeed rejected by Darwin himself. Unlike most biolo-
gists, evolutionary psychologists do not acknowledge the possiblility of struc-
tural features of cognition arising by evolutionary accident, only later to be-
come functional (what is known as genetic drift), or under selection pressure
for some other original but now obscure purpose (exaptation). Of course exap-
tations arose as adaptations at some point, but this is not what these evolutionary
psychologists need for their arguments. They need the selection pressures to be
identiﬁable from current function, and this is unfortunately not possible. Their
picture of the human mind is that of a collection of adaptations (a collection of
“design features”) more or less hanging together, tant bien, tant mal; in a very
evocative metaphor: “the mind is a Swiss army knife.” These assumptions are
critical for the applicability of their methodology. If one cannot simply reason
from the current usefulness of some trait to its evolutionary origin from selec-
tion pressure for that usefulness, then evolutionary research of course becomes
much harder.
Listening to Darwin
This is a view of evolution which was actively opposed by Darwin in his own
day. Darwin was acutely aware that evolutionary analysis was a difﬁcult busi-
ness and that “just so” stories from modern usefulness were easy to imagine
and hard to substantiate. In fact, many of Cosmides’ arguments (particularly
the ones against the idea that we need to be able to detect altruism) are rem-
iniscent of Spencer who was a contemporary of Darwin. Spencer set about
justifying recent social changes brought about by the industrial revolution in
terms of competition in “nature red in tooth and claw.” Darwin already rejected
these arguments. It is a salutary reminder that current political contexts are
rarely completely irrelevant to developments in the social sciences, and biology
too.
Darwin’s argument against radical adaptationism was that the impact on re-
productive success of the same phenotypic trait could change radically over the
course of evolution. The lamprey’s gill arch becomes the shark’s jaw bone.
Chewing is a useful thing for sharks to do, but the lamprey is a more sucky sort
of critter. Darwin was well aware that the difﬁculty of evolutionary analysis
was to provide a continuous account of selection pressure through the history
of change, even though the selection pressure on the phenotypic trait changes
radically. The problem is particularly acute when a modern system is com-
posed of components which are each currently useless themselves without all
the others. Each component must be found continual phylogenetic usefulness
to preserve it throughout the period before the system was “assembled” and
acquired its different modern usefulness.
6.2 Evolutionary Thinking: From Biology to Evolutionary Psychology 147
Human language and reasoning are plausibly perfect cases. For spoken nat-
ural languages and their attendant reasoning capacities we need elaborate per-
ceptual and motor abilities (e.g., vocal tract conﬁgurations) as well as recursive
syntactic apparatus, semantic apparatus for interpreting and reinterpreting rep-
resentations, pragmatic apparatus for understanding intentions, working mem-
ory, episodic long–term memory, and lots else. Some of these components may
have obvious usefulness in other cognitive functions, but others do not.
Adaptation and Exaptation This contrast in traits’ relations to selective pres-
sures is captured by the contrast between adaptation and exaptation. An adap-
tation is a trait that has been selected under pressure from natural selection
because of its differential effects on reproductive success – the melanic moth’s
advantage on the blackened tree.5 An exaptation is a trait evolved under one se-
lection pressure which acquires a new (beneﬁcial) effect, without having been
selected for that particular effect. Here a prime example is birds’ feathers:
originally selected for their functions as temperature regulators, they were later
exapted for ﬂight. (This is primary exaptation. A process of secondary adapta-
tion has led to further improvements in the ﬂight-enabling properties of feath-
ers.) A slightly different example is furnished by snails that use a space in their
shell to brood eggs. The existence of that space is a necessary consequence of
the spiral design of shells – but only the latter can be said to have evolved by
selection. Apparently the snails that use the space for brooding eggs evolved
after the ones who don’t: in this sense the open space is exapted to brooding
eggs. (Following Gould and Lewontin [105], such exaptations are often called
spandrels, an architectural term referring to the open surfaces on the ceiling of a
Gothic church, necessarily created by its supporting arches. These surfaces are
often decorated with mosaics; but the point is, as argued by Gould and Lewon-
tin, that they were not designed for that purpose. Indeed, the crucial point is
that they do not even ﬁgure in the description of the function that they were
originally selected by – holding up the roof.)
Darwin was adamant that exaptation was important in evolution. We agree
with him. We think it is especially likely that in assembling systems as com-
plex and multifaceted as human communicative and reasoning capactities, var-
ious component abilities were exaptations of adaptations originally driven by
very different selection pressures. In the case of behavioral traits, particularly
those related to modern human cognition, it is notoriously hard to know what
the shifting selection pressures might have been, and under what phenotypic
description those traits emerge. Darwin insisted that his arguments applied to
behavior as well as morphology, but he was also aware of the difﬁculties of
analysis posed, the prime one being the extremely wide range of options for de-
5. We sketch this classical example of adaptation by natural selection on page 158.
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scribing behavioral phenotypes and their functions in the animal’s ecology. At
the very least, painstaking description of the modern functioning of phenotypic
traits is an entry condition for evolutionary analysis.
6.2.4 Massive Modularity
The evolutionary psychologists’ point of view has been aptly described as mas-
sive modularity: the mind is completely composed of domain-speciﬁc modules
(“Darwinian algorithms”).
[Content-speciﬁc mechanisms] will be far more efﬁcient than general purpose mecha-
nisms . . . [content-independent systems] could not evolve, could not manage their own
reproduction, and would be grossly inefﬁcient and easily out-competed if they did [49,p.
112].
One can of course agree that the major problem in cognitive evolution is to ex-
plain how humans have developed staggeringly more general cognitive abilities
than their ancestors. In this context, massive modularity is to be contrasted with
Fodorian modularity, which is more of a hybrid architecture. On the one hand,
in Fodor’s view, there are low-level modules for input and output computations,
primarily perception and motor control (“transducers” as Fodor calls them), but
these are connected to a central processing unit (CPU), which is able to integrate
information from the various low-level modules. As such, the CPU must func-
tion in a modality-independent manner, perhaps by symbol processing. That is,
one picture of the functioning of the CPU is that the input is ﬁrst translated into
symbols, then processed, then translated back into motor commands.
Evolutionary psychologists claim that Fodorian modularity would be less
adaptive (would less lead to reproductive success) than massive modularity;
they view the processing that would have to go on in the CPU as so much use-
less overhead. This inference might be best viewed as an invalid conclusion
from the early AI work of Simon and Newell showing that human reasoning
cannot be based on “a general logic theorist” because of the intractability of
such an architecture. What these authors showed is that guiding the search for
theorems in classical logic required the representation of extensive knowledge
of the domain. But that is not what evolutionary psychology needs to dissmiss
general reasoning. The issue is, of course, about what domain independence
means here. Modern logic, computer science, and AI have done more than any
other disciplines to show how weak universal reasoning mechanisms are with-
out domain knowledge. So we have no trouble with the notion that reasoning
is domain dependent in a certain well-deﬁned sense – domain speciﬁc knowl-
edge needs to be encoded so that it can be called on by the procedures which
reason about problems in speciﬁc domains. But once such speciﬁc knowledge
is encoded in a way that is compatible with general knowledge, then the pro-
cedures that reason over the combination may be uniform across domains. We
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say “may” because there is still the issue whether the general logics that reason
over the domains are the same. We have argued not. So we have argued for
logical domain speciﬁcity and against content domain speciﬁcity. This is not a
simple issue of efﬁciency, but a complex one of qualitative differences.
Modules and Neurogenesis
The ill-deﬁned nature of modules in evolutionary psychology has similar prob-
lems when it meets genetics, as innateness has.6 Evolution does not generally
proceed by adding whole new modules, but by tweaking old ones. So identify-
ing cognitive innovations and identifying them with modules in an adaptationist
program is a poor way to proceed. Modern genetics tells us that most macro-
traits arise by tweaks on control elements which change the operation of a large
number of genes already contributing to a module. The classic example from
genetics is again due to Waddington [293] who showed that an artiﬁcially in-
duced genetic change in Drosophila could put an entire new pair of legs onto
the head segment of the ﬂy. Many hundreds or thousands of genes may con-
tribute to the production of legs, but a single genetic element which controls the
turning on and off of the expression of this complex of genes can produce an
extra pair of legs by allowing leg production to go on for one more segment.
The control element is not sensibly thought of a gene for legs-on-the-head –
though in a sense it is. It is a controller of other genes which work together to
produce legs wherever.
X-ray–induced mutations putting extra legs on the heads of fruit ﬂies may
seem rather distant from human cognitive evolution, so we will spend a little
time on an example nearer to home – the ontogeny and phylogeny of human
brain development – as an example where rather few genes can have profound
macroscopic effects. Just as the number of genes contributing to Drosophila
legs is large, the estimations of the number of genes which affect brain devel-
opment in mammals is of the order of tens of thousands [157]. This is just what
one would expect if it is tweaks to old modules that effect macrochanges.
A major source of evidence about the ontogeny of human brain growth comes
from the study of a particular sub-type of abnormality – autosomal recessive
primary microcephaly (MCPH) [306]. The genetics of this human condition
reveals examples of simple control processes having profound consequences
on brain size. MCPH results in an adult brain size roughly one third of normal.
The surprise is that although this does lead to mild mental retardation, the rad-
ically reduced brain seems to function more or less normally. The ontogenetic
mechanism of this disorder is beginning to be well understood. By studying
families prone to this condition it has been possible to identify at least some
6. This section requires some outline knowledge of genetics; readers not so equipped could continue with
section 6.3.
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of the genes involved. Two important genes are ASPM (abnormal spindle-like
microcephaly) and MCPH1 (microcephalin) [78, 77].
The mechanism of the former gene’s effect is well analysed, although most
of the experimental analysis is of the homologous gene in the mouse. ASPM
appears to control mitotic spindle orientation in the fetal cells which give rise
to the cortex. In one spindle orientation, the progenitor cells divide to give two
more progenitors: in the other orientation, mitosis yields one progenitor and one
neuron. Obviously, assuming that all progenitors eventually become neurons,
the ﬁrst process is exponential, doubling cell number with each division: the
second is linear. ASPM controls the exponential process. The mechanism of
expression of the second gene (microcephalin) is not yet analysed, but it is a
candidate for control of the second linear process through effects on cellular
metabolic rate and centrosome structure.
Before these genes had been identiﬁed, Rakic [224] had already proposed a
model of cortical ontogeny. The huge growth of cortex in mammals, especially
in primates, and especially in Homo, is overwhelmingly due to an increase in
area of the much folded cortex, rather than in its thickness. Rakic proposed that
the area of cortex is controlled by a factor with exponential effects and that an-
other factor controls thickness with linear effect. Just a few days’ difference in
onset and offset of the exponential process will radically alter eventual cortical
volume.
In the macaque monkey, with a 165-day gestation, the cells divide in the
exponential manner up to embryonic day E40. After E40, there is a gradual
switchover to the asymmetric mode of division which gives linear growth. In
the monkey, the former phase is 20 days longer than in the mouse, though it has
to be taken into account that mouse cells divide about twice as fast as monkey
cells. It is possible to calculate that, provided human cell cycle timings are
similar to macaque, this phase would only have to be prolonged a few days from
the monkey timings to yield the increase in human brain size. In contrast, an
increase of 20 days to the second linear process would add only approximately
ten cells to each column of cells in the cortex’s thickness. Presumably, the
mutations occurring in the ASPM gene in families with MCPH, alter timings of
the exponential process.
This constitutes a genetic model of one major inﬂuence on the ontogenetic
process controlling cortical size in mammals. (We do not suggest this is the
only factor, though it does suggest that there could be rather few major factors.)
Of itself, it does not show that the evolutionary process was driven by selection
of this gene for brain size. However, it is possible to gauge whether genes have
been under selective pressure, at least over evolutionary spans such as these.
The method studies the ratio of nonsynonymous to synonymous changes in the
proteins produced by the expression of genes – the so-called Ka/Ks ratio. A
great many DNA changes do not result in any functional effect. The key idea
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here is to estimate the proportion of protein changes which do have functional
consequences. Dorus et al. [65] studied the Ka/Ks ratio for nervous system
related genes (and some control groups of genes) in a range of mammals. They
show accelerated evolution of nervous system genes relative to control gene
groups, especially in the line leading to Homo sapiens. This study identiﬁes a
set of genes whoseK ratios are particularly outlying. ASPM and microcephalin
both appear in this set. ASPM shows evidence of particularly intense selection
pressure in the late stages of our ancestry.
In contrast, another study focusing just on the lineage from chimpanzee to hu-
man showed that neural genes have lower Ka/Ks ratios than genes expressed
outside of the brain between these two species [39, 202]. Perhaps a few neural
genes may be targets for positive selection in this period, but neural genes as a
whole are here subject to intense negative selection due to the severe disadvan-
tages conferred by mutations that disrupt brain function. We return to this topic
below on page 295.
Before leaving issues of neurogenesis, it is worth noting our changing under-
standing of how long this process continues. From the early twentieth–century
studies of Ramo´n y Cajal, until within the last few decades, it was widely be-
lieved that neurogenesis only occurred in embryonic stages of development.
Only in the more recent years has it been established that neurogenesis contin-
ues in narrowly delineated areas of the adult mammalian brain, chieﬂy the hip-
pocampus, olfactory bulb, and dentate gyrus [110]. What is more, this process
in the hippocampus has been shown to be instrumental in establishing certain
kinds of memory [247]. It is even known that there are certain divergences
between the patterns and mechanisms of adult neurogenesis in humans as com-
pared to chimpanzees [240]. Some of the cells destined to become new neurons
start in the subventricular zone (SVZ) and migrate into their eventual sites by
a mechanism called “astrocyte chains.” Possibly because the enlargement of
the human cortex has greatly increased the distances neuron progenitor cells
have to migrate from their starting places in the SVZ, neuronal migration from
ventricular walls to eventual positions is not by the ancestral astrocyte-chain
mechanism.
There have been controversial reports of adult neurogenesis in neocortex over
several years, and more recently studies claiming to show neurons generated in
situ in adult human neocortex [60]. Interestingly the contested cells are of a
speciﬁc type of GABA-ergic inhibitory interneuron. Although these results are
controversial, the rate of change of knowledge is enough to make it likely that
growth of new structures inﬂuenced by experience in the adult brain will be es-
tablished. As we shall see in chapters 8, this may be of some signiﬁcance when
we come to consider how working memory is to be modelled at a neural level,
and even more speciﬁcally in abnormalities such as autism and schizophrenia.
So here is a close and rather more cognitively relevant analogy with the extra
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legs on the heads of Drosophila. A large number of genes are involved in
producing legs and in producing brains, but a small number of control elements
may have profound effects on where legs wind up in fruit ﬂies, and how big
mammals’ brains grow. Brain size is not everything in human evolution, but the
degree of encephalization of Homo sapiens is a distinctive feature, and there is
evidence that it has played some role in the selection pressures that produced us.
It, of course, remains to understand the impact of these brain changes on human
functioning, possibly partly through our high–level example of the effects of
altriciality (see Chapter 6, section 5), but our point here is that we can only do
that as the transformation of old modules by small tweaks. To the extent that
cheater detection is a modular function of human cognition, we can only expect
to understand it as it grows out of the ancestral functions and structures from
which it developed. Cummins [54] provides some preliminary proposals.
Of course, much of the attraction of identifying a cognitive innovation with
a new module is that it would make cognitive science so easy. But the wishful
thinking backﬁres. If we think new cognitive functions are new modules, once
we hear of the estimate of ten thousand genes affecting brain development, we
are likely to throw up our hands about genetics helping to understand cognition.
If, on the other hand, we realise that the number of relevant control elements for
some critical aspects of brain development may be quite small, then whole new
sources of evidence are available and may be useful, and these genetic sources
of evidence speak to issues, such as selection pressures, that other sources do
not. We return to brain growth when introducing the importance of altriciality
in human evolution below, and again when we turn to look at autism in chapter
9.
6.3 What Evolutionary Psychology Has to Say about Reasoning
After this introduction to the biological background, we are now in a position to
assess evolutionary psychology’s views on logical reasoning. As we have seen
in chapter 3 there have been recurrent attempts to oppose form and content
as controllers of reasoning, usually to the detriment of the former. The most
forceful assault on form is due to the evolutionary psychologist Leda Cosmides,
who claims that (1) successful reasoning (according to the canons of classical
logic) occurs only in the case of narrowly circumscribed contents, and (2) these
contents have been selected by evolution, i.e., they correspond to situations in
our environment to which we are especially attuned because they are crucial for
survival. “Reasoning” is simply the wrong abstraction: there exists “reasoning”
in speciﬁc domains, designed to solve a particular adaptive problem, but there is
no general overarching innate capacity for reasoning. But by its very deﬁnition,
logic seems to be content independent: an argument is valid if whatever is
substituted for the nonlogical terms, true premises lead to a true conclusion.
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Hence logic must be an acquired trick: humans have no special capacity for
formal reasoning. Indeed, the difﬁculty of mastering logic points to its lack of
biological roots: the existence of an adaptive module is usually reﬂected in the
ease with which humans learn to use it effectively and quickly.
Cosmides’ starting point was reasoning in Wason’s selection task as analysed
in chapter 3. Originally, Cosmides claimed that all successful reasoning in the
selection task involved social contracts, in which parties agree to exchange
beneﬁts. Recently, the catalogue has been extended to include reasoning about
precautions, warnings, etc.[81], supposedly each underpinned by its own neural
apparatus, but our discussion will concentrate on the original idea; the same
arguments apply to the later claims.7
6.3.1 Reassessing Cheater Detection
The research on the Wason task and other reasoning tasks is seen as showing
that people reason correctly (according to the norms of classical logic) with
material like drinking age rules. Cosmides’ argument outlined above proposes
that this must be an adaptation, a speciﬁc module, responsible for good perfor-
mance. Cosmides proposed that logically correct reasoning, when it occurs, has
its origins in the policing of social cooperation. In particular, she focuses on the
domain of social contracts, in which one party is willing to pay a cost to acquire
a certain beneﬁt from a second party. In order to ensure survival it would be
imperative to be able to check for parties cheating on the contract, i.e., parties
accepting the beneﬁt without paying the associated cost. In the crisp summary
given by Gigerenzer and Hug:
For hunter-gatherers, social contracts, that is, cooperation between two or more people
for mutual beneﬁt, were necessary for survival. But cooperation (reciprocal altruism[8])
cannot evolve in the ﬁrst place unless one can detect cheaters [(Trivers [277])]. Con-
sequently, a set of reasoning procedures that allow one to detect cheaters efﬁciently – a
cheater-detector algorithm – would have been selected for. Such a “Darwinian algorithm”
would draw attention to any person who has accepted the beneﬁt (did he pay the cost?)
and to any person who has not paid the cost (did he accept the beneﬁt?). Because these
reasoning procedures, which were adapted to the hunter-gatherer mode of life, are still
with us, they should affect present day reasoning performance ([96,p. 3]).
Cosmides ran a number of experiments contrasting social contracts with ar-
bitrary regulations, and contrasting cheater detection with altruism detection.
Figure 6.1 gives her famous experiment on cheater detection in a social con-
tract. Seventy-ﬁve per cent of subjects now chose the did get tattoo and Big
7. The purpose of this section is mostly critical. Readers who are more interested in the positive development
can continue with section 6.4.
8. Reciprocal altruism is one party behaving altruistically on one occasion on the expectation that this gen-
erosity will be reciprocated by the other party at some future time. It is important to note that whether and
under what conditions altruism can evolve and to what degree it has to be reciprocal is highly controversial
in biology[301]; and even reciprocal altruism requires the ability to detect altruism.
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You are an anthropologist studying the Kaluame, a Polynesian people who live in small,
warring bands on Maku Island in the Paciﬁc. You are interested in how Kaluame “big
men”– chieftains– yield power. “Big Kiku” is a Kaluame big man who is known for
his ruthlessness. As a sign of loyalty, he makes his own subjects put a tattoo on their
face. Members of other Kaluame bands never have facial tattoos. Big Kiku has made so
many enemies in other Kaluame bands, that being caught in another village with a facial
tattoo is, quite literally, the kiss of death. Four men from different bands stumble into
Big Kiku’s village, starving and desperate. They have been kicked out of their respective
villages for various misdeeds, and have come to Big Kiku because they need food badly.
Big Kiku offers each of them the following deal: “If you get a tattoo on your face, then I’ll
give you cassava root.” Cassava root is a very sustaining food which Big Kiku’s people
cultivate. The four men are very hungry, so they agree to Big Kiku’s deal. Big Kiku says
the tattoos must be in place tonight, but that the cassava root will not be available until
the following morning. You learn that Big Kiku hates some of these men for betraying
him to his enemies. You suspect he will cheat and betray some of them. Thus, this is the
perfect opportunity for you to see ﬁrst hand how Big Kiku wields his power. The cards
below have information about the fates of the four men. Each card represents one man.
One side of a card tells whether or not the man went through with the facial tattoo that
evening and the other side of the card tells whether or not Big Kiku gave that man cassava
root the next day. Did Big Kiku get away with cheating any of these four men? Indicate
only those card(s) you deﬁnitely need to turn over to see if Big Kiku has broken his word
to any of these four men.
Cards
did get tattoo didn’t get tattoo BK gave cassava BK gave nothing
Figure 6.1 Cosmides’ cheater detection task. From [47,p. 211; p.264-5]
Kiku gave nothing cards, a score comparable to that for the drinking age rule.
Cosmides interprets this result as falsifying an explanation of the alleged con-
tent effect based on familiarity with the rule. As opposed to this, Cosmides
claims that unfamiliar content may also elicit good performance, as long as a
social contract is involved. It will be clear by now that our explanation of the
result is different: Cosmides’ rule is of a deontic nature, and hence none of the
factors that complicated reasoning in the case of descriptive conditionals are
operative here, and so one would expect many competence answers here. Fa-
miliarity is important in the postal regulation case (see p.46) because without
familiarity with the content, there is nothing to trigger the deontic interpretation
of an indicatively stated rule. Familiarity is not necessary in Cosmides mate-
rial because the scenario is described as requiring deontic interpretation. Note
that the drinking age rule is not a social contract (nothing is exchanged). Note
also that other nonsocial contract deontic examples (such as Wason and Green’s
inspection rules) were prominent in the literature before Cosmides wrote.
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6.3.2 Why Cheater Detection Is Claimed to Override Logical Form
Cosmides, however, has more arguments up her sleeve, and claims that in some
cases of reasoning about social contracts, the predictions of logic and cheater
detection theory diverge; the experimental results then show that the former are
falsiﬁed [47,p. 189]. Consider the following social contract:
(1) If you give me your watch, I give you 20 euro.
According to Cosmides, this contract is equivalent to the following:
(2) If I give you 20 euro, you give me your watch.
Indeed, both contracts express that the “I” is willing to pay a cost (20 euros)
in order to receive a beneﬁt (the watch) from “you.” The only difference ap-
pears to lie in the ordering of the transactions, in the sense that usually, but
not always, the action described in the consequent follows the action described
in the antecedent. Now suppose the cards are laid out on the table as in ﬁg-
ure 6.2. Then contracts (1) and (2) would, according to Cosmides, both lead
did give watch didn’t give watch did give 20 euro didn’t give 10 euro
Figure 6.2 Cards in watch transaction.
to the choice “give watch” and “give 10 euro,” since “I” have cheated “you”
if “I” accept “your” watch while paying “you” less than the 20 euros that we
agreed upon. Observe that if the contract is expressed in the form (1), the cards
showing “give watch” and “didn’t give 10 euros” would correspond with the an-
tecedent and the negation of the consequent of the conditional. If the contract is
expressed in the form (2), these cards correspond instead with the consequent
and the negation of the antecedent of the conditional. Cosmides now claims
that the prediction of propositional logic is different from that of cheater detec-
tion, since a falsifying instance would always be of the form “antecedent plus
negation of consequent,” whereas as we have seen, instances of cheating can
take different forms. Thus, if the contract is presented in the form (2), logic and
cheater detection would dictate different answers.
Similarly, suppose that the deal proposed by Big Kiku is formulated as a
switched social contract (ﬁgure 6.2).
If I give you cassava root, you must get a tattoo on your face.
Cosmides claims that (a) the original and the switched rule embody the same
social contract, therefore in both cases the cards “did get tattoo” and “BK gave
nothing” would have to be chosen, and (b) logic dictates that in the case of
the switched social contract the following cards would have to be chosen: “BK
gave cassava” and “didn’t get tattoo.” The argument for this is that only these
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cards can yield counterexamples to the conditional as stated. While we agree
to (a), we consider (b) to be another example of the surface form fetishism that
has so marred the subject. It is precisely because (a) is true that the logical
form of either the original or the switched version is not that of a material
conditional. These equivocations brought about by reversing materials with
temporal interpretations are common in the psychological literature.
6.3.3 Altruism
Cosmides’ second way of arguing that competence reasoning with “if. . . then”
is due only to the activation of cheater detection, and not to the logical form
of social contracts, is to present an example of reasoning with social contracts
in which humans don’t excel. Evolutionary theories, according to Cosmides,
would not require the existence of “altruists,” that is, individuals who are will-
ing to pay a price without taking the corresponding beneﬁt. These individuals
would quickly lose out in the struggle for survival, and hence don’t exist. But if
altruists don’t exist, there has been no need for an “altruist detector” to evolve,
and accordingly humans should not exhibit a special ability to reason about
altruism with respect to a given social contract. The argument outlined here
already raises many questions, but let us take it for granted for the moment. We
will show that the experiment designed to verify the prediction leaves much to
be desired. In ﬁgure 6.3 we give Cosmides’ instructions, which are for the most
part identical to those for the case of cheater detection, until and including the
sentence “You suspect he will cheat and betray some of them.”
[] However, you have also heard that Big Kiku sometimes, quite unexpectedly, shows
great generosity towards others - that he is sometimes quite altruistic. Thus, this is the
perfect opportunity for you to see ﬁrst hand how Big Kiku wields his power. The cards
below have information about the fates of the four men. Each card represents one man.
One side of a card tells whether or not the man went through with the facial tattoo that
evening and the other side of the card tells whether or not Big Kiku gave that man cassava
root the next day. Did Big Kiku behave altruistically towards any of these four men?
Indicate only those card(s) you deﬁnitely need to turn over to see if Big Kiku has behaved
altruistically to any of these four men.
Cards
did get tattoo didn’t get tattoo BK gave cassava BK gave nothing
Figure 6.3 Cosmides’ “altruism” task [48,p. 193ff]
Cosmides claims that in this experiment the “didn’t get tattoo” and “Big Kiku
gave cassava” cards would have to be turned, with the following argument.
Altruists, according to Cosmides, are people ready to pay a price without taking
the corresponding beneﬁt; if Big Kiku is an altruist, he wants to pay a price
(give cassava root), without demanding his rightful beneﬁt (the tattoo). Hence it
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would have to be checked whether behind the “didn’t get tattoo” card is written
“Big Kiku gave cassava” and whether behind the “Big Kiku gave cassava” card
is written “didn’t get tattoo.” Very few subjects made this choice, which led
Cosmides to the conclusion that there is no sixth sense for altruism.
Inspection of Cosmides’ experiment and argument reveal that her opera-
tionalization of the meaning of altruism is random giving. Cursory access to
the dictionary suggests this is not a plausible meaning, and as a consequence it
becomes unclear what the competence answer should be.
We can see, for instance, that the story about Big Kiku’s dealings suggests
the opposite of altruism; a truly altruistic person would give that cassava root,
no questions asked, without demands. Therefore a conditional promise is not
altruistic; only an unconditional promise would count as such. If this is so, then
no card needs to be turned – one can see immediately that Big Kiku is not an
altruist. One arrives at the same conclusion if one argues as follows: “The cards
exhibited make plain that at least one of the men did not get cassava. That’s not
altruistic: a true altruist feeds the hungry. Hence one doesn’t have to turn a card
to see that Big Kiku is not an altruist.” We now have two different predictions,
Cosmides’, and the “no card” prediction.
A different prediction from these two can be obtained when the subject argues
as follows: ‘Big Kiku has made a conditional promise. Altruism requires that
Big Kiku at the very least keeps his promise, but furthermore displays his gen-
erosity. But then all four cards have to be turned.’ Hence we have at least three
different predictions. It is therefore unclear what follows from the supposed
existence of an altruism detector, and hence what counts as a falsiﬁcation.
Once a more plausible meaning is attached it equally quickly becomes ev-
ident that being able to detect acts of altruism is rather an important part of
social interaction, whether people who invariably randomly give away their
possessions are evolutionarily ﬁt or not.
6.3.4 The Moral, Part 1: The Problem of Phenotypic Description
Our argument has been that Cosmides’ phenotypic description is wrong for
modern undergraduates. Solubility by cheater detection is not the property
that determines difﬁculty in the selection task, but rather processing differences
ﬂowing from differences in logical form. But even if the description were cor-
rect, it would be unlikely to be an evolutionarily insightful description. For that
one would minimally have to ask questions like: What can undergraduates (and
other people) do with conditional sentences outside Wason’s task? A large pro-
portion of conditionals are not social contracts yet they persist in the language.
What are they for? What could our ancestors do by way of cheating detection?
What ancestral capacities evolved into our capacities for cheating detection?
The fundamental problem of applying Darwin’s extraordinarily powerful and
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abstract theory to particular cases is, as he well understood, the problem of
phenotypic description and the identiﬁcation of functionally important traits
which are instrumental in evolution. It is worth taking a look at just what is
involved in a simple morphological case.
Excursion: To Be a Moth in the Industrial Revolution Biston betularia was a
pale brown moth which occurred in the English midlands and lived a beau-
tifully camouﬂaged life on lichen–covered trees. It was preyed on with only
medium success by various birds. Along came the industrial revolution which
polluted the Black Country air and killed the sensitive lichens, blackening the
trees. The birds had a ﬁeld day until a melanic (black) form of B. betularia
rapidly spread throughout the populations in polluted areas. The great majority
of B. betularia in the still delichened areas is now melanic. This case has all
the ingredients of a microstep of evolution by natural selection, and being one
of the classical examples of the process actually caught in operation is thor-
oughly researched. We have a phenotypic description (pale vs. melanic) and
this functional property has been shown by ﬁeld observation of birds’ feeding
successes to differentially affect reproductive success of the moth in the natural
environment according to the color of the tree bark as determined by the level
of pollution’s effect on the lichen. Moreover, it is now known that the melanic
form is the result of a single mutant gene, which was present at low levels of
occurrence in the original population. As with almost all such cases it is still
not known what other phenotypic traits, if any, this same mutant gene controls,
nor what range of variability of expression the gene exhibits in the full range of
possible environments in which the moth can survive. As with the many single
gene traits maintained at low levels in the original population by mutation, this
melanic trait has a high heritability in the natural environment, and may have a
high heritability in a wide range of environments.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First and foremost, although every de-
scription of an animal may be a phenotypic description, vanishingly few such
descriptions are evolutionarily signiﬁcant. Which ones are signiﬁcant is deter-
mined by the environment on the one hand and by the relation between phe-
notype and genotype on the other. The environment includes the color of the
lichens and whether they grow on the trees (in turn determined by sulfur diox-
ide levels in the atmosphere and the lichens’ phenotypic traits of susceptibility
to it), and the perceptual sensitivities of the birds and their role in determining
their preying behavior, along with much else. The environment also includes all
the moth’s other genes inasmuch as they affect either the expression of the phe-
notypic trait in question or the reproductive success of the phenotypic character
the target gene controls. Almost all the well-documented cases of evolution
in action are cases of traits controlled by few (often one) genes which largely
genetically control the relevant trait in the relevant range of environments. For
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various reasons that need not detain us here, these are often pathological mu-
tations. Most of the characteristics that psychologists want to study are not of
this simple kind. This does not argue against genetic involvement, but merely
for the difﬁculty of evolutionary analysis. Blackness from head to tail is a trait
which invites a simple description which is transparently related to reproductive
ﬁtness in an environment (blackened trees). It doesn’t take a lot of other fea-
tures of the moth to understand how this ﬁts into its pattern of life (and sex and
death). The behavior of sitting on trees and being eaten by visually guided birds
is more or less enough. The other differences between life for a white moth and
life for a black moth are also presumably not huge (it might be signiﬁcant to
know if there are mating preferences between varieties).
Compare the trait of turning the P and not Q cards in the drinking age selec-
tion task for modern undergraduates. Without a further account of this trait’s
relation to reproductive ﬁtness it doesn’t look to have much of a purchase for
selection pressures. Fallacious reasoning about under-age drinking isn’t a cap-
ital offense, even in America. We need some generalization. Understanding
what it is to obey laws (or perhaps conditional commands) sounds perhaps a
bit more plausible. But we palpably do not have an insightful characterization
of the phenotypic trait involved, in say, performance of the selection task (any
of its variants) which we can relate to more general psychological function-
ing, let alone the individual variations in performances, let alone reproductive
success in our current environment, let alone that of the Pleistocene. (Our pro-
posals in chapter 3 might be a beginning.) Finding more abstract descriptions
such as “performing social contract reasoning” is obviously a necessary move
if we are to develop insightful phenotypic descriptions of psychological ca-
pacities. But we also need evidence to distinguish them from other plausibly
more insightful descriptions such as “capacity for generalized natural language
communication,” or “capacity to distinguish between deontic and descriptive
interpretations” and we saw above that the evidence from the selection task is
stronger that such descriptions are insightful than anything about social con-
tracts. And however useful such capacities may sound, they need substantial
empirical investigation before we should accept them even as candidates for
driving evolution.
6.3.5 The Moral, Part 2: What’s so Special about Logical Reasoning
We have argued that Cosmides has not presented any evidence that human rea-
soning is implemented piecemeal by specialized modules. The evolutionary
psychologists’ arguments for modular specialization, and so against logic, were
based on the idea that logic is a general system and that general systems are
necessarily inefﬁcient. We have shown that these presuppositions need to be
severely modiﬁed. Logical reasoning is not domain-independent in the sense
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envisaged by the evolutionary psychologists; its laws can vary across domains,
and reasoning is involved in determining what these laws are.
So the issue must be rather what general skills subjects have for crafting
appropriate reasoning systems for localized problems. These are the skills we
saw working overtime in the abnormal environment of the descriptive selection
task, trying to understand which of the many possible interpretations of the
experimenter’s intentions might be the one she had in mind.
Although subjects reasoning in Wason’s task may be fraught, the overall pic-
ture of their reasoning capacities in more familiar situations can hardly be de-
scribed as specialized or local, especially by the standards of any other creature
or system yet known. Human reasoning and communication are surely charac-
terized by amazing, though of course not total, generality relative to any other
candidate. The most obvious example is of course human capacities for un-
derstanding cooperative communication. The reasoning involved is logically
much more complex than the reasoning the experimenters believe they have
speciﬁed in laboratory “reasoning tasks.” For example, computing implicatures
and their consequences is more complex than simply computing the logical
consequences of material implications. It is very strange to ﬁnd a group of sci-
entists confronted with this generality who insist that their ﬁrst task is to explain
domain dependence [268].
6.4 Modularity with a Human Face
The human mind is modular because organisms are modular. We have ar-
gued, however, that ﬁnding human cognitive novelties and identifying them
with novel modules is not a good approach to analyzing human evolution. It
is not a good idea with regard to cheater detectors, nor is it a good idea with a
“narrow language” faculty.9 If the human mind didn’t arise through the addition
of a large number of new modules, each identiﬁed as adding a human innova-
tion, is there some more biologically plausible view of how it might have arisen
which stands a chance of explaining the greater generality of human reasoning
abilities?
A more biological approach is to seek cognitive continuities with our ances-
tors, and then against that background of continuity to seek ways to specify
innovations and discontinuities. With the giraffe, it is easy to see that necks are
the continuity, and the innovation is in length. With cognitive functions, the
homologies should not be expected to be so obvious. Speciﬁcally, there is no
reason to believe that the capacities homologous to modern humans’ language
capacities should necessarily be capacities for communication. Interestingly, a
number of disparate lines of research suggest that we may not need to go much
9. Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch [119] (discussed in section 6.1.) attempt to remain agnostic about whether
their faculties are modules, but it is not clear to what extent they succeed.
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beyond our analysis of logical reasoning tasks to ﬁnd some of the relevantly
continuous apparatus.
6.4.1 Planning: Continuities with Our Ancestors
Systems of closed–world reasoning are logics of planning. We plan with respect
to our expectations of the world, not, as we would have to if we planned using
classical logic, with respect to all logical possibilities. Maintaining a model of
the current state of the immediate environment relevant to action is a primitive
biological function; calculating what is true in all logically possible models of
the current sense data is not. These planning logics are just as much what one
needs for planning low-level motor actions such as reaching and grasping, as
they are for planning chess moves (see Shanahan [246] for examples of such
use in robotics).10
Recursion is a very important part of planning. We plan with respect to a main
goal, and this then creates subgoals and sub–subgoals with respect to which we
plan recursively. Our early primate ancestors became planners of much more
complex motor actions when they took to the trees and acquired the kind of
forward–facing binocular overlap required for doing the depth perception re-
quired for complex manipulations. Recursion, and the general complexity of
our motor planning, no doubt got a huge boost from our primate ancestors’ ar-
boreal habits, and another much more recent but well before language emerged,
from the advent of tool–making. Of course all planning does not have to have
complete plans before execution. We often plan “reactively,” beginning on a
course of action and leaving the details to later, taking opportunistic advantage
of happenstance as it arrives along the way. But reactive planning of any struc-
tured activity requires the holding of goals and subgoals in memory, even if
the staging of decision and execution of what turns out to be the plan becomes
smeared across time.
It is also well known that apes fail in many planning tasks which we ﬁnd
straightforward. Ko¨hler’s chimpanzees fail to fetch the box from next door to
climb up to reach the bananas, even though they may use the box if they can see
it simultaneously with seeing the bananas out of reach [161]. But the fact that
some subgoaling is difﬁcult doesn’t mean that apes can’t do any subgoaling.
What we have in mind is the kind of subgoaling which goes on at a much more
implicit level in performing complex motor control – planning a reach for an
object through a set of obstacles for example.
As neuroscientists have pointed out, it is intriguing that the motor areas for
10. This should remind the reader that there is nothing particularly linguistic about logic, which is one
reason why logical analysis may be particularly useful for ﬁnding evolutionary continuities between pre–
and postlinguistic cognition. Another quite different approach to motor control problems uses continuous
models derived form control theory [192] and it would be of great interest to know more about the formal
relations between these models and defeasible logical ones.
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planning speech are right next to the motor areas for planning action. This hy-
pothesis about the cognitive continuities between primate ancestors and man
has been elaborated by many researchers [3, 107]. Approaching from the di-
rection of the syntactic and semantic analysis of temporal expressions of natu-
ral languages also directs attention to planning as underlying our faculties for
language [256, 282]. More generally, a main human brain innovation is the in-
crease in neocortex, and speciﬁcally in frontal areas of neocortex. These frontal
areas are involved in planning and “executive functions,” among other things.
Another striking demonstration of unexpected continuities in planning in in-
ternal mental functions is provided by work on monkeys’ working memory.
Cebus appella has been shown to have hierarchical planning capabilities with
respect to their working memories remarkably similar to the hierarchical chunk-
ing strategies that are evidenced in human list recall.11 When humans are given
a suitably categorized list of words, the animal words all come out clustered
together, followed by the vegetable words etc. McGonigle et al. [189] trained
monkeys on a touchscreen task requiring that they touch each of a set of hierar-
chically classiﬁable icons exhaustively. Of course, if the positions of the icons
remain constant between touches, very simple spatial sweep strategies sufﬁce.
So the icons are spatially shufﬂed after each touch. The monkeys have to re-
member, with no external record, just which icons they have already touched,
and they still succeed. McGonigle et al. showed that the monkeys were then
capable of efﬁciently exhausting an array of nine items, but more interestingly
that they did so by touching all the icons of one shape, followed by all of those
of another, just as humans’ recall sequence is clustered. Here is recursive hierar-
chical planning in individual (rather than socially expressed) working memory,
in the service of strategic planning of action sequences.
Seeing such sophisticated strategic planning with respect to a private memory
function in monkeys is rather suggestive of the hypothesis that human innova-
tions may have more to do with introducing the social expression of recursive
planning in communication than with any lack of recursion in our ancestors’
individual mental capacities12 This is a good example of the problem of pheno-
typic description – whether “recursion” is novel depends on whether we conﬁne
our search to communicative behaviors, or cast the net more broadly. Planning
provides a good basis for understanding cognitive continuities at various time-
scales in our evolution. At least some of the simpler versions of closed–world
reasoning, unlike classical logic, carry out the biologically primitive function
of maintaining a model of the current environment, and, as will be explored in
11. These monkeys are of the order of 25 million years diverged from their last common ancestor with
humans.
12. This approach contrasts with Chomsky’s belief that recursion is what is novel about human language.
But at a deeper level it is closely aligned with his own preference for the hypothesis that language may have
evolved as a private “language of thought” whose function is internal mental “calculation,” and only rather
recently has become expressed as a medium of social communication.
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chapter 8, are demonstrably neurally implementable in an extremely efﬁcient
manner.
6.4.2 Discontinuities
If externalization of planning, and plan recognition abilities, are one candidate
area for what is special about human cognition, what does closed–world rea-
soning have to offer as a framework for understanding the transition to modern
humans? In our discussion of causal reasoning, and attribution of beliefs and
intentions, we suggested that reasoning about beliefs can be viewed as an ex-
tension of causal reasoning in which perception is a kind of causal effect on
beliefs. Then there is still more complex reasoning about false beliefs, and
about intentions for intentions to be recognized.
Without pretending to have a full cognitive account of reasoning about minds
in terms of closed–world reasoning, we would claim that this is a good po-
tential basis for understanding the cognitive discontinuities of our reasoning
capacities as well as the continuities. It is a good framework because it offers
many gradations of reasoning and implementation. Notice that this approach
takes the capacities provided by the conceptual-intentional subfaculty postu-
lated by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch [119] to be novel (if continuous) with
earlier ancestral capacities (recursion, working memory, plan recognition, de-
feasible reasoning, etc.) but is entirely agnostic about the degree to which they
are modular. The relations between system 1 interpretive capacity and system
2 “supervision-of-interpretation” capacity belong among the innovations here.
For example, we saw above that closed–world reasoning is a whole family of
modes which can model many qualitative changes in what can be achieved. The
psychological literature on reasoning about mental states indicates the need for
such gradations. It is at present controversial in human development at what
stage “theory of mind” abilities emerge. False-belief tasks were proposed as
diagnosing a lack of these abilities in normal 3-year-olds and their presence
in normal 4-year-olds [172]. Others have proposed that irrelevant linguistic
demands of these tasks deceptively depress 3-year-olds’ performance. For ex-
ample, in the false belief task, the child sees the doll see the sweet placed in
one box, and then the child but not the doll sees the sweet moved to another.
Now if the child is asked, “Where will the doll look for the sweet ﬁrst?” instead
of “Where will the doll look for the sweet?” then children as young as 2 can
sometimes solve the problem [248]. Intriguingly, this might be read as evidence
of the 3-year-olds in the original task adopting a deontic reading of the question
(Where should the doll look?) rather than a descriptive one (Where will the
doll look ﬁrst?).13 Clement and Kauffman [40] offer evidence that children’s
13. There are of course other possibilities. Another, which also echoes a problem in the selection task, is
that the younger children’s problem may be with sequencing contingencies in their responses.
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capacity to reason about the relation between the actual world and some dis-
crepant ‘ideal’ state (the capacity underlying false-belief reasoning and many
other kinds) develops much earlier in deontic reasoning. It would be hardly
suprising if children’s grasp of the discrepancy between what someone did and
what they were supposed to do loomed early and large in children’s reasoning.
Onishi and Baillargeon [207] use data from nonverbal expectation of looking
in infants of only 15 months to argue for the beginnings of effective reasoning
about false beliefs at this age. Although these data can, as the authors point out,
alternatively be interpreted in terms of more superﬁcial strategies of looking
for things where they were last seen, even this requires the child to preserve
distinctions between who last saw the object and where. Nevertheless, all these
arguments push reasoning about mental states earlier in ontogeny. Above we
raised the possibility that some theory–of–mind failures might be more per-
spicuously described as failures of reasoning about possibilities (rather than
speciﬁcally about mental states), so there is a great need for a more analytical
classiﬁcation of these reasoning tasks. An approach based on the variety of
logics and their contextual triggers offers a gradation of models of performance
which can plausibly explain such developmental sequences whereas posing a
theory-of-mind module itself offers little help.
This approach through continuities and discontinuities of function still needs
to be supplemented by a much more biological grounding. We will end this
chapter by illustrating what one highly speculative grounding might look like.14
Our purpose here is to provide an example of how the different levels of evi-
dence – from cognitive function to genetics – might actually come together in
a biological account of human speciation15 that does justice to the large–scale
innovations of the human mind and the far greater generality of our reasoning.
6.5 Out of the Mouths of Babes and Sucklings
One of the great biological distinctions of the species Homo sapiens is the im-
mature state of its offspring at birth, and the lengthened period of their matura-
tion (known in biology as altriciality). We will take this example of a biological
innovation and trace out some of its consequences and how it relates evidence
at many levels. Here is an indisputable novel biological feature which engages
both with our social reorganization into a group-breeding species – intensi-
ﬁed by the cost of rearing altricial infants – and with the distinctive cognitive
changes that enable language and culture in such a group-breeding species. Re-
member that the purpose of our example is to provide a contrast with the kinds
of stories on offer which identify cognitive innovations as modules. Altricial-
ity is an example that shows how one adaptation, plausibly driven by relatively
14. Developed from the argument of Stenning [257].
15. Human speciation is the process which gave rise to Homo sapiens from its ape ancestors.
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few selection pressures, could give rise to changes in large numbers of other
modular systems. It is an excellent illustrative example of biological grounding
because it brings together effects at so many levels. Evolution does not, by and
large, proceed by adding new modules, but by retiming the control of devel-
opmental processes of old ones. Altriciality is just such a process where few
control elements might retime macromodules in development.
Evolutionary stories must begin with a characterization of selection pres-
sures. A prime candidate for the driving force behind human altriciality is that
constraints on growth rates of neural tissue along with maternal anatomy may
mean that altriciality was the only way to develop a big-brained narrow-hipped
species of biped. Whatever the pressure for larger brains, larger brains would
have forced more altricial birth, given constraints on maternal pelvic dimen-
sions – “Get out while you can!” being the wise human infant’s motto. There
may even be a positive feedback loop here – more altricial birth means greater
dependence and more pressure for social coordination in order to group-rear
infants. But social coordination is one candidate for driving the need for bigger
brains, and so it goes round.
It is easy to see that altriciality has radically affected the data to which human
learning mechanisms are exposed, and the sequence of exposure. Maturational
mechanisms which previously occurred in utero now happen in the external en-
vironment. Humans are, for example, unique in the amount of postnatal neural
growth they exhibit. The human changes in the duration and sequencing of
brain development, which constitute an important part of altriciality, are prime
candidates for being one cause of the kind of widespread modular repurposing
which took place in human speciation and subsequent evolution.
6.5.1 Altriciality and Social Behavior
We hypothesise that the intensiﬁcation of humans’ focus on reasoning about
the intentions of conspeciﬁcs, and particularly their communicative intentions,
arose as an outgrowth of existing capacities for reasoning in other kinds of
planning. One very important contribution of altriciality to human cognitive
evolution is its pressures toward cooperation – ﬁrst between mother and infant,
then between adults in small groups, and outward to larger societies. Hare and
Tomasello [116] have pointed to the predominantly competitive interactions be-
tween chimpanzees as being a major brake on the development of their mind–
reading abilities. Even domestic dogs are superior in this regard, and, interest-
ingly, domestic dogs are altricial in respect of a number of critical behavioral
characteristics with regard to their wolf ancestors. For example, mammalian
young engage in play, which involves suspension of aggression, along with in-
tense cooperation in coordination, and social signaling of group comembership
through greeting. Altricial domestic dogs continue these infantile behavioral
166 6 The Origin of Human Reasoning Capacities
traits into adulthood. Whereas adult wolves may greet once daily, domestic
dogs may repeat their greetings on a 10 minute separation. Humans may con-
tinue play into old age.
There are good general reasons for believing that the social coordination re-
quired for the establishment and preservation of language conventions requires
a highly cooperative setting such as that which altriciality provides. For exam-
ple, Davidson’s arguments for the “principle of charity” in interpretation [57]
provide just such reasons. If we were really so focused in our earliest social
dealings on whether we are being cheated or lied to, it seems unlikely that
human communication would ever have got off the ground. Reasoning about
interpretations is quite hard enough under assumptions of cooperation, and the
evidence of misalignment all too easy to come by once one expects deliber-
ate misalignment. Policing of contracts may be important at the margins, but
is not a plausible explanation of the initial establishment of cooperation. Fur-
thermore, it is far from clear that our ancestors were in general incapable of
detecting cheating on social regulations in say food-sharing cliques—no effort
on the part of those who propose cheating detectors as novel modules seems to
have gone into studying the ancestral precursors. Almost certainly it is the ca-
pacity for creating and dissolving the regularities we call social contracts which
is novel and that has more to do with communication and the formation of trust
than the negative detection of cheating.
Views of altruism in the several literatures which have cause to study it seem
to have undergone a recent marked transformation. Economists, for example,
have started to acknowledge that when players consider themselves to be mem-
bers of a team, immediate cooperative play in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
without the expectation of repeated play, is often observed [6]. Study of the Ul-
timatum game and other non-zero sum games clearly illustrate that Homo eco-
nomicus is a rare species possibly largely conﬁned to economics departments
[98]. This has immediate implications for the possibility of group selection
and non-Spencerian evolutionary theory. Such cooperative possibilities were,
of course, pointed out by the early users of game theory [242], but seem to
have been dismissed, as far as one can tell, on ideological grounds. Human
social organization, relative to that of our immediate ancestors, is characterized
by hugely decreased within-group aggression (with, it may be argued, greatly
increased between-group aggression) [32].
Quite apart from a generalized increased pressure for cooperation arising
from altriciality, we should expect some more speciﬁcally cognitive impacts.
Dumping an immature brain out into the external world exposes its learning
mechanisms to quite different inputs and outputs than retention in utero. Learn-
ing is closely related to what can be controlled. Human infants have little con-
trol over their physical environment for an extended period from birth. In round
ﬁgures, human infants take 9 months to reach the state of motor development of
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a newborn chimpanzee. However, in the extended period of their development,
they have considerable access to social control, mainly through voice but also
through facial expression. Screaming brings one set of effects, cooing another,
and a little later, smiling yet different effects. Bruner has emphasized the devel-
opment of taking turns in primitive preverbal exchanges between mother and
infant. The development of this predictable shifting pattern of authority and
control is clearly an important precursor of discourse and possibly of the self
as the locus of control. This ﬂexibility of assignment of authority is another
rather biologically distinctive human pattern of behavior. Most animals have
pecking orders which determine patterns of authority with limited contextual
ﬂexibility. Along with this change goes substantial changes in eye movement
patterns: in most animals eye contact tends to be aggressive; in humans it often
signals social bonding and its refusal can be agonistic, though there is evidence
the change in this pattern already began in our ape ancestors.
One might speculate that this shift of emphasis from physical control to social
control may have widespread implications for human cognition. Learning so-
cial control requires developing intentional concepts. It has long been observed
by philosophers of science that our common grasp of even physical causality
has many intentional aspects. More exotically, philosophers, at least since Ni-
etzsche, have argued that our capacity for anthropomorphism (and with it the
basis of religion) stems from our earliest experiences of causality and control
being of social rather than physical control. Stenning [257] develops some im-
plications for the origins of human cognition.
6.5.2 Altriciality and Neurogenesis
If altriciality is a good candidate adaptation for driving widespread cognitive
innovation, what are the biological details of altricial development patterns
and when did they happen in evolution? Focus on the changes in the tempo-
ral proﬁle of human development reveals some complicated and controversial
patterns. Strict neotony (continuation of an infantile state of some trait into
adulthood) does not appear to be the best model of, for example, human brain
growth. Once a more general class of multiphasic growth models are con-
sidered, it has been shown that the best ﬁt to human brain growth timing is
provided by a four-phase nonlinear model, with breakpoints at 4.4, 9.3, 13.8,
18.2, and 114 conception months [292] (see ﬁgure 6.4). The ﬁnal phase has a
zero growth parameter and a large estimation error (error bar on the last point:
38-288). When compared to the chimpanzee model, the human growth rate pa-
rameter has remained ﬁxed, and each phase has been lengthened by a factor of
about 1.3. So at least for brain growth, this is not neotony – rather lengthening
of the same pattern. Nevertheless altriciality, at a descriptive level, is indis-
putable. Other characteristics can, of course, show either no changes in timing,
or different changes in developmental scheduling.
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Figure 6.4 Multiphasic regression of human log ages and log brain weights. Reprinted from
[292,p. 232] by permission of Elsevier Inc.
Above we already introduced Rakic’s model of brain growth (see page 150),
which describes an exponential process of expansion of neuron progenitor num-
bers, placed in the ﬁrst half of the ﬁrst phase (up to 4.4 conception months).
This is the phase critical for the eventual brain size. It has been calculated
that during this phase, on average about 225,000 cortical neuron progenitors
are generated per minute. What has been referred to as the “brain growth spurt”
roughly corresponds to the second phase. It starts near the beginning of midges-
tation with multiplication of glial cells and growth and myelination of neurons,
which continue until the end of the second postnatal year or later. The third
phase, the “cerebellar phase,” starts prenatally and proceeds especially rapidly
soon after birth. Phase 4 may be underestimated in current data and is not so
easily identiﬁed with a dominant process.
Normal brain growth works by producing a very large number of intercon-
nections between neurons early on, and then subsequently pruning many of
these out. This pruning is assumed to be associated with less active usage. So
the connections that are reinforced (and which are presumed to be functionally
active in the individual’s processing) survive, but those not used die out – use it
or lose it as a kind of natural selection among neurons. The timing of the ma-
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jor phases of synaptic pruning are currently contentious though probably start
within the ﬁrst year of postnatal life.
We will revisit this temporal proﬁle when we turn to autism is chapter 9.
Brain growth is, of course, only one much–studied example of evolutionarily
changed temporal proﬁle in development. Nor is it clear what part brain size
plays in human cognitive evolution—whether size matters. We merely offer
it as on example which is probably cognitively relevant. Scerif and Karmiloff-
Smith [241] review evidence that several genetically based behavioral disorders
(e.g., Williams syndrome are to be at least partly understood as distortions of
relative developmental phasing of different systems.
6.5.3 Altriciality in the Evolution of Homo
One immediate evolutionary question about the changes in the temporal proﬁle
of human development is just when they happened in phylogeny. Until recently,
it was widely assumed that the pressures for altriciality from obstetric problems
must have arisen with the origins of bipedalism – that is fairly far back in our
divergence from our ape ancestors. More recently, a variety of kinds of evidence
point to a much later date for the major changes in the timing of development.
Although australopithecine bipedal walking evolved around 5 million years
ago, there were 2.5 to 3 million years of walking before distance running evolved
[23]. A secondary narrowing of the pelvis to facilitate the mechanics of efﬁcient
running is claimed by these authors not to occur inHomo erectus but to arrive in
Homo sapiens. The tall human body with a narrow trunk, waist, and pelvis cre-
ates more skin surface for our size, permitting greater cooling during running.
It also lets the upper and lower body move independently, which allows us to
use the upper body to counteract the twisting forces from the swinging legs. If
distance running was a factor in narrowing the pelvis, then we can assume that
this would have increased the selection pressure on obstetric problems arising
from large fetal heads.
Studies of the evolution of the mechanics of human birth show that it evolved
in several stages [234]. The early australopithecines’ shift to bipedalism brought
some of the innovations invoked by the changes in human shoulders, but not
the problems due to brain size. Australopithecines probably displayed one of
two part rotations which modern human infants perform on passing through the
pelvis, but not both. Martin [184] proposes that pelvic size began to constrain
brain size only around 1.5 miilion years ago, and by 100,000 years ago we
reached essentially the modern arrangements, although even these exert con-
siderable selection pressure on the systems of development and delivery. This
time scale certainly overlaps with the emergence of modern human cognition.
Study of the skull openings in a single well-preserved skull of Homo erectus
from Java [46] provides some information on this issue. These authors argue
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from estimates of the skull’s age (1.8 million years) and age at death (0.5 to 1.5
years), that this it is more ape-like than modern Homo sapiens-like in its degree
of development at birth. They conclude that secondary altriciality (the exten-
sion of brain growth after birth) was a late innovation in the mutual ancestor of
Homo sapiens and Homo neanderthalensis. They comment that both displayed
enlarged brains and reduced pelvic inlet sizes. To give some idea of the scale
of the long-term changes, whereas macaque newborns have 70% of their adult
brain volume, in humans the ﬁgure is 25% (then after ﬁrst year it’s 50% and
after 10 years, 95%). Apes are intermediate (40%) at birth.
A completely different kind of evidence comes from molecular clock com-
parisons between human, chimpanzee, gorilla, and baboon which have been
used to estimate when human generation length extended. It turns out that hu-
man and chimpanzee are much more similar in clock speed than the gorilla and
baboon. Humans’ molecular clock speed is about 10% slower than the gorilla
and 3% slower than the chimpanzee’s. The signiﬁcant 3% slowdown of hu-
mans from chimpanzees is taken to indicate that the human slowdown is recent.
Making the simplifying assumptions that all the difference is due to genera-
tion lengthening and the change was instantaneous, the estimate is of a change
about 1 million years ago [70]. This is a little earlier than the other sources of
evidence.
All these diverse sources of evidence place changes in the timing of human
development as possibly being active not too far from the period of the emer-
gence of modern human cognition starting around 1 million to half a million
years ago, an important motivator for choosing an intensiﬁcation of the long-
term trend to altriciality as an organizing adaptation. Altriciality illustrates how
the impact of a single well-established coherent biological change can ram-
ify throughout the biology of a species, altering a myriad of ancestral func-
tions, each itself already modularized in complex ways. Existing machinery is
exapted for dealing with the resulting new situations. Secondary adaptations
are required to live with these exaptations.
6.6 Conclusion: Back to the Laboratory (and the Drawing Board)
In summary, our sketch of an answer to how human cognition became so much
more general than that of our immediate ancestors is a variant of the traditional
one that communication through language (suitably understood) is central. But
it is a variant with considerable twists. Humans gained the ability to plan and
reason about the complex intentions involved in communication, and so to pro-
cess the multiple interpretations in the multiple logics required for natural lan-
guage use. Considerable planning in thought may have been possible before it
could be externalized in communication. The languages of thought led to the
languages of expression.
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These conjectures send us back to the laboratory. If reasoning developed out
of planning, it is worth investigating reasoning tasks which somehow activate
the planning system. In the following two chapters several such tasks – sup-
pression task, box task, false–belief task, counterfactual reasoning task – will
be discussed. As the reader can see from this list, it concerns tasks which have
been around for a considerable time, having been used for quite different pur-
poses. Formal modeling in nonmonotonic logic will be applied to show that
these tasks all embody aspects of planning. This opens up the possibility to
establish a correlation between failures on verbal reasoning tasks and nonver-
bal planning tasks, and the chapter on autism will show that such correlations
indeed exist.
In this chapter we have proposed altriciality as an example of an important
development in human evolution which can serve as one organizing principle
for thinking about phenomena at many different levels. We do not propose that
it is the only, nor even the best, example. However, it is sufﬁcient to illustrate
how fundamental biological concepts such as modularity, heritability, adapta-
tion, and exaptation have been mistreated in discussions of cogntive evolution.
Biology’s new “evo devo” insights lead us to expect that an important theme
in human evolution is the retimings of modular development under the inﬂu-
ence of relatively few control elements. This model virtually guarantees that
exaptation will be as important as adaptation – when complex modules develop
in different contexts, their behavior will change in complex ways, exposing
them to repurposing. This means that phenotypic description, and especially
cognitive phenotypic description, is hard because the identiﬁcation of selection
pressures from current function is fraught with difﬁculty. Since innovation does
not happen by the arrival of new modules, our method must be to identify both
continuity and discontinuity with our ancestors.
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The preceding chapters have introduced a perspective on human reasoning
which emphasizes the large variety of logical systems not only available, but
actually necessary for, describing human reasoning behavior. If classical logic
is taken as the norm, irrationality seems to abound, but on a wider conception
of reasoning which also involves assigning logical form, apparent irrationality
may turn out to be compliance with a different norm, or the impossibility of
imposing any logical form whatsoever. Indeed, in chapter 4 we have seen how
a variety of contexts supporting subjects in imposing classical logical form in
the selection task considerably improve their performance vis– a`– vis even the
classical criterion.
After the detailed information about parameter setting in the selection task
obtained from tutorial dialogues and presented in chapter 3, it might seem that
the selection task is an ideal task for studying the process of assigning logical
form. However, the great variety of possible parameters, and the complexity
of the logical forms associated to each of these parameters, create considerable
problems; the number of combinations is simply too large for a ﬁrst attempt. We
therefore need a task in which parameter setting is apparently more constrained,
in order to yield information both about parameter setting and about consistency
with the parameters thus set.
Another problem with the selection task is that the rule is such a compressed
discourse that the subjects’ interpretive efforts are narrowly focused, and hard
to elicit. A further problem is that what is at issue is clearly the communication
between the experimenter and the subject, and the information is intended to be
insulated from general knowledge or a larger population of cases. A better task
would more obviously invoke interpretation of a more extended discourse with
the focus on using general knowledge to resolve the absent speaker’s intentions
rather than on the experimenter’s. In chapter 7 we turn to the so-called “sup-
pression task” which fulﬁlls these requirements. We outline the results obtained
and describe a family of defeasible logical theories of closed-world reasoning as
a framework for modeling the course of discourse interpretation in this task. We
make some premilinary observations of the range of interpretations that occur
and the degree of subjects’ success in maintaining consistency. We also con-
sider some probabilisitic approaches that have been taken to similar tasks, and
argue that these approaches still need to distinguish the process of constructing
a (probabilistic) interpretation, and the process of deriving consequences from
that interpretation.
If defeasible logics are our framework for specifying what function is com-
puted when we interpret discourses, we can then consider how these logics are
implemented in the brain. In chapter 8, we show that this logic, unlike clas-
sical logic, is readily implementable in neural networks. In fact, it is possible
to account not only of the computations within networks but also to at least
outline how such networks might be constructed anew as discourse processing
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proceeeds. This is something that few neural accounts even attempt. These
neural implementations have certain computational properties which are psy-
chologically suggestive – their rules are, for example, unlike classical ones,
asymmetric in the amount of computation for forward and backward reasoning.
Rather than leave this as an abstract implementation of general reasoning
within albeit particular logics, we illustrate what the availability of logic and
implementation can offer to the analysis of particular behavioral syndromes.
Since our logic is “planning logic,” an obvious choice is an area where “execu-
tive function” has ﬁgured prominently in psychological analyses, and in chapter
9 we choose autism as a developmental disorder where this is true. Our study
of autism also leads us to extend our earlier sketch of the evolutionary basis of
cognition.
In the ﬁnal chapter of part II, we turn our new tools back onto the other heart-
land task of the psychology of reasoning – the syllogism. We present evidence
that credulous interpretation of syllogisms is an important interpretive factor in
this task too. Employing exploratory empirical methods, a combination of the
credulous/skeptical dimension, with features of the expression of information
structure in this simple logical fragment, is used to reveal groups of subjects
approaching the syllogism in qualitatively different fashion. This raises the bar
on empirical investigations of reasoning.
By this time we would claim to have outlined a broadly based interpretive
approach to human reasoning which provides an alternative to what has been
on offer in this ﬁeld. Interpretation is a substantial process, to be distinguished
from derivation. It has well–understood logical models which relate long–term
general knowledge to episodic information arriving in discourse. These log-
ics can be given interesting neural implementations. The combination can be
applied to behavioral phenomena such as autism to reveal hidden continuities
and contrasts between diverse behaviors and theories of the condition. This ap-
proach also suggests very different accounts of the biological and evolutionary
grounding of cognition. Above all, the approach takes seriously the contribu-
tions both of psychological experimentation and of formal studies of cognition
in logic and linguistics.
7 Planning and Reasoning: TheSuppression Task
Before we introduce the reasoning task which will play the lead role in the com-
ing three chapters, we start with a preamble explaining its wider signiﬁcance.
The evolutionary considerations of chapter 6 suggested that instead of thinking
of reasoning as an adaptation to a speciﬁc environmental pressure (e.g., the ne-
cessity to detect cheaters), it is more fruitful to view it as an exaptation, a new
use of an older capacity. We proposed the following evolutionary sequence
1. Language exapted the planning capacity, both for syntax and for semantics,
and in particular discourse interpretation
2. Discourse interpretation involves credulous reasoning by the hearer, that is to
say the hearer tries to accommodate the truth of all the speaker’s utterances
in deriving an intended model
3. Credulous reasoning itself is best modelled as some form of nonmonotonic
logic
4. Classical logic arose from conscious reﬂection on the outcome of (often au-
tomatic) credulous reasoning.
With reference to 4, it may be noted that there are various reasons why classi-
cal ﬁrst–order logic is not a very plausible candidate for a “natural” reasoning
process, operative also in the absence of schooling. The ﬁrst reason is that clas-
sical logic requires an extensional representation of concepts as sets, hence inter
alia assumes that it is fully determined whether an object falls under the con-
cept or not. It is much more plausible to assume that concepts are represented
cognitively as algorithms which test whether or not the object falls under the
concept, that is, intensionally, not extensionally. (For an early defense of this
idea, see [194].) At the very least the logic describing such concepts is three-
valued Kleene logic (see chapter 2) because the algorithm may be undecided
on some inputs. If, moreover, the algorithm operates by comparing the input to
a prototype, the logic is doubtlessly more complicated, although it is not fully
clear what it should be. (Compare, for example, [153] and [90, 91].)
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The second reason why classical logic may have to be laboriously learned
instead of coming naturally is that the deﬁnition of validity underlying classical
logic creates computational problems for working memory (when unaided by
external devices such as pen and paper). Viewed semantically, one has to go
through all models of the premises and check for each of these whether the
conclusion holds. One needs a routine to search through all models, and keep
track of where one is in the search. The point can be illustrated by asking the
reader to determine without use of paper and pencil whether the syllogism
¬∃x(Ax ∧Bx), ∃x(Bx ∧ Cx)/ ∃x(Ax ∧ ¬Cx)
is valid or not. Classroom experience shows that even students with some logic
training ﬁnd this difﬁcult.1 Logics which are computationally less taxing for
working memory may well precede, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically,
those logics which require conscious computation. Note that this complexity is
a mathematical feature of classical logic and as such independent of a “rules”
or “models” representational format. The claim of the next three chapters is
that (a) such less taxing logics exist, and (b) it can be tested whether subjects
actually reason consistently with such a logic. In this chapter we will ﬁrst
introduce the pertinent reasoning task, then the associated logical form, and
lastly some data relevant to the assignment of logical form.
As an introduction to the reasoning task to be discussed in this chapter con-
sider the following two examples. The ﬁrst is from a boarding card distributed
at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, where we read
If it’s thirty minutes before your ﬂight departure, make your way to the gate.
As soon as the gate number is conﬁrmed, make your way to the gate.
The traveler looking at the screen and seeing the gate number conﬁrmed 2 hours
before ﬂight departure might well be in a quandary: Can I wait for another hour
and a half, or do I proceed to the gate immediately? But his dilemma pales
beside that of the hapless visitor who sees it’s 30 minutes before departure and
is thus told to go the gate, which is, however, as yet undisclosed.
The second example2 is from a notice explaining the alarm signal button in
trains of the London underground.
If there is an emergency then you press the alarm signal button.
The driver will stop if any part of the train is in a station.
Here the second sentence, taken literally, on its own, does not even make sense:
the train could never leave the station. However, its intended meaning does
make sense:
1. Clearly, algorithms like semantic tableaux do help in these simple cases, but they are available only to the
initiated.
2. Brought to our attention by R.A. Kowalski. See also his [163].
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The driver will stop the train if someone presses the alarm signal button and any part of
the train is in a station.
Similarly, in the ﬁrst example, the intended meaning is likely to be
If it’s thirty minutes before your ﬂight departure and the gate number is conﬁrmed, make
your way to the gate.
Rigid adherence to classical logic would have little survival value in these cases.
Instead there seems to be a reasoning process toward a more reasonable inter-
pretation, in which the antecedents of the conditionals become conjoined. But
why this interpretation, and how is it computed? Surprisingly, there is con-
siderable experimental and theoretical information about this question. This is
because the very same problem was studied in an entirely different context: the
so-called suppression task in the psychology of reasoning.
Suppose one presents a subject with the following innocuous premises:
(1) If she has an essay to write she will study late in the library.
She has an essay to write.
In this case roughly 90% of subjects draw the conclusion She will study late in
the library. Next, suppose one adds the premise
(2) If the library is open, she will study late in the library.
In this case, only 60% conclude She will study late in the library. However, if
instead of (2) the premise
(3) If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
is added, then the percentage of She will study late in the library conclusions is
comparable to that in (1).
These observations are originally due to Ruth Byrne [28], and they were used
by her to argue against a rule-based account of logical reasoning such as found
in, e.g., Rips [228]. For if valid arguments can be suppressed, then surely logi-
cal inference cannot be a matter of blindly applying rules; and furthermore the
fact that suppression depends on the content of the added premise is taken to be
an argument against the role of logical form in reasoning.3
While we believe Byrne’s interpretation of the results is mistaken, we agree
that the task connects to deep issues in the psychology of reasoning. In this
chapter we give a logical analysis of the various answer patterns observed. We
have distinguished in the previous chapters between two main kinds of logical
reasoning: reasoning from a ﬁxed interpretation of the logical and nonlogical
terms in the premises, and reasoning toward an interpretation of those terms.
3. Note that the percentages refer to population averages of endorsement; they provide no information about
an individual subject’s behavior. In section 7.4 we will present some data which bear on this issue.
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Here we show that Byrne’s interpretation of her data (a “failure” to apply clas-
sical logic) follows only if experimental subjects in her task reason from a ﬁxed
interpretation. If what they are doing is reasoning to a consistent interpretation
of the experimental materials, their answers can be shown to make perfect log-
ical sense, albeit in a different logic. This is where closed–world reasoning,
which has been touched upon repeatedly in the preceding chapters, comes to
the fore. We provide an extended introduction to this form of reasoning and
show how the deviation from classical logical reasoning found in Byrne’s data
and those of others (e.g., Dieussaert et al. [63]) can be accounted for in the
proposed formalism. Here, we will look not only at “binary” data on whether
or not a particular inference is suppressed but also consider data from tuto-
rial dialogues, which give some clue to the interpretational processes involved.
Chapter 8 will then show that closed–world reasoning has an efﬁcient neural
interpretation. In chapter 9 we show that the logic behind the suppression task
is the common logical core behind several benchmark tests for autism, such as
the false–belief task, unexpected contents task, and box task. This leads one to
expect that people with autism show a consistently different answer pattern on
the suppression task, a hypothesis that was corroborated in an experiment.
7.1 The Suppression Task and Byrne’s Interpretation
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, if one presents a subject with
the following premises:
(4a) If she has an essay to write she will study late in the library.
(4b) She has an essay to write.
In this case roughly 90% of subjects4 draw the conclusion She will study late
in the library (we will later discuss what the remaining 10% may be thinking).
Next, suppose one adds the premise
(5) If the library is open, she will study late in the library.
and one asks again: what follows? In this case, only 60% conclude She will
study late in the library.
However, if instead of the above, the premise
(6) If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library
4. The ﬁgures we use come from the experiment reported in [63], since the experiments reported in this
study have more statistical power than those of [28].
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is added, then the percentage of She will study late in the library conclusions is
around 95%.
In this type of experiment one investigates not only modus ponens (MP),
but also modus tollens (MT), and the “fallacies” afﬁrmation of the consequent
(AC), and denial of the antecedent (DA), with respect to both types of added
premises, (5) and (6). In table 7.1 we tabulate the relevant data, following
Dieussaert et al. [63].
Table 7.1 Percentages of Dieussaert’s subjects drawing target conclusions in each of the four argument
forms modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial of the antecedent (DA), and afﬁrmation of the con-
sequent (AC), in two–premise and three–premise arguments: conditional 1 is the same ﬁrst premise in all
cases. In a two-premise argument it is combined only with the categorical premise shown. In a three-premise
argument, both are combined with either an alternative or an additional conditional premise.
Role Content
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library
Categorical She has an essay to write
Conclusion She will study late in the library (MP 90%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library
Conclusion She will study late in the library (MP 94%)
Additional If the library stays open, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She will study late in the library (MP 60%)
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
Categorical She will study late in the library
Conclusion She has an essay to write (AC 53%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library
Conclusion She has an essay to write (AC 16%)
Additional If the library stays open, then she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She has an essay to write (AC 55%)
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library
Categorical She hasn’t an essay to write
Conclusion She will not study late in the library (DA 49%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library
Conclusion She will not study late in the library (DA 22%)
Additional If the library stays open, she will study late in the library
Conclusion She will not study late in the library (DA 49%)
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
Categorical She will not study late in the library
Conclusion She does not have an essay to write (MT 69%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library
Conclusion She does not have an essay to write (MT 69%)
Additional If the library stays open, then she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She does not have an essay to write (MT 44%)
We start with Byrne’s explanation in [28] of how mental models theory5 ex-
plains the data. Mental models assumes that the reasoning process consists of
the following stages:
1. The premises are interpreted in the sense that a model is constructed on the
5. Section 10.6 in chapter 10 will give a more detailed exposition (and criticism) of mental models theory in
the context of syllogistic reasoning.
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basis of general knowledge and the speciﬁc premises.
2. An informative conclusion is read off from the model.
3. This conclusion is checked against possible alternative models of the situa-
tion.
In this particular case the model for the premises p → q, r → q that is con-
structed depends on the content of p and r, and the general knowledge activated
by those contents. If r represents an alternative, the mental model constructed
is one appropriate to the formula p∨r → q, and the conclusion q can be read off
from this model. If, however, r represents an additional condition, that model
is appropriate to the formula p∧ r → q, and no informative conclusion follows.
The conclusion that Byrne draws from the experimental results is that
in order to explain how people reason, we need to explain how premises of the same
apparent logical form can be interpreted in quite different ways. The process of inter-
pretation has been relatively neglected in the inferential machinery proposed by current
theories based on formal rules. It plays a more central part, however, in theories based on
mental models [28,p. 83].
Byrne thus sees the main problem as explaining “how premises of the same
apparent logical form can be interpreted in quite different ways.”
We would question the accuracy of this formulation, and instead prefer to
formulate the main issue as follows: it is the job of the interpretive process
to assign logical form, which cannot simply be read off from the given mate-
rial. In other words, the difference between Byrne (and others working in the
mental models tradition) and ourselves appears to be this: whereas she takes
logical form to be more or less given, we view it as the end result of a (possibly
laborious) interpretive process.
Before we embark on our modeling exercise, however, some preliminary re-
marks on what we mean by “modeling” are in order. Since we view task under-
standing as an integral component of reasoning, the model must include both
reasoning to an interpretation – setting crucial parameters – and reasoning from
the interpretation so deﬁned. This goal places constraints on the kind of data
most revealing of appropriate models. As we saw in our discussion of the selec-
tion task in chapter 3, even within a group of subjects which exhibit the same
ﬁnal answer pattern, the underlying parameter settings can be very different,
thus leading to qualitatively different models of what subjects are doing and
why. The contrast is most blatant when the stark “outcome data” of four bi-
nary card choices are contrasted with the rich processes revealed in the socratic
dialogues.
With the suppression task, we see this contrast repeated. Cross–sectional sta-
tistical information about proportions of groups of subjects suppressing or not
is a poor and indirect foundation for discriminating the different interpretations
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which are behind these choices. As long as the investigation remains focused
on the spurious contrast between models and rules, the investigators have re-
mained content with cross–sectional proportion analyses. If we want to know
what subjects are doing (deriving a variety of interpretations) we need to know
at least what a single subject does on the sequence of inferences MP, MT, AC,
and DA, with or without an extra conditional premise of one or other of the
two types—additional or alternative. One can then hope to build up a picture
of subjects’ setting of the various logical parameters critical for understanding
their reasoning.
But what if the trajectory through a sequence of interpretational choices is
actually a random walk? What if the subject’s answer pattern is not consistent
with any parameter setting? The analysis of logical form may still not be ﬁne-
grained enough, in the sense that additional parameters can be identiﬁed which
have a causal role in determining the subject’s behavior. Still another possibility
is that the subject is learning while doing a task, and so changing earlier settings.
There is ample opportunity for this, as lots of items are necessary to achieve
statistical signiﬁcance. If none of these possibilities appear to be the case, in a
dialogue situation the experimenter can still probe the subject’s assignment of
logical form and point out to him that some of his inferences do not conform to
the logical form assigned. There is a clear educational moral in this: rather than
impose a formal system upon a student, it is preferable to teach the assignment
of logical form, and the value of being consistent with the form assigned.
7.2 Logical Forms in the Suppression Task
Chapter 2 has given a lengthy introduction to the notion of logical form; here it
sufﬁces to repeat what are the main parameters to be set.
1. L a formal language into whichN (the natural language) is translated,
2. the expression in L which translates an expression in N ,
3. the semantics S for L,
4. the deﬁnition of validity of arguments ψ1, . . . , ψn/ϕ, with premises ψi and
conclusion ϕ.
As in the selection task, the cardinal parameter to be ﬁxed is the form of the con-
ditional. Byrne assumed that the conditional can be represented by a material
implication, in all circumstances. We believe, on the contrary, that the logical
form is the endpoint of an interpretation process, which may be the material
implication, but may also be entirely different.
We claim that one meaning of the conditional that naturally occurs to the sub-
ject in the suppression task is that of a law-like relationship between antecedent
and consequent. An example of a law expressed by means of a conditional is
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(7) If a glass is dropped on a hard surface, it will break.
or
(8) If a body is dropped, its velocity will increase as gt2.
What is common to both examples is that the antecedent hides an endless num-
ber of unstated assumptions: in the ﬁrst case, e.g. that the glass is not caught
before it falls, etc., in the second case, e.g., that there are no other forces at
work on the body, etc.6 This implies that there may very well be exceptions to
the law; but these exceptions do not falsify the law. 7
We will therefore give the general logical form of law-like conditionals “if
A, then B” as
(9) If A, and nothing abnormal is the case, then B.
where what is abnormal is provided by the context. This characterization is,
however, incomplete without saying what “if . . . then” means in (9).
We contend that the conditional is often not so much a truth–functional con-
nective, as a license for certain inferences.8 One reason is the role of putative
counterexamples, i.e., situations where A and not-B; especially in the case of
law-like conditionals, such a counterexample is not used to discard the condi-
tional, but to look for an abnormality; it is thus more appropriate to describe it
as an exception. Thus, one use of the conditional is where it is taken as given,
not as a statement which can be false, and we claim that this is the proper way
to view the conditionals occurring in the suppression task, which are after all
supplied by the experimenter.9 Having posited that, in the present context, the
conditional is rather a license for inferences than a connective, what are these
inferences? One is, of course, modus ponens: the premises ϕ and “if ϕ then B”
license the inference that B. The second type of inference licensed is what we
have dubbed closed–world reasoning in chapter 2: it says that if it is impossi-
ble to derive a proposition B from the given premises by repeated application
of modus ponens, then one may assume B is false. This kind of reasoning
is routinely applied in daily life: if the timetable doesn’t say there is a train
6. For a recent defense of the idea that this is how scientiﬁc laws must be conceptualized, consult [307].
7. As we shall see in section 7.5, several authors have tried to explain the suppression effect by assuming
that the conditional expresses a regularity rather than a material implication, and feel forced to consider
a probabilistic interpretation of the conditional. But the fact that the conditional, viewed as a law, in a
sense represents an uncertain relationship, does not thereby license the application of probability theory.
“Uncertainty” is a multifaceted notion and can be captured by probability only in very special circumstances.
8. A connective differs from a license for inference in that a connective, in addition to licensing inferences,
also comes with rules for inferring a formula containing that connective as main logical operator.
9. The preceding considerations imply that the conditional cannot be iterated. Natural language condition-
als are notoriously hard (although not impossible) to iterate, especially when a conditional occurs in the
antecedent of another conditional – “If, if conditionals are iterated, then they aren’t meaningful, then they
aren’t material” is an example; one more reason why “if ... then” is not simply material implication.
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from Edinburgh to London between 5 pm and 5:10 pm, one assumes there is
no such train. Closed world reasoning is what allows humans to circumvent the
notorious frame problem (at least to some extent): my reaching for a glass of
water may be unsuccessful for any number of reasons, for instance because the
earth’s gravitational ﬁeld changes suddenly, but since I have no positive infor-
mation that this is likely to happen, I assume it will not. We hypothesise that
closed–world reasoning plays an important part in reasoning with conditionals;
in particular, the suppression effect will be seen to be due to a special form of
a closed–world assumption. We now recast the preceding considerations as a
formal deﬁnition in the branch of logic known as logic programming.
7.2.1 Logic Programming and Planning: Informal Introduction
In chapter 6, we deﬁned planning as setting a goal and devising a sequence of
actions that will achieve that goal, taking into account events in, and properties
of the world and the agent. In this deﬁnition, “will achieve” cannot mean:
“provably achieves” because of the notorious frame problem: it is impossible
to take into account all eventualities whose occurrence might be relevant to the
success of the plan. Therefore the question arises: what makes a good plan? A
reasonable suggestion is: the plan works to the best of one’s present knowledge.
In terms of models, this means the plan achieves the goal in a “minimal model”
of reality, where, roughly speaking, every positive atomic proposition is false
which you have no reason to assume to be true. In particular, in the minimal
model no events occur which are not forced to occur by the data. This makes
planning a form of nonmonotonic reasoning: the fact that
“goal G can be achieved in circumstances C”
does not imply
“goal G can be achieved in circumstances C + D.”
The book by van Lambalgen and Hamm [282] formalises the computations per-
formed by our planning capacities by means of a temporal reasoner (the event
calculus) as formulated in a particular type of nonmonotonic logic, namely
ﬁrst-order constraint logic programming with negation as failure. Syntactically,
logic programming is a good formalism for planning because its derivations are
built on backward chaining (regression) from a given goal. Semantically, it cor-
responds to the intuition that planning consists in part of constructing minimal
models of the world. The purpose of [282] is to show that the semantics of tense
and aspect in natural language can be formally explained on the assumption that
temporal notions are encoded in such a way as to subserve planning. For our
present purposes we may abstract from the temporal component of planning,
and concentrate on the skeleton of the inference engine required for planning,
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namely propositional logic programming. Planning proceeds with respect to a
model of the world and it is hypothesized that the automatic process of con-
structing a minimal model which underlies planning also subserves discourse
integration. We present our analysis of the suppression task as evidence for this
hypothesis.
Nonmonotonic logics abound, of course,10 but logic programming is attrac-
tive because it is both relatively expressive and computationally efﬁcient.11 In
chapter 8 we shall see that logic programming also has an appealing imple-
mentation in neural nets, and that it may thus shed some light on the operation
of working memory. Taken together, the proven merits of logic programming
in discourse processing [282] and its straightforward implementation in neural
networks suggest to us that it is relevant to cognitive modeling. We are not
aware of any other nonmonotonic logic which has this range of features, but
deﬁnitely do not claim that there cannot be any such logic.12
7.2.2 Logic Programming and Planning Formally
Logic programming is a fragment of propositional (or predicate) logic with a
special, nonclassical, semantics embodying closed–world reasoning. For the
sake of clarity we start with the fragment of logic programming in which nega-
tion is not allowed.
Deﬁnition 2 A positive clause is a formula of the form p1, . . . pn → q, where
the q, pi are proposition letters; the antecedent may be empty, in which case q
is referred as a fact.
In this formula, q is called the head, and p1, . . . pn the body of the clause.
A positive program is a ﬁnite set of positive clauses.
Until further notice, we assume that propositions are either true (1) or false (0);
but the semantics is nonetheless non-classical. The only models to be consid-
ered are those of the following form
Deﬁnition 3 Let P be a positive program on a ﬁnite setL of proposition letters.
An assignmentM of truth-values {0, 1} toL (i.e., a functionM : L −→ {0.1})
is a model of P if for q ∈ L,
10. See Pelletier and Elio [210] for a plea for more extensive investigations into the psychological reality of
nonmonotonic logics.
11. This is because it does not involve the consistency checks necessary for other nonmonotonic logics, such
as Reiter’s default logic [226]. This point is further elaborated in chapter 8.
12. Consider for instance the defeasible planner OSCAR developed by Pollock (see, e.g., [221]). This
planner is built on top of a theorem prover for classical predicate logic, and is thus more expressive than
logic programming. But the gain in expressiveness is paid for by less pleasing computational properties,
since such a system cannot be interpreted semantically by iterations of a ﬁxed–point operator, a prerequisite
for an efﬁcient neural implementation.
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1. M(q) = 1 if there is a clause p1, . . . pn → q in P such that for all i,
M(pi) = 1
2. M(q) = 0 if for all clauses p1, . . . pn → q in P there is some pi for which
M(pi) = 0.
The deﬁnition entails that for any q not occurring as the head of a clause,
M(q) = 0. Furthermore, if q occurs in a single formula of the form p → q
and p does not occur as the head of a clause, alsoM(q) = 0. More generally,
the modelM is minimal in the sense that any proposition not forced to be true
by the program is false inM; this is our ﬁrst (though not ﬁnal) formulation of
the closed–world assumption.
We now present a generalization of this deﬁnition in terms of a three-valued
semantics. This is necessary for the following reasons:
(i) Since the proposed notion of conditionals requires negation, we have to lib-
eralise the preceding deﬁnitions and allow negation in the body of a clause, and
this will be seen to entail a move to a different semantics13.
(ii) It is useful to have some freedom in deciding to which propositions we want
to apply closed–world reasoning; the above deﬁnition applies it to all proposi-
tions, whereas it is more realistic to remain agnostic about some.
We ﬁrst generalize the deﬁnition of clause.
Deﬁnition 4 A deﬁnite clause is a formula of the form (¬)p1 ∧ . . . ∧ (¬)pn →
q,14 where the pi are either proposition letters,  or ⊥,15 and q is a proposi-
tional variable. Facts are clauses of the form  → q, which will usually be
abbreviated to q. Empty antecedents are no longer allowed. A deﬁnite logic
program is a ﬁnite conjunction of deﬁnite clauses.
The intuitive meaning of negation is what is known as “negation as (ﬁnite) fail-
ure”: ¬ϕ is true if the attempt to derive ϕ from the program P fails in ﬁnitely
many steps. To make this precise requires specifying in detail the notion of
derivability, which we shall not now do; but see section 7.2.3. Instead we give
a semantic characterization, which will allow the reader to see the connection
with closed–world reasoning. The proper semantics for deﬁnite programs re-
quires a move from two-valued semantics to Kleene’s strong three-valued se-
mantics (introduced in chapter 2), which has the truth–values undecided (u),
false (0), and true (1). The intuitive meaning of undecided is that the truth–
value can evolve toward either true or false (but not conversely). This provides
us with the notion of a three-valued model. It is an important fact that the
models of interest can be captured by means of the following construction.
13. For instance, the program clause ¬p → p is inconsistent on the above semantics.
14. (¬)p means that p may, but need not, occur in negated form.
15. We use  for an arbitrary tautology, and⊥ for an arbitrary contradiction.
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Deﬁnition 5 (a) If q is a proposition letter occurring in a program P , the deﬁ-
nition of q with respect to P is given by:
1. take all clauses ϕi → q whose head is q and form the expression
∨
i ϕi → q;
2. if there is no such ϕi, then the expression ⊥ → q is added;
3. replace the →’s by ↔’s (here, ↔ has a classical interpretation given by:
ψ ↔ ϕ is true if ψ,ϕ have the same truth–value, and false otherwise).
(b) The completion of a program P , denoted by comp(P ), is constructed by
taking the conjunction of the deﬁnitions of atoms q, for all q in P .
(c) More generally, if S is a set of atoms occurring in P , the completion of
P relativized to S, compS(P ), is obtained by taking the conjunction of the
deﬁnitions of the atoms q which are in S.
(d) If P is a logic program, deﬁne the nonmonotonic consequence relation |≈
by
P |≈3 ϕ iff comp(P ) |=3 ϕ,
where |=3 denotes consequence with respect to three-valued models.16 For
comp(P ) one may also read compS(P ); in which case one should write, strictly
speaking, P |≈S3 ϕ.
Here are some examples.
1. Let the deﬁnite program P consist of p → q and ⊥ → p. In this case the
completion comp(P ) is p↔ q,⊥ ↔ p, which implies that both p and q are
false.
2. Take the same program, but restrict the completion to q. In this case the
completion comp{q}(P ) is p ↔ q, which is true on all models in which p
and q have the same truth–value.
3. Let P be the program {p; p ∧ ¬ab → q}. closed–world reasoning for ab-
normalities can be viewed as forming the completion comp{ab}(P ), which
in this case equals { ↔ p;⊥ ↔ ab; p ∧ ¬ab → q}, which is equivalent to
{p; p→ q}. We thus have comp{ab}(P ) |= q.
4. Suppose the program P equals {⊥ → p; p ∧ ¬ab → q}. If we form the
completion comp{ab,p}(P ), we obtain {⊥ ↔ p;⊥ ↔ ab; p ∧ ¬ab → q},
from which nothing can be concluded in the sense of |=3. A conclusion
becomes possible, however, if the completion comp{ab,p,q}(P ) is considered
instead, because now
comp{ab,p,q}(P ) |=3 ¬q.
16. Γ |=3 ψ means that every three-valued model of Γ is a model of psi. The subscript will be dropped
when there is no danger of confusion.
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Thus closed–world reasoning can be analyzed in rather ﬁne detail using this
procedure.
If P |≈3 ϕ, we say that ϕ follows from P by negation as failure, or by
closed–world reasoning. The process of completion is also referred to as mini-
mization.17 Using the terminology introduced above, our main hypothesis in
explaining Byrne’s data as conforming to the logical competence model of
closed–world reasoning can then be stated as
a. the conditionals used in the suppression task, far from being material im-
plications, can be captured much more adequately by logic programming
clauses of the form p∧¬ab → q, where ab is a proposition letter indicating
that something abnormal is the case;
b. when making interpretations, subjects usually do not consider all models of
the premises, but only minimal models, deﬁned by a suitable completion.
The readers who wish to see some applications of these notions to the sup-
pression task before delving into further technicalities may now jump ahead to
section 7.3, in particular the explanations with regard to the forward inferences
MP and DA. The backward inferences MT and AC require a slightly different
application of logic programming, which will be introduced in the next sub-
section. The ﬁnal subsection will look at the construction of models, which is
necessary for the connection with neural networks.
7.2.3 Strengthening the Closed–World Assumption: Integrity Constraints
So far we have applied the closed–world assumption to atomic formulas (for
instance, ab) and their negations: if ab is not in the database, we may assume it
is false. We now extend the closed–world assumption to cover program clauses
as well: if we are given that q and if ϕ1 → q, . . . , ϕn → q are all the clauses
with nontrivial body ϕi which have q as head, then we (defeasibly) conclude
that q can only be the case because one of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is the case. We there-
fore do not consider the possibility that q is the case because some other state
of affairs ψ obtains, where ψ is independent of the ϕ1, . . . , ϕn and such that
(unbeknownst to us) ψ → q. This kind of reasoning might be called “diagnos-
tic” or “abductive” (see [151]); we will also call it “closed–world reasoning for
rules.”
17. Readers who recall McCarthy’s use of an abnormality predicate ab may wonder why we do not use
circumscription [185] instead of logic programming, since circumscription also proceeds by minimizing
the extension of ab. There is a technical reason for this: circumscription cannot be easily used to explain
the fallacies; but the main reason is that logic programming, unlike circumscription, allows incremental
computation of minimal models, and this computation will be seen to be related to the convergence toward a
stable state of a neural network. This shows why model construction can here proceed automatically.
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This notion of closed–world is not quite expressed by the completion of a
program. For in the simple case where we have only a clause p → q and a fact
 → q is added, the completion becomes (p ∨ ) ↔ q, from which nothing
can be derived about p. What we need instead is a principled way of adding q
such that the database or model is updated with p. The proper technical way
of achieving this is by means of so-called integrity constraints. To clarify this
notion, we need a small excursion into database theory, taking an example from
Kowalski [164,p. 232].
An integrity constraint in a database expresses obligations and prohibitions
that the states of the database must satisfy if they fulﬁl a certain condition. For
instance, the “obligation” to carry an umbrella when it is raining may be for-
malized (using a self-explanatory language for talking about actions and their
effects) by the integrity constraint
Holds(rain, t) → Holds(carry-umbrella, t) (7.1)
The crucial point here is the meaning of →. The formula (7.1) cannot be an
ordinary program clause, for in that case the addition of Holds(rain,now)
would trigger the consequence Holds(carry-umbrella,now) which may well
be false, and in any case does not express an obligation.
A better way to think of an integrity constraint is to view the consequent as
a constraint that the database must satisfy if the antecedent holds. This entails
in general that the database has to be updated with a true statement about the
world. The relevant notions are most easily explained in terms of the deriva-
tional machinery of logic programming.
Derivations in Logic Programming
We ﬁrst need a piece of terminology.
Deﬁnition 6 A query is a ﬁnite (possibly empty) sequence of proposition letters
denoted as ?p1, . . . , pm. Alternatively, a query is called a goal. The empty
query, canonically denoted by , is interpreted as ⊥, i.e., a contradiction.
Operationally, one should think of a query ?q as the assumption of the formula
¬q, the ﬁrst step in proving q from P using a reductio ad absurdum argument.
In other words, one tries to show that P,¬q |= ⊥. In this context, one rule
sufﬁces for this, a rule which reduces a goal to subgoals.
Deﬁnition 7 Resolution is a derivation rule which takes as input a program
clause p1, . . . pn → q and a query ?s1, . . . , q, . . . , sk and produces the query
?s1, . . . p1, . . . pn, . . . , sk.
Given a goal ?q several clauses may match with q, so we need a choice rule to
provide a unique choice. Since we choose only one clause, derivations become
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linear. A linear derivation starting from a query ?A can be pictured as the acid
rain-affected tree depicted in ﬁgure 7.1. A linear derivation starting from a
?A B1, . . . , Bn → A




?B1, . . . , Bi, . . . , Bn C1, . . . , Cm → Bi




?B1, . . . , Bi−1, C1, . . . , Cm, Bi+1, . . . , Bn
...
Figure 7.1 An illustration of a linear derivation with resolution.
query ?q is successful if it ends in the empty query (i.e., ⊥); if the derivation is
ﬁnite but does not end with the empty query it is said to fail ﬁnitely.
If one does not use a choice rule but executes all possible resolution steps si-
multaneously one obtains a (rather more healthy–looking) derivation tree. The
tree is successful if one branch ends in the empty query; if there is no such
branch and all branches are ﬁnite, it is said to fail ﬁnitely.
Finite failure is important in providing the operational semantics for nega-
tion: a query ?¬ϕ is said to succeed if ?ϕ fails ﬁnitely. The relation between
derivations and semantics is given by
Theorem 2 A query ?ϕ succeeds with respect to a program P , if P |≈3 ϕ,
i.e., if ϕ is entailed by the completion of P in the sense of comp(P ) |=3 ϕ.
Likewise, a query ?ϕ fails with respect to a program P , if P |≈3 ¬ϕ, i.e.,
comp(P ) |=3 ¬ϕ.
Integrity Constraints and Derivations
An integrity constraint is a query used in a very particular way. Let ?ϕ be a
query, and P a program, then one may or may not have P |≈3 ϕ. In the latter
case, the integrity constraint
?ϕ succeeds
means that P must be transformed by a suitable update into a program P ′ such
that P ′ |≈3 ϕ. In principle, the way to do this is to take a ﬁnitely failed branch
in the derivation tree and update P with the leaves on the branch.
A conditional integrity constraint of the form
if ?ψ succeeds, then ?ϕ succeeds
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then means the following: If a program P be given, and P ′ an extension of P
such that P ′ |≈3 ψ, then also P ′ |≈3 ϕ.
To return to our example, the integrity constraint which was formulated as
(7.2)
Holds(rain, t) → Holds(carry-umbrella, t) (7.2)
must be interpreted as18
if ?Holds(rain, t) succeeds, (7.3)
then ?Holds(carry-umbrella,now) succeeds
Suppose that observation has shown that it rains, leading to an update of the
database with Holds(rain,now). It follows that the antecedent of the integrity
constraint is satisﬁed, and the agent is now required to satisfy the consequent.
The database will contain a name for the action take-umbrella, linked to the
rest of the database by
Initiates(take-umbrella, carry-umbrella,now),
and there will be a general clause to the effect that taking an umbrella now leads
to
Holds(carry-umbrella, t),
for t ≥ now . In order to make the query
?Holds(carry-umbrella,now)
succeed, the agent reasons backward from this query using the clauses in the
database to conclude that he must take an umbrella. Once he has informed the
database that he has done so, the query succeeds, and integrity is restored.
Readers who wish to see applications to the suppression task may now jump
ahead to the second part of section 7.3, which treats the backward inferences
MT and AC. The next (and ﬁnal) subsection is only essential for the neural
implementation discussed in chapter 8.
7.2.4 Constructing Models
In this last subsection of section 7.2, we explain how minimal models of a
deﬁnite logic program can be efﬁciently computed. As above we start with
the simpler case of positive programs. Recall that a positive logic program has
clauses of the form p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn → q, where the pi, q are proposition letters
and the antecedent (also called the body of the clause) may be empty. Models
of a positive logic program P are given by the ﬁxed–points of a monotone
operator.19
18. Here, t must be interpreted as a constant.
19. Monotonicity in this sense is also called continuity.
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Deﬁnition 8 The operator TP associated to P transforms a modelM (viewed
as a functionM : L −→ {0, 1}, where L is the set of proposition letters) into
a model TP (M) according to the following stipulations: if v is a proposition
letter,
1. TP (M)(v) = 1 if there exists a set of proposition lettersC, true onM, such
that
∧
C → v ∈ P ;
2. TP (M)(v) = 0 otherwise.
Deﬁnition 9 An ordering⊆ on (two-valued) models is given by: M⊆ N if all
proposition letters true inM are true in N .
Lemma 1 If P is a positive logic program, TP is monotone in the sense that
M⊆ N implies TP (M) ⊆ TP (N ).
This form of monotonicity would fail if a body of a clause in P contains a
negated atom ¬q and also a clause ¬q → s: one can then set up things in
such a way that s is true at ﬁrst, and becomes false later. Hence we will have
to complicate matters a bit when considering negation, but this simple case
illustrates the use of monotone operators. Monotonicity is important because it
implies the existence of so called ﬁxed–points of the operator TP .
Deﬁnition 10 A ﬁxed point of TP is a modelM such that TP (M) = M.
Lemma 2 If TP is monotone, it has a least and a greatest ﬁxed point. The least
ﬁxed point is the minimal model with respect to the ordering of deﬁnition 9.
Monotonicity is also important because it allows incremental computation of
the minimal model. This is achieved through iteration of TP , as follows. One
starts from the ‘empty model’ M0 in which all proposition letters are false.
One then constructs a sequence M0 ⊆ TP (M0) ⊆ TP (TP (M0)) ⊆ . . . ⊆
TnP (M0) ⊆ . . ., where the inclusions follow from lemma 1. It can then be
shown that the least ﬁxed point, i.e., the minimal model, can be written as⋃
n T
n
P (M0). As noted above, other formats for default reasoning such as cir-
cumscription do not give this computational information. Computability is a
consequence of the syntactic restrictions on logic programs.
The logic programs that we need must allow negation in the body of a clause,
since we model the natural language conditional ‘p implies q’ by the clause p∧
¬ab → q. As observed above, extending the deﬁnition of the operator TP with
the classical deﬁnition of negation would destroy its monotonicity, necessary
for the incremental approach to the least ﬁxed point. Our preferred solution is
to replace the classical two-valued logic by Kleene’s strong three-valued logic,
for which see ﬁgure 2.2 in chapter 2. We also deﬁne an equivalence ↔ by
assigning 1 to ϕ ↔ ψ if ϕ, ψ have the same truth–value (in {u, 0, 1}) , and 0
otherwise.
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We show how to construct models for deﬁnite programs, as ﬁxed points of
a three-valued consequence operator T 3P . We will drop the superscript when
there is no danger of confusing it with its two-valued relative deﬁned above.
Deﬁnition 11 A three-valued model is an assignment of the truth–values u, 0, 1
to the set of proposition letters. If the assignment does not use the value u, the
model is called two-valued. IfM,N are models, the relationM ≤ N means
that the truth–value of a proposition letter p in M is less than or equal to the
truth–value of p in N in the canonical ordering ≤ on u, 0, 1 (i.e., u ≤ 0, 1; 0,1
are incomparable in the ordering).
Deﬁnition 12 Let P be a program.
a. The operator T 3P applied to formulas constructed using only ¬, ∧, and ∨ is
determined by the above truth–tables.
b. Given a three-valued modelM, T 3P (M) is the model determined by
(a) T 3P (M)(q) = 1 iff there is a clause20 ϕ→ q such thatM |= ϕ,
(b) T 3P (M)(q) = 0 iff there is a clause ϕ→ q in P and for all such clauses,
M |= ¬ϕ,
(c) T 3P (M)(q) = u otherwise.
The preceding deﬁnition ensures that unrestricted negation as failure applies
only to proposition letters q which occur in a clause with nonempty antecedent,
such as ⊥ → q; proposition letters r about which there is no information at all
(not even of the form ⊥ → r) may remain undecided.21 This will be useful
later, when we will sometimes want to restrict the operation of negation as
failure to ab. Once a literal has been assigned value 0 or 1 by TP , it retains that
value at all stages of the construction; if it has been assigned value u, that value
may mutate into 0 or 1 at a later stage.
Here are two essential results, which will turn out to be responsible for the
efﬁcient implementability in neural networks.
Lemma 3 If P is a deﬁnite logic program, TP is monotone in the sense that
M≤ N implies T 3P (M) ≤ T 3P (N ).
Lemma 4 Let P be a deﬁnite program.
1. The operator T 3P has a least ﬁxed point, obtained by starting from the model
M0 in which all proposition letters have the value u. The least ﬁxed point
of T 3P can be shown to be the minimal model of P .
20. Recall that according to deﬁnition 4, empty clauses are not allowed.
21. This parallels the similar proviso in the deﬁnition of the completion.
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2. The least ﬁxed point of TP is reached in ﬁnitely many steps (n + 1 if the
program consists of n clauses).
3. All modelsM of comp(P ) are ﬁxed points of T 3P , and every ﬁxed point is a
model.
These notions can be elucidated by means of some simple examples.
1. Let the deﬁnite program P consist of the single clause p → q. The initial
modelM0 assigns u to p and q. Inspection of deﬁnition 12 shows thatM0
is the least ﬁxed point of T 3P . The models which make both p and q true
(resp. false) are also ﬁxed points.
2. Let the deﬁnite program P consist of the clauses p → q and ⊥ → p. Then
M1(p) = T 3P (M0)(p) = 0, M1(q) = T 3P (M0)(q) = u. In the next
iteration we get M2(p) = T 3P (M0)(p) = 0 and M2(q) = T 3P (M0)(q) =
0, and this is the least ﬁxed point.
3. Let the deﬁnite program P consist of the single clause ¬p → q. The initial
modelM0 is the least ﬁxed point.
4. Let the deﬁnite program P consist of the clauses ¬p → q and ⊥ → p.
Then M1(p) = T 3P (M0)(p) = 0, M1(q) = T 3P (M0)(q) = u, whence
M1(¬p) = 1. In the next iteration therefore M2(q) = T 3P (M0)(q) = 1,
and this is the least ﬁxed point.
The last two examples illustrate the semantic effect of closed–world reasoning.
If for a proposition letter p, the program P contains the clause ⊥ → p this
means (via the completion comp(P )) that p represents a proposition to which
closed–world reasoning can be applied. If P does not contain ⊥ → p, nor any
other clause in which p occurs as head, p’s initial truth–value (u) may never
change.
Recall (from deﬁnition 5) that the nonmonotonic consequence relation P |
≈3 ϕ is given by “comp(P ) |=3 ϕ,” or in words: all (three-valued) models of
comp(P ) satisfy ϕ. The relation |≈ is completely determined by what happens
on the least ﬁxed point. Larger ﬁxed points differ in that some values u in the
least ﬁxed point have been changed to 0 or 1 in the larger ﬁxed point; but by the
monotonicity property (with respect to truth–values) of Kleene’s logic this has
no effect on the output, in the sense that an output value 1 cannot be changed
into 0 (or conversely).
7.3 How Closed–World Reasoning Explains Suppression
The suppression task sets subjects the problem of ﬁnding an interpretation
which accommodates premises which at least superﬁcially may conﬂict. It
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therefore provides a good illustration of how closed–world reasoning can be
used to model human interpretation and reasoning. It is one of the beneﬁts of
formalization that it reveals many aspects of the data which are in need of clari-
ﬁcation and suggests how ﬁner-grained data might be found, as well as how the
formalism may be modiﬁed to account for richer data. As the literature review
and the sample of new data below will reveal, there are several prominent inter-
pretations subjects may adopt. All that is attempted in this section is to provide
an illustrative model of one important interpretation subjects adopt.
The explanation of the suppression effect will be presented in two stages, cor-
responding to the forward inferences (MP and DA) and the backward inferences
(MT and AC).
7.3.1 The Forward Inferences: MP and DA
We will represent the conditionals in Byrne’s experiment as deﬁnite clauses of
the form p∧¬ab → q, where ab is a proposition which indicates that something
abnormal is the case, i.e., a possibly disabling condition. These clauses are
collected together as programs.
Deﬁnition 13 In the following, the term program will refer to a ﬁnite set of
conditionals of the form A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ ¬ab → B, together with the clauses
⊥ → ab for all proposition letters of the form ab occurring in the conditionals.
Here, the Ai are proposition letters or negations thereof, and B is a proposi-
tional letter. We also allow the Ai to be  and ⊥. Empty antecedents are not
allowed.22
In the following we will therefore represent (10a) as (10b)
(10a) If she has an essay, she will study late in the library.
(10b) p ∧ ¬ab → q.
and (11a) and (11b) both as formulae of the form (11c)
(11a) If the library is open, she will study late in the library.
(11b) If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
(11c) r ∧ ¬ab′ → q.
It is essential that the conditionals are represented as being part of a deﬁnite
logic program, so that they function as licenses for inference rather than truth–
functional connectives. We show that on the basis of this interpretation, the
forward inferences MP and DA and their “suppression” correspond to valid
argument patterns. in this nonmonotonic logic. The main tool used here is the
completion of a program, as a formalization of the closed–world assumption
22. As mentioned before, this deﬁnition is formulated because we do not necessarily want to apply closed–
world reasoning to all proposition letters, although always to proposition letters of the form ab.
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applied to facts. We emphasize again that in virtue of lemmas 3 and 4, the
completion is really “shorthand” for a particular model. Thus, what we will be
modeling is how subjects reason toward an interpretation of the premises by
suitably adjusting the meaning of the abnormalities. Once they have reached
an interpretation, reasoning from that interpretation is trivial.
The backward inferences (MT and AC) require the closed–world assumption
as applied to rules, and will be treated separately, in section 7.3.2.
MP for a Single Conditional Premise
Suppose we are given a single conditional p ∧ ¬ab → q and the further infor-
mation that p (i.e.,  → p – to economise on notation we will usually write
the shorter form in spite of the strictures of deﬁnition 13.). The full logic pro-
gram for this situation is {p; p ∧ ¬ab → q;⊥ → ab}. Closed–world reasoning
as formalized in the completion gives the set {p; p ∧ ¬ab ↔ q;⊥ ↔ ab},
which is equivalent to {p; p ↔ q}, from which q follows. This argument can
be rephrased in terms of our distinction between two forms of reasoning as
follows.
Reasoning to an interpretation starts with the general form of a conditional,23
and the decision to apply nonmonotonic closed–world reasoning. The former
gives the logic program {p; p ∧ ¬ab → q}; the latter extends this program to
{p; p ∧ ¬ab → q;⊥ → ab}, and constructs the completion {p; p ∧ ¬ab ↔
q;⊥ ↔ ab}. As a consequence, one derives as the logical form of the condi-
tional p ↔ q. Reasoning from an interpretation then starts from this logical
form and the atomic premise p, and derives q.
There are, however, also subjects who refuse to endorse MP, and in the tuto-
rial dialogues we conducted we found that this was because the subject could
think of exceptional circumstances preventing the occurrence of q even when
p. Such subjects combine the enriched representation of the conditional with a
refusal to apply closed–world reasoning to the abnormality.
A “Fallacy”: DA for a Single Conditional Premise
Suppose we are again given a conditional p ∧ ¬ab → q and the further infor-
mation ¬p.24 Reasoning to an interpretation starts from the program {¬p; p ∧
¬ab → q;⊥ → ab} and the closed–world assumption. As above, the end result
of that reasoning process is {¬p; p ↔ q}. Reasoning from an interpretation
23. There is nothing sacrosanct about this starting point. It may itself be the consequence of a reasoning
process, or a different starting point, i.e., a different interpretation of the conditional may be chosen. The
formalization chosen is a ﬁrst approximation to the idea that natural language conditionals allow exceptions.
For other purposes more complex formalizations may be necessary.
24. Strictly speaking ¬p is not an allowed clause, but we may interpret ¬p as obtained from the allowed
clause ⊥ → p by closed–world reasoning.
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then easily derives ¬q.25
A considerable number of subjects do not endorse DA, usually with the moti-
vation that the protagonist may have other reasons for going to the library. This
can be viewed as a refusal to apply closed–world reasoning to q, i.e., as deﬁning
the completion only with reference to the set {p, ab} (see deﬁnition 5 and the
examples which illustrate it).
MP in the Presence of an Additional Premise
As we have seen, if the scenario is such that nothing is said about ab, mini-
mization sets ab equal to⊥ and the conditional p∧¬ab → q reduces to p↔ q.
Now suppose that the possibility of an abnormality is made salient, e.g., by
adding a premise “if the library is open, she will study late in the library” in
Byrne’s example. This leads to an extension of the set of clauses with the clause
r ∧ ¬ab ′ → q. We furthermore propose that the set of clauses is extended with
the clause ¬r → ab connecting the two conditionals, because the possibility of
an ab-normality is highlighted by the additional premise.26 Although this is not
essential, the situation may furthermore be taken to be symmetric, in that the
ﬁrst conditional highlights a possible abnormality relating to the second condi-
tional. The circumstance that the library is open is not a sufﬁcient incentive to
go and study there; one must have a purpose for doing so.27 This means that
the further condition ¬p → ab ′ for ab′ is added. That is, reasoning toward an
interpretation starts with the set
{p; p ∧ ¬ab → q; r ∧ ¬ab ′ → q;⊥ → ab;⊥ → ab′;¬r → ab;¬p→ ab′}.
Applying closed–world reasoning in the form of the completion yields
{p; (p ∧ ¬ab) ∨ (r ∧ ¬ab′) ↔ q; (⊥ ∨ ¬r) ↔ ab; (⊥ ∨ ¬p) ↔ ab′},
which reduces to {p; (p ∧ r) ↔ q}. Reasoning from an interpretation is now
stuck in the absence of information about r. Here we see nonmonotonicity at
work: the minimal model for the case of an additional premise is essentially
different from the minimal model of a single conditional premise plus factual
information.
As will be seen in section 7.4 there are many reasons why nonsuppression
occurs, but one hardly if ever sees nonsuppression because of the application
of classical logic to conditionals interpreted as material implication. Instead,
25. We wrote “fallacy” in quotes in the section heading, because, contrary to beliefs often expressed in the
psychology of reasoning, whether or not an argument pattern such as DA is invalid cannot be determined
from its syntactic form alone without recourse to the interpretation. There are no absolute fallacies.
26. Obviously, this is one place where general knowledge of content enters into the selection of appropriate
logical form. Nothing in the form of the sentence tells us that the library being open is a boundary condition
on her studying late in the library.
27. Evidence for such symmetry can be found in experiment 1 of Byrne et al. [29].
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nonsuppression seems to be due to forms of closed–world reasoning not yet
taken account of here.
DA for an Additional Premise
Now suppose we have as minor premise ¬p instead of p. Reasoning toward an
interpretation derives as above the set {¬p; (p ∧ r) ↔ q}. Since ¬p implies
¬(p ∧ r), reasoning from an interpretation concludes ¬q. One may therefore
expect that those subjects who endorsed DA in the two-premise case will not
suppress it here. Our data furthermore show that subjects who did not endorse
DA in the two-premise case did not endorse it here, and for the same reason.
This derivation hides the assumption of symmetry made above, culminating
in the condition ¬p → ab ′ and its completion. In the case of MP this assump-
tion does not make a difference, but here it does. One possibility is that no
content for ab′ is envisaged, which means that whenever the library is open,
the protagonist can be found there. This is called the “strengthening interpre-
tation” in section 7.4.5 below. In this case the second conditional reduces to
r → q, in which case one expects suppression. Another possibility is that ab′
is given more content than just ¬p → ab ′, for instance ¬p ∧ ¬s ∧ ¬t → ab ′
for contextually salient s, t. Closed–world reasoning then yields the combined
conditional (r ∧ p) ∨ (r ∧ s) ∨ (r ∧ t) → q, which again leads one to expect
suppression of DA. This matter will be taken up again in section 7.4.2.
MP for an Alternative Premise
The alternative conditional is again formalized as r∧¬ab′ → q, but the manner
of connection of the conditionals differs. The difference between this case and
the previous one is that, by general knowledge, the alternatives do not high-
light possible obstacles. This means that the clauses ¬r → ab;¬p → ab ′ are
lacking. Reasoning to an interpretation thus starts with the set
{p; p ∧ ¬ab → q; r ∧ ¬ab′ → q;⊥ → ab;⊥ → ab′}
closed–world reasoning converts this to
{p; (p ∧ ¬ab) ∨ r ∧ ¬ab′) ↔ q;⊥ ↔ ab;⊥ ↔ ab′},
which reduces to {p; (p∨r) ↔ q}. Reasoning from an interpretation then easily
derives q: no suppression expected.
DA for an Alternative Premise
We interpret ¬p again as obtained from ⊥ → p by closed–world reasoning.
The completion then becomes (p ∨ r ↔ q) ∧ (p ↔ ⊥), and reasoning from
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an interpretation is stuck: suppression. Indeed, in Byrne’s study [28] DA for
this type of problem was applied by only 4% of the participants. However, in
the study of Dieussaert et al. [63], 22% applied DA in this case. This could
be a consequence of applying negation as failure to r as well (that is, includ-
ing ⊥ → r in the program), instead of only to abnormalities. Reasoning to
an interpretation also decides to what propositions negation as failure must be
applied.
7.3.2 The Backward Inferences: MT and AC
As we have seen, the forward inferences rely on the completion, that is, the
closed–world assumption for facts. We propose that the backward inferences
rely in addition on the closed–world assumption for rules. When we come
to discuss the neural implementation of the formalism we will see that this
explains to some extent why backward inferences are perceived to be more
difﬁcult. This section uses the material on integrity constraints introduced in
section 7.2.3.
AC for a Single Conditional Premise
Suppose we have a single conditional premise p∧¬ab → q and a fact q. closed–
world reasoning about facts would yield the completion {((p ∧ ¬ab) ∨ ) ↔
q; ab ↔ ⊥}, from which nothing can be concluded about p. Thus this form of
closed–world reasoning, like classical logic, does not sanction AC.
But now assume that reasoning to an interpretation sets up the problem in
such a way that AC is interpreted as an integrity constraint, that is, as the state-
ment
if ?q succeeds, then ?p ∧ ¬ab succeeds.
In this case, closed–world reasoning for rules can be applied and we may ask
what other atomic facts must hold if ?q succeeds. Since the only rule is p ∧
¬ab → q, it follows that ?p∧¬ab must succeed. For ¬ab this is guaranteed by
closed–world reasoning about facts: the query ?ab fails ﬁnitely. The truth of p
must be posited, however, meaning that the database must be updated with p.
In this sense AC is valid.
MT for a Single Conditional Premise
For MT, the reasoning pattern to be established is
if ?q fails, then ?p ∧ ¬ab fails.
One starts from the integrity constraint that the query ?q must fail. This can
only be if at least one of ?p and ?¬ab fails. Since in this situation we know
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that ¬ab is true (by closed–world reasoning for facts), we must posit that ?p
fails. Here is a subject who refuses to apply closed–world reasoning to ab.
Occasionally one observes this type of reaction with MP as well, but it is much
more frequent in the case of MT.
Subject 728
S: Either she has a very short essay to write or no essay. Maybe she had to write an essay
but didn’t feel like going to the library, or that it was so short that she ﬁnished it on time,
so she didn’t have to stay.
AC for an Additional Premise
In the case of an additional premise such as
If the library is open, she will study late in the library.
the program consists of
p ∧ ¬ab → q, r ∧ ¬ab′ → q,¬p→ ab′,¬r → ab.
If the reasoning pattern is AC, one starts with the integrity constraint that the
query ?q succeeds. It follows that at least one of ?p∧¬ab, ?r∧¬ab′ must suc-
ceed. But given the information about the abnormalities furnished by closed–
world reasoning for facts, namely the completions ¬r ↔ ab and ¬p ↔ ab ′, in
both cases this means that ?p and ?r must succeed, so that AC is supported.
MT for an Additional Premise
Now consider MT, for which we have to start from the integrity constraint that
?q must fail. The same reasoning as above shows that at least one of p, r must
fail – but we don’t know which. We thus expect suppression of MT.29
AC for an Alternative Premise
In the case of AC, an alternative premise such as
If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
leads to clear suppression (from 55% to 16%). It is easy to see why this must
be so. closed–world reasoning for facts reduces the two conditional premises
to p → q and r → q by eliminating the abnormalities. Given that ?q must
28. In the experiment conducted by Borensztajn et al. [22].
29. Dieussaert et al. [63] observed that in the case of MT for an additional premise, 35.3% of subjects, when
allowed to choose compound answers, chose ¬p ∧ ¬r, whereas 56.9% chose ¬p ∨ ¬r. The second answer
has just been explained. The ﬁrst answer can be explained if subjects actually interpret the additional premise
as alternative, or in other words interpret the conditional premises as independent. With these aggregate data
it is hard to tell; section 7.4 contains some data relevant to choice of interpretation.
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succeed, closed–world reasoning for rules concludes that at least one of ?p, ?r
must succeed – but we don’t know which. It is interesting at this point to look
at an experiment in Dieussaert et al. [63] where subjects are allowed to give
compound answers such as p ∧ q or p ∨ q.30 For AC, 90.7% of subjects then
chose the nonmonotonically correct p ∨ r. In our own sample, those who don’t
cite refusal to endorse closed–world reasoning for rules as a reason.
MT for an Alternative Premise
Turning to MT, we do not expect a lower rate of endorsment than in the two-
premise case, because of the following argument. If ?¬q succeeds, ?q must fail
ﬁnitely. This can only happen if all the branches in the derivation starting from
?q fail ﬁnitely, which means that both ?p and ?r must fail ﬁnitely. In the data
of Dieussaert et al. for MT, 96.3% of the subjects, when allowed to choose
compound answers, indeed chose ¬p ∧ ¬r.
7.3.3 Summary
Let us retrace our steps. Byrne claimed that both valid and invalid inferences
can be suppressed, based on the content of supplementary material; therefore,
the form of sentences would determine only partially the consequences that peo-
ple draw from them. Our analysis is different. Consider ﬁrst the matter of form
and content. We believe that logical form is not simply read off from the syntac-
tic structure of the sentences involved, but is assigned on the basis of “content”
– not only that of the sentences themselves but also that of the context. In this
case the implied context – a real-life situation of going to a library – makes it
probable that the conditionals are not material implications but some kind of
defaults. We then translate the conditionals, in conformity with this meaning,
into a formal language containing the ab, ab ′, . . . formulas; more importantly, in
this language the conditional is a special, noniterable non-truth-functional con-
nective. However, translation is just the ﬁrst step in imposing logical form. The
second step consists in associating a semantics and a deﬁnition of validity to the
formal language. For example, in our case the deﬁnition of validity is given in
terms of minimal models, leading to a nonmonotonic concept of validity. Once
logical form is thus ﬁxed (but not before!), one may inquire what follows from
the premises provided. In this case the inferences observed correspond to valid
30. These authors correctly argue that Byrne’s experiment is ﬂawed in that a subject is allowed to judge only
for the antecedent or for consequent of the ﬁrst conditional whether it follows from the premises supplied.
This makes it impossible for the subjects that draw a conclusion which pertains to both conditional premises.
Accordingly, the authors also allow answers of the form (¬)A(∧)(∨)(¬)B, where A,B are atomic. Un-
fortunately, since they also require subjects to choose only one answer among all the possibilities given,
the design is ﬂawed. This is because there exist dependencies among the answers (consider, e.g., the set
{p ∨ q, p ∧ q, p, q}) and some answers are always true (e.g., p ∨ ¬p). Thus, the statistics yielded by the
experiment are unfortunately not interpretable.
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inferences, given the assignment of logical form. Hence we would not say that
content has beaten form here, but rather that content contributes to the choice
of a logical form appropriate to content and context. There are many different
ways of assigning logical form, and that of classical logic is not by any means
the most plausible candidate for commonsense reasoning; indeed systems for
closed–world reasoning can provide formal explanations for the variety of rea-
soning behavior observed.
7.4 Data from Tutorial Dialogues
The previous sections have introduced the formal machinery of closed–world
reasoning and have shown how suppression of inferences can be a consequence
of applying a form of closed–world reasoning to an enriched representation
of the conditional as a ternary logical connective: “if p then q” is formally
represented as p ∧ ¬ab → q, which can be viewed as a single connective with
arguments p, q, ab. However, we view this formal model as the starting point,
not the endpoint, of empirical investigations. A host of empirical questions are
left open by the data obtained by Byrne and others, such as
1. Do individual subjects exhibit consistent patterns of suppression and non-
suppression, across materials and across inference patterns?31
2. Is the second conditional premise always assigned to one of the categories
“additional” or “alternative,” or are there other possibilities?
3. More generally, to what type of discourse is the subject assimilating this
peculiar material?32
4. Is there evidence that (suppressing) subjects indeed view the conditional as
exception tolerant?
5. More generally, what is the interpretation of the conditional assumed by the
subject?33
6. Is there a uniform description of what nonsuppressing individuals are doing?
In particular, are they all applying classical logic to conditionals interpreted
as material implication?
31. That is, suppression of, say, MP in one kind of material leads to suppression of MP for other materials;
suppression of MP leads to suppression of MT in those cases where it is endorsed, etc.
32. Peculiar, because it is hard to imagine a single person uttering these sentences in a single discourse act.
The sentences would seem to be more natural when uttered by different participants in a discourse.
33. e.g., the running example “if she has an essay, she will study late in the library” can be interpreted as a
generic (referring to a habit), or as pertaining to an individual occasion. This difference becomes important
when incorporating the contribution of the second conditional.
204 7 Planning and Reasoning: The Suppression Task
These questions and others will be discussed using dialogue data obtained by
our students. Our principal sources here are two experiments conducted by our
students, A. Lechler [168] and G. Borensztajn et al. [22].
7.4.1 Suppression of MP Exists
But in the dialogues it is usually formulated positively: the conclusion holds if
the antecedent of the second (additional) conditional holds. This does not seem
to be a simple repetition of the second conditional, but rather the inference of
the conclusion when the antecedent of the second conditional is added to the
premises.34 We present two examples of this phenomenon.35 The reader can
see from the ﬁrst excerpt that the experimenter tried to mitigate the pragmatic
infelicity of the discourse by assigning the sentences to different participants in
a conversation.
Subject 25.
E: Again three sentences: If the green light is on, the rabbit is in the cage. If the door is
closed, the rabbit is in the cage. I can see that the green light is on. So, imagine that’s a
conversation, you hear these sentences, what can you conclude now?
S: What I conclude? If the cage door is shut, then the rabbit is in the cage. Again, you’ve
met one of the two criteria for the rabbit being in the cage. The green light is on, the
rabbit is in the cage. Um, but we don’t know whether or not the door is open or not. If
the door’s shut, then that’s it, we got it for sure, the rabbit is deﬁnitely in the cage.
E: So, you are not sure now?
S: I’m not sure because I don’t know whether the door is open or not. The point about
the door being open or not hasn’t been cleared up to my satisfaction. The point about the
green light has been cleared up to my satisfaction, but not the point about whether the
door is open or not. If the door is open, I’m not sure the rabbit’s in the cage, it’s probably
somewhere else by this time.
The following excerpt shows the same type of answer, which then mutates into
a conditional of the form p ∧ r → q.
Subject 2.
S: Ok yeah I think it is likely that she stays late in the library tonight, but it depends if the
library is open. . . so perhaps I think [pauses]. yeah, in a way I think hmm what does it say
to me? I mean the fact that you ﬁrst say that she has an essay to write then she stays late
in the library, but then you add to it if the library stays open she stays late in the library
so perhaps she’s not actually in the library tonight, because the library’s not open. I don’t
think it’s a very good way of putting it.
E: How would you put it?
S: I would say, if Marian has an essay to write, and the library stays open late, then she
does stay late in the library.
These answers can be accounted for in a straightforward manner by the formal
model: the addition of the premise r licenses the inference that q.
34. Compare the analogous difference in classical logic between the implication ϕ → ψ and the entailment
ϕ |= ψ.
35. Similar data have been obtained by Dieussert et al. [63].
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7.4.2 Evidence for the Involvement of Closed–World Reasoning in Sup-
pression
This heading covers a number of issues, namely
1. evidence for the conditional as an exception-tolerant construct p∧¬ab → q,
2. evidence for closed–world reasoning with respect to exceptions, including
redeﬁning ab,
3. evidence for closed–world reasoning with respect to arbitrary propositions
not of the form ab.
The reader may wonder why we cared to separate (2) and (3). There is a clear
theoretical motivation for the distinction, since the abnormalities play a special
role in the system, e.g., because they occur negatively, and because their def-
initions can change. On the empirical side there appears to be some form of
“double dissociation” between the two reasoning styles, in the sense that sup-
pression of MP and MT for an additional premise (which requires (2)) appears
to be independent of the suppression of AC and DA for an alternative premise
(which requires (3)). In chapter 9 we will see that people with autism tend to
be good at (3) but bad at (2). Conversely, we have data36 showing that a high
degree of suppression of MP (99% ⇓ 55%, i.e., from 99% down to 55%) and
MT (86% ⇓ 48%) for an additional premise is compatible with a very low rate
of endorsement of AC (19%) in the two-premise case.
As to the question what “evidence” means here: we mean something stronger
than “behavior in accordance with the predictions of the model.” Ideally the
subject’s reasoning in the dialogue should reﬂect some of the considerations
that are formalized in the closed–world computation, for instance, in an utter-
ance of the form: “I can see there are such and such exceptions possible, but
since nothing is said about these here I assume ....” Such utterances are rare,
but they do occur.
Subject 7.
S: . . . that she has to write an essay. because she stays till late in the library when she has
to write an essay, and today she stays till late in the library.
E: Could there be other reasons for her to stay late in the library?
S: That could be possible, for example, maybe she reads a very long book. But as I
understand it she stays late in the library only if she has to write an essay.
The italicized phrase seems to point to closed–world reasoning. Evidence for
(1) can be found particularly in subjects who hesitate to endorse two-premise
MT (i.e., MT with one conditional and one categorical premise). To repeat a
quotation given earlier:
36. These were obtained by Judith Pijnacker at the F.C. Donders Centre for Neuroimaging , Nijmegen,
Netherlands.
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Subject 7.
S: Either she has a very short essay to write or no essay. Maybe she had to write an essay
but didn’t feel like going to the library, or that it was so short that she ﬁnished it on time,
so she didn’t have to stay.
The subject envisages abnormalities such as “didn’t feel like going,” but does
not at ﬁrst apply closed–world reasoning to it. Now look at the continuation of
this conversation:
E: But if you look again at the ﬁrst sentence...
S: So she doesn’t have to write an essay today, because she doesn’t stay in the library till
late.
Prompting by the experimenter thus leads to closed–world reasoning, eliminat-
ing the exceptions that the subject originally explicitly entertained.
Evidence for the manipulation of abnormalities can also be found in the con-
text of DA for three premises, where the second conditional is of the additional
type. In section 7.3 we showed that, given a certain deﬁnition of the abnor-
malities involved, DA is not suppressed, in conformity with the data of Byrne
and others. However, our own data37 show considerable suppression in this
case (42% ⇓ 19%). We explained in section 7.3 that this is likely to be due to
a different deﬁnition of the abnormalities. Indeed we ﬁnd a subject who does
precisely this, in an explicit manner.
Subject 1.
S: Marian doesn’t have an essay to write, which means she would not stay late in the
library, but the second condition says that if the library stays open that she will stay late
in the library, but it doesn’t say dependent or independent of the essay that she might have
to write, so she could still stay late in the library if it’s open to do something else.
E: So you’re saying that . . .
S: that there could be another reason for her to go to the library and to stay late in the
library . . .
E: . . . and the fact that she doesn’t have an essay to write. . .
S: doesn’t mean that she won’t go to the library and stay there till late.
E: OK, so she doesn’t have an essay to write, then normally you’d say she wouldn’t stay
late in the library.
S: Well, it doesn’t really say because the second condition is that if the library is open,
she stays late in the library; so apparently there could be another reason for her to stay
in the library.
E: And that being . . .
S: a book she might want to read, some research she has to do, maybe she fancies someone
there.
E: And if you had to reformulate the text the way you understood it, as text for a following
experiment?
S: You could give other reasons for her to stay in the library, or you could indicate whether
there are other reasons for her to stay late in the library.
37. See footnote 36.
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The italicized phrase says that the additional conditional suggests that “she”
might have a reason to go the library, different from having an essay, and these
reasons are detailed in the subject’s next utterance. The subject thus rejects the
completion of ¬p → ab ′, but in the process she highlights the fact that there
is a hidden ¬ab ′ in the second conditional about which some clarity must be
obtained ﬁrst.
To conclude, we give a lovely excerpt showing the discourse role that closed–
world reasoning plays.
Subject 2.
S: OK, it’s likely that she has to write an essay; it’s also possible that she’s staying late in
the library because she has something else to do. so I’m not sure that she has to write an
essay, but it’s likely.
E: If you had to describe this situation to someone else, would you describe it in a different
way?
S: Well, if I would say it like this, in this order, I would suggest or I would mean to
suggest with the second sentence that she has to write an essay, that she is writing an
essay and I could leave out the second sentence. It does suggest that she is writing an
essay, because otherwise why would you bother saying the ﬁrst sentence? You could just
say she’s staying late in the library.
E: But if you were just thinking about Marian in real life you see her studying late in the
library, what might you think then?
S: Oh, then I think she must have some deadlines coming up.
E: But not necessarily that she has an essay to write?
S: From this? [pointing to card]
E: You know this information (someone has told you this information) and you seeMarian
studying late in the library.
S: Oh, then I think she’s probably writing an essay.
E: So, you don’t think she might be doing something else?
S: Well, yeah, of course it’s possible, but because I was told this, I’m more likely to take
this as a ﬁrst option.
The italicized phrase says it all: the only point of using the conditional whose
antecedent is conﬁrmed is to make the hearer infer the antecedent via closed–
world reasoning (cf. the last sentence).
7.4.3 Is there a Role for Classical Logic?
In the normal population, nonsuppression because of strict adherence to classi-
cal logic appears to be rare.38 The following excerpt appears to be an instance,
although only after some prompting by the experimenter.
Subject 12.
S: [reading] If John goes ﬁshing, he will have a ﬁsh supper. If John catches ﬁsh, he will
have a ﬁsh supper. John is almost always lucky when he goes ﬁshing. John is going
ﬁshing.
38. In chapter 9 we shall see that the situation is markedly different in a population of autistic people.
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E: So, what follows here?
S: There’s a good chance of having a ﬁsh supper.
E: What could prevent him here from having a ﬁsh supper?
S: If he doesn’t catch a ﬁsh.
E: Okay, so what...
S: Well, ah, not, not necessarily actually, he is going ﬁshing, so he might have bought ﬁsh
supper.
E: So, do you think... So, if you know that he catches ﬁsh, do you know then for sure that
he will have a ﬁsh supper?
S: Well, it says of John: if he goes ﬁshing, he WILL have a ﬁsh supper, so he may have
ﬁsh supper, even if he doesn’t catch ﬁsh.
E: Which information do you need to be sure that he will have a ﬁsh supper?
S: Um..., that he is going ﬁshing, I don’t know.
At ﬁrst the subject suppresses the MP inference in the sense of qualifying it by
“a good chance,” noting that not catching a ﬁsh is a disabling condition, but he
then decides to stick to the literal wording of the conditional (see the emphasis
on “will”), and invents a reason why John might still have a ﬁsh supper if he
doesn’t catch a ﬁsh.
A clearer instance is given in
Subject 8.
S: The second [conditional] again has no function. If you suppose that it is always the
case that when she has an essay to write, she studies late in the library, then of course she
now stays late in the library.
7.4.4 Nonsuppression Comes in Different Flavors
Contrary to ﬁrst impressions, nonsuppression may also be a consequence of
closed–world reasoning; it need not be stubborn adherence to classical logic. In
the next excerpt, the experimenter is reading the experimental material aloud,
so that the experiment becomes partly a recall task.
Subject 2.
E: . . . ?If she has an essay to write, she will be in the library. If she has to train for a
competition, she will be in the gym. If the library stays open, then she will be in the
library. Oh, I remember her telling me that she has to hand in an essay next week.? So,
where would you look for her now?
S: In the library.
E: Why?
S: Because, you said: if she has an essay to write then she will be in the library, and it
stays open.
E: Okay, so, do you know that it stays open?
S: Didn’t the guy just say that it stays open? While it stays open.
E: It says: if the library stays open, she will be in the library.
S: Okay, then I would go to the library, I would bet that the library is open.
E: Okay. Could you think of any situations where she has an essay to write, but she isn’t
in the library?
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S: Just random ones, like if she was going to the library, and then she saw her boyfriend
and they decided to go out for coffee instead [laughing]....
Although the situation that the library is open was presented as hypothetical
(since it occurs as the antecedent of a conditional), the subject’s recall is that
of a fact. This is a form of credulous reasoning; it is assumed that all the con-
ditions necessary for the ﬁrst conditional to apply in fact hold, and that the
antecedent of the second conditional is one such condition. It is easy to model
this type of reasoning as an instance of closed–world reasoning. Suppose the
premise set is formalized as {p; p ∧ ¬ab → q; r ∧ ¬ab ′ → q}, then the sec-
ond conditional again contributes the premise ¬r → ab, but the credulousness
now has to be represented39 as the integrity constraint ?¬ab succeeds. That
is, ?ab must fail ﬁnitely, from which it follows (using ¬r → ab) that ?r must
succeed. Note that this form of credulousness does not make the abnormality
in the representation of the conditional superﬂuous: the abnormality still has an
essential role in integrating the necessary conditions into the ﬁrst conditional.
The argument given is also a form of closed–world reasoning, in that the abnor-
mality is connected only to the necessary condition explicitly introduced. Note,
however, that subject 2 could open up his world when prompted to do so by the
experimenter.40
Looking back to our closed–world analysis of suppression, we can see the
similarities and differences between the two forms of credulousness. What
is common is that the ﬁrst conditional is not taken as false after the second
(additional) conditional has been digested, as a skeptical stance would require.
Suppression is, however, due to a residue of skepticism, in which the subject
remains agnostic on the abnormality. Nonsuppression is then a consequence of
also eradicating this residue.
7.4.5 Different Roles of the Second Conditional
Byrne originally distinguished between alternative and additional conditionals
and assumed that her experimental material is classiﬁed by all subjects in the
same way. This is not true: often additional conditionals are interpreted as
alternatives, and in isolated cases alternatives can be interpreted as additionals
as well.41 In these circumstances rough statistical data on how many subjects
do or do not suppress are meaningless. Subjects may fail to suppress because
39. This is not ad hoc, but the standard “dynamic” way of treating presupposition accommodation.
40. The interpretation of “the library is open” as presupposition provides interesting indirect support for
the present analysis of integration of premises, using abnormalities. At least, according to the theory of
presuppositions, the use of “if . . . then” cancels possible presuppositions of its arguments; “the library is
open” now functions as a presupposition because of its link to the abnormality.
41. Here is an extreme case of this phenomenon. The two conditionals are If Bill has AIDS, he will make a
good recovery and If Bill has cholera, he will make a good recovery. One subject interpreted this as saying
If Bill has AIDS and cholera, he will make a good recovery.
210 7 Planning and Reasoning: The Suppression Task
they interpret the additional premise as an alternative, or take the antecedent of
the additional premise to be true, as above. Compounding the difﬁculty is that
sometimes the interpretation of the second conditional ﬁts in neither category.
An example is furnished by
Subject 10.
S: She is late in the library. Actually I can conclude she has no life because she will study
late in the library as long as it is open. I wonder what she should do if she has an essay
and the library is closed.
Subject 23.
E: Hm, hm. Then you read the next message, which says: If the library is open, she’ll be
in the library.
S: Um, yeah, then I think it was getting increasingly likely that she was there.
E: What do you think that person meant?
S: Um, just exactly what she, exactly what they said, really. That she can be found most
of the time in the library, um, she’s hard-working.
The additional premise is thus interpreted as strengthening the ﬁrst one, by
saying something like “in fact she’s such a diligent student, she’ll be in the
library whenever it is open.”
Formally, this means that the abnormality in the representation of the second
conditional, r ∧ ¬ab′ → q, is set to ⊥: no circumstance (such as not having an
essay) is envisaged in which the protagonist is not in the library. The premise set
then reduces to {p; p∧r → q; r → q}, which is equivalent to {p; r → q}. Thus
we get suppression of MP (and MT); but also of AC and DA, unlike the case
where the additional conditional leads to the inclusion of the clause ¬r → ab.
It is also possible to interpret the second conditional as denying the ﬁrst one.
For example, with the conditionals introduced in footnote 41, one can imagine
that the ﬁrst one is said by a novice medical student, the second by an experi-
enced professor, correcting the student. Again we have suppression of MP, in
this case because of a skeptical reading.
Subject 16.
E: You have a medical student saying: If Bill has AIDS, he will make a good recovery.
And the situation is: Bill has AIDS.
(...)
E: If you also had a professor of medicine saying: If Bill has cholera, he will make a good
recovery?
(...)
E: What do you think why the professor is saying that, in this situation?
S: The “if cholera” part?
E: Yeah.
S: I think he’s saying you can’t recover from AIDS. But if he had cholera, then he’d have
a chance to recover.
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7.4.6 Suppression is Relative to Task Setup
Asmentioned in section 7.3 it was noticed by Dieussaert et al. [63] that suppres-
sion of inferences can be observed only if the experimenter’s questions relate to
the antecedent and consequent of the ﬁrst conditional. If a more liberal answer
set is supplied, for example including “¬p ∨ ¬r” in the case of MT (i.e., when
given ¬q), most subjects are willing to conclude something. Strictly speaking
the results in [63] were vitiated by a ﬂaw in the design of the response choice
offered, or answer set, but the idea is suggestive. Redoing the experiment with
a better design (on ten subjects) showed the pattern exhibited in table 7.2 (taken
from [22]). Many phenomena alluded to earlier can also be seen in this table.
The main difference with the earlier table 7.1 is that subjects could choose from
a more liberal answer set; the table lists the answers most frequently given.
Table 7.2 Data from [22].
Role Content
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
Categorical She has an essay to write.
Conclusion She will study late in the library. (MP 100%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She will study late in the library. (MP 100%)
Additional If the library stays open, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She will study late in the library. (MP 40%)
Conclusion The library is open (presupposition to previous conclusion 30%)
Conclusion If the library is open, she will study late in the library. (MP42 70%)
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
Categorical She will study late in the library.
Conclusion She has an essay to write. (AC 50%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She has an essay to write or she has a textbook to read. (AC 80%)
Additional If the library stays open, then she will study late in the library.
Conclusion The library is open. (AC 80%)
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
Categorical She doesn’t have an essay to write.
Conclusion She will not study late in the library. (DA 30%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion If she has no textbook to read, she will not study late in the library.
(DA 70%)
Additional If the library stays open, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She will not study late in the library. (DA 10%)
Conditional 1 If she has an essay to write, she will study late in the library.
Categorical She will not study late in the library.
Conclusion She doesn’t have an essay to write. (MT 80%)
Alternative If she has a textbook to read, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She doesn’t have an essay to write. (MT 100%)
Additional If the library stays open, she will study late in the library.
Conclusion She doesn’t have an essay to write or the library is closed. (MT 70%)
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Of the four subjects who continue to draw the MP inference, three do this
because of the credulous inference that the library is closed. As we have seen
in section 7.4.3, there is one subject who adheres strictly to classical logic, but
the remaining six state their inference in conditional form, the formal rationale
of which was explained in section 7.4.1. In the case of DA for an alternative
premise, seven subjects choose a conditional formulation; it is interesting that
closed–world reasoning is much more in evidence here than in the other two
forms of DA. Lastly, the answers to MT and AC show that allowing disjunctions
greatly increases subjects’ tendency to give an answer.
The enlarged answer sets thus provide strong evidence that most subjects rep-
resent the effect of an additional premise formally as p ∧ r → q and that of an
alternative premise formally as p ∨ r → q. There are probably few subjects
who reason completely classically, that is, who adopt the uniform interpreta-
tion p ∨ r → q for the premise set and who endorse neither DA nor AC; in this
sample there were none. The term “suppression effect” for this phenomenon
is something of a misnomer, since few subjects say that there is no valid con-
clusion. This observation directs the spotlight away from inference and toward
interpretation.
7.4.7 The Consistent Subject: a Mythical Beast?
The question arises, therefore, whether these subjects have consistent interpre-
tations. It is impossible to answer this question deﬁnitively based on the data
that we have, because those same data suggest that there are so many possibil-
ities. We therefore make a reasoned choice among the possibilities, based on
our theoretical understanding of the main interpretive mechanisms: the mean-
ing of the conditional and the choice of logical form. Among the former we
count the interpretation of the (intended) additional conditional as strengthen-
ing; the latter includes, for example, the precise form of closed–world reason-
ing, e.g., whether it applies only to abnormalities or across the board. With
these distinctions in mind we consider the data of [22]. Here seven out of ten
subjects behave in a manner predicted by strengthening and closed–world rea-
soning with respect to abnormalities. The remaining three subjects endorse MP
in the case of an additional premise, but suppress MT. This is hard to make
sense of: the presupposition interpretation as illustrated in section 7.4.4, which
works well to explain nonsuppression of MP, would seem to predict that MT
is also not suppressed, unless negative contexts do not trigger presupposition
accommodation.
Of the seven subjects who behaved consistently with strengthening and closed–
world reasoning with respect to abnormalities, six also behaved more or less
as predicted by full closed–world reasoning, in the following sense: closed–
world reasoning is not very much in evidence for two premises (one conditional,
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one categorical), but becomes prominent when a second conditional premise is
added. This can be formulated as a form of closed–world reasoning in its own
right, but we need not do so here. Sufﬁce it to say that although a much larger
data set is needed to get statistical signiﬁcance, the available results show that
the majority of subjects are consistent to a considerable extent.
7.5 Probabilities Don’t Help as Much as Some Would Like
After this excursion to the data, which showed a great variety of possible in-
terpretations, we return to the literature and tackle one particular proposal for a
monolithic interpretation of the suppression phenomenon. A number of authors
believe that the main problem with the “mental models” account of the suppres-
sion effect lies in its assumption of an absolute connection between antecedent
and consequent, and propose that this should be replaced by a form of con-
ditional probability, either qualitative or quantitative. We discuss these views
here because they furnish a good example of why probabilistic methods in the
study of cognition cannot stand on their own, but have to be supplemented by
an account of how the probabilistic interpretation is set up in the ﬁrst place.43
As a preliminary, consider the work of Chan and Chua [33], who correctly
upbraid both the “rules” and “models” camps for their failure “to give a prin-
cipled account of the interpretive component involved in reasoning.” Chan and
Chua propose a “salience” theory of the suppression task, according to which
antecedents are more or less strongly connected with their consequents – “oper-
ationalized as ratings of perceived importance [of the antecedent in the second
conditional premise] as additional requirements for the occurrence of the con-
sequent [33,p. 222].” Thus Chan and Chua adopt a “weak regularity” interpre-
tation of the conditional (somewhat like a conditional probability) instead of the
material implication, and they assume their subjects do too. They correctly ar-
gue that both the “rules” and the “models” theories do not ﬁt this interpretation,
because
[W]e believe that in the suppression experiments, the way subjects cognise the premise
“If R then Q” may be more ﬁne-grained than merely understanding the antecedent as an
additional requirement or a possible alternative [33,p. 222].
Their main experimental manipulation accordingly varies the strengths of the
connections between antecedents and consequents, and shows that the magni-
tude of the suppression effect depends upon such variations. In principle such
results can be modelled in the framework presented here, if one equates the
strength of the connection between antecedent and consequent with the (in-
verse of the) number of preconditions (i.e., r such that ¬r → ab) that have to
43. This section assumes the reader is acquainted with probability theory, and knows the basics of Bayesian
networks.
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be fulﬁlled. The more preconditions, the weaker the connection.
A full-ﬂedged probabilistic account of the suppression effect is presented in
Stevenson and Over [270], who performed four experiments designed to sup-
port the idea that subjects interpret the materials of Byrne’s experiment in terms
of conditional probabilities. Two quotations give a ﬂavor of their position. In
motivating the naturalness of a probabilistic interpretation they argue that
it is, in fact, rational by the highest standards to take proper account of the probability of
one’s premises in deductive reasoning [270,p. 615].
. . . performing inferences from statements treated as absolutely certain is uncommon in
ordinary reasoning. We are mainly interested in what subjects will infer from statements
in ordinary discourse that they may not believe with certainty and may even have serious
doubts about [270,p. 621].
How are we to interpret claims that subjects’ interpretations are “probabilis-
tic”? First there is a technical point to be made. Strictly speaking, of course, one
is concerned not with the probability of a premise but with a presumably true
statement about conditional probability. The authors cannot mean that subjects
may entertain doubts about their own assignments of conditional probabilities;
or if they do, the formalism becomes considerably more complicated. In fact,
in this and other papers on probabilistic approaches to reasoning there is some
ambiguity about what is intended. At one point we read about “probability of
one’s premises,” only to be reminded later that we should not take this as an
espousal of the cognitive reality of probability theory: “Even relatively simple
derivations in that system are surely too technical for ordinary people [270,p.
638].” So there is a real question as to how we are to interpret occurrences of
the phrase “conditional probability.”
In our opinion, at least two issues should be distinguished here – the issue of
the role that knowledge and belief play in arriving at an interpretation, and the
issue whether the propositions which enter into those interpretations are abso-
lute or probabilistic. We agree that subjects frequently entertain interpretations
with propositions which they believe to be less than certain. We agree that
subjects naturally and reasonably bring to bear their general knowledge and
belief in constructing interpretations. And we agree that basing action, judg-
ment or even belief on reasoning requires consideration of how some discourse
relates to the world. But we also believe that subjects can arrive at both abso-
lute and less than absolute interpretations only by some process of constructing
an interpretation. Stevenson and Over need there to be a kind of discourse in
which statements are already interpreted on some range of models known to
both experimenter and subject within which it is meaningful to assign likeli-
hoods. Most basically, hearers need to decide what domain of interpretation
speakers intend before they can possibly assign likelihoods.
The most important point we want to make about probabilistic interpretations
is this: probabilistic and logical interpretations share an important characteristic
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in that they necessarily require the same interpretive mechanisms. For instance,
as designers of expert systems well know, it is notoriously difﬁcult to come
up with assignments of conditional probabilities which are consistent in the
sense that they can be derived from a joint probability distribution. This already
shows that the probabilistic interpretation may face the same problems as the
logical interpretation: both encounter the need to assure consistency.
Now consider what goes into manipulating conditional probabilities of rules,
assuming that subjects are indeed able to assign probabilities.44 Recall that an
advantage of the probabilistic interpretation is supposed to be that conditional
probabilities can change under the inﬂuence of new information, such as ad-
ditional conditionals. What makes this possible? Let the variable Y represent
the proposition “she studies late in the library,” X the proposition “she has an
essay,” and Z: “the library is open.” These variables are binary, with outcomes
in {0, 1}. We ﬁrst study MP. We are then given that X = 1. Probabilistic
modus ponens asks for the a posteriori probability P (Y = 1), and by Bayes’
rule this equals the a priori probability P (Y = 1 | X = 1). The value of this
a priori probability depends, however, on what other variables are present; this
is the analogue of the computation of the logical form of the conditional in the
logical case.
One appealing way to describe this process is by means of a Bayesian net-
work: a graph which represents causal (in)dependencies, together with the con-
ditional probabilities that have to be estimated. In the case of one categorical
and one conditional premise, the network is of the form depicted in (ﬁgure 7.2).
In this case P (Y | X) has to be estimated, and P (Y = 1) can be derived from
this estimate by Bayes’ rule. The processing of the second conditional is rep-
resented by the move from a Bayesian network ﬁgure 7.2, to one of the form
as depicted in ﬁgure 7.3. The conditional probability that has to be estimated
is now P (Y | X,Z), and this estimate cannot be obtained from P (Y | X) and
P (Y | Z) separately because of possible dependencies.
X Y
Figure 7.2 Bayesian network for probabilistic modus ponens.
Indeed, the additional character of the premise is reﬂected in the entry in
the conditional probability table associated to the network in ﬁgure 7.3 which
says that P (Y = 1 | X = 1, Z = 0) equals zero. Hence Y is dependent on
Z given X , and the new P (Y | X) = P (Y | X = 1, Z = 1)P (Z = 1)
given by marginalization on P (Y | X,Z) may well differ from the earlier
P (Y | X) estimated in the context of ﬁgure 7.2. As a consequence we have
P (Y = 1) = P (Y = 1 | X = 1) = P (Y = 1 | X = 1, Z = 1)P (Z = 1).
44. We are skeptical, but also think probabilistic approaches to reasoning only make sense under this as-
sumption.
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Figure 7.3 Bayesian network with second conditional premise.
Even if P (Y | X = 1, Z = 1) is high, probabilistic MP will be suppressed in
the absence of the further information that P (Z = 1) is high.
Now let us see what happens in the case of an alternative premise, also rep-
resented by Z. The speciﬁc alternative character can now by captured by
the assumption that Y is independent of Z given X: P (Y | X = 1, Z) =
P (Y | X = 1). In this case P (Y = 1) is equal to the originally given
P (Y = 1 | X = 1), and no suppression is expected.
The upshot of this discussion of Stevenson and Over [270] is that moving to
a probabilistic interpretation of the premises does not obviate the need for an
interpretive process which constructs a model for the premises, here a Bayesian
network, where the associated conditional probability tables are determined by
the content of the conditional premises. Human reasoning may well mostly
be about propositions which are less than certain, and known to be less than
certain, but our processes of understanding which meaning is intended have to
work initially by credulously interpreting the discourse which describes the sit-
uation, and in doing so accommodating apparent inconsistencies, repairs, and
revisions. Only after we have some speciﬁcation of the domain (the variables
and their relations of causal dependence) can we start consistently estimating
probabilities in the light of our beliefs about what we have been asked to sup-
pose. Thus a probabilistic treatment needs the same interpretive processes as
the logical treatment of section 7.3; and the alleged advantage of conditional
probabilities in allowing new information to modify values can be captured
easily by the enriched representation of the conditional given in section 7.2. If
these observations are combined with the authors’ insistence on the fact that
probabilities have no cognitive reality, we see that there is no reason to prefer a
probabilistic treatment over a logical one.45
45. Oaksford and Chater [203] present models of probabilistic interpretations of the suppression task and
show that these models can ﬁt substantial parts of the data from typical suppression experiments. What is
particularly relevant in the current context is that these authors, like Stevenson and Over, do not present the
probability calculus as a plausible processing model, but merely as a computational-level model in Marr’s
sense – that is, a model of what the subjects’ mental processes are “designed” to perform. In contrast, the
nonmonotonic logic presented here as a computational model for the suppression effect is also intended as a
processing model, via the neural implementation given in chapter 8.
8 Implementing Reasoning in NeuralNetworks
While discussing, in chapter 5, the various “schools” in the psychology of rea-
soning, we adopted as an organizing principle David Marr’s three levels of in-
quiry [183,chapter 1]
1. Identiﬁcation of the information–processing task as an input–output function
2. Speciﬁcation of an algorithm which computes that function
3. Neural implementation of the algorithm speciﬁed
The previous chapter can be viewed as being concerned with the ﬁrst two levels:
the information–processing task is credulously incorporating new information,
and as an algorithm we proposed logic programming.1 The present chapter
is devoted to the third level. We show how a particular way of executing a
logic program, by means of monotone operators as deﬁned in chapter 7, section
7.2.4, corresponds to computation in a suitable recurrent neural network in the
following sense: the stable state of the network is the least ﬁxed point of the
monotone operator.
In itself this observation is not new.2 By now there exists a huge litera-
ture on “neural symbolic integration,” which started from the seminal paper of
Ho¨lldobler and Kalinke [130]. Another landmark in this area is d’Avila Garcez
et al. [59] which, among much else, replaced the idealized neurons (with bi-
nary thresholds) used in [130], by sigmoid activation functions, thus enhancing
learning capabilities. There is much more, and the Internet fortunately excuses
us from giving a complete bibliography. The reason that we devote a chapter
to this topic is, ﬁrst of all, that this literature is concerned with machine in-
telligence rather than cognitive processing, and furthermore that we propose a
very different neural implementation of negation (based on three-valued logic),
which does not need restrictions on the logic programs which can be made to
1. Strictly speaking, though, a logic program is a speciﬁcation for an algorithm, not the algorithm itself,
since control steps have to be added in the execution, for example, selection of program clauses.
2. When writing [266] we were unfortunately not aware of the results that were obtained in this direction.
218 8 Implementing Reasoning in Neural Networks
correspond to a neural net.3 In the resulting neural network a special role is
assigned to inhibition, and this may have some relevance for the study of disor-
ders of executive function in the brain. This idea will be put to work in chapter
9, which is devoted to autism. Three-valued logic also has intrinsic cognitive
plausibility. One obvious reason is that it allows some propositions to be unde-
cided, that is, not subject to negation as failure. An equally important reason is
that three-valued semantics treats truth and falsity as independent, unlike two-
valued semantics. One may view a proposition p as a pair (p+, p−), where p+
is the “true component” of p, and likewise p− the “false component,” with the
following intuitive meaning. Evidence for p+ and p− can be collected inde-
pendently; but of course one has to take care that as soon as enough evidence
has been gathered for one component, the other component is inhibited. Thus
computation of truth–values can proceed partially in parallel, a feature that will
become visible in the structure of the neural networks.4
8.1 Closed–World Reasoning and Neural Nets
There have been several attempts to model logical reasoning using neural net-
works, starting from McCulloch and Pitts’s[188] observation that classical truth
functions can be computed using networks of idealized neurons.
Deﬁnition 14 A computational unit, or unit for short, is a function with the
following input-output behavior:
1. Inputs are delivered to the unit via links, which have weights wj ∈ [0, 1].
2. The inputs can be both excitatory or inhibitory; let x1 . . . xn ∈ R be excita-
tory, and y1 . . . ym ∈ R inhibitory.
3. If one of the yi ﬁres, i.e., yi = 0, the unit is shut off, and outputs 0.
4. Otherwise, the quantity
∑i=n
i=1 xiwi is computed; if this quantity is greater
than or equal to a threshold θ, the unit outputs 1; if not it outputs 0.
For the time being we assume, following McCulloch and Pitts, that all links
have weight 1 or 0. The classical (binary) AND can be represented by a unit
which has only excitatory inputs and whose threshold equals 2; for OR the
threshold equals 1. NOT is represented by a unit which has one excitatory
and one inhibitory input, and whose threshold (denoted by θ) equals 1; see
3. These restrictions are of a technical nature and are unnatural in the course of discourse processing, one of
our aims.
4. The material presented in this chapter is a development of section 5 of [266]. Here we aim for a neural
implementation of general logic programs, whereas our concern in the paper cited was with the particular
application to the suppression task.
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ﬁgure 8.1.5 The truth–value of the proposition to be negated is fed over the
Figure 8.1 The role of inhibition in negation
inhibitory channel. The excitatory link has its origin in a bias unit 1 which ﬁres
continuously. If the truth–value is 1, the unit is shut off and outputs 0. If the
truth–value is 0, the excitatory channel takes over and makes the unit output
1. By combining these units into a feedforward neural network every classical
truth function F (p1, . . . , pn) can be represented in the sense that upon clamp-
ing truth–values for p1, . . . , pn to the corresponding input units, the output is 1
(0) if F (p1, . . . , pn) is true (false).
Deﬁnition 15 A feedforward neural network is an acyclic directed graph on a
set of units (cf. deﬁnition 14); the (weighted) edges will also be called links.
These can be either inhibitory or excitatory. There are two distinguished sets of
units, I (input) and O (output).
With the rise of parallel distributed processing, the emphasis switched to learn-
ing: starting from a network with arbitrary distribution of weights, can one
teach it, using backpropagation, to recognise classically valid argument pat-
terns and distinguish them from fallacies? An example of this type of approach
can be found in [16,chapter 5].
We mention this work here just to make clear that this is not what we will
be doing. We have emphasized several times in the course of this book that we
view planning as a precursor of logical reasoning, and therefore consider an im-
portant function of logical reasoning to be the construction of (minimal) models
using closed–world reasoning. Accordingly, we look toward neural networks
5. In this and the following diagrams, dashed arrows represent excitatory connections and solid lines which
end in a circle denote inhibitory connections.
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as a way to construct models: a model corresponds to the stable state of the
associated network which is reached when facts are clamped to the input units.
This correspondence is motivated by the intimate connection that can be seen to
exist between closed–world reasoning and the operation of neuronal units. We
will ﬁrst explain the main idea intuitively for a program not containing negation
in the body of a clause, a case for which a two-valued semantics with values 0
(false) and 1 (true) sufﬁces.
Suppose we have a programP consisting of the clauses {p1; p2; p1∧p2 → q}.
Associate to P the (feedforward) neural network N(P ) whose input units are
p1, p2, whose output unit is q, and whose structure is given in ﬁgure 8.2. The
Figure 8.2 {p1; p2; p1 ∧ p2 → q} as a feedforward net
input units are connected by a binary AND and the link between AND and q
represents the implication →. We assume that all links have weight 1. In P ,
p1, p2 are both true, so that in N(P ) both p1, p2 ﬁre, whence AND ﬁres, and
q as well. The units representing true inputs ﬁre continuously, whence q also
ﬁres continuously. The stable state of this feedforward network thus has the
units corresponding to p1, p2, q ﬁre continuously, and this ﬁring pattern codes
the minimal model of P .
Now consider the subprogram P ′ consisting of {p2; p1 ∧ p2 → q}, i.e., P
without the fact p1. In N(P ′) = N(P ), the input unit for p2 ﬁres, but that for
p1 remains silent – falsity of an atom is represented by activation 0. It follows
that the units for AND and q also remain silent. This stable state corresponds to
the minimal model for P ′.
This extremely simpliﬁed example has to be generalized in several ways in
order to achieve a full correspondence between neural nets and closed–world
reasoning:
1. We need output units with several incoming links.
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2. We need negation in the body of a clause.
3. We need recursive programs, i.e., programs in which an atom can occur in
both heads and bodies.
The ﬁrst generalization is easy: output units can have arbitrarily many incoming
links, and the threshold always equals 1; thus each output unit has an implicit
OR built in. For negation there are various options. One solution is to add NOT
units as deﬁned above in ﬁgure 8.1. The solution adopted by Ho¨lldobler and
Kalinke [130] is to give some links negative weights and to modify AND units.6
Suppose our program is P ′′ = {p2;¬p1 ∧ p2 → q}; the associated network is
N(P ′′) (see ﬁgure 8.3), with weights indicated. The threshold of the former
AND unit (denoted A in ﬁgure 8.3) is now set equal to 1. Thus, if p1 is false and
p2 true, the weighted sum of the inputs feeding into A is 1, whence it ﬁres. If
p1 is true, the weighted sum does not exceed 0, hence A cannot ﬁre.
Figure 8.3 Negation via negative weights.
However, these constructions are no longer adequate if recursive programs
are considered, especially those containing negation, for example, ¬p → p.
The type of network we need is the recurrent neural net (RNN), which differs
from feedforward networks in that the graph of links may contain cycles.7
6. The earlier absolute distinction between excitatory and inhibitory links (see deﬁnition 14) is motivated by
neuroscience, which has found evidence for distinct neurotransmitters involved in excitatory and inhibitory
processes.
7. The deﬁnition to be given is tailored to our purposes and slightly nonstandard in that we prefer to work
with absolutely inhibitory links instead of links with negative weights. It is possible, however, to give an
equivalent deﬁnition in the latter format.
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Deﬁnition 16 A recurrent neural network is a set of units Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
connected by links which may be inhibitory or excitatory. Activation over any
inhibitory link entering Ui shuts it off completely. An excitatory link from unit
Uj to Ui (where j = i) has a real-valued weight wij ∈ [0, 1]. There is a
universal activation function σ : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] which computes the outgoing
activation from the incoming excitation. In addition to the units Ui there are
two bias units 1 and 0, which may be connected to some of the Ui.8
We assume time ranges over the positive integers. At each instant t, the global
state
−−−→
Ui(t) is computed as follows. At time 0, all units except bias units and
possibly input units are inactive. To compute
−−−−−−→
Ui(t + 1), we must consider two
possibilities, for each unit Ui.
If unit Ui receives an inhibitory input at time t, then Ui(t + 1) = 0.
Otherwise Ui collects the excitatory inputs xj(t) from units Uj to which it is
connected, computes
∑
j xj(t)w
i
j and outputs Ui(t + 1) = σ(
∑
j xj(t)w
i
j).
We will mostly be interested in the case where the units obey the earlier deﬁ-
nition 14, i.e., where the activations are 0 or 1, and σ is deﬁned by a threshold
vector
−→
θi as follows: σ(
∑
j xj(t)w
i
j) = 1 iff
∑
j xj(t)w
i
j ≥ θi. Again, this is
slightly unrealistic from a neurophysiological point of view, but it sufﬁces for
purposes of exposition. The networks can be made more realistic by exploiting
the techniques of [59]. The real difference between the present construction
and deﬁnition 15 is in the time lags introduced in the computation, allowing
recurrence.
8.2 From Logic Programs to Recurrent Neural Networks
Now that we have deﬁned the appropriate concept of network, we need an al-
gorithm which transforms logic programs into suitable neural networks. We do
this in two stages, corresponding to positive programs and deﬁnite programs.9
8.2.1 Positive Programs
Assume the proposition letters occurring in a positive programP are p1, . . . , pn;
these letters must not include,⊥. The recurrent network associated to P con-
sists of three layers.
1. The bottom layer is formed by units corresponding to p1, . . . , pn, viewed as
inputs. Bias units are considered to be inputs.
2. The middle (or “hidden”) layer is formed by AND units.
8. Bias units are often added for technical reasons: to make the threshold uniformly equal to 0. Here they
play an essential role in coding truth and falsity.
9. Recall that the latter, but not the former, allow negation in the body of a clause.
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3. The top layer is again formed by units corresponding p1, . . . , pn, now viewed
as outputs.
4. Let
∧
C → q be a clause in P , where C is a nonempty set of atoms.
(a) Connect the units in the bottom layer corresponding to atoms in C to the
inputs of an AND unit by means of links of weight 1.
(b) Connect the output of this AND unit to the unit corresponding to q in the
top layer.
(c) Connect the unit corresponding to pi in the top layer to the corresponding
unit in the bottom layer.
5. If p is a fact in P , add a connection from the bias unit 1 to the output unit p
with weight 1.
Some examples will be helpful, also for introducing our graphical conventions.
The ﬁrst example (see ﬁgure 8.4) is the program P = {p1; p2; p1 ∧ p2 → q}
already discussed above, but now represented as a recurrent net. The neurons
Figure 8.4 {p1; p2; p1 ∧ p2 → q} as a recurrent net.
are represented as squares, and in the interest of legibility inputs and outputs are
only distinguished by the direction of the dashed arrows; the square does not
have distinguished sides for input and output. The bias unit has been depicted
separately, although strictly speaking it belongs to the input layer.
For another example consider the language L = {p, q, r, s, t}, and the fol-
lowing program P in L: P = {p, p → q, q ∧ s → r}. The network RN(P )
corresponding to P is depicted in ﬁgure 8.5. Units corresponding to a proposi-
tion letter q will be denoted by Uq; if we need to make a notational distinction
between input and output units we shall write U iq and U
o
q , respectively. We
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show how the action of the consequence operator TP is mirrored exactly by
the ﬂow of activation in the network; to do so we ﬁrst chart the course of the
computation according to TP .
We start from the empty modelM0 = ∅, i.e., the model in which all proposi-
tion letters are false. We then get the following computation:
1. M1 is given by TP (M0)(p) = 1, TP (M0)(q) = TP (M0)(r) = TP (M0)(s)
= TP (M0)(t) = 0.
2. M2 is given by TP (M1)(p) = 1, TP (M1)(q) = 1, TP (M1)(r) = TP (M1)(s)
= TP (M1)(t) = 0.
The model M2 is a ﬁxed point of TP in the sense that TP (M2) = M2. It is
also the least ﬁxed point; we may considerM2 to be the minimal model in the
sense that it makes true as few proposition letters as possible.
The time course of the computation in the networkRN(P ) mimics the action
of the monotone operator TP . At time 0, no unit except 1 is activated. At time
t = 1 the units compute their activation, and we get Uop (1) = 1, U ip(1) = 0,
U i,oq (1) = U
i,o
r (1) = U
i,o
s (1) = U
i,o
t (1) = 0. At time 2, each unit collects its
inputs as of time 1; this results inU ip(1) = 1 and the remaining units unchanged.
At time t = 3, Uoq (1) = 1, but no changes otherwise. At time 4, the output of
Uoq is fed into U
i
q, but although the network keeps cycling, there are no changes
in activation. The preceding considerations are summarized in the following
Figure 8.5 Network associated to {p, p → q, q ∧ s → r}.
Theorem 3 Every positive logic programP can be associated to a three-layered
recurrent neural network RN(P ) such that the least ﬁxed point of TP corre-
sponds to the activation of the output layer in the stable state of RN(P ).
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Before we move on to include negation, it is worthwhile to consider the rep-
resentation of closed–world reasoning in RN(P ). In the network depicted in
ﬁgure 8.5 all units except the bias unit start inactive, representing the initial
closed–world assumption that all propositions are false. The computation then
propagates the activation of the bias unit 1, but this does not affect r, s, and t,
which remain inactive. In this simple case we can implement closed–world rea-
soning by making the following identiﬁcations: active = true, inactive = false.
This simple picture becomes considerably more complicated when negation is
included.
8.2.2 Deﬁnite Programs
To extend this correspondence to logic programs with clauses having negation
in the body, one has to either restrict the class of programs one considers (as
in [130] or [59]) or move to (strong Kleene) three-valued logic. Given the in-
trinsic cognitive plausibility of three-valued logic (the possibility to leave some
propositions undecided, and the independence of truth and falsity), and since
we need its functional features anyway, we choose the latter option.10 The
basis for our treatment is the following trick. Let 0 and 1 stand for “true” and
“false” respectively, taken in the two-valued sense. To avoid confusion we write
Kleene’s three truth–values {u, 0, 1} as {u, f , t}. We now represent Kleene’s
truth–values as pairs (0, 0) = u, (0, 1) = f and (1, 0) = t, with the ordering
inherited from that of {u, f , t}: u ≤ f , t and f , t incomparable.11 The ordering
could be extended by the pair (1, 1), which represents a contradiction; these
four truth–values together give a diamond-shaped partial order like ﬁgure 8.6.
However, in the neural networks to be constructed belowwe have to take special
care that (1, 1) does not actually occur by suitably deﬁned consistency-checking
units.
The logical operations on pairs are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 17 For all i, j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}:
1. ¬(i, j) = (j, i)
2. (i, j) ∧ (k, l) = (min(i, k),max(j, l))
3. (i, j) ∨ (k, l) = (max(i, k),min(j, l))
10. The completeness of deﬁnite programs with respect to three-valued semantics was ﬁrst proved by the
logician Ken Kunen using a very intricate model-theoretic argument. Subsequent treatments have simpliﬁed
this somewhat (see, for example, [64]) but the proof remains one of the most difﬁcult in the area (although
the proof of soundness is fortunately much easier). In section 8.4 below we give some reasons to believe that
the brain has developed the kind of neural architecture necessary for dealing with deﬁnite programs. This is
not to say that the brain is capable of a complicated metaproof!
11. This trick is due to Sta¨rk [255], who uses it in his proof of completeness with respect to three-valued
semantics. Our own motivation will be given shortly.
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Figure 8.6 Algebra of truth–values for Kleene three-valued logic.
We leave it to the reader to check that this deﬁnition gives the same result as
the truth–tables for three-valued logic given in chapter 2. We shall refer to the
ﬁrst component in the pair as the “plus” (or “true”) component, and to the right
component as the “minus” (or “false”) component. We interpret a 1 neurally as
“activation,” and 0 as “no activation.” The truth–value u therefore corresponds
to no activation in the “true” and “false” components.
As a consequence of this representation of truth–values, we may now view
the required neural networks three-dimensionally as consisting of two isomor-
phic coupled sheets, one sheet doing the computations for “true,” the other for
“false,” and where the coupling is inhibitory to prevent pairs (1, 1) from occur-
ring.12 We think of the sheets as aligned horizontally, with the plus (= ‘true’)
sheet on top. In order to make these ideas precise, we ﬁrst introduce a technical
term.
Deﬁnition 18 A node consists of two coupled competing units U+ and U−, that
U+ projects an inhibitory link to U− and, conversely, U− projects an inhibitory
link to U+. A node will be denoted by the pair (U+, U−).
To see what the effect of the coupling is, consider the computational fate of the
four inputs (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1) to a node (U+, U−) corresponding to a
proposition letter p (see ﬁgure 8.7).
If (0, 0) is clamped to (U+, U−) nothing happens, and the output is (0, 0).
If (1, 0) is clamped, U+ becomes active but U− is inhibited, so that the pair
(U+, U−) outputs (1, 0); and analogously for the input (0, 1). If the input is
(1, 1), both U+ and U− are inhibited, and the output of the pair will be (0, 0).
Thus in our setup there is some computation going on in the input units, whereas
it is usually assumed that input units do not compute anything. Although the
computation is fairly trivial here, it becomes more interesting if inputs are of
the more general form (a+, a−) with a+, a− ∈ [0, 1], reﬂecting independent
degrees of activation for the “true” and “false” components of a proposition.
Concretely, one may think of a situation where evidence for both the “true” and
12. Again this can be made more realistic by allowing both components to take values in the real interval
[0, 1] and deﬁning inhibition in such a way that “winner takes all.”
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Figure 8.7 (a) Full representation of the node corresponding to p. (b) Concise representation.
“false” components is piling up independently. If in this situation “true” has
collected so much evidence that the input is of the form (1, a) for a ∈ [0, 1),
the node has the effect of ensuring that “winner takes all.”
The nets that we will consider as implementations of deﬁnite programs have
the following general form.
Deﬁnition 19 A coupled recurrent neural network consists of two recurrent
neural networks (cf. deﬁnition 16) such that for each unit in one layer there
is a unique unit in the other layer with which it forms a node.
We will now describe the main varieties of nodes in coupled nets necessary for
computing logic programs.
Connectives AND and OR
ﬁgure 8.8 presents a simple, but fundamental, example: three-valued binary
AND. What we see in ﬁgure 8.8 is two coupled neural nets, labeled + (above
the separating sheet) and− (below the sheet). The circles indicate units, and the
thick vertical lines indicate the inhibitory couplings between units in the plus
and minus nets, as deﬁned in deﬁnition 18 and depicted in ﬁgure 8.7(b). The
inputs of AND are considered to lie on the left, and its output on the right. To
increase perspicuity, the three-dimensional structure has been tilted, and rotated
counterclockwise over 45 degrees. The horizontal arrows represent excitatory
connections.
The threshold of the AND+ unit is 2, and that of the AND− unit is 1. We
assume all links have weight 1. As an example, suppose the two truth–values
(1, 0) and (0, 0) are fed into the AND node. The sum of the plus components is
1, hence AND+ does not ﬁre. The sum of the minus components is 0, so AND−
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Figure 8.8 Three-valued AND
likewise does not ﬁre. The output is therefore (0, 0), as it should be.
Similarly, a binary OR gate can be constructed by setting the threshold of
OR+ to 1, and that of OR− to 2. The reader may check that these stipulations
translate deﬁnition 17 for ∧ and ∨ into neural terms. We obtain an AND-gate
with n inputs for n ≥ 2 (useful for representing the body of a clause) if the
threshold for the plus unit is set to n, and the threshold for the minus unit is set
to 1. Similarly, we obtain an n-ary OR-gate if the threshold of the plus-unit is
set to 1, and that of the minus–unit to n.
Bias Units and Negation
Finally we introduce the continuously ﬁring bias units 1 and 0, the former for
the plus sheet, where it will take care of the facts in the program as before, and
the latter for the minus sheet, where it is connected to those atoms to which we
wish to apply negation as failure.
Bias units also play a role in the neural representation of negation. Deﬁnition
17 shows that, strictly speaking, negation need not be represented by a unit do-
ing a computation, as, for instance, the NOT unit deﬁned in section 8.1, since
negation can be viewed as a simple switching of the plus and minus compo-
nents. In the case of a negation occurring in front of a propositional atom, this
view of negation would lead to the following construction. Suppose we have a
node (U+, U−) which has one outgoing + link connected to V+, and one outgo-
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ing− link connected to V−, where (V+, V−) is a node. To negate (U+, U−) one
must “cross the wires,” so that the outgoing link from U+ connects to V−, and
the outgoing link from U− connects to V+. In terms of real neural networks this
crossing over does not seem to be very plausible, however, as will be discussed
in section 8.4.
Because of the mutually inhibitory character of truth and falsity, it is more
plausible to represent three-valued negation by means of an inhibitory process.
We will elaborate on this in section 8.4. Our suggestion is given in ﬁgure 8.9.
On the left side of the diagram there are two NOT nodes, one for each layer.
Figure 8.9 Three-valued negation through inhibition (viewed from the side).
The bias units are linked to the NOTs via excitatory links, whereas the inputs
inhibit. This arrangement gives the correct outputs for (1, 0) and (0, 1), but not
for (0, 0) since it generates the output (1, 1). Therefore the output also has to
pass a consistency-checking node, depicted on the right. This extra complexity
is the price to be paid for the parallel processing of truth and falsity.
This completes the description of the logic gates required for the construc-
tion of the coupled recurrent neural networks. Our next task is to deﬁne the
network CRN(P ) corresponding to a deﬁnite program P . We ﬁrst give a gen-
eral construction, which will, however, be modiﬁed later in order to bring out
the special nature of the propositional variables for an abnormality.
The network is now a three-dimensional structure consisting of a plus sheet
and a minus sheet such that each sheet has at least three layers of units. We
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think of the input fed into the “leftmost” layer and the output read out at the
“right.”13 The leftmost layer then consist of input units corresponding to the
propositional variables used in P ; these units are coupled into nodes. The mid-
dle or hidden layers consist of AND units (ﬁgure 8.8), and NOT units (ﬁgure 8.9)
where corresponding units in the plus and minus sheets are coupled. The right-
most layers are copies of the leftmost layers, and hence also consist of units
coupled into nodes.
To complete the deﬁnition we must describe the wiring of the network such
that it represents the program P . Let p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn ∧¬r1 ∧ . . .∧¬rk → q be a
clause in P . The networkCRN(P ) has (at least) leftmost nodes corresponding
to p1, . . . , pn, r1, . . . , rk, q, and an n + k–ary AND node in the middle section.
The links from p1, . . . , pn feed directly into AND; those from r1, . . . , rk are ﬁrst
sent into NOT nodes before being linked to AND. The AND node projects to the
q node. If there are more clauses with q as head, these are ORed in q, that is, to
compute its output, q applies OR to its inputs. If q also occurs in a body, this
rightmost node feeds back into the corresponding node on the left; inputs to the
leftmost nodes are ORed. If p is a fact in P , add a link from the bias unit 1 into
the plus component of p viewed as an output node. If r is a proposition letter to
which negation is failure is applicable, add a link from the bias unit 0 into the
minus component of r, viewed as an output node.
Note that this construction reﬂects a condition in the deﬁnition of the com-
pletion which transforms facts into conditionals: if r does not occur in the head
of a clause of P , the clause ⊥ → r is added to P . This explains why the bias
unit 0 must be connected to r as an output node. (Likewise for facts p, in view
of the equivalence of p and  → p.) Until further notice, all links are assumed
to have weight 1.
Computation in such a coupled net proceeds as follows. At time t = 0, all
nodes are inactive in both units. At t = 1, the facts in P output (1, 0) and
the output atoms to which negation as failure is applicable (and which have no
other inputs) output (0, 1). All other input nodes remain inactive in both units.
For larger t the computation follows the procedure given in deﬁnition 16, taking
into account the deﬁnitions of the AND and OR nodes. We thus obtain
Theorem 4 Let P be a deﬁnite program, and CRN(P ) the associated cou-
pled recurrent neural network. The least ﬁxed point of T 3P corresponds to the
activation of the output layer in the stable state of CRN(P ).
13. We cannot use “top” and “bottom” anymore, since this might lead to confusion with the plus and minus
sheets.
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8.3 Backward Reasoning and Closed–World Reasoning for Rules
We now have to consider the computations that correspond to the inferences
AC (afﬁrmation of the consequent) and MT (modus tollens). We have analysed
these by means of integrity constraints, that is, statements of the form “if query
?ϕ succeeds/fails, then query ?ψ succeeds/fails.” From a neural
point of view, this is vaguely reminiscent of a form of backpropagation, except
that in our case inputs, not weights, are being updated. However, there is a
duality between weights and inputs, and this can be exploited to construct a
rigorous correspondence between backward inferences and learning in neural
networks. The type of learning we need is fortunately only perceptron learning,
not the biologically implausible backpropagation. For expository reasons the
idea will be illustrated for positive programs and recurrent neural networks only,
although an extension to coupled nets is straightforward.
From now on we drop the assumption that all links have weight 1, and also
allow links with weight 0. As before, if p is a fact in a program P , there is a
link from the bias unit 1 to p with weight 1. What is new here is that in case p
is not a fact, the link from 1 to p has weight 0.
Consider a very simple case: the AC inference of p from q and p → q. The
recurrent neural network corresponding to {p→ q} is given in ﬁgure 8.10; the
question mark on the link from 1 to p indicates that the weight of this link is
adjustable.
Figure 8.10 AC as perceptron learning
The learning problem can now be stated as follows. If Uop ﬁres (because the
link from the bias unit 1 to p has weight 1) we are done. If not, input 1 to p
yields output 0 in Uoq , although the desired output is 1. Therefore the weights
in the net have to be readjusted so that the output is indeed 1. The perceptron
learning algorithm (see, for example, [231,p. 84]) achieves precisely this. In
this particular case it tells us that in order to approximate the right value for
the weight, we have to add the initial weight (0) to the input (1). In this case
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the algorithm even converges in one step, because 1 is the correct value for the
weight.
The same thing can be done for MT. In this case Uoq must not be active by
hypothesis. If Uop does not ﬁre (because the link from 1 to p has weight 0) we
are done. If it does ﬁre, the link has weight 1, and it must learn the correct
weight (i.e., 0). The perceptron learning algorithm now tells us to subtract the
input (1) from the weight (1) to get weight 0, and again we have convergence
in one step.
In conclusion of this discussion of how the networks compute, we may thus
note that the relatively easy forward reasoning patterns such as MP and DA
correspond to computations in simple recurrent networks, in which no learn-
ing occurs, whereas backward reasoning patterns such as AC and MT, which
subjects typically ﬁnd harder, necessitate the computational overhead of read-
justing the network by perceptron learning. We propose that this difference
between the processes of forward and backward reasoning can play a part in
explaining various observations of the difﬁculty of valid backward reasoning
such as MT.
8.4 Constructing the Nets
We will now brieﬂy sketch a hypothesis on how networks as discussed above
may be set up in working memory, following the highly suggestive treatment in
a series of papers by von der Malsburg starting with [287] (see [286] for a recent
summary), some of which were written alone [288], some in collaboration with
Bienenstock [19, 289] and some with Willshaw [290, 303, 302, 291]. There are
two issues to be distinguished: (1) the representation of conditionals as links,
and (2) the structure of the network as coupled isomorphic graphs.
8.4.1 Fast Functional Links
For the ﬁrst issue we can do no better than borrow (a lightly edited version of)
von der Malsburg’s own description from [287,p. 13]. The synaptic connection
between brain cells i and j is characterized by a strength wij . It is a measure
for the size of the postsynaptic conductance transient which is produced in the
postsynaptic cell (i) upon arrival of a nerve impulse in the presynaptic ﬁber
from cell j. It is postulated that the weightwij of an excitatory synapse depends
on two variables with different time scale of behavior, aij and sij . The set
{sij} constitutes the permanent network structure. Its modiﬁcation (synaptic
plasticity) is slow and is the basis for long-term memory. The new dynamic
variable aij , termed the state of activation of the synapse ij (as distinct from
the activation of the cell) , changes on a fast time scale (fractions of a second)
in response to the correlation between the signals of cells i and j. With no
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signals in i and j, aij decays toward a resting state a0, within times typical
for short-term memory. With strong correlation between the signals the value
aij changes such that wij increases (activation). With uncorrelated signals aij
changes such that wij decreases to zero (inactivation). This behavior of the
variable aij will be referred to here as synaptic modulation. It can change the
value of aij signiﬁcantly within a fraction of a second, thus establishing a fast
functional link. Not all synapses from a given cell to other cells can grow at the
same time, since an inhibitory system prevents those target cells from all ﬁring
simultaneously; also the synapses received by a cell compete with each other,
for the same reason. The physical basis for synaptic modulation is not clear; it
might correspond to the accumulation or depletion of some chemical substance
at a strategic location in or near the synapse. The relevant postsynaptic signal
is here taken to be the cell’s output spike train, but it may also be a more local
dendritic signal. As a simple example one could assume wij = aijsij with
0 ≤ aij ≤ 1 and a resting state a0 within the interval (0, 1).
The variables {sij} are controlled by what will be called reﬁned synaptic
plasticity: strong correlation between the temporal ﬁne structure in the signals
of cells i and j causes sij to grow. Absence of correlation does not directly
reduce sij . The analogy between synaptic modulation and reﬁned plasticity
is apparent. Both are controlled by correlations in the signals of cell pairs in
a positive feedback fashion. They differ in time scale of decay (seconds for
aij , decades to permanent for sij ), and of buildup; and they differ in the way
they are controlled. The aij react only to the two locally available signals and
are both increased and decreased by correlations and their absence. The sij are
only increased by local signals and are decreased in response to the growth of
other synapses.
If we apply the ideas just outlined to our representation of the suppression
task, we get something like the following. Declarative memory, usually mod-
elled by some kind of spreading activation network, contains a unit represent-
ing the concept “library,” with links to units representing concepts like “open,”
“study,” “essay,” and “book.” These concepts may combine into propositions.
Neurally, one may view an atomic proposition (“the library is open”) as a sin-
gle unit (say Up) which is activated when the units for the constitutive concepts
(“library,” “open”) are activated; for example, because mutual reinforcement of
the units for “library” and “open” makes their combined weighted output ex-
ceed the threshold of Up. Two propositional units p, q (“the library is open,”
“she will study late in the library”) can be combined into a conditional by the
activation of a further link from p to q, possibly via an abnormality unit.14
All these links can be viewed at two time scales. At large time scales the links
are connections laid down in declarative memory; these links have positive (al-
14. We will have more to say on the neural representation of abnormalities in section 8.5.
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though small) weights and correspond to the {sij} in the above description, At
small time scales, links may become temporarily reinforced by sensory input,
through an increase of the {aij}. For example, upon being presented with the
conditional “if she has an essay, she will study late in the library” (p∧¬ab → q),
the link from p to q via ab becomes temporarily reinforced by synaptic mod-
ulation, and thus forms a fast functional link. As a result, the system of units
and links thereby becomes part of working memory, forming a network like the
ones studied above, where the {wij} are a function of the {sij} and the {aij}.
Working memory then computes the stable state of the network, and the state
of the output node is passed on to the language production system.
8.4.2 Between the Sheets
The second intriguing issue, raised at the beginning of section 8.4, is how the
two layers of neurons become isomorphically wired up through inhibitory con-
nections. What is most interesting here is von der Malsburg and Willshaw’s
observation [291,p. 83] that this form of coupling neural nets must actually be
a fundamental operation in the brain, both at small and large time scales. In the
paper cited they discuss extensively the following example. During ontogene-
sis, the ganglion cells of the retina send axons through the eye stalk to the brain
to form connections with central structures such as the optic tectum. In order to
preserve the coherence of an image, this mapping from retina to tectum must be
“continuous” in the sense that neighboring retina cells project onto neighboring
cells of the tectum; and indeed this is true in the adult animal – the “retino-
topic” mapping. There is a clear analogy15 with the networks described in this
chapter: the map which projects units in the “true” layer via inhibitory links to
units in the “false” layer has precisely this property of continuity, in the sense
that neighbors in the “false” sheet are mapped to neighbours in the “true” sheet.
Von der Malsburg and Willshaw mention other examples as well, now referring
to “dynamic links” active at very small time scales. A good illustration is the
integration of information from the left and the right eye – this can be viewed
as establishing a temporary continuous map between two neural networks cor-
responding to the eyes. Another example at the same time scale is visual ﬂow,
where points in an image seen at consecutive moments in time must be related
continuously to each other.
15. There is also a clear disanalogy: the retinotopic map consists of excitatory connections, whereas we
need inhibitory connections. The excitatory connections are supposedly constructed via Hebb’s rule which
says that if two neurons ﬁre simultaneously the excitatory connection between them is strengthened. What
we need is rather the “anti-Hebbian rule,” which says that if two neurons ﬁre simultaneously, the inhibitory
connection between them is strengthened. The existence of an anti-Hebbian rule has been demonstrated
experimentally.
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The work of von der Malsburg and his associates contains many models and
simulations of how such continuous correspondences can be established by pro-
cesses of synaptic growth and synaptic pruning. Translated to our context, the
construction could run as follows. Initially there are two neural networks cor-
responding to systems of propositions, one dealing with truth, one with falsity.
The results of the computations in the networks must inhibit each other, and ini-
tially a forest of inhibitory links connect the two networks. The simulations in
[302] then suggest that this forest can dynamically reduce to a one-to-one pro-
jection between the isomorphically corresponding cells in the two networks.
The system is able to spontaneously break the symmetry between several pos-
sible projections. We need not delve into the details here; the purpose of this
section has only been to point to a striking analogy.
8.5 A Hidden Layer of Abnormalities
While the preceding constructions of neural networks are completely general,
in the sense of applying to all deﬁnite logic programs, there is reason to think
that abnormalities play a special role in such networks. We have seen in chap-
ter 7, and will see again in chapter 9, that abnormalities play a special role as
inhibitors in rules. They may inhibit an inference, and they may also inhibit ac-
tions. Abnormalities in rules are furthermore special in that they need not occur
in the overt linguistic representation of a rule. They may, however, be activated,
or suppressed, by material which is overtly represented. We therefore prefer to
represent abnormalities as a hidden layer in the network and hypothesise that
normally this layer is present in all networks representing the condition–action
rules involved in the operation of executive function. This is a theme taken
up in chapter 9, where we shall argue that the condition–action rules in mo-
tor planning can in fact be formalized as exception–tolerant conditionals like
those used in the suppression task. It will be shown that, if this formalization
is adopted, the resulting hidden layer of abnormalities is responsible for the
possibility of ﬂexible planning. We will furthermore see in chapter 9 that the
theory that autism is a form of executive disorder can be modelled by assuming
that this hidden layer is malfunctioning, thus leading to behavioral rigidity and
perseverance.
Consider a conditional like p∧¬ab → q together with a further determination
of the abnormality as ¬s→ ab and ¬t→ ab. We do not treat ab as an ordinary
proposition letter, which would have to be included in input and output layers.
Instead the effect of the abnormality is captured by a separate ab = (ab+, ab−)
node, located between the body of the clause minus ¬ab, which is in this case
just p, and the head, here q (see ﬁgure 8.1116). The clauses ¬s → ab and
16. The diagram does not yet exhibit the symmetry of, for example, ﬁgure 8.8. This issue will be discussed
at the end of the section.
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Figure 8.11 A hidden layer of abnormalities
¬t → ab are represented by links from units labeled s−, t− to the unit ab−,
which contains an implicit OR. The threshold of ab− is a small positive value.
The function of the unit ab+ in the upper sheet is only to interrupt the ﬂow
of activation from p to q if the possibility of an exception is highlighted. The
connection from ab− to ab+ is therefore inhibitory.
One may think of the “false” sheet as gathering contextual information rele-
vant to the inhibition of the link from p to q. This information is summarized
by the unit ab− before being relayed to ab+ in the “true” sheet.17 In order to
visualise neural computations involving abnormalities, it is useful to allow ac-
tivations strictly between 0 and 1. First suppose that s−, t− are not activated at
all, either because the propositions s, t are known to be true, or because there is
(as yet) no link from the units to ab− in working memory. Since the threshold
of ab− is positive, ab− does not ﬁre, and hence the link between p and q is
not interrupted. Now suppose that the possibility of an exception, say ¬s, is
highlighted. This does not yet mean that s is known to be false, so assume this
possibility is represented as a small activation in the unit s−. If this activation is
greater than or equal to the threshold of ab−, this unit ﬁres and thereby inhibits
the link between p and q. If the proposition s is known to be false, the activation
of the unit s− is 1, and again the preceding considerations apply.
Looking at ﬁgure 8.11, it might seem that we quietly dropped a basic feature
of the neural networks computing minimal models of deﬁnite logic programs:
the isomorphism of the “true” and “false” sheets. The answer is yes and no: yes,
17. The reader may wonder why we do not represent the effect of the abnormality by means of an ANDNOT
unit in the “true” sheet, since that is, after all, what is suggested by the clause p ∧ ¬ab → q. One reason is
that in our chosen way the role of inhibition is made more explicit, and this ties in nicely with the neurophys-
iological discussion of inhibition in section 9.11.1. Furthermore, the fact that ab− is located in the “false”
sheet means that new contextual information can be added on to ab− linearly (via OR); the unit ab− itself
does not have to be modiﬁed.
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because at ﬁrst not all links required by the isomorphism will be present; no,
because at least some of these links will be established as the result of learning.
Let us be more precise.
The units labeled s− and t− in the diagram actually form part of a node
(s+, s−) (and (t+, t−)), where the two units are connected by inhibitory links.
The units s+ and t+ are at ﬁrst not connected to ab+. The unit p+ is part of
the node (p+, p−); here p− need not be connected to ab−.18 Suppose ﬁrst that
s is irrelevant to ab; in this case there will not develop a link from s− to ab− in
working memory, and there is therefore no need to have a corresponding link
from s+ to ab+. If we now suppose that ¬s is considered a possible abnor-
mality, hence is relevant to ab, then we must assume that in working memory
a link is constructed from s− to ab−; at ﬁrst only in the “false” sheet, since
we assume that it is this sheet which is responsible for the incorporation of the
context, insofar as is relevant to inhibition. If one now receives the information
that s is true, s+ inhibits s−, and hence (disregarding t) ab− will not ﬁre. If
p is known to be true, it follows that ab+ ﬁres, and because s+ and ab+ ﬁre
simultaneously, a link will be forged between s+ and ab+ by Hebbian learning.
One may view this process as the neural analogue of the synthesis of a new rule
p∧ s→ q, a synthesis that will further occupy us in chapter 9, section 9.6. The
only essential difference between the network in ﬁgure 8.11 and the network
consisting of two isomorphic sheets is therefore that there is no inhibitory link
from ab+ to ab−. Indeed there cannot be such a link, otherwise activation of
p+ would by itself already inhibit ab−, and thus discount the inﬂuence from the
context.
8.6 Discussion
We showed that closed–world reasoning in its guise as logic programming has
an appealing neural implementation, unlike classical logic. On our proposals
the networks corresponding to logic programs become part of working memory,
which then maintains a minimal preferred model of the world under description
in a form in which it can be efﬁciently revised at any point in the light of new
information. This is the kind of system required for an organism to plan, and
is the kind of system which might be developed by an organism evolved for
planning, as discussed in chapter 6.
We are now in a position to give some further substance to, and modify, the
distinction between system 1 and system 2 processes mentioned in chapter 5.
For convenience we recall Evans’s view of the distinction, already quoted in
18. An easy calculation shows that the presence or absence of this connection does not make a difference.
Suppose we add ¬p → ab to our data, which corresponds to a link from p− to ab−. Program completion
gives ¬p∨¬s → ab, which is equivalent to ¬ab ↔ (p∧ s). Substitution in p∧¬ab → q gives p∧ s → q
as before.
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chapter 5:
System 1 is . . . a form of universal cognition shared between animals and humans. It is
actually not a single system but a set of subsystems that operate with some autonomy.
System 1 includes instinctive behaviors that are innately programmed and would include
any innate input modules of the kind proposed by Fodor . . . The system 1 processes that
are most often described, however, are those that are formed by associative learning of
the kind produced by neural networks. . . . System 1 processes are rapid, parallel and
automatic in nature; only their ﬁnal product is posted in consciousness[72,p. 454].
In these theories, logical reasoning is considered to belong to system 2 which
is
slow and sequential in nature and makes use of the central working memory system [72,p.
454].
We believe the distinction is useful and important, but the constructions pre-
sented in this chapter challenge the idea that fast and automatic processes are
thereby not logical processes. In virtue of its mathematical properties closed
world reasoning can be modelled by fast parallel neural processes, and there-
fore may be taken to belong to system 1. It is not logic per se that belongs to
system 2, but some logical systems (such as classical logic) do belong there be-
cause in these systems model generation does not have a neural representation.
The reader somewhat familiar with the logical literature may have felt in-
creasingly uneasy during our discussion of nonmonotonic logic: isn’t it true
that nonmonotonic reasoning has high computational complexity and is there-
fore ipso facto ruled out as a formal description of actual human reasoning?
There are in fact two issues here, one pertaining to the search for possible ex-
ceptions or abnormalities in the mental database, the other to the computational
complexity of the derivability relation of a given nonmonotonic logic. The ﬁrst
issue can be illustrated by a quotation from Politzer [218,p. 10]
Nonmonotonicity is highly difﬁcult to manage by Artiﬁcial Intelligence systems because
of the necessity of looking for possible exceptions through an entire database. What I
have suggested is some kind of reversal of the burden of proof for human cognition:
at least for conditionals (but this could generalize) looking for exceptions is itself an
exception because conditional information comes with an implicit guarantee of normality.
Translated to our formalism, the difﬁculty hinted at by Politzer concerns tab-
ulating all clauses of the form ϕ → ab which are present in memory. But in
our setup we do not have a knowledge base in the sense of AI, with its huge
number of clauses which are all on an equal footing. What counts instead is the
number of links of the form ϕ → ab which are activated in working memory
by means of a mechanism such as von der Malsburg’s “fast functional links.”
This search space will then be very much smaller. There remains the issue of
how relevant information in long–term memory is recruited into working mem-
ory, though we assume this is achieved efﬁciently through the organization of
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long-term memory. We do not pretend to have solved the problem, but equally
we do not believe that the AI experience of the intractability of nonmonotonic
logic is relevant here.
The second issue is concerned with the computational complexity of the de-
cision problem for the relation “ψ is derivable from ϕ1, . . . , ϕn in nonmono-
tonic logic L,” where we may restrict attention to propositional logics only.
For example, one well-known nonmonotonic logic, Reiter’s default logic, is
computationally more complex than classical propositional logic, which is NP–
complete, so in practice exponential (see Gottlob [104] for a sample of results
in this area). By contrast, ifL is propositional logic programming with negation
as failure, the corresponding decision problem is P-complete, hence less com-
plex than classical propositional logic (see Dantsin et al. [56] and references
given therein for discussion).19 This difference is mainly due to a restriction in
the syntactic form of the clauses, which have to be of the form ϕ→ A, where ϕ
can be arbitrary, but A must be atomic. This restriction, whose main effect is to
rule out disjunctions in the consequent, is harmless in the case of the suppres-
sion task, although it may cause problems in other reasoning tasks. Again, this
only serves to show that logical form determines whether a task can be solved
by system 1 or just by system 2 processing.
19. It is true that our representation of MT goes beyond the derivability relation of logic programming.
However, the fact that it can be represented using perceptron learning guarantees that it is still polynomial.

9 Coping with Nonmonotonicity inAutism
Autism is a clinical syndrome ﬁrst described by Leo Kanner in the 1940s, of-
ten ﬁrst diagnosed in children around 2 to 3 years of age as a deﬁcit in their
affective relations and communication. The autistic child typically refuses eye
contact, is indifferent or hostile to demonstrations of affection, and exhibits de-
layed or abnormal communication, repetitive movements (often self-harming),
and is rather indifferent to pain. Autistic children do not engage spontaneously
in make-believe play and show little interest in the competitive social hierar-
chy, and in personal possessions. Autism comes in all severities – from com-
plete lack of language and severe retardation, to mild forms continuous with the
“normal” range of personalities and IQs. Autism is sometimes distinguished
from Aspberger’s syndrome – very roughly speaking, autism without language
impairment – but Aspberger’s is probably just the mild end of the autistic spec-
trum. Autistic children share many symptoms shown by deaf and by blind
infants, possibly because of the social isolation imposed by these conditions.
There are known biochemical abnormalities associated with autism. There is
evidence of a probably complex genetic basis. As should be clear by now, we
do not believe that psychological analyses of autistic functioning are inconsis-
tent with, or exclusive of, such biochemical– or genetic–level analyses, and we
will indicate something of how we think the different levels may relate to each
other.
More than any other psychiatric disorder, autism has captured the imagina-
tion of the practitioners of cognitive science, because, at least according to some
theories, it holds the promise of revealing the essence of what makes us human.
This holds especially for the school which views autism as a deﬁcit in “theory
of mind,” the ability to represent someone else’s feelings and beliefs. An impli-
cation seems to be that in this respect autistic people are like our evolutionary
ancestors, given that chimpanzees have much less “theory of mind” than hu-
mans. Although we believe the claims that can be made are quite different, we
obviously agree that autism may well be important from the point of view of
evolutionary cognitive science.
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9.1 Psychological Theories of Autism
There are several current psychological theories of autism. To mention some
of the main ones: the theory of mind deﬁcit theory (Leslie [172]), the affective
foundation theory (Hobson [127]), the weak central coherence theory (Happe´
[114]), and the executive function deﬁcit theory (Russell [237]).
9.1.1 Theory of Mind
The “theory theory” originated in Premack and Woodruff’s work on chim-
panzees [222], attempting to characterise the differences between human and
nonhuman primates. Alan Leslie [172] proposed that human beings have a
brain “module” that does reasoning about minds, by implementing a “theory
of mind” (often abbreviated to ToM), and that autistic development could be
seen as delayed acquisition or impairment of this module. So, the theory the-
ory goes, in normals the module constitutes the difference between humans
and their ancestors. To paint with a broad brush, this claim gives us the two
equations:
chimpanzee + ToM = human
and
human – ToM = autist
Certainly this is a great simpliﬁcation, but, we will argue, it usefully encapsu-
lates a largely unspoken argument common in the ﬁeld (although not in Happe´
or in Frith [114, 88]), that autism is to be characterized by the lack of quali-
ties present in normals. Very little equation solving yields the consequence that
autistic people are like chimpanzees (in some relevant respects). This we ﬁnd
highly counterintuitive: chimpanzees are, for example, hypersocial animals. It
may be more useful at least to entertain a different equation:
normal human + too much “magic ingredient” = autist
That is, some of whatever cognitive additions yielded humans from their ape
ancestors may be overrepresented in autistic cognition. Just for an example to
illustrate, much of autistic cognition is an obsessive attempt to extract excep-
tionless truth about a complicated world. This sounds to us rather more like the
scientiﬁc life than that of chimpanzees. At least this equation may allow us aca-
demics to empathize with autistic reasoners. Of course, this alternative equa-
tion has very different evolutionary implications. As we shall see, autism has
a substantial genetic component, and a high prevalence for a deleterious inher-
ited condition, so one must ask whether there are beneﬁts from lesser dosages
which maintain the condition in the population. Perhaps autism is the sickle cell
anaemia of behavioral traits? Sickle cell anemia is a double-recessive genetic
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disease maintained in the populations of malaria–infested areas by the enhanced
malaria resistance of the heterozygote. This particularly simple mechanism is
too simple for autism, but there are others whereby alleles may be beneﬁcial in
one environment or one genotype, and harmful in another.
These equations raise many questions about just what nonhuman primates
can and can’t do in the way of reasoning about conspeciﬁcs’ behavior and men-
tal processes. Apes have considerable facility in reasoning about conspeciﬁcs’
plans – in the sense of predicting their behavior by diagnosing their motivation
– but they appear not to be able to reason about conspeciﬁcs’ epistemic states.
A related point is that young children seem to develop “desire” psychology
before “belief” psychology, although desires are “states of mind,” and so it is
unclear why they do not require a theory of mind to reason about them. After
all, to reason about a person’s desires seems to necessitate an appropriate set of
beliefs.
The theory theory can be taken as explanatory, or as an important label for a
set of problems. Its authors appear to claim the former. It seems more plausible
at this stage to interpret it as the latter – an important label for a problem that
needs a label. So, for example, there has been a debate in philosophy contrast-
ing “theory” vs. “simulation” accounts of reasoning about mental states (see,
for example, Harris [117] and Heal [121]). This debate bears rather directly on
autism, and we do not imply by our discussion of theory of mind that we are
rejecting simulation-based accounts.1
9.1.2 Affective Foundation
Hobson’s theory of autism [127] does not so much deny theory of mind as
seek to derive it from more fundamental ontogenetic processes2 – in particu-
lar from the affective foundations3 of interpersonal communication. Humans
uniquely control shared attention, especially by gaze. We diagnose where oth-
ers’ attention is focused from information about where they are looking. “Inter-
subjectivity” is established through mutual control of attention. Just as Piaget
saw the child’s sensorimotor activity as achieving the child’s mastery of where
itself left off and the world began, so Hobson sees the child’s understanding of
itself as a social being separated from others being achieved through joint atten-
tional activity. The child must learn that the other can have different represen-
tations, and different wants and values. Hobson proposes that it is autistic peo-
ple’s valuation of these experiences of intersubjectivity which is abnormal. If
the child does not experience the achievement of intersubjectivity as rewarding
(or even experiences it as aversive), then any cognitive developments founded
1. In fact Stenning [258] argues that the two may not be as distinct as would at ﬁrst appear.
2. But see Hobson [126].
3. The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes the relevant sense of affect as “The way in which one is affected
or disposed; mental state, mood, feeling, desire, intention.”
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on it will not develop normally. Cognitive symptoms of autism are, on this
theory, consequences of this valuation.
9.1.3 Weak Central Coherence
Frith and Happe´’s weak central coherence (WCC) theory of autism [114, 88] is
built on the observation that autistic people show certain supernormal abilities.
Autistic people are good at things which can be done by attention to detail while
ignoring “the big picture,” particularly in some visual tasks. They show a lack
of susceptibility to some visual illusions (e.g., Mu¨ller-Lyer4). Furthermore they
perform very well on the Hidden Figures task, an example of which is presented
in ﬁgure 9.1.
Figure 9.1 Example Hidden Figures test item. The task is to select which of the outline ﬁgures
in the row above is contained in the complex pattern below.
The theoretical basis of WCC is Fodor’s theory of the modularity of mind, al-
luded to in chapter 6. It will be recalled that Fodor postulated a central process-
ing unit which processes the information supplied by the modules in a modality-
free manner. Fodor viewed analogy and metaphor as the characteristic modus
operandi of the central processor. WCC maintains that in autistic people the
central processor does not fully perform its integrative function, resulting in the
separate modules “pushing” their own speciﬁc information. As additional sup-
port for this account one may cite autistic people’s claimed inability to under-
stand metaphor, and also their claimed failure to exploit analogies in problem
solving (see [250]). More generally, weak central coherence can be thought of
as a style of cognition dominated by bottom–up information processing.
4. See http://www.essex.ac.uk/psychology/experiments/muller.html for an online version.
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9.1.4 Executive Disorder
Russell’s executive function deﬁcit (ED) theory [237] takes yet another cluster
of symptoms as basic: the observation that autistic people often exhibit severe
perseveration. They go on carrying out some routine when the routine is no
longer appropriate, and exhibit great difﬁculty in switching tasks when the con-
text calls for this (that is, when switching is not governed by an explicit rule).
This perseveration, also observed in certain kinds of patients with frontal cortex
damage, is hypothesized to give rise to many of the symptoms of autism: ob-
sessiveness, insensitivity to context, inappropriateness of behavior, literalness
of carrying out instructions.5 Task switching is the brief of executive function,
a process (or set of processes) responsible for high-level action control such as
planning, initiation, coordination, inhibition and control of action sequences.
Executive function is hypothesized to be necessary for mentally maintaining a
goal, and pursuing it in the real world under possibly adverse circumstances.
On this view, executive dysfunction is held to be responsible for the sometimes
extreme behavioral rigidity of autistic people.
The origin of the concept of “executive function” was heavily inﬂuenced
by the analysis of neuropsychological patients. This has the important conse-
quence that it is often most discussed in terms of its malfunctioning, and leaves
us with little positive characterization of what executive function does when it
is functioning healthily. Here AI theories of planning are perhaps helpful since
they provide principled analyses of just what is involved in planning action.
By contrast, the psychological study of normal undamaged planning mainly
surfaces in the study of problem solving (e.g., [199]) and problem solving in
turn has been most extensively studied in the guise of expertise – what is the
difference between expert and novice problem solving[35]. 6
When discussing cognitive analyses of mental malfunctioning, it is worth re-
membering that although much clinical literature is understandably oriented to-
ward giving patients a unique categorization, there is an active strand of thought
in contemporary psychiatry that argues that the discreteness of such categories
is always to be questioned [118]. For example, autistic subjects are consid-
erably more depressed, as measured by the relevant clinical diagnosis instru-
ments, than are controls. Whether this is a reaction to, or rather a cause of, their
condition, it becomes particularly important when considering such explana-
tions of autism as executive dysfunction, since executive function is a compo-
nent of a whole spectrum of mental disorders, including depression, but also
including anxiety, schizophrenia, and attention–deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder
5. Note that although autistic people may lack spontaneity, they may be able to carry out tasks involving
fantasy play when instructed, as is indeed necessary if they are to engage with diagnostic tests such as the
false belief task ( see section 9.3 below) at all.
6. Shallice [245] provides a bridge in his studies of the Tower of London problem–solving task, which is
derived from the Tower of Hanoi, a staple of the early AI literature on planning.
246 9 Coping with Nonmonotonicity in Autism
(ADHD). We have already noted that executive function is itself a broad cat-
egory of functions. Is the executive dysfunction observed in autism the same
as the executive dysfunction observed in depression, or in ADHD? If we could
fractionate autistic people’s problems, could the executive function subset be
due to the accompanying depression? These are questions which don’t cur-
rently have answers, but are nevertheless important to appreciate in thinking
about cognitive accounts of such complex syndromes. They crop up again be-
low when we survey the genetics of autism.
This quick survey of theories was intended to illustrate that there are multi-
ple psychological characterizations of autism. Although it is the habit of the
ﬁeld to present these theories as alternatives, it is far from obvious that they
are mutually exclusive. For example, Hobson’s theory might be construed as a
theory about where our theory-of-mind abilities develop from. Although there
is some tension between the idea that these abilities come in a genetically de-
termined module, and that they develop out of experiences of communication,
in truth these are not really inconsistent. In any case, the theory theory does
not present any evidence for the genetic basis or modularity, save for the lack
of any evidence of learning and the discreteness of the diagnosing task. Sim-
ilarly, executive function and central coherence are presumably computational
capacities of systems and as such they might be components of whatever system
realises theory–of–mind abilities.
9.2 Logic and Experiment in the Study of Psychiatric Disorders
Several of the proffered explanations for autism will be explored in greater
depth below, but the brief synopsis given above makes plain that the relations
between the theories merits greater scrutiny. It is here that a logical analysis can
be helpful. More concretely, we will show that there is a common core to the
theory–of–mind deﬁcit theory and executive disorder theory, which consists
in well-deﬁned failures in nonmonotonic reasoning. Based on this analysis,
one can also show in what sense theory–of–mind reasoning is more difﬁcult
(contains more components) than this common core. Furthermore, the common
core leads to predictions about autistic people’s behavior on our old friend the
suppression task which differ from those for normals. One virtue of logical
analysis is its ability to cross linguistic and nonlinguistic tasks. Another is to
insist that vague distinctions between representation and processing are reﬁned.
But the logician has another role as well. In chapter 3 we showed that dra-
matically different performance on superﬁcially similar versions of the Wason
task are in fact due to the different logical forms of these tasks. The same
situation occurs in the “executive disorder” branch of autism research, where
autistic people were shown to behave very differently on the box task (intro-
duced in chapter 2) and the “tubes task” (to be introduced in this chapter). A
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careful analysis shows that in fact the logical structures of these tasks are very
different, and that different behavior is therefore to be expected.
The common core has to do with autistic people’s handling of nonmonotonic
inference, more speciﬁcally that of closed–world reasoning. In chapter 2 we
identiﬁed a number of areas to which closed–world reasoning is applicable,
each time in slightly different form:
• lists: train schedules, airline databases, etc.
• diagnostic reasoning and abduction
• unknown preconditions
• causal and counterfactual reasoning
• attribution of beliefs and intentions
Autistic people have difﬁculties with at least the last three. They also have
a special relationship with lists, in the sense that they feel lost without lists,
such as timetables, to organise daily activities; they have great difﬁculty ac-
commodating unexpected changes to the timetable, and try to avoid situations
such as holidays in which rigid schedules are not applicable. One may view
this as an extreme version of closed–world reasoning, sometimes even applied
in inappropriate circumstances. But before one concludes from this that autis-
tic people are good at closed–world reasoning to the point of overapplying it,
one must carefully distinguish several components of closed–world reasoning.
On the one hand, there is the inference from given premises which reduces to
a computation of the minimal model of the premises and checking whether a
given formula holds. (This is what we referred to earlier as reasoning from an
interpretation.) As we have seen in the last chapter, this is presumably easy
because automatic, as can be seen from the neural model presented there. In a
wider sense, nonmonotonic reasoning also involves “preprocessing” the given
situation or discourse, that is, encoding the law-like features of a situation in a
particular type of premise (reasoning to an interpretation). Laws and regular-
ities always allow exceptions, and skill at “exception handling” is required –
which involves identifying and encoding the relevant exceptions, and knowing
when enough is enough. The chapter heading Coping with Nonmonotonic-
ity refers to this last aspect, at which autistic people appear to do worse than
normals, although they behave normally with respect to the nonmonotonic in-
ferences themselves. That is, autistic people appear to be worse in reasoning to
an interpretation. In the remainder of the chapter we study the implicit reason-
ing patterns of autistic people in several well-known experimental paradigms,
and show that they can be analysed as failures to engage in the difﬁcult part of
closed–world reasoning.
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9.3 Theory of Mind and Reasoning
A famous experiment, the false belief task [305, 212], investigates how autistic
subjects reason about other people’s belief. The standard design of the exper-
iment is as follows. A child and a doll (Maxi) are in a room together with the
experimenter. Maxi and child witness a bar of chocolate being placed in a box.
Then Maxi is taken out of the room. The child sees the experimenter move the
chocolate from the box to a drawer. Maxi is brought back in. The experimenter
asks the child: “Where does Maxi think the chocolate is?” The answers to this
question reveal an interesting cutoff point, and a difference between autistic and
normally developing children. Before the age of about 4 years , the normally
developing child responds where the child knows the chocolate to be (i.e., the
drawer); after that age, the child responds where Maxi must falsely believe the
chocolate to be (i.e., the box). By contrast, autistic children go on answering
“in the drawer” for a long time.
This experiment has been repeated many times, in many variations, with
fairly robust results. Some versions can easily be done at home. There is,
for instance, the “Smarties” or “unexpected contents” task, which goes as fol-
lows. Unbeknownst to the child, a box of Smarties is emptied and reﬁlled with
pencils. The child is asked: “What do you think is in the box?” and it happily
answers: “Smarties!” It is then shown the contents of the box. The pencils are
put back into the box, and the child is now asked: “What do you think your
[absent] mother will say is in the box?” We may then observe the same critical
age: before age 4 the child answers: “Pencils!,” whereas after age 4 the child
will say: “Smarties!” Even more strikingly, when asked what it believed was in
the box before seeing the actual contents, the younger child will say “Pencils,”
even though it has just answered “Smarties!”
The outcomes of these experiments have been argued to support the theory–
of–mind–deﬁcit hypothesis on the cause of autism. Proposed by Leslie in 1987
[172], it holds that human beings have evolved a special “module” devoted
speciﬁcally to reasoning about other people’s minds. As such, this module
would provide a cognitive underpinning for empathy. In normals the module
would constitute the difference between humans and their ancestors – indeed,
chimpanzees seem to be able to do much less in the way of mind-reading. In
autistic children, this module would be delayed or impaired, thus explaining
abnormalities in communication and also in the acquisition of language, if it is
indeed true that the development of joint attention is crucial to language learn-
ing (as claimed, for instance, by Tomasello [276]).
This seems a very elegant explanation for an intractable phenomenon, and
it has justly captured the public’s imagination. Upon closer examination the
question arises whether it is really an explanation rather than a description of
one class of symptoms. For instance, as we have seen in chapter 6, the notion
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of a “module” is notoriously hazy. In this context it is obviously meant to be
a piece of dedicated neural circuitry. In this way, it can do the double duty of
differentiating us from our ancestors and being capable of being damaged in
isolation. But it is precisely this isolation, or “encapsulation” as Fodor called it,
that is doubtful. One reason is just our general skepticism expressed in chapter
6, section 6.4, that evolution does not generally proceed by adding newmodules
(rather than tweaking old ones), and another is that much of the problem of
functionally characterizing human reasoning about minds is about interactions
between modules. Theory of mind requires language to formulate beliefs in and
it also entails a considerable involvement of working memory, as can be seen
in “nested” forms of theory of mind, as in Dunbar’s example
Shakespeare intended us to realise that Othello believes that Iago knows that Desdemona
is in love with Cassio [66,p. 162].
However, as soon as one realises that a module never operates in isolation,
then the theory–of–mind–deﬁcit hypothesis begins to lose its hold. We are now
invited to look at the (possibly defective) interactions of the module with other
cognitive functions (for example, language and working memory), which leads
to the possibility that defects in these functions may play a role in autism. And
there is, of course, also the problem of what the module would have to contain,
given that, for instance, reasoning about other people’s desires is possible for
both autistic people and non-human primates.
Apart from these theoretical problems, it is experimentally controversial at
what stage theory–of–mind abilities emerge. False-belief tasks were initially
proposed as diagnosing a lack of these abilities in normal 3-year-olds and their
presence in normal 4-year-olds (Leslie [172]). Others have proposed that irrel-
evant linguistic demands of these tasks deceptively depress 3–year–olds’ per-
formance. For example, in the false belief task, the child sees the doll see the
sweet placed in one box, and then the child but not the doll sees the sweet moved
to another. Now if the child is asked “Where will the doll look for the sweet
ﬁrst?” (instead of “Where will the doll look for the sweet?”) then children as
young as 2 can sometimes solve the problem (Siegal and Beattie [248]).7 These
arguments, as well as others cited earlier (see p. 164) push reasoning about
intentions earlier in ontogeny.
9.4 Reasoning in the False Belief Task
In chapter 2 we made a start on analyzing attribution of belief, as it occurs in
the false–belief task, as a species of closed–world reasoning. For convenience
7. Intriguingly, this might be read as evidence of the 3-year-olds in the original task adopting a deontic
reading of the question (Where should the doll look? See[40]) rather than a descriptive one (Where will the
doll look ﬁrst?). Another possibility, which also echoes a problem in the selection task, is that the younger
child’s problem may be with sequencing contingencies in their responses.
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we repeat the informal argument here, before proceeding to a rigorous logical
analysis.
An agent solving the task correctly ﬁrst of all needs to have an awareness of
the causal relation between perception and belief, which can be stated in the
form: “if ϕ is true in scene S, and agent a sees S, then a comes to believe
ϕ.” Applied to the situation at hand, this means that Maxi comes to believe
that the chocolate is in the box. An application of the principle of inertia now
yields that Maxi’s belief concerning the location of the chocolate persists un-
less an event occurs which causes him to have a new belief, incompatible with
the former one. The story does not mention such an event, whence it is reason-
able to assume – using closed–world reasoning – that Maxi still believes that
the chocolate is in the box when he returns to the experimenter’s room. An
explanation for performance in the false belief task also needs to account for
the incorrect answers given by children younger than 4 and autistic children.
These subjects almost always answer “in the drawer,” when asked where Maxi
believes the chocolate to be. To model this, we borrow a notion from executive
dysfunction theory, and hypothesise that the “prepotent response” is always for
the child to answer where it knows the chocolate to be. In some children, this
response can be inhibited; in other children it cannot, for various reasons which
we shall explore below.
The formal analysis we are about to present has to combine reasoning about
beliefs and about the world, as well as to link a subject’s beliefs with her re-
sponses (verbal as well as nonverbal). This last component, usually omitted in
discussions of a theory–of–mind “module,” but which we consider an integral
part of the task, is the brief of executive function. We therefore preface our
analysis with a brief discussion of some logical features of executive function.
This will pay dividends in later parts of this chapter, when we treat the expla-
nation of autism as a form of executive dysfunction. In fact, it will be seen that
the executive components in false-belief tasks make them formally very similar
to tasks not involving beliefs about other people at all.
Recall from section 9.1.4 that executive function can be decomposed in plan-
ning, initiation, inhibition, coordination, and control of action sequences lead-
ing toward a goal held in working memory. In the following we abstract from
the coordination and control component, and concentrate on goal maintenance,
planning, and (contextually determined) inhibition. We have seen in chapter 7
that at the level of competence, planning can be described as a form of closed–
world reasoning, which is applied in particular to implicit preconditions for ac-
tions. Viewed in terms of executive function, the suppression effect is a special
case of inhibition of a response. In the logical model of executive function pro-
posed here, inhibition is represented through the special logical form of causal
properties of actions, as a conditional in which the link from say action to effect
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is mediated by the slot labeled ¬ab:
A ∧ ¬ab → E (9.1)
To recapitulate the discussion in chapters 7 and 8: the conditional (9.1) is read
as “if A and nothing abnormal is the case, then E,” where the expression noth-
ing abnormal is the case is governed by closed–world reasoning. For instance,
if there is nothing known about a possible abnormality, i.e., if the causal system
is closed, one concludes ¬ab, hence from A it follows that E. If, however,
there is information of the form C → ab, i.e., if there is a context C which
constitutes an abnormality, and C is the case, then the link from A to E is in-
hibited. In the neural model of closed–world reasoning proposed in chapter 8,
ab corresponds to a neuron situated between the neurons for A and E, such
that C is connected to ab via an inhibitory link; and this is the general way of
incorporating contextual inﬂuences. The theories describing task competence
will all consist of sets of such conditionals. We begin by formulating languages
in which these theories can be expressed.
9.4.1 Formal Language and Principles
The languages we need comprise at least the following predicates8:
Ra(p): agent a reports her belief that p
seea(p): agent a sees that p
tolda(p): agent a is told that p
deda(p): agent a deduces that p
Ba(p): agent a has the belief that p
l(i, t): the chocolate is at location i at time t
aba: an exception which obstructs agent a’s inferences
clipped(s, i, t): at some time between s and t, the chocolate ceases to be at
location i.The agent’s information state Ba(ϕ) satisﬁes properties such as the
following9:
seea(ϕ) → Ba(ϕ) (9.2)
tolda(ϕ) → Ba(ϕ) (9.3)
deda(ϕ) → Ba(ϕ) (9.4)
Ba(ϕ→ ψ) → (Ba(ϕ) → Ba(ψ)) (9.5)
8. The formalism introduces just what is necessary to model the various tasks. A fully general formalism
would have to use the “event calculus,” for which see [282]. Our formulation uses predicates which can take
formulas as arguments. Strictly speaking this is not allowed in ﬁrst–order logic, but there are a number of
technical tricks to deal with this issue. A general approach is given in [282,chapter 6].
9. The properties of Ba(ϕ) assumed in the analysis of the standard false–belief task are very minimal. We
shall have occasion to use deeper principles concerning Ba(ϕ) in section 9.4.5.
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Suppose b is an agent thinking about the behavior of agent a. We model b’s
responses as the result of a competition between two rules, both of which are
instantiations of the general response rule schema
Bb(ϕ) ∧ ¬abb → Rb(ϕ) (9.6)
where abb indicates a possible circumstance which prevents b from reporting his
belief.10 This response schema says that if b believes ϕ, his prepotent response
is to report that ϕ; but the rule is inhibitable in that the occurrence of abb may
prevent the report. Obviously this response is itself an instance of the more
general schema (9.1).
The ﬁrst substitution instance of rule (9.6) says that if b knows what the lo-
cation of the chocolate is, he will report that location, barring exceptional cir-
cumstances:
Bb(l(i, t)) ∧ ¬abb → Rb(l(i, t)), (9.7)
which arises from rule (9.6) by the substitution ϕ := l(i, t).
The second rule, which reﬂects partial comprehension of the task instruc-
tions, says that b will report a’s information state:
Bb(Ba(l(i, t))) ∧ ¬abb → Rb(Ba(l(i, t))) (9.8)
It arises from rule 9.6 by the substitution ϕ := Ba(l(i, t)).
In the case of a false belief, these rules are in competition, and we have to
ensure that only one is operative; i.e., the rules must inhibit each other mutually.
This is achieved by means of the abnormalities. The inhibitory effect of (9.7)
on (9.8) is modelled by the clause
Rb(l(j, t)) → abb (9.9)
which expresses that b’s own response interferes with 9.8 if j = i.
The inhibitory effect of 9.8 on 9.7 is modelled by a clause which expresses
another part of task comprehension: b should report a’s beliefs, even if he
knows them to be wrong:
Bb(Ba(l(i, t))) → abb (9.10)
This formula expresses that b’s prepotent response 9.7 is inhibited if agent b has
information that agent a has (possibly incorrect) information about the location
of the chocolate.
It is essential to note that the false–belief task not only involves fairly modest
reasoning about beliefs, but more importantly also reasoning about the world.
10. The abnormality abb may be different for each concrete ϕ, but in order not to overload notation we will
not indicate this explicitly.
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The interaction between the inertial properties of the world and the information
of an agent a is given by
Ba(l(i, s)) ∧ s < t ∧ ¬Ba(clipped(s, i, t)) → deda(l(i, t)) (9.11)
with clipped governed by clauses such as
l(i, s) ∧ chocolate-moved(r) ∧ s < r < t→ clipped(s, i, t); (9.12)
l(i, s) ∧ chocolate-melted(r) ∧ s < r < t→ clipped(s, i, t). (9.13)
9.4.2 Closed–World Reasoning in the Normal Child Older Than 4 Years
Let the location variable i range over {1, 2}, where 1 = box, 2 = drawer. Also
let a be Maxi, b the child, t0 the time at which Maxi leaves the room, and
t > t0 the time at which b must answer the experimenter’s question, i.e., report
Maxi’s belief state. We will represent b’s report as a statement of the form
Rb(Ba(p)). We assume that b believes that l(2, t), and we omit the derivation of
this fact. We must explain why the normal child responds with Rb(Ba(l(1, t))),
and not with Rb(l(2, t)). As mentioned above, the explanation assumes that of
the competing conditionals (9.7) and (9.8) the ﬁrst is inhibited by the second
through a condition on abb reﬂecting the child’s understanding of the task:
Bb(Ba(l(i, t))) → abb (9.14)
We ﬁrst show that in these conditions b will not respond with his own knowl-
edge of the whereabouts of the chocolate. The response Rb(l(2, t)) would re-
quire ¬abb, i.e., that abb cannot be derived. Now abb reduces to Bb(Ba(l(i, t)))
by equation (9.10): if the latter can be proved, so can the former. But as we will
prove next, one has Bb(Ba(l(i, t))), whence also abb. Thus the prepotent re-
sponse (9.7) is inhibited and Rb(l(2, t)) is not a possible response for b. This
will help in showing that the antecedent of rule (9.8) is satisﬁed.
The second part of the proof shows that b will report a’s beliefs. We know
l(1, s) ∧ seea(l(1, s)) for some s < t0 < t. It follows that Ba(l(1, s)) by
equation (9.2). Intuitively, because nothing happens between s and t0, and
Maxi leaves after t0, one may conclude ¬Ba(clipped(s, i, t)), i.e.,
?Ba(clipped(s, i, t)) fails.
Formally, one can show a query like
?Ba(chocolate-moved(r) ∧ s < r < t)
fails, even though the chocolate is actually moved. Indeed, applying equation
(9.2)
?Ba(chocolate-moved(r) ∧ s < r < t)
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reduces to queries such as the following, which all fail:
?seea(chocolate-moved(r) ∧ s < r < t)
It thus follows that
?Ba(clipped(s, i, t)) fails.
By inertia (i.e., equation (9.11)), we then have deda(l(1, t)), whenceBa(l(1, t))
by (9.4). Since b can perform the preceding deduction, it follows again by (9.4)
that Bb(Ba(l(1, t))). We have already seen in the ﬁrst part of the argument
that therefore ¬Rb(l(2, t)), and it follows by clause (9.9) that ¬abb. We must
therefore have Rb(Ba(l(1, t))) by rule (9.8).
9.4.3 Attribution of Beliefs and Closed–World Reasoning in the Younger
or Autistic Child
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, in this case b’s response rule
is effectively of the form
Bb(l(i, t)) → Rb(l(i, t)), (9.15)
i.e., rule (9.7) without the inhibiting condition. In the Maxi task we thus get the
response Rb(l(2, t)). This response cannot be inhibited: the form of the rule
does not even allow b to consider a’s information sources. But the effect of the
response Rb(l(2, t)) is that rule (9.8) is inhibited, whenceRb(Ba(l(1, t))) is not
a possible response.
The rule (9.15) may be primitive, or a consequence of failed task comprehen-
sion. In the latter case, the child has not yet incorporated rule (9.10), so that
closed–world reasoning leads to ¬ab. In this case cognitive development may
be viewed as relating the variable for an exception in (9.7) to internal theories
about mental processing and about the world. The child may also substitute the
rule (9.10) with the following theory relating world and information
l(i, t) → Ba(l(i, t)) (9.16)
introducing a short circuit which bypasses the set of principles (9.2) – (9.4),
(9.11), and (9.12) and its analogues for other events affecting the chocolate.
The rules (9.15) and (9.8) are then no longer in competition, but yield the same
answer.
It is also possible that (9.15) arises as a failed neural encoding of a rule of the
form (9.7). As in chapter 8, section (8.5), consider what is the neural analogue
of having a node ¬ab in a rule like (9.7) (see ﬁgure 8.11, repeated here for
convenience as ﬁgure 9.2). The inhibitory effect of the node ab = (ab+, ab−)
is captured by the link from ab− to ab+: if ab− ﬁres because it is activated
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by contextual material, it inhibits the unit ab+, whence the linked from p to q
is blocked. If this inhibitory channel is defective (e.g., because of insufﬁcient
inhibitory neurotransmitters such as GABA, see [235]), chances are that the
link from p to q is not interrupted, even if the input ab− is active. In case there
is such a deﬁcit, cognitive development may not make much of a difference.
The same argument applies to the ¬Ba(clipped(s, i, t)) node in the inertial rule
(9.11), which is an ab node with more structure built in.
Figure 9.2 The relation between inhibition and abnormalities.
9.4.4 Reasoning in an Unexpected Contents Task
It is of some interest to inquire whether the above analysis extends to the entire
family of false–belief tasks. A full treatment would exceed the bounds of this
chapter, but as an illustration we sketch the reasoning in the Smarties task, when
viewed as a species of closed world reasoning.
We ﬁrst recapitulate the task at issue. A box of Smarties is emptied, reﬁlled
with pencils, and then shown to a child who is ignorant of the change. The
child is asked: “What do you think is in the box?” and it answers: “Smarties!”
The child is then shown the contents of the box. The pencils are put back into
the box, and the child is now asked: “What do you think your [absent] mother
will say is in the box?” We may then observe the same critical age: before
age 4 the child answers: “Pencils!,” whereas after age 4 the child will say:
“Smarties!” Also, when asked what she believed was in the box before seeing
the actual contents, the younger child will say “Pencils,” even though she has
just answered “Smarties.” Here we are interested in the responses to the second
question.
This type of answer seems to be related to the development of episodic mem-
ory in children. Young children have no “source memory” for when they have
learned a particular piece of information. Parents of 3–year–olds will recognise
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the calm self-conﬁdence with which the child claims to have “always known”
a particular fact she recently learned. In our formalization, source memory is
encapsulated in principles such as (9.2), together with closed–world reasoning;
if Ba(p), then one of seea(p), tolda(p), . . . must be the case.
We need the following primitive propositions, in addition to the language
introduced for the false–belief task:
p: Smarties inside
q: pencils inside
Again we start from an instance of the general response rule (9.1), now indexed
to time (compare (9.6)):
Ba(ϕ, t) ∧ ¬aba(t) → Ra(ϕ, t) (9.17)
where Ba(ϕ, t) means that agent a has information that ϕ at time t. Let t0 be
the time of the ﬁrst question, t1 > t0 that of the second question. A particular
instance of (9.17) is what can be called the prepotent response in this task
Ba(q, t1) ∧ ¬aba(t1) → Ra(q, t1) (9.18)
Proper task comprehension requires that the response rule (9.18) is inhibited
when the task is to report the subject’s belief at time t0; this is achieved via the
inhibitory condition
Ba(Ba(p, t0), t1) → aba(t1). (9.19)
As in the false–belief task, the competence response is governed by another
instance of rule (9.17), namely
Ba(Ba(p, t0), t1) ∧ ¬ab′a(t1) → Ra(Ba(p, t0), t1)) (9.20)
with the associated inhibitory condition
Ra(q, t1) → ab ′(a)(t1). (9.21)
The reasoning now proceeds as in the false–belief task. The older child in-
vokes the principle (9.4), relativized to time:
deda(p, t0) → Ba(p, t0) (9.22)
The child deduces at t0 that there are Smarties inside the box from the fact
that it is a Smarties box. As a consequence she comes to believe that there
are Smarties inside: Ba(p, t0). At the time the second question is asked (t1),
source memory comes into play: the child remembers what she deduced at
t0, so that we get Ba(deda(p, t0), t1); by monotonicity of Ba (principle (9.5))
it follows that Ba(Ba(p, t0), t1). The prepotent response (9.18) is inhibited
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because of (9.19), whence we get (by closed–world reasoning), ¬Ra(q, t1) and
¬ab′(a)(t1). The rule (9.20) now produces the right response.
The younger child may experience several problems. If she has no source
memory, i.e., if she does not infer Ba(deda(p, t0), t1), task-understanding (rule
(9.19)) cannot be applied, and the child will give the prepotent response (9.18).
The same would happen if the child experiences the difﬁculties with inhibition
outlined in section 9.4.3. Notice that these difﬁculties are very different. It
might well be that the normal child younger than 4 fails the task because of un-
derdeveloped source memory, whereas the autistic child fails it due to problems
with inhibition.
9.4.5 What This Analysis of the Child’s Reasoning Tells Us
Let us ﬁrst explain some of our design decisions. The reader might wonder why
a task called the “false–belief task” is not analysed logically in terms of one of
the several available logics of belief. And indeed the predicate Ba, applied to
propositions, acts somewhat like a modal belief operator as used in multiagent
epistemic logics (since we need iterated belief operators, for instance, in the
clause reﬂecting task understanding (9.10), and in rule 9.8). The trouble with
such an analysis is that, on the one hand, standard axioms for belief such as
positive and negative introspection appear to play no role in the derivation of the
responses of the two categories of subjects, and on the other hand, the real work
in the derivation is done by assumptions concerning the relation of belief and
sensory information, concerning persistence of belief over time, and concerning
belief reports. In other words, the reasoning is mostly about belief formation,
not so much about belief manipulation. For the same reason it does not appear
to be very useful to analyse the false–belief task in terms of a possible world
semantics for epistemic logic, since such a semantics is concerned with how to
get from one belief state to another, which is not the main issue in the false–
belief task.
This said, there remain intuitive considerations on the false–belief task which
suggest that some sort of modal principle of positive introspection is operative
after all. An experiment by Clements and Perner [41] shows that normal 3–
year–olds may give the wrong answer in the false–belief task, while simulta-
neously looking at the right place. Hauser’s interesting paper ‘Knowing about
knowing’ [120] glosses this result by saying that these 3–year–olds have (im-
plicit) knowledge about the right response, but no knowledge of their knowl-
edge, i.e., no explicit knowledge. This distinction can be represented by a slight
change in the setup. We keep the predicate Ra(p) for “agent a (verbally) re-
ports her belief that p,” but introduce a new predicate Aa(p) with the intended
meaning “agent a acts out her belief that p,” for example by looking. We then
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get two general response schemata instead of the one given as (9.6), namely
Bb(ϕ) ∧ ¬abb → Ab(ϕ) (9.23)
and
Bb(Bb(ϕ)) ∧ ¬abb → Rb(ϕ). (9.24)
Only positive introspection leads to congruent answers here. That is, the argu-
ment given above for the normal child older than 4 now applies to “acting out”
only, i.e., with Rb replaced by Ab everywhere; positive introspection is needed
to give the corresponding verbal response.11
On the assumption that the analysis captures the processing that is going on
in the child’s mind, we can isolate the executive and “theory” components in
the false–belief task. To start with the latter, the theory component for the nor-
mally developing child consists of the rules (9.2), . . . , (9.11), (9.12) and its
analogues, and the response rule (9.7). If we deﬁne executive control generally
as concerned with maintaining a goal, and planning, coordination, inhibition,
and control of action sequences leading toward that goal, then in this particular
task executive control has to maintain the goal “Find out what Maxi’s belief
state is, and report truthfully,” and to set up a sequence of steps leading to this
goal. This ﬁrst involves keeping the linking rule (9.10) active in working mem-
ory, and also the goal ?Ba(l(i, t)). Second, a computation has to be started,
regressing from the activated goal; this is essentially the closed–world argu-
ment given above. Given the connection between closed–world reasoning and
planning, one can see from this analysis that executive function is essentially
involved in solving the false–belief task. Inhibiting the prepotent response (9.7)
is only one, relatively minor, facet of this involvement.
These two components together explain competent verbal performance in the
false–belief task. If one of these is lacking, one may expect wrong answers. If
the child does not answer that Maxi believes the chocolate to be in the box,
this may thus be due to a failure to maintain the goal, or rule (9.10), in work-
ing memory, a failure to apply closed–world reasoning, for instance due to rule
(9.16), a failure to grasp inertia (principle (9.11) plus closed–world reasoning),
11. The reader may well wonder why we identiﬁedB andBB with implicit and explicit belief, respectively.
The reason is mainly that matters may be arranged such that BBϕ implies Bϕ, but not conversely, so that,
at least formally, BB represents a stronger form of belief. It is possible to give more reﬁned analyses, e.g.,
in terms of graded modalities, or of Halpern’s awareness operator. (See, e.g., [191] for notions not explained
here.) Investigations of the neural correlate of the distinction between implicit and explicit belief may well
need such a more reﬁned analysis. The reader may think of the neural implementation of the belief operator
in the following way. So far we have assumed that outgoing signals always have activation strength 1 (cf.
deﬁnition 14); this roughly corresponds to the assumption that one is always fully aware of the truth. With
a model of the neuron which is less simpliﬁed than that of deﬁnition 14 one can relax this assumption,
and allow output strength to correlate with the number of iterated B ’s in front of a proposition, or with
the strength of the graded modality. Technically, one can do this by making bias nodes amplify the signal
emanating from a neuron representing a proposition ϕ; the meaning of Bϕ is that the bias node is switched
on. The principle of positive introspection then says that one type of bias node sufﬁces.
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a failure to grasp the connection between sensory input and information state
(principles like (9.2) together with closed–world reasoning), or simply having
a different primitive response rule replacing (9.7), one which cannot be inhib-
ited, as in (9.15). We know that children below the cut-off age overwhelmingly
answer that Maxi believes the chocolate to be in the drawer, whereas a possi-
ble answer could also be “anywhere.” This reduces the possible causes of the
failure to those which generate a response rule which is essentially of the form
(9.15). As shown in section 9.4.3 this still leaves several possibilities, from
deﬁcient neural encoding of rules to a failure in closed–world reasoning about
information sources. That is, the defect could be located at the level of neuro-
transmitters, at the level of executive function, or at the level of theory of mind;
at the moment one cannot say which.
What the analysis also shows is the implausibility of a theory–of–mind mod-
ule, in the sense of an encapsulated piece of neural tissue dedicated exclusively
to theory of mind. The force of the set of rules (9.10), (9.2), . . . , (9.11), (9.12)
and its analogues comes from combining notions which have to do with mental
representation, and notions useful in understanding (and acting in) the natural
world, by means of a powerful inference engine operated by executive function.
Theory of mind must be viewed as a superstructure built on top of a theory of
causality in the world, powered by a theorem prover in executive function.
Although this superstructure is a quite considerable extension, and so could
be differentially affected, some researchers have claimed that in autism the
foundation itself, the theory of causality, is compromised. This will be dis-
cussed next, in section 9.5. We then turn to a more detailed discussion of exec-
utive dysfunction in section 9.6, and will provide a formalization of one of its
important experimental paradigms, the box task. The formalization of the false
belief task reveals formal similarities with the suppression task, a reasoning
paradigm much studied in the adult reasoning literature. The box task exhibits
even stronger similarities to the suppression task, and this has led us to try the
latter task on a population of autistic subjects. The results (see section 9.7) are
highly suggestive of a very speciﬁc deﬁcit in autism.
9.5 Counterfactual Reasoning
The ‘theory of mind deﬁcit’ hypothesis lays great stress on normal children’s
supposed discovery that the mind forms representations of the world and rea-
sons on the basis of these representations. By thus distinguishing between
world and representation, there arises the possibility of a mismatch between
the two. Some researchers claim that it is in fact this last step, appreciation of
the possibility of a mismatch, that is most important:
. . . the important step taken between 3 and 5 years . . . is not the discovery that the mind is
a representational device, but rather the appreciation that mental states . . . can be directed
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at situations that the child rules out as part of reality as it stands. This discovery is part
of a more wide-ranging ability to think about and describe counterfactual substitutes for
current reality (Harris [117,p. 131]).
In other words, between ages 3 and 5 the child learns to appreciate what philoso-
phers call the intentional character of mental states: they are always about
something, but that something need not be there.
At ﬁrst blush, there still is a difference between false–belief reasoning and
counterfactual reasoning: the former is more speciﬁc in that the child must also
appreciate that the intentional character of mental states holds for others as well,
whereas this is not necessary for counterfactual reasoning. This suggests that
one should fractionate false–belief reasoning into different components, and try
to determine experimentally which component is responsible for the observed
behavior.
A purely counterfactual version of the false–belief task due to Riggs and
Peterson [227] was designed with the purpose of showing that (in normally de-
veloping children) indeed failures in counterfactual reasoning lie at the root of
unsuccessful performance in the false belief task, as Harris proposed. Brieﬂy,
the setup is as follows. In each condition, a false–belief task and a correspond-
ing physical state task based on the same ingredients were constructed. For
instance, the analogue of the Maxi task was the following. A child, a mother
doll and an experimenter are in a kitchen. The child sees that there is a choco-
late in the fridge. The mother doll now bakes a chocolate cake, in the process
of which the chocolate moves from fridge to cupboard. The experimenter now
asks the child: (*) Where would the chocolate be if mother hadn’t baked a cake?
In two of the three experiments, the pattern of answers is highly correlated
with that on the false–belief task. Below the cutoff age of 4, the child answers:
“in the cupboard”; afterwards, it answers “in the fridge.” Apparently there is
no theory of mind involved in answering this question correctly; instead one
needs insight into the “inertia” of the world: “things only change places when
there is an explicit cause.” It is interesting to inquire what prompts the younger
child to answer “in the cupboard”; a simple failure to apply inertial reasoning
might as well lead to the answer “it could be anywhere,” say, because of the
events that could have happened in this alternative world. Answers such as this
would be a consequence of applying causal reasoning without closed–world
reasoning for occurrences of events. The answer “in the cupboard” more likely
reﬂects a failure to apply causal reasoning altogether, reverting instead to the
prepotent response. It must be noted here that in one of Riggs and Peterson’s
three experiments, the false–belief task was considerably more difﬁcult for the
children than the counterfactual task, which is what one would expect given the
analysis of section 9.4. We will return to this issue below, in connection with
autistic children’s behavior on this task.
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We will now restate the previous considerations in terms of the formal ma-
chinery introduced for the false–belief task; this will allow a more precise com-
parison. The main difference with the argument in section 9.4 is that the child
now compares two belief states of herself: what she knows to be true and what
she is asked to assume. To economize on notation we will not introduce a sep-
arate operator for knowledge, and will continue to use B to mark beliefs which
are not necessarily true.
The general form of the response rule is now
ϕ ∧ ¬abch → Rch(ϕ) (9.25)
where the subscript ch indicates that the rule is applied by the child herself. The
substitution instance of interest to us is
l(i, t) ∧ ¬abch → Rch(l(i, t)). (9.26)
The analogue of the substitution instance (9.8) is now the simpler
Bch(l(i, t)) ∧ ¬abch → Rch(l(i, t)), (9.27)
which comes together with a clause inhibiting (9.26), where j = i:
Rch(l(j, t)) → abch (9.28)
Let t = 0 denote the time of the initial situation, t = 1 the time of moving the
chocolate, t = 2 the time of asking question (*). The child is asked to imagine
that chocolate-moved(1) did not occur. Understanding this task amounts to the
adoption of the rule
ϕ ∧ Bch(¬ϕ) → abch, (9.29)
which inhibits the child’s report of the true situation ϕ if she pretends to believe
¬ϕ. The child may derive by closed–world reasoning that¬clipped(0, fridge, 2),
whence by equation (9.11) ded ch(l(fridge, 2)). It follows thatBch(l(fridge, 2)),
whence the child will report l(fridge, 2) by rule (9.27), if in addition ¬abch. To
establish this latter formula, we have to show (using (9.28)) that
¬Rch(l(cupboard , 2)). That the response Rch(l(cupboard , 2)), triggered by
the rule (9.25), is indeed inhibited, follows from the fact that l(fridge, 2) and
l(cupboard , 2) are incompatible, so that Bch(¬l(cupboard , 2)), whence abch
by 9.29, which inhibits the rule (9.25).
The younger child is again hypothesized not to use (9.25), but to use the
uninhibitable prepotent response ((9.25) stripped of ¬abch) instead, for any of
the reasons outlined in section 9.4 (failed task understanding, deﬁcient neural
encoding etc.).
If we now compare the two tasks, we see that the reasoning involved is very
similar, but that the false–belief task requires a more extensive set of princi-
ples. Thus, failure on the counterfactual task may be expected to lead to fail-
ure on the false–belief task, because in both cases it is the prepotent response
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that is assumed to be operative, perhaps as a derivative effect. Success on the
counterfactual task by itself does not imply success on the false–belief task,
because the calculations for the latter involve combining reasoning about infor-
mation sources, inertial properties, and closed–world reasoning. In this sense
false–belief reports are a proper subspecies of counterfactuals, and it would be
interesting if they could be shown to be harder for some populations.
There is some experimental evidence which bears on this issue. Peterson
and Bowler [215] have compared performance on false–belief tasks and coun-
terfactual tasks in populations of typically developing children, children with
severe learning problems, and autistic children. The normal children showed
high correlation on these tasks, but a dissociation became apparent in the other
two groups. In all groups, those who failed the counterfactual task overwhelm-
ingly failed the false–belief task, suggesting that the kind of reasoning going
on in the former is a necessary ingredient of the latter. Seventy-ﬁve percent of
the typically developing children who pass the counterfactual task also pass the
false–belief task, but these percentages get lower in the other groups: 60% in
children with learning difﬁculties, 44% in autistic children. The authors specu-
late on the additional factors going into a false–belief computation, and suggest
that one factor is the necessity to “generate” Maxi’s false–belief, whereas in
the counterfactual task the false statement is given. They then go on to relate
this feature to other supposed failures of generativity in autism, such as the
difﬁculty of spontaneous recall compared to cued recall. While we would not
put it in precisely this way, there is something to this distinction, in that in the
false–belief task the child has to see the relevance of Maxi’s not witnessing the
crucial event, for the ensuing computation. In the counterfactual task all the
ingredients are given, and only an inertial computation is necessary.
In the next section we shall provide an analysis of the theory which views
autism as executive dysfunction, that is, as a failure of executive function. We
will take one of the experiments illustrating the theory, the box task, and provide
a logical analysis to exhibit similarities and differences with the other tasks
discussed. This includes the suppression task, whose formal structure will be
seen to be very similar to the false–belief task, counterfactual task and box task.
9.6 Executive Dysfunction and the Box Task
As noted above when introducing the concept of executive function, Russell
[237] takes as basic the observation that autistic children often exhibit severe
perseveration. Executive function is called upon when a plan has to be re-
designed by the occurrence of unexpected events which make the original plan
unfeasible. Autistic people indeed tend to suffer from rather inﬂexible plan-
ning. Here are two examples, furnished by a single (Aspberger’s) patient, to
illustrate the phenomenon.
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(1) If she wants to go to the supermarket, she must make a shopping list. If she ﬁnds
items in the supermarket that she needs, but which do not ﬁgure on her list, she has to go
home, append the needed item to the list, and return to the supermarket. Occasionally she
has to go through this loop several times.
(2) She has a ﬁxed route from home to work. If a detour is necessary because of con-
struction work on the road, she does not know what to do, because she has only one plan,
whose execution is now thwarted [131,p. 503].
The second example is an instance of the inability to inhibit the prepotent re-
sponse to a stimulus, even when it is known that the response is inappropriate.
This phenomenon is illustrated in an experiment designed by Hughes and Rus-
sell [131], the box task, which we have already encountered in chapter 2 (see
ﬁgure 9.3).
Figure 9.3 Russell’s box task
The task is to get the marble which is lying on the platform (the truncated
pyramid) inside the box. However, when the subject puts her hand through the
opening, a trapdoor in the platform opens and the marble drops out of reach.
This is because there is an infrared light beam behind the opening, which, when
interrupted, activates the trapdoor mechanism. The switch on the left side of the
box deactivates the whole mechanism, so that to get the marble you have to ﬂip
the switch ﬁrst. In the standard setup, the subject is shown how manipulating
the switch allows one to retrieve the marble after she has ﬁrst been tricked by
the trapdoor mechanism.
The pattern of results is strikingly similar to that exhibited in the false–belief
task: normally developing children master this task by about age 4, and before
this age they keep reaching for the marble, even when the marble drops out of
reach all the time. Autistic children go on failing this task for a long time. The
performance on this task is conceptualized as follows. The natural, “prepotent,”
plan is to reach directly for the marble, but this plan fails. The child then has
to replan, taking into account the information about the switch. After age 4
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the normally developing child can indeed integrate this information, that is,
inhibit the prepotent response and come up with a new plan. It is hypothesized
that autistic people cannot inhibit this prepotent response because of a failure in
executive function. But to add precision to this diagnosis we have to dig deeper.
It is important to note here, repeating a point made in chapter 6, that the abil-
ity to plan and re-plan when the need arises due to changed context, is funda-
mental to human cognition, no less fundamental than theory–of–mind abilities.
Human beings (and other animals too) act not on the basis of stimulus-response
chains, but on the basis of a (possibly distant) goal which they have set them-
selves. That goal, together with a world model leads to a plan which sufﬁces to
reach the goal in the assumed circumstances. But it is impossible to enumerate
a priori all events which might possibly form an obstacle in reaching the goal. It
is therefore generally wise to keep open the possibility that one has overlooked
a precondition, while at the same time not allowing this uncertainty to inhibit
one’s actions. It is perhaps this ﬂexibility that autistic people are lacking. This
point can be reformulated in logical terms. The autistic person’s concept of
a rule is one in which the consequent invariably follows the antecedent. By
contrast, a normal subject’s rule is more likely to be of the exception–tolerant
variety. Indeed, Russell writes (following a suggestion by Donald Peterson)
[T]aking what one might call a “defeasibility stance” towards rules is an innate human
endowment – and thus one that might be innately lacking . . . . [H]umans appear to possess
a capacity – whatever that is – for abandoning one relatively entrenched rule for some
novel ad hoc procedure. The claim can be made, therefore, that this capacity is lacking
in autism, and it is this that gives rise to failures on “frontal” tasks – not to mention the
behavioral rigidity that individuals with the disorder show outside the laboratory [236,p.
318].
Russell goes on to say that one way this theory might be tested is through the
implication that children with autism will fail to perform on tasks which require
an appreciation of the defeasibility of rules such as “sparrows can ﬂy.” This is
what we shall do; but to get started we ﬁrst need a logical description of what
goes on in the box task, reﬁning the description given in chapter 2.
9.6.1 Closed–World Reasoning in the Box Task
For the formalization we borrow some self-explanatory notation from the situ-
ation calculus.12 Let c be a variable over contexts, then the primitives are
the predicate do(a, c), meaning “perform action a in context c”;
the function result(a, c), which gives the new context after a has been per-
formed in c.
12. The situation calculus is a standard formalism in AI. A good reference is Russell and Norvig [238,chapter
10]. Note that these authors use the variable s (for “situation”) where we use c (for “context”).
9.6 Executive Dysfunction and the Box Task 265
The actions we need are g (“grab”), u (“switch up”), d (“switch down”). We
furthermore need the following context-dependent properties:
possess(c): the child possesses the marble in c,
up(c): the switch is up in c (= correct position),
down(c): the switch is down in c (= wrong position).
The following equations give the rules appropriate for the box task
down(c) ∧ do(u, c) ∧ ¬ab′(c) → up(result(u, c)) (9.30)
do(g, c) ∧ ¬ab(c) → possess(result(g, c)) (9.31)
We ﬁrst model the reasoning of the normal child older than 4 years. Initially,
closed–world reasoning for ab(c) gives ¬ab(c), reducing the rule (9.31) to
do(g, c) → possess(result(g, c)), (9.32)
which prompts the child to reach for the marble without further ado. After
repeated failure, she reverts to the initial rule 9.31, and concludes that after all
ab(c). After the demonstration of the role of the switch, she forms the condition
down(c) → ab(c) (9.33)
. She then applies closed–world reasoning for ab to 9.33, to get
down(c) ↔ ab(c), (9.34)
which transforms rule (9.31) to
do(g, c) ∧ up(c) → possess(result(g, c)). (9.35)
Deﬁne context c0 by putting c = result(u, c0) and apply closed–world rea-
soning to rule (9.30), in the sense that ab ′(c) is set to ⊥ due to lack of further
information, and → is replaced by ↔. Finally, we obtain the updated rule,
which constitutes a new plan for action
down(c0) ∧ do(u, c0) ∧ c = result(u, c0) ∧ do(g, c) → possess(result(g, c))
(9.36)
As in the previous tasks, both the normal child younger than 4, and the autistic
child are assumed to operate effectively with a rule of the form
do(g, c) → possess(result(g, c)) (9.37)
which cannot be updated, only replaced in toto by a new rule such as (9.36).
It is tempting to speculate on the computational complexities of both these
procedures. Russell wrote that “humans appear to possess a capacity – what-
ever that is – for abandoning one relatively entrenched rule for some novel ad
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hoc procedure [236,p. 318].” The preceding considerations suggest that “aban-
doning one relatively entrenched rule” may indeed be costly, but that normal
humans get around this by representing the rule in such a way that it can be
easily updated. It is instructive to look at the computation that the normal child
older than 4 is hypothesized to be performing. The only costly step appears to
be the synthesis of the rule (9.33); the rest is straightforward logic program-
ming which, as we have seen in chapter 8, can proceed automatically. The rule
(9.31) is never abandoned; a new rule is derived without having to ditch (9.31)
ﬁrst.
To close this discussion, we compare the false–belief task to the box task
from the point of view of the formal analysis. The tasks are similar in that for a
successful solution one must start from rules of the form p∧¬ab → q, identify
conditions which constitute an abnormality, and apply closed–world reasoning;
and also that in both cases a failure of ab to exercise its inhibitory function
leads to the inability to inhibit the prepotent response. A difference is that in
the false–belief task, one needs a “theory” relating ab to sensory, or inferred,
information via clauses such as seea(l(i, t)) → Ba(l(i, t)), ¬Ba(l(i, t)) →
aba(i, t), etc., whereas it sufﬁces to operate with rules for actions in the box
task.
9.6.2 The Suppression Task as a Formal Analogue of the Box Task
The reader who has followed the above computation will have noticed its strik-
ing similarity to the essential step in our derivation of the suppression effect
as a form of closed–world reasoning. Given the formal analogy between the
box task and the suppression task, we were led to expect that autistic people
have a very speciﬁc difﬁculty with closed world reasoning about exceptions.
This should show up in a refusal to suppress the inferences MP and MT, in
case the second conditional premise is of the additional type. To show that
the problem is really speciﬁc to exceptions, and not a problem about integrat-
ing new information, or with closed–world reasoning generally, one may com-
pare autistic people’s reasoning with AC and DA,. In these cases, suppression
of the inference by addition of an alternative motivation, for example, is in-
dependent of exception handling. Here one would expect behavior which is
comparable to normals. One must thus distinguish two forms of closed–world
reasoning that play a role here. On the one hand there is closed–world reason-
ing applied to abnormalities or exceptions, which takes the form: “assume only
those exceptions occur which are explicitly listed.” On the other hand there
is closed–world reasoning applied to rules which takes the form of diagnostic
reasoning: “if B has occurred and the only known rules with B as consequent
are A1 → B, . . . , An → B, then assume one of A1, . . . , An has occurred.”
These forms of closed–world reasoning are in principle independent, and in our
autistic population we indeed observed a dissociation between the two.
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9.7 Autists’ Performance in the Suppression Task
In order to test these hypotheses, formulated generally as
(1) Autistic people can apply closed–world reasoning, but have a decreased
ability in handling exceptions to rules.
Smid [250] conducted an experiment on a population of six autistic subjects
(young adults) with normal intelligence (IQ > 85) and language abilities from
a psychiatric hospital in Vught (Netherlands). The tests administered to the sub-
jects involved a false belief task (the Smarties task13) propositional reasoning
with two premises (MP, MT, etc.), the Wason selection task, the suppression
task, reasoning with prototypes, and analogical reasoning. The method con-
sisted in engaging in tutorial dialogues with the subjects.
The data strongly suggested that in autistic people there is indeed a disso-
ciation between the two forms of closed–world reasoning. As predicted, sup-
pression of fallacies (DA and AC) with an alternative premise did occur and the
percentages we found are roughly the same as those found in research with nor-
mal subjects. Suppression of MP, by contrast, was much rarer in our subjects
than in normals. In the dialogues, subjects often ignored the additional premise
completely in their overt reasoning. With regard to suppression of MT the re-
sults were less dramatic, and harder to interpret, in particular because the rate
of endorsement for MT with an alternative premise is somewhat higher than
that for the base case. Nevertheless, the percentage of MT conclusions drawn
in problems with an additional premise is higher than for the normal subjects
– autistic subjects are not suppressing. What is of especial relevance is that
the experimenter’s interventions, pointing to the possible relevance of the addi-
tional conditional premise, had no effect. Another ﬁnding in the dialogues that
deserves to be noticed is the diverse and sometimes unusual interpretation of the
conditional. Particularly the hypothetical character of the antecedent appears to
be hard to represent; for instance, subjects sometimes take the antecedent as
stating something which is the case.
While suggestive, the data from this experiment were obtained in a small
population and so lacked statistical signiﬁcance. The experiment was redone
on a much larger scale at the F.C. Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging
(Nijmegen, Netherlands).14 The experimental group consisted of twenty-eight
autistic individuals, who were tested also on a standard battery of neuropsy-
chological tests. The control group consisted of twenty-eight subjects, each
matched to a unique autistic subject with respect to intelligence and verbal
mental age. The reasoning problems were presented as a list of two or three
premises, followed by the question: “is [conclusion] true?” where the allowed
13. Five out of six subjects performed normally on this task.
14. The experimenter is Judith Pijnacker, who kindly gave permission to include some of her data here.
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answers were yes, no or maybe. Table 9.1 gives the percentages, the preﬁxes a-
indicating the autistic population, and c- the controls. We discuss some salient
features of this table.
With regard to the two-premise inference patterns MP, MT, AC, and DA, this
study found an unexpected difference between the groups: in all four inference
patterns the autistic subjects volunteered signiﬁcantly more maybe answers.15
Given this result, it is somewhat surprising that there is no signiﬁcant difference
between the groups in rate of endorsement of MP, of MT, and of AC.16 In
the case of DA, inspection of the table shows there is a difference in rate of
endorsement between the groups; in fact this difference approaches signiﬁcance
(p = .054).
Turning to the three premise arguments, results are almost as expected. In
MPadd, autistic subjects answer yes signiﬁcantly more often than controls (p =
.011), while in MTadd the autistic subjects answered no more often, although
the difference only approaches signiﬁcance (p = .066). For MPalt and MTalt
there are no signiﬁcant differences between the two groups, nor are there among
ACalt, ACadd, DAadd, and DAalt.17
These observations lend some support to the hypothesis (1), that it is specif-
ically processing exceptions that creates difﬁculties for autistic subjects.18 DA
and AC showed the pattern familiar from normals, suggesting that this type
of closed–world reasoning, where exceptions do not ﬁgure, presents no atypi-
cal difﬁculties. The behavior in MP and MT conditions (especially the former),
where implicit exceptions need to be acknowledged to achieve suppression, was
different from normals, showing much less suppression. Moreover, the tutorial
dialogues show that nonsuppression in MPadd and MTadd is caused by a total
disregard of the additional premise, even though these same subjects had no
trouble incorporating the alternative premise in ACalt and DAalt. We have seen
in chapter 7 that nonsuppression may be due as well to a form of nonmonotonic
reasoning: introducing, for example, “the library is closed” as a presupposi-
tion. The dialogues with the autistic subjects do not show this pattern; here
nonsuppression is due to rigid rule following, and the experimenter’s attempts
15. The full results are as follows – MP: p = .031; MT: p = .011; AC: p = .040; DA: p = .059. (Strictly
speaking, of course, the result for DA only approaches signiﬁcance.) The fact that there are more “maybes”
in all four conditions suggests that the increased frequency is not related to the logical properties of these
argument patterns.
16. MP: p = .156; MT: p = .091; AC: p = .078.
17. In this experiment also reaction times were measured. One interesting ﬁnding is that in both groups
the ‘fallacial’ responses of the type AC and DA were given signiﬁcantly faster than the answers dictated
by the classical logic. Perhaps there is a relation here with the straightforward neural implementability of
closed–world reasoning discussed in chapter 8.
18. The behavioral task whose outcome is given in table 9.1 is actually a prelude to an ERP experiment
involving the suppression task. Very roughly speaking, the prediction is that upon presentation of the addi-
tional premise in MPadd, controls show the characteristic ‘surprise response’ called the N400 (see Kutas and
Hillyard [166] for deﬁnition and discussion), whereas this response will be much less in evidence in autistic
subjects.
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Table 9.1 Results on suppression task in autists (n=28) and matched controls (n=28)
argument a-yes a-no a-maybe c-yes c-no c-maybe
MP 89.0 0.0 10.4 96.1 2.5 1.4
MPadd 71.0 1.1 28.9 51.1 0.7 48.2
MPalt 92.9 0.4 6.7 97.5 0.7 1.8
MT 1.4 79.6 19.0 2.5 92.8 4.7
MTadd 0.7 62.1 37.2 0.7 45.0 54.3
MTalt 0.4 90.3 9.3 1.1 95.0 3.9
AC 45.0 1.1 53.9 67.1 2.1 30.8
ACadd 28.1 1.1 70.9 35.7 0.0 64.3
ACalt 12.2 2.2 85.6 9.6 0.0 90.4
DA 1.1 48.0 50.9 0.4 69.1 30.5
DAadd 2.9 28.9 68.2 2.5 33.6 63.9
DAalt 3.2 15.7 81.1 1.1 10.4 88.5
to induce some ﬂexibility were to no avail. 19
9.8 Dialogue Data
We now present some conversations with subjects from the experiment con-
ducted by Smid [250] while they were engaged in the suppression task. The
subjects were presented with either two or three premises, and were asked
whether another sentence was true, false, or undecided. We then proceeded
to ask them for a justiﬁcation of their answer.
The ﬁrst example gives something of the ﬂavor of the dialogues. We see
subject A engaged in MT with three premises, having refused to endorse MT in
the two-premise case. The excerpt is interesting because the subject explicitly
engages with the possibility of exceptions.
If Marian has an essay to write she will study late in the library.
(*) If the library stays open then Marian will study late in the library.
Marian will not study late in the library.
Does Marian have an essay?
A: It says here that if she has an essay, she studies late in the library.. . . But she doesn’t
study late in the library . . . which suggests that she doesn’t have an essay . . . But it could be
that she has to leave early, or that something else came up . . . if you only look at the given
data, she will not write an essay . . . but when you realise that something unexpected has
come up, then it is very well possible that she does have to write an essay . . . [our italics]
[250,p. 88ff]
19. For an analogous use of the logical framework to predict discourse processing style in children with
ADHD , see [267].
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The sentence beginning “But it could be that ... ” suggests considerations
of possible exceptions; the italicized phrase looks like closed–world reasoning
applied to these exceptions. The interesting point is that the information in (*)
is nowhere integrated; the step library-closed → ab is not made.
9.8.1 Excerpts from Dialogues: MP
We recall the argument:
If Marian has an essay to write she will study late in the library.
(*) If the library stays open then Marian will study late in the library.
Marian has an essay to write.
Does Marian study late in the library?
Here is subject C, ﬁrst engaged in the two-premise case, i.e., without (*):
C: But that’s what it says!
E: What?
C: If she has an essay then she studies.
E: So your answer is “yes”?
C: Yes.
The same subject engaged in the three-premise argument:
C. Yes, she studies late in the library.
E. Eh, why?
C. Because she has to write an essay.
Clearly the possible exception highlighted by the second conditional is not in-
tegrated; the emphasis shows that the ﬁrst conditional completely overrides the
second.
9.8.2 Excerpts from Dialogues: MT
In this case the argument pattern is
If Marian has an essay to write she will study late in the library.
(*) If the library stays open then Marian will study late in the library.
Marian will not study late in the library.
Does Marian have an essay?
Here is again subject C:
C. No, she has . . . oh no, wait a minute . . . this is a bit strange isn’t it?
E. Why?
C. Well, it says here: if she has to write an essay . . . And I’m asked whether she has to
write an essay?
E. Mmm.
C. I don’t think so.
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This is probably evidence of the general difﬁculty of MT, but note that the
second conditional does not enter into the deliberations. In the dialogue, E then
prompts C to look at second conditional, but this has no effect: C sticks to his
choice.
Here is a good example of the way in which a subject (in this case B) can be
impervious to the suggestions of the experimenter. The dialogue refers to the
argument with three premises; we give a rather long abstract to show the ﬂavor
of the conversations.
B: No. Because if she had to make an essay, she would study in the library.
E: Hmm.
B: And she doesn’t do this, so she doesn’t have an essay.
E: Yes.
B: And this means . . . [inaudible]
E: [laughs] But suppose she has an essay, but the library is closed?
B: Ah, that’s also possible.
E: Well, I’m only asking.
B: Well, according to these two sentences that’s not possible, I think.
E: How do you mean?
B: Ehm, yes she just studies late in the library if she has an essay.
E: Hmm.
B: And it does not say “if it’s open, or closed . . . ”
E: OK.
B: So according to these sentences, I know it sounds weird, but . . . .
E: Yes, I . . .
B: I know it sounds rather autistic what I’m saying now [laughs].
E: [laughs]
B: Eh yes.
E: So it is like you said? Or perhaps that she . . .
B: Yes, perhaps the library closes earlier?
E: You may say what you want! You don’t have to try to think of what should be the
correct answer!
B: OK, no, then I’ll stick to my ﬁrst answer.
E: OK, yes.
B: [laughs] I know it’s not like this, but [laughs].
E: Well, that’s not clear. It’s possible to say different things about reasoning here, and
what you say is certainly not incorrect.
In the above we have seen examples of how our autistic subjects refuse to inte-
grate the information about exceptions provided by (*). The next extracts show
that this need not be because they are incapable of integrating a second condi-
tional premise, or of applying closed–world reasoning. We here consider the
“fallacies” DA and AC, which can be valid if seen as a consequence of closed–
world reasoning, and which can be suppressed by supplying a suitable second
conditional premise, e.g., (†) below.
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9.8.3 Excerpts from Dialogues: AC
The argument is
If Marian has an essay to write she will study late in the library.
(†) If Marian has an exam, she will study late in the library.
Marian studies late in the library.
Does Marian have an essay?
Here is subject C, in the two-premise argument without (†).
C: Yes.
E: Why?
C: It says in the ﬁrst sentence “if she has an essay then she does that [study late etc.]”
. . . But Marian is just a name, it might as well be Fred.
Now consider the three-premise case.
C: Mmm. Again “if,” isn’t it?
E: Yes.
C: If Marian has an essay, she studies late in the library. . .
E: Yes.
C: If Marian has an exam, she studies late in the library . . .
E: Hmm.
C: Marian studies late in the library. Does Marian have an essay?
E: Hmm.
C: No.
E: Hmm.
C: It does not say she has to make an essay.
E: Hmm. But she studies late in the library, can you conclude from this that she has to
make an essay?
C: No you can’t, because she could also have an exam.
We see in this example that C correctly judges the import of (†): after having
applied closed–world reasoning to the two-premise case, he notices that it is
powerless in this case.
9.9 A Similar Task with very Different Outcomes
After having explained the importance of defeasible reasoning for the study of
autism, Russell was forced to add a caveat. The box task is superﬁcially similar
to another task devised by Russell, the tubes task (depicted in ﬁgure 9.4), but
performance on the latter task is very different from that on the former.
What one sees in the schematic drawing in ﬁgure 9.4 is a series of six holes
into which a ball can be dropped, to land in a small container below. A ball
dropped through the leftmost opening will end up in the catch tray directly
underneath, but a ball dropped through the opening which is second from left
travels through an opaque tube to end up in the catch tray which is third from
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Figure 9.4 Schematic drawing of the tubes task.
left. The child sees the ball being dropped through an opening, and has to
retrieve it from one of the catch trays below. When the ball is dropped in the
second from left opening, children of age 3 or younger tend to look in the
catch tray directly underneath the opening, probably applying the (defeasible)
rule that things fall vertically. Older children, including also autistic children,
manage to inhibit the “prepotent” response and search in the correct catch tray,
adequately representing the trajectory of the ball as guided by the tube.
The apparent puzzle posed by performance on this task is that in this case
also autistic children older than 3 are able to switch rules effortlessly. Rus-
sell originally explained this by a distinction between “arbitrary” rules imposed
by the experimenter (as in the box task), and rules based on fairly transparent
physical principles (as in the tubes task). Autistic children would be impaired
on the former but not the latter, incidentally showing that autism, viewed as
executive dysfunction, must be a rather speciﬁc executive deﬁcit. If both kinds
of defeasible rules require the same kind of closed–world reasoning about ab-
normalities, the hypothesis that it is this form of reasoning that is difﬁcult for
autistic subjects is defeated.
The ﬁrst thing to observe here is that the rules involved in the two tasks have
different logical forms, and so require different reasoning. In the box task,
correct performance hinges on the ability to amend the antecedent of the rule,
whereas in the case of the tubes task it is the consequent (i.e., the catch tray)
that has to be changed. In the box task, the original plan has to be changed by
incorporating another action, whereas in the case of the tubes task one action
has to be replaced by another. This suggests that what happens in the tubes task
need not be viewed as rule switching, but can also been seen as the application
of a single IF-THEN-ELSE rule, where the action to be taken depends on the
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satisfaction or not of an explicit precondition: unimpeded fall of the ball. On
this analysis, the difference between box and tubes task would be that the for-
mer forces synthesizing a new rule on the spot by exception handling, whereas
in the latter case the switch is between components of a single rule.
The experimental literature shows that autistic subjects have less difﬁculty
with synthesizing an IF-THEN-ELSE rule from instructions shown to them,
than with rule construction by exception handling. Indeed, a standard Go/No
Go task is of the IF-THEN-ELSE form. For instance, in one such task, subjects
were shown different letters of the alphabet that ﬂashed one at a time on a com-
puter screen. They were asked to respond by pressing a key in every case except
when they saw the letter X. The ﬁrst task was a Go task, in which the letter X
never appeared and in this way subjects were allowed to build up a tendency to
respond. Immediately afterward, subjects performed a Go/No Go task in which
the letter X did appear in the lineup, at which point the subject had to control
the previously built-up response tendency. Autistic subjects are not particularly
impaired at such a task,20 although they do become confused when they have to
shift rapidly between one target stimulus and another (Ozonoff et al. [208]). At
a more abstract level, what the analysis of the empirical difference between the
box and tubes tasks just given highlights is that, before one can discuss whether
autistic subjects have difﬁculties with rule switching, the proper deﬁnition of
“rule” in this context has to be clariﬁed. If the preceding considerations are
correct, then autistic subjects can be successful with rules more general than
the “condition–action” format.
9.9.1 The ‘A not B’ Task
The above method of analysis is actually a general scheme for the analysis of
executive tasks,21 as we will illustrate here using Piaget’s famous ‘A not B’
task, for which see Baillargeon [10] and the references given therein. Suppose
one shows a child between ages 1 and 2 two opaque screens, A and B, and
suppose furthermore one hides a toy behind A. The child is asked to retrieve
the toy. Once she successfully and repeatedly retrieves the toy behind A, the
experimenter switches sides, hiding it behind screen B. Surprisingly, the child
searches behind A, not behind B, and keeps doing so over many trials. This
looks like the building up of a prepotent response, but as Hauser [120] observes,
it is a response tendency built up by the actual reaching, not by the bare fact that
the toy was observed to go behind A.
If an experimenter repeatedly hides and then reveals the object behind A, but doesn’t
allow the child to search until the switch trial to B, the child shows no deﬁcit, searching
20. In contrast, for example, to ADHD kids.
21. See [267] for an elaboration of this point.
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right away at B. This shows that actively searching is crucial; simply observing passively,
is not.[120,p. 4]
In a further twist reminiscent of Clements and Perner’s observation of the dis-
sociation between verbal and nonverbal responses in the false–belief task (see
section 9.4.5), it was observed that sometimes a child will look at the B screen
even when reaching for the A screen. However, in this case there is clearly a
dissociation within the nonverbal domain, one between looking and reaching.
We will now formalise this task, again using exception-tolerant rules allowing
inhibition, as we did above.
We refer to the screens as s1 and s2, and useB for “belief.” As in the Smarties
task, a single B will stand for implicit knowledge, whereas the iterated BB
represents explicit knowledge. We assume the child knows implicitly that the
toy is either behind s1 or behind s2: B(toy-at(s1) ∨ toy-at(s2)), and that she
either (implicitly) knows that the toy is behind si or (implicitly) knows that it
isn’t: B(toy-at(si))∨¬B(toy-at(si)). From these assumptions it follows that
¬B(toy-at(si)) → B(toy-at(sj)) for i = j. The following rules then describe
the task, incorporating the distinction between looking (9.38,9.39) and reaching
(9.40,9.42). We use intention(toy) to express that the child has the intention
to get the toy.
The ﬁrst set describes the looking response, in which the child looks at the
correct screen even when reaching for the wrong screen; this response is sup-
posed to be driven by implicit knowledge.
intention(toy) ∧ ¬abi → look(si) (9.38)
¬B(toy-at(si)) → abi (9.39)
If the child has implicit knowledge that the toy is at s2, i.e., B(toy-at(s2)),
it follows that ¬B(toy-at(s1)), whence ab1, so that closed–world reasoning
shows she does not look at s1. That she must look at s2 follows because
B(toy-at(s2)) implies ¬ab2, whence look(s2).
The second set describes the grasp response, where the difference with the
previous set is that now explicit knowledge, i.e., iteration of the belief operator,
is needed to generate the correct response. The observation that it is the reach-
ing system that builds up the prepotent response is reﬂected in the abnormality
conditions, which are asymmetric, in contrast to the previous case.
intention(toy) ∧ ¬ab ′i → reach(si) (9.40)
reach(s2) → ab ′1 (9.41)
¬BB(toy-at(s2)) → ab ′2 (9.42)
In this case, if positive introspection fails, it may happen thatB(toy-at(s2)) but
not BB(toy-at(s2)). It follows that ab
′
2, whence ¬reach(s2) and by closed–
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world reasoning ¬ab ′1, so that we must have reach(s1). If the child has posi-
tive introspection, B(toy-at(s2)) implies BB(toy-at(s2)), whence by closed–
world reasoning ¬ab ′2 and reach(s2).
The analyses just given hinge on the difference between implicit and explicit
knowledge, i.e., between B(toy-at(s2)) and BB(toy-at(s2)). A neural inter-
pretation of this difference was given in footnote 11 (this chapter). Applied
to this case, that interpretation implies that the signals governing the looking
response can be of weaker strength than that governing the reaching response.
Indeed, the A not B task shows differentiation of an attentional system (look-
ing) from an action system (pointing). There is evidence of a different time
scale for registration of learning episodes in the two systems – the pointing sys-
tem lagging behind the looking system at least in this context. The degree of
organization required for information to control the attentional system is clearly
less than for the action system. To put this in slightly different terms, the young
child “knows” it can get things done by acting, not just by looking, and there-
fore the responses built up by the reaching system are at ﬁrst stronger than that
built up by the attentional system. An equilibrium between the two systems is
reached only later.
9.10 Summing up the Cognitive Analyses
We can now brieﬂy discuss what can be said about the various explanations for
autism, based on experimental data and logical analysis.
At ﬁrst sight, the analyses presented here appear to have little relevance for
the assessment of Hobson’s “affective foundation” theory, although they do
raise important general questions about the relation between cognition and af-
fect, which are relevant to assessing the relation between Hobson’s theories and
cognitive accounts. Most speciﬁcally, planning logics incorporate reasoning
goals within their accounts of reasoning in a way which classical logic does
not. Goals are part of motivation, and motivation is intimately related to af-
fect.22 There has, for example, been much discussion recently of defects of
reasoning which can be understood as abnormalities of motivation (see, for ex-
ample, Damasio [55]). Inasmuch as reasoning and motivation for reasoning
can be separated, these patients (also with frontal lobe damage and executive
function deﬁcits) have intact reasoning but defective motivation for reasoning.
They seem to “discount the future” in assessing the relevance of lines of rea-
soning. Damasio cites a patient who is trying to decide whether or not to enter
into a business relationship with the arch enemy of his best friend. The patient
22. Less speciﬁcally, there are issues about how we are to conceptualise the implementations of logical sys-
tems in the mind. Stenning [258,p. 266ff.] has argued that affective reactions are as much implementations
of aspects of logical reasoning systems as is cold calculative machinery. The particular case of the affective
element of “cheating detection” is taken as an example.
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enters into an elaborate calculation of costs and beneﬁts which would normally
be pruned from the reasoning space by emotional rejection. This sounds not a
million miles from some aspects of autistic people’s failure to empathise.
There are somewhat more speciﬁc things to say about Frith and Happe´’s weak
central coherence theory. The computations involved in the false–belief task
seem to call for some kind of central processor, because they combine ingre-
dients from different “domains,” in particular reasoning about information and
mental states, and reasoning about inertial properties of the world.23 We have
seen that decoupling these domains, for whatever reason, leads to anomalous
behavior on the false–belief task. Perhaps, then, weak central coherence fosters
this decoupling. The weak central coherence theory is all about attention and its
distribution. Attention is controlled by motivation even if attention may be in-
terrupted bottom–up by environmental events whose motivational signiﬁcance
then has to be assessed. Autistic motivation and attention appear to be gripped
by detail, and difﬁcult to shift.
One of the contributions of affect to cognition is its capacity for abstraction
(Stenning [258,p. 217ff.]). Although we often think of emotion as being a con-
crete reaction (for example, experienced in the gut), affect is peculiarly abstract
in that the same affective state can be a response to almost any object, state, or
event, given the right circumstances. Stenning [258,p. 203ff.] argues that affec-
tive mappings are the wellspring of our earliest analogical recognition. Perhaps
the decoupling highlighted by weak central coherence theory is related to the
affective abnormalities which are the basis of Hobson’s theory.
The most speciﬁc comparisons are between the theories which propose theory–
of–mind failure and executive dysfunction. In making this comparison, we
draw on a survey paper by Perner and Lang [211], who suggest ﬁve possible
relationships between these theories:
1. Executive control depends upon theory of mind.
2. Theory–of–mind development depends upon executive control.
3. The relevant theory of mind tasks require executive control.
4. Both kinds of tasks require the same kind of conditional reasoning.
5. Theory of mind and executive control involve the same brain region.
We discuss each of these except the last (since so little is known), and evaluate
them in the light of the foregoing considerations.
23. One should not take “central processor” too literally. The importance of the neural implementation of
default reasoning is precisely that it shows how reasoning can be “distributed” across a network, though the
network itself may be operating as a central processor relative to some peripheral systems.
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Executive Control Derives from Theory of Mind
Perner and Lang suggested that both theory–of–mind and executive inhibition
tasks require the child to appreciate the causal power of mental states to initiate
action. This is clear in the false–belief task. In the case of executive inhibition,
such as found in the box task, the child would need to see that the mental picture
of the apparently fully accessible marble causes her to make the unsuccessful
reaching movement. Thus there would be a common mental factor underlying
both types of tasks.
This conceptualization suffers from an unduly narrow view of executive con-
trol as concerned only with inhibition. Even if Perner and Lang’s invocation of
mental causation would apply to inhibition, it is not clear at all how it could ex-
plain the closed–world reasoning, in other words the planning, that takes place
during the computations.
Theory of Mind Essentially Requires Executive Control
Under this heading we will discuss both 2 and 3 from our list above. Russell
suggested that self monitoring (as part of executive control) is a prerequisite of
self awareness, which is in turn necessary for the development of ToM. Less
strongly, false belief tasks would all involve an executive component in that a
prepotent response has to be inhibited. Perner and Lang claim that there are
versions of the false–belief task which do not involve inhibiting a prepotent
response. One example is the “explanation task,” which (translated to the lan-
guage of our running example) runs like this: when Maxi returns to the room,
he looks for his chocolate in the (empty) box. The child is then asked why he is
doing this. Children above the cutoff age give the correct explanation, whereas
younger children appear to guess. The authors claim that this is in marked
contrast to the standard task, where these children consistently answer “in the
drawer,” thus showing that no (failed inhibition of the) prepotent response is
operative in the explanation task.
Here one may well wonder what the younger children can do except guessing,
given that Maxi is looking in what is (according to the child) evidently the
wrong place. It is precisely because the prepotent response is not inhibited that
the child must guess.
Defective Conditional Reasoning as a Root Failure in Autism
In their survey, Perner and Lang here refer to work by Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai
[89], who claim that all the relevant tasks can be formalized as reasoning with
embedded conditionals of the form
if p then (if q then r else r′) else . . .
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The difﬁculty with embedded conditionals is then presumably that they put
heavy computational demands on working memory.
Unfortunately there are two serious problems with the proposed explanation.
The ﬁrst is that conditionals such as the above do not involve embedding essen-
tially, since they can be rephrased as
(if p and q then r) and (if p and not-q then r′) and (if
not-p. . . )
Thus the embedded conditionals can be replaced by a conjunction of noniter-
ated conditionals, where the antecedents enumerate the various possibilities:
p∧ q, p∧¬q, ¬p∧ q, . . . Indeed, avoidance of iterated conditionals that cannot
be eliminated by such conjunctive paraphrase seems to be a general tendency
in natural languages. The description in terms of a conjunction of conditionals
is more systematic and probably quite easy to code into working memory; al-
though perhaps some people never re-represent the embedded conditional into
this simpler form.
Furthermore, while it is readily apparent that the logical form of card–sorting
tasks can be given in this way, the application to false–belief tasks, via rules
such as
if the question is from Maxi’s perspective then (if he is looking for his
chocolate then predict that he goes to the cupboard) . . .
is much more dubious. In the case of a card–sorting task, or a Go/No Go task,
the embedded conditional is provided by the experimenter, and autistic subjects
have no difﬁculty with this as long as the nesting (i.e., the number of different
antecedents) is not too deep. But the whole problem with the other tasks is that
the subject has to synthesise the relevant rules herself, for instance by means of
the closed–world reasoning illustrated here.
It will be clear, however, from the analyses presented in this chapter that
we fully endorse the view that all these tasks are ultimately about conditional
reasoning, once a more reasonable concept of conditional is adopted. Thus, our
considered view of the relation between theory of mind and executive function
is a combination of (3) and (4): theory of mind is built on top of executive
function, and all tasks ultimately reduce to applying closed–world reasoning to
suitable sets of conditionals.
9.11 The Biological Setting of Autism
We will end this chapter with some biological background to autism and with a
discussion of its possible signiﬁcance in evolutionary analyses. We do this for
two reasons. First, in discussing logical accounts of reasoning tasks which di-
agnose autism, it would be easy to leave the reader with the picture that autism
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is the result of a few implementations of logical rules going awry – that is cer-
tainly not our position. We present this biological background to give some
idea of what may be involved in understanding the relation between our “neu-
ral” model and its brain implementation. Second, autism offers an opportunity
to elaborate our conjectural account of the part played by altriciality in cog-
nitive evolution given in chapter 6, section 6.5. Remember, the main purpose
of that conjecture was to offer an alternative way of thinking about cognitive
evolution from the approaches which dominate evolutionary psychology. We
emphasized the importance of changes in timing of developmental processes.
Whether our conjectures about autism turn out to be true or wild, they can serve
to illustrate what we claim is a more reasonable general biological approach.
In chapter 6, we introduced altriciality as an important example of a biolog-
ical innovation, which is a good candidate for playing an organizing role in
many of the changes responsible for the emergence of humans and their minds.
Homo sapiens is an altricial species – it is born at an immature stage with re-
gard to a whole host of features. The changed pattern of timing of maturation
persists long after birth. Biological adolescence as a delay of sexual maturity
is a related human innovation. The growth of neural tissue in the frontal cortex
is now understood to continue until about the age of 20. These are uncontested
biological innovations of humans relative to their immediate ancestors.
We believe that autism can insightfully be considered as a disturbance of the
timings of developmental processes. Autism is therefore particularly relevant
to our more general effort to interpret human cognitive evolution in the light
of changes in the temporal patterning of development. To take one example,
it has often been reported that autistic children have rather large heads, typi-
cally about 15% to 40% having macrocephaly, deﬁned as a head circumference
greater than two standard deviations above the mean [193]. Although many
conﬂicting reports of data have appeared, macrocephaly is one of the most of-
ten reported gross correlates of autism spectrum disorders. Even more interest-
ing for our concerns with changes in timing is that the conﬂicts appear to arise
because autistic children have a changed temporal proﬁle of head growth (see
ﬁgure 9.5).
The difﬁculty of getting data on early head circumference growth is that
autistic children are often not diagnosed until about the age of 2 years. But
retrospective studies indicate that the head growth proﬁle of those subsequently
diagnosed as autistic is even more surprising [225]. As can be seen in the ﬁg-
ure, at birth they have smaller heads than average, but by 1 year their heads are
substantially larger than average, and by 2 years this growth spurt is leveling
off. By adulthood, the normal population has caught up (not shown). Several
studies [62, 271] have reported that it is particularly accelerated brain growth
rather than absolute size that correlates with autistic symptoms. However, their
results show better cognitive function (relative to autistic peers) with growth
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Figure 9.5 Head circumference (HC) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) percent differ-
ence (%Diff) by age. %Diff values from all HC and MRI studies are plotted by the mean age
of the study. The best ﬁtted curve shows the most rapid rates of increased deviation from nor-
mal brain size in autism within ﬁrst year of life and the greatest rates of decrease in deviation
from normal during middle and late childhood. Study number is given next to each percent dif-
ference value. HC, head circumference; MRI, magnetic resonance imaging. (Reprinted from
[225,Figure 1, p. 5] by permission of the Society of Biological Psychiatry.)
spurts, whereas the analysis of Courchesne et al. indicates worse behavioral
deﬁcits. It is as well to note that macrocephaly is common in other related psy-
chiatric categories such as ADHD [97, 94]. Since macrocephaly is normally
given an extreme deﬁnition, and since temporal proﬁle data from longitudinal
studies are not available, it is hard to say how many autistic spectrum children
exhibit brain growth spurts, but from the ﬁgures available it could be a very
considerable proportion.
Some possible genetic determinants or concommitants of this pattern of head
growth are surfacing. [197] following up work by [45] and [138] have shown
that the gene HOXA1 appears to be both related to autism, and a controller for
head growth rates in some normal populations as well as autistic ones. Chil-
dren with at least one g allele of this gene show more rapid head growth than
those without, whereas the a allele is associated with an increased suceptibility
to autism. The head growth rate is not associated with larger heads in adults—
it is a growth rate difference. HOXA1 is a member of the homeobox family
of highly conserved genes responsible for laying down the ‘body plan’ of or-
ganisms. Its particular inﬂuence is on the differentiation of head from body,
and its main known effects are seen in innervation of posterior portions of the
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head. It is therefore related to another well-known homeobox gene, FOXP2.
which was identiﬁed through the disruption of articulation in a family with a
mutated form [181]. These are genes close to the foundations of the modern
“evo devo” understanding of relations between development and evolution (see
section 6.2.4).
This disturbed pattern of the phasing of head growth prompts the possibly
wild speculation that it might be an adaptation to the problems of human birth
as discussed in chapter 6, and argued there to be the focus of major evolutionary
changes in the period of emergence of modern human cognition. Perhaps hav-
ing a slightly smaller head at birth and compensatnig with accelerated gowth
thereafter is one contribution to safer birth. Perhaps some autistic children have
overdone such an adaptation. Regardless of how this speculation fares, here
is clear evidence of changed temporal patterning of a developmental process
with pervasive effects on brain development and consequent behavior [123]. At
the very least we can organise our enquiries into the autistic brain around the
question of how this grossly changed pattern of head growth relates to neural
developmental processes.
We will now explore two avenues that lead from viewing autism as a change
in the temporal pattern of development. First we seek to link these observations
of the timing of brain development, through executive function interpretations
of autism, to our neural implementations of closed–world reasoning in chapter
8. Second, we will review some of what is known about the genetics of autism,
which will serve to further link autism, through the phenomenon of genetic
imprinting, to our organizing theme of altriciality in human evolution. What
follows is rather dense neuroscience and we do not claim more than amateur
status here. Nor could we reasonably expect readers to be or become experts.
Until rather recently we too were skeptical ourselves whether neuroscience or
genetics was sufﬁciently developed to bring to bear on computation models of
functional characterizations of reasoning. However, things are moving fast, and
our purpose here is to ﬁnd some areas where the gap may be closing.
9.11.1 Brain Development and Implementations of Closed–World
Reasoning
Understanding autistic brain function as it implements autistic cognition re-
quires a demanding integration of data from different time scales: develop-
mental, learning, and online computation. This is true of many developmental
disorders, to say nothing of “neurotypical” cognition, as is eloquently argued
by Scerif and Karmiloff-Smith [241]. What is so intriguing coming from a
perspective dominated by the shortest of these time scales (in discourse pro-
cessing) is both that the developmental processes which construct the brain are
themselves computational processes not unrelated to those of learning and rea-
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soning, and conversely, that with what we already know about the brain, online
adult discourse interpretation and reasoning processes could plausibly involve
construction of bits of brain. As an example of brain development as computa-
tion, neurons migrate from one place to another, and their axons and dendrites
grow to make their connections by following chemical gradients – a kind of
hill climbing. Neurons and synapses survive or are pruned according to their
activity levels as deﬁned by algorithms closely related to Hebb’s law. Examples
of on-line brain construction are recent demonstrations that adult neurogenesis
plays a functional role in some kinds of learning, as described above (p. 151).
Our own models of neural implementation of discourse understanding require
some combination of construction and activation of new networks on the time
course of online discourse comprehension. Large parts of our working memory
networks may be the reactivated parts of long–term memory, but to the extent
that they have to incorporate modiﬁcations based on episodic information, and
this information subsequently gets consolidated and can be reactivated, there is
network construction going on at this time scale too. There is a ﬁne line between
the adjustment of synaptic weights to extremes, and the making or severing of
connections, but as we shall see, the evidence grows that “weight-adjustment”
and “activation level” are not the only structural changes wrought on the brain
by experience. Modelers need to think more broadly.
Needless to say, these considerations make any idea that “the DNA deter-
mines brain structure” thoroughly obsolete, just as obsolete as the idea that
“learning registers experience on a tabula rasa.” We begin with attempts to pro-
vide higher functional level models of autistic “neural computation,” proceed
through what is known about autistic brain development, and ﬁnally discuss the
genetics of the condition.
Functional Level Considerations
Levy [174] reviews functional properties of autistic neural computation through
several neural network models of aspects of autistic cognition. Cohen [43]
uses over- and underprovision of hidden units in multilayer networks to explain
“overﬁtting” and failure to generalize respectively. These hidden-unit layers of
cells would presumably be interneurons, which might be of some signiﬁcance
when we come presently to discuss neurogenesis. Gustafsson [111] sees abnor-
malities of self-organizing map networks explaining autistic perceptual func-
tioning. Maps that are smaller than normal lead to perceptual discrimination
that is greater than normal, but also to problems with abstraction. Interestingly,
narrow selectivity is claimed to be due to “excessive lateral feedback inhibitory
synaptic strengths.” McClelland [187] emphasizes the tension between general-
ization and interference in the storage of memories, with reference to his work
on memory and the interaction between cortex and hippocampus. McClelland’s
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suggestion is that the parts of autistic brains devoted to semantics and concep-
tual representations rely on conjunctive encoding too much and are thus unable
to take advantage of generalizations but are good at learning speciﬁc associ-
ations. The idea is related to weak central coherence and might be the con-
sequence of mechanisms such as those suggested by Cohen and Gustafsson.
Levy’s review [174] points to the importance of numbers of units and the
balance of excitation/inhibition as modeling factors in understanding autism.
It turns out that these two factors are intimately related in brain development.
Our earlier discussion of neurogenesis in chapter 5 reviewed the phases of brain
neuron generation and their mapping onto the phases of brain growth. We al-
luded to the process of overproduction of neurons and synaptic connections,
followed by a combination of pruning of connections and cell death. Pruning
differentially affects excitatory and inhibitory synapses, reducing the number
of the former far more than of the latter (see Luciana [176,p. 161]). Chris Frith
[87] has proposed that some aspects of autistic functioning may be explicable
in terms of abnormalities in pruning – underpruning leading to their overspe-
ciﬁc, bottom-up style of cognition. If pruning is mainly of excitatory synapses
and less pruning goes on in autistic people’s brains, then the result will be more
excitatory synapses relative to inhibitory ones.24
It is a fascinating question how to map microscopic brain development pro-
cesses onto macroscopic models of brain growth, as [292] shown in ﬁgure 6.4
in chapter 9, both in normal and abnormal development. On Frith’s account,
underpruning might well be a direct explanation of the course of autistic head
growth. It is interesting that Vrba labels the phase of her model corresponding
to this period as the “cerebellar period” and the cerebellum is one brain area
which develops abnormally in autism, but the cerebellum is relatively small
(compared, say, to the frontal lobes) and unlikely to account for gross head-size
differences. Then there is the further difﬁculty in thinking about the timing
of these developmental processes, since there may be delayed effects. Just as
a hypothetical example, although the number of a class of cells may be de-
termined early, perhaps in utero, it is possible that the resulting contribution
to brain volume might only show up later due to maturational effects such as
myelination. Finally, before we leave the issue of mapping Vrba’s model to the
detailed subprocesses of development, we have to ask how does human brain
24. Frith relies on Huttenlocher [137] for his data: “In visual cortex, the total number of synapses at birth
is less than 10% of the maximum. It reaches a maximum number at about age 6 months, and decreases to
about half the maximum between ages 1 and 5 years. Synapse number remains stable after age 5. In medial
frontal gyrus, synaptic density reaches a maximum between ages 24 and 36 months, synaptic density begins
to decrease at about age 7 years, and adult synaptic density, about 60% of the maximum, is reached by early
adolescence. Preliminary data from left angular gyrus and left Broca’s speech area show curves that fall
between those for visual cortex and medial frontal gyrus [137,p. 348].” If these data are correct, pruning also
differentially affects different areas of the brain.
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development change the timings of subprocesses relative to our primate ances-
tors. Is everything merely slowed down? Or is there shear between processes?
If conditions such as autism can be interpreted as distortions of timing, then
they may provide valuable evidence about normal development and evolution.
Despite the gross differences in head size growth patterns, at a structural
level autistic brains were, until relatively recently, chieﬂy characterized by their
structural similarity to normal brains. Postmortem examination, and imaging
with increasingly sophisticated technology, revealed only small differences, of-
ten inconsistent from study to study. Certainly the frontal lobes and the cere-
bellum were often mentioned in dispatches, but sometimes as too large, some-
times as too small, sometimes as more and sometimes as less interconnected.
It is only in the last few years that that more stable characterizations of these
differences, so hard to detect at a gross level, have begun to emerge.
For example, Courchesne and Pierce [51] review what is known about frontal
lobe abnormalities in autism. Despite the multiply conﬂicting data about gross
structural abnormalities there is a growing body of evidence for microscopic
maldevelopment. Minicolumns, a basic unit of neocortical organization, are
narrower and more numerous in autistic brains, and there are differences in
gray/white matter balance. These authors particularly stress recent evidence
from [285] that autistic children suffer from an immunological inﬂammatory
response in their temporal lobes and cerebella. The response is primarily by
the glia and astrocytes rather than neurons themselves. Inﬂammation might ac-
count for some of the head size observations. One might be tempted to dismiss
the behavioral signiﬁcance of inﬂamed astrocytes and glia as these are not neu-
rons. But it turns out that whereas astrocytes and glia have long been thought
of as passive maintenance agents supporting neurons, it now seems that they
play critical roles in controlling the architecture of the developing brain [198].
These immune responses are not reactions to infectious agents but are “innate
immune reactions.” They may be related to the differences in cell death pat-
terns discussed presently under “pruning.” They are interpreted as persistence
of a “pre-natal” state or process – all the more surprising since they showed up
postmortem in a sample of ﬁfteen autistic people ranging from 5 to 40 years
old – and adding further encouragement that autism may be understood as a
disturbance of the timing of developmental processes. The upshot of Courch-
esne and Pierce’s discussion [51] is that autist people show overdevelopment
of local, and underdevelopment of longrange, connections, together with some
abnormalities of inhibitory processes (Rubinstein and Merzenich [235]). The
authors encapsulate their conclusions in the memorable claim that the autistic
temporal lobe is cut off from the rest of the brain, “talking to itself”.
Three further aspects of autistic brain development deserve brief mention as
possibly relevant to our earlier modeling proposals. One is differences in the
timing of development of feedforward and feedback connections in the neocor-
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tex. The second is the phenomenon of adult neurogenesis mentioned earlier in
connection with brain growth. The third is the balance between excitation and
inhibition.
Feedforward and Feedback Connections The phasing of the development of
feedback and feedforward connections may be functionally relevant because
of the earlier mentioned differences in ease of reasoning forward and back-
ward. It is a very striking feature of adult neocortical microstructure that nearly
as many projections go in the direction from brain to retina as from retina to
brain, reﬂecting the role of expectation in perception, at a functional level. Most
of what is known about the development of feedforward and feedback projec-
tions comes from study of the topographically mapped visual system in which
the two are easier to distinguish, though it is assumed that the observations
may be more generally applicable in areas of less convenient microanatomy.
These studies show that feedforward connections develop earlier than feedback
connections (Burkhalter [27]). Friston [86] proposes a mapping from brain to
computational models which places the issue of directionality and the role of
forward models of expectations at centerstage. These forward models are con-
tinuous control theory models, but they are functionally closely related to our
logical models for closed–world reasoning.
Neurogenesis and Brain Growth With respect to adult neurogenesis, we de-
scribed in chapter 6 how it is now known that neurons continue to be added to
various areas of the mammalian brain throughout adult life, and these neurons
can be shown to function in certain kinds of learning and memory tasks, espe-
cially in the hippocampus, an area known to be involved in working memory
tasks. This fact is especially relevant to our neural models of default discourse
interpretation. A central proposal of these models is that networks are actu-
ally constructed in working memory on the time course of discourse process-
ing. This is functionally necessary since it is implausible that preexisting net-
works can provide the range of structures which are required. The anatomical
and functional relation between working and long–term memory is contentious.
The activated portion of existing default rules in long–term memory plays some
role in constituting these networks, yet the networks must also be capable of in-
corporating new connections to represent episodically new information, which
may later be consolidated into long–term memory.25 In the light of the role of
25. We have been careful to emphasize that the relation between the units and links in our models and
the neurons and axons in the brain is at this point open. Our units and links may represent a considerable
abstraction over groups of neurons, rather than single neurons [304, 1]. But plausible cognitive models need
to be able to create structure, and furthermore the adult brain does literally continue to create structure in
performing working memory tasks (and possibly in consolidating the results). Our models may well describe
this process of creating structure.
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inhibitory disturbance in autism, it is intriguing that the particular class of neu-
rons claimed to be created in the adult neocortex are GABA-ergic inhibitory
interneurons (Dayer et al. [60]). Levitt et al. [173] propose that it is exactly
this subclass of neurons which are undersupplied in autism, and that a mouse
model of this deﬁciency yields related behavioral deﬁcits in social interaction.
Autism and the Ratio of Excitation to Inhibition Inhibition brings us to the
third issue of the balance between excitation and inhibition. Rubinstein and
Merzenich [235] propose a model of autism as a family of brain disorders
whose common factor is too high a ratio of excitation to inhibition, especially
in frontal areas of the brain.26 This work is primarily focused on neurotrans-
mitters, and so is complementary to issues of pruning at the structural level.
Glutamate is the prime excitatory and GABA the prime inhibitory neurotrans-
mitter – a pair that operate over a wide area of the brain. Their model discusses
many factors and other neurotransmitters, but GABA insufﬁciency plays a large
role in increasing the ratio of excitation over inhibition. Just to complicate mat-
ters, it has recently been discovered that whereas GABA is inhibitory in the
adult brain, it actually has an excitatory function during early neuron develop-
ment. GABA’s switch from excitatory to inhibitory function appears to play
an important role in neurons’ switching from early embryonic modes, in which
activity is driven by gross factors such as giant polarizing potentials giving rise
to synchronized waves of activity, to later modes in which neurons modulate
each other’s activity through synaptic connnections in more complex patterns
[18]. On the face of it, this switch by GABA is occurring at a much earlier stage
than the appearance of autism, but nevertheless may be signiﬁcant for the later
balance between inhibition and excitation. Rubinstein and Merzenich [235] de-
scribe the close relation between GABA and the brain growth factors which
play important roles in ending critical developmental periods. This is particu-
larly intriguing for an interpretation of autism as arising from disturbances of
the timing of developmental processes. We return to GABA in our discussion
of the genetics of autism.
Neural Underpinning of Closed–World Reasoning The neural implementation
of our model of closed–world reasoning offers many points of contact with
this biological background. The central role of abnormalities in closed–world
reasoning couches the whole process as the spread of excitation and its in-
hibitory control. As we discussed above and illustrated in ﬁgure 9.2, insufﬁ-
cient inhibitory resources (either at the transmitter level or through pruning),
26. Needless to say, these proposals about inhibitory deﬁciency do not sit well with the idea that excessive
lateral inhibition lies behind the narrowness of autistic perceptual maps, though there are many factors, not
least timing discrepancies, that might or might not account for the apparent contradiction.
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would have speciﬁc effects on the processing of conditionals’ abnormality con-
ditions.27 The two-tiered architecture of our net with its truth and falsity sheets
bound by corresponding inhibitory connections also gives a prominent role to
inhibition, although it seems unlikely that the symmetry of the net’s sheets as
presented can be the whole story. On the biological side, there is no shortage of
evidence implicating the relevance of the balance of excitation and inhibition,
but much of it is speculative. We make no apology for this: we intend to give
some feel for how much is settled and just how much is not.
9.11.2 The Genetics of Autism and Parental Resource Allocation
The power of modern genetic analysis offers great opportunities for understand-
ing the processes of cognitive change involved in human speciation. While
human speciation as a process presents immense difﬁculties of investigation –
neither brains nor behavior fossilise, the nearest extant species are 5 million
years diverged, etc. – genetics represents one of the main sources of evolution-
ary information. It really is possible to get information about which genes have
been under selection pressure and something about when. Genetics has barely
entered into cognitive science yet, but it will be worth a detour here in making
our example of altriciality more vivid.
The Importance of Epigenesis
In chapter 6 we contrasted the concept of innateness, still much discussed in
psychology, with the genetic concept of heritability which has replaced it in
biology. The realization that heritability could only be studied relativized to
an environment crystallized the contrast between genetic and epigenetic factors
controlling development. The known role of epigenetic factors in development
is growing by the day. The brain growth processes we have been describing
are ones in which the chemical soup in which neurons develop has all sorts of
environmental effects on the resulting brain structures. Of course the composi-
tion of the soup is partly genetically controlled, but at each stage close analysis
shows interaction between gene and environment, always remembering that the
other genes and their products are environment in these calculations.
Our understanding of the genetic control of autism is rudimentary, but devel-
oping fast. There is good evidence that genes are involved. In fact autism highly
genetically inﬂuenced: observations of the concordance of autism in monozy-
gotic (identical) twins run as high as 90%. In dizygotic twins it is about 3%,
similar to nontwin siblings. This concordance rises to 90% for monozygotic
27. It must be noted though that at present our treatment of abnormalities is rudimentary in the sense that
insufﬁcient analysis is given of how propositions are identiﬁed as abnormalities in conﬁguring a network,
and how relevant abnormalities are differentiated from irrelevant ones within a context.
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twins if the criteria for autism are relaxed [141]. That is, there is a some-
what higher concordance if a broader deﬁnition of autism spectrum disorders
is adopted. This strongly suggests that the inheritance mechanism involved ap-
plies to a wider spectrum of characteristics than full-blown autism, raising the
possibility that the beneﬁts of autistic spectrum characteristics may play a part
in the maintenance of autism in the population. The pattern whereby monozy-
gotic twins show more than double the concordance of dizygotic twins suggests
that multiple interacting genes play a role [232]. In fact, a speciﬁc gene-gene
interaction which affects the GABA metabolism has recently been identiﬁed in
some autistic cases [178]. Such gene interaction is a common situation, but
needless to say, it hugely complicates the business of analysis.
While this is strong evidence that genes are involved, the patterns do not ﬁt
simple patterns of inheritance (many genetic conditions do not, so this in it-
self is unsurprising). These high concordances in monozygotic twins, coupled
with concordances for dizygotic twins similar to nonsiblings, suggests at least
some epigenetic inﬂuence and/or some de novo factors (e.g., mutation). The
sex ratio, variously estimated at between three and ten to one times as many
males affected as females, is not easy to explain by a sex-linked trait on the Y
chromosome. Again, one possibility is that there are many genes involved, pos-
sibly with varying degrees of expression, possibly interacting with each other to
determine the phenotype. Another, not exclusive possibility, is that epigenetic
factors are involved.
Imprinting: Generalities
One class of epigenetic factors, recently discovered, and especially pertinent to
analyses of altriciality, is genetic imprinting, whereby alleles of maternal origin
have different effects than the same alleles of paternal origin [139]. Alleles
of genes with normal Mendelian characteristics have the same effect whether
they are paternal or maternal genes. Imprinting is an epigenetic process which
applies to relatively few, and only mammalian, genes which overwhelmingly
control aspects of resource allocation in development. An increase in parental
investment in offspring is one deﬁning characteristic of mammals, carried to
extremes in altricial Homo sapiens. With an imprinted gene, one parent, most
often the mother, suppresses the effects of the other parent’s allele, often by a
process known as methylation which takes place at conception. So, although the
offspring has, say, two dominant alleles (DD), one of those alleles is suppressed
and is not expressed in the phenotype.
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The dominant theory of imprinting is that it is part of a competition between
mother’s and father’s interests in reproductive resource allocation. Whenever
females mate with more than one male, there is a divergence of genetic interests
of the two parents. This conﬂict theory of imprinting has more recently been
joined by a “dose dependence” theory of imprinting, speciﬁcally for genes on
the X chromosome [140]. One can make a good case for a noncompetitive
explanation for imprinting on the X sexchromosome.28
Whether or not there is parental conﬂict under conditions of polyandrous
mating, mothers and fathers also share interests in having advantageous sex-
ual dimorphism in their offspring. Since females have a double dose of the X
chromosome, it seems that they have evolved imprinting to switch off the X
chromosome they contribute for genes on X for which too great a dose (i.e., a
double dose) would disrupt other genes which must contribute to the pheno-
types of both sexes. This is called “dosage compensation.” So if it is advanta-
geous, for example, for females to have greater social skills, then this must be
represented on the X chromosomes that fathers contribute to their daughters,
because mothers have to turn this off on their Xs which they contribute to both
sons and daughters. So the crucial issue is whether a gene beneﬁts males more
than females (size perhaps), females more than males (social skills perhaps),
or both equally (brain development perhaps) [209].29 Note that this analysis
presupposes that having greater social skills has to actually be deleterious for
males, to explain why imprinting in the form of dosage compensation by the
female would take place. Ramsay et al. [196] in a recent review of imprinting,
considers the status of several theories of its evolutionary origin, as well as its
extent, and the considerable divergence in imprinting between mouse and man
which may suggest the importance of imprinting in our evolution. The authors
also argue that a high proportion of imprinted “transciptional units” are non-
coding RNAs (not DNA at all). Imprinted genes are important as “controllers”
of genetic cascades as we emphasized in our discussion of the importance of
control elements in explaining macroevolution (chapter 6, section 6.2.4), and in
discussing altriciality as an example.
Imprinting and Brain Growth
Whatever the status of these particular examples it has been shown that im-
printing is rife among the genes which control brain growth, and that there
are distinctive spatial and temporal patterns to the maternal/paternal imprint-
28. The XX (female) and XY (male) sex chromosomes in mammals exercise genetic control of the organ-
ism’s sex, but this is not imprinting. Imprinting can happen on non-sex chromosomes (autosomes), or on the
X chromosome. It cannot happen on the Y chromosome since all Y chromosomes are contributed by fathers.
But autosomal imprinting generally affects both sons and daughters.
29. These particular example characteristics are taken from claims in the literature, but should be treated
with a healthy skepticism – their purpose here is illustrative only.
9.11 The Biological Setting of Autism 291
ing. Interestingly, the X chromosome appears to disproportionately inﬂuence
the development of the brain and cognitive traits [309]. For example, the genes
contributing to mental deﬁciency are overrepresented on the X chromosome.
There are some very basic biological reasons why speciation genes (those under
particular selection pressure as two varieties of a species drift toward reproduc-
tive isolation and full specieshood) are particularly likely to be related to sexual
behavior, and expressed in brain, testes, and placenta. An old observation of
Haldane was that when hybrids between two subspecies are sterile, it is usually
the heterogamous sex (i.e., XY males in mammals) which is sterile.
Many imprinted genes do not control the synthesis of any protein but are the
elements controlling other clusters of genes which were mentioned in chapter 6
as being particularly important in tweaking old modules in macroevolutionary
change. Imprinted genes are independently identiﬁable, and are evidently prime
candidates for controlling the changed pattern of fetal maturation in altricial
Homo sapiens, and especially of brain development – big brains are supremely
metabolically expensive as well as being difﬁcult to give birth to.
Neuroscientists now have sophisticated techniques for mapping both spatially
and temporally the patterns of expression of genes. The molecular signatures
of imprinting have enabled researchers to track down genes controlling brain
growth during maturation (the techniques have currently been applied mostly
in mice – 70 million years diverged from our ancestral line). Maternally im-
printed genes are responsible for controlling the growth of the frontal lobes
(one of the areas of greatest human innovation in development, and a prime
seat of the planning functions we are focused on in our cognitive analysis of
executive function). Paternally imprinted genes control growth of the hypotha-
lamus [103]. To put it facetiously, mom controls the development of civilization
and dad the animal urges. Slightly more intricately, the unique degree to which
human brains, and especially the planning frontal lobes, continue growing af-
ter birth may prove to be an innovation controlled by the mother’s interest in
reproductive resource allocation – speciﬁcally her interests in her offsprings’
capacities for inducing their father and his relatives to provide resources.
If such accounts hold up, then they provide evidence about the originating
selection pressures for the explosive growth of human planning, reasoning, and
communication capabilities. Just so stories about evolution get grounded in se-
lection pressures, as evidenced by molecular genetics. These capabilities may
have proved useful for mammoth hunting or for mate attraction, but to the ex-
tent they are controlled by imprinted genes, their evolution is more likely to
have been driven by changes in maternal reproductive resource allocation, or
pressures for sexual dimorphism of particular characteristics involved in these
processes.
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Imprinting and Lifestyle in Primates
This distribution of imprinting in the brain suggests a return to reconsider Fo-
ley’s paradox (p. 140). Keverne et al. [156] present a table of forty-ﬁve primate
species, with data on their brain part sizes and such lifestyle factors as whether
they are diurnal or nocturnal, herbivore or fructivore, their living group size,
the sexual composition of groups, and the timing of mating. They divide the
brain into “executive brain” and “emotional brain” on the basis of the maternal
vs. paternal imprinting of genes expressed, and show that there is a positive
correlation between sizes of parts within the executive and the emotional brain,
but negative correlations between parts across these two areas. They then study
the relation between lifestyle variables and brain part size for each of the two
divisions of brain. For the executive brain there were signiﬁcant correlations be-
tween its size and living group size (+), number of females in the group (+), but
not number of males, or arboreal/terrestrial (-), nocturnal/diurnal (-) lifestyles,
or restricted/conﬁned mating times (+). Imprinted genes have reciprocal ef-
fects on body and brain size: maternally imprinted genes suppress body size
(to decrease maternal investment) but paradoxically increase brain size; pater-
nally imprinted genes increase body size (to increase maternal investment) but
decrease brain size. There is something inverse about investment in brain, the
hypothesis being that a bigger brain (at least some parts) leads to better social
skills at extracting resources from others. These authors interpret the decrease
in the emotional brain and increase in executive brain in the course of primate
evolution as resulting from appetitive behaviors becoming less under neuroen-
docrine control, and more under the control of strategic behaviors, controlled
by the frontal cortex and social skill. As an example, they remark that dominant
males in higher primates are often not particularly aggressive, achieving their
ends by more cerebral methods of clique formation or what–have–you.
Keverne et al.[156], like their colleague Foley, note the female bonded groups
of many Old World monkeys, although they don’t mention his observation of
how male-bonding plays such a distinctive role in the great apes. Much of the
genetic experimentation involves the mouse, so it is far from clear exactly how
these patterns changed and affected human evolution. It seems likely that the
shift from female– to male–bonded group living, combined with the huge in-
crease in reproductive resource requirements, must have had a large impact on
the balance between maternal and paternal control of brain development. Al-
though the details of the last phase of human evolution are not settled, we can
be sure that they will need interpretation against this long–run backdrop of pri-
mate evolution.
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Imprinting and Autism
Claims have also been made that imprinting plays a role in determining the
sex-ratio of cases of autism (Skuse [249], Jiang et al. [141]). It does in mouse
models of autism, where a particular gene can be shown to affect analogues of
executive function tasks [58]. Skuse’s model proposes a paternally imprinted
gene on X suppressing the effects of multiple autosomal (non-sex chromosome)
genes which are responsible for the actual phenotype when expressed. Fathers
would normally pass this suppressor factor to their daughters, which would
ensure they were free of the kinds of social skills deﬁcits associated with autism.
Already a number of human behavioral syndromes are known to be related
to abnormalities of imprinting (e.g., Prader–Willi, Angelman’s , Silver-Russell,
and Beckwith-Wiedemann syndromes [80]). There is evidence that Angelman’s
syndrome particularly is associated in at least a subgroup of cases with autism.
In one study, nine of nineteen Angelman’s subjects fulﬁlled the diagnostic cri-
teria for autism [214]. Badcock and Crespi [8] make the proposal that autism is
a syndrome of generally imbalanced imprinting. Their paper contains an exten-
sive review of the current state of knowledge of the involvement of imprinted
genes, and links this aspect of autism to evolution through the parental compe-
tition for investment in the offspring theory of imprinting and the “male brain”
theory of autism.
Of course, imprinting is not the whole story in the genetics of autism. There
are plenty of unimprinted genes which show evidence of affecting the devel-
opment of autism. Rubinstein and Merzenich [235], already discussed with
respect to inhibition, provide a useful review of some of the candidate genes,
oriented toward neurotransmitter effects. Another useful review is [213]. As
mentioned above, the complex pattern of inheritance makes it likely that many
genes are involved – estimates vary between ten and a hundred. And it should
not be forgotten that the expression of nonimprinted genes may be controlled by
imprinted ones, and vice versa. Even more recent advances in the unravelling of
what is called copy number variation in genetics has opened up the alternative
possibility that hundreds of different genetic anomalies may individually cause
autistic symptoms—the “rare-alleles” model of common genetically inﬂuenced
diseases [69, 186].
On a concluding note, both positive and cautionary, an important contribution
of genetic population studies is that they study random samples more or less
representative of whole populations rather than populations of subjects ﬁltered
through clinical diagnostic criteria which constitute almost all other data on
autism. Here is a source of evidence which avoids the distorting selection of
data (see Harvey et al. [118] for discussion). Intriguing examples are two
papers by Happe´ and colleagues [232, 115] which ask the question whether the
social and nonsocial deﬁcits in autism are correlated and/or genetically related
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in the general population. Since the clinical criteria guarantee an association
in clinical populations, this is a ﬁrst preliminary indication (using a not yet
fully normed scale for autistic tendencies in the normal population) that in fact
these symptoms may not be highly correlated, and although both are under
substantial genetic inﬂuence, they appear to be under independent genetic (or
epigenetic) inﬂuence. We agree about the probable phenotypic heterogeneity of
autism as stated above, but these authors believe that individual genes will map
onto phenotypic characteristics of the varied disorders. This seems to us most
unlikely for the reasons stated here. Interaction between genes in determining
phenotypic characteristics is to be expected as the default case however difﬁcult
it is to identify speciﬁc interactions with current methods. This is a powerful
reason for thinking in terms of changes in timing of developmental processes,
since changes in timing are inherently likely to produce interactions.
To the extent that imprinting is involved in the epigenetic control of autism,
then that is evidence that the condition has something to do with the selection
pressures on parental investment in the rearing of offspring, and/or the require-
ments of sexual dimorphism and its (epi)genetic control. Against this back-
ground of evolution of the species, the fact that autistic people exhibit such a
marked temporal proﬁle of head growth is a striking observation.
In normal human development, altriciality means that the human infant’s
brain is dumped out into the external environment at a very much earlier stage
of development than that of our ancestors, and that it goes on developing for
very much longer. The particularly “hyperdeveloped” part of the human brain,
the frontal lobes are the most extreme part of this pattern, even to the degree that
it has been suggested that mothers essentially function as their infants’ frontal
lobes in the early months of development. This closeness of coupling of two
individuals has long been understood as playing an organizing role in human
learning and development. In the next few years we are likely to learn a great
deal more about the genetic and epigenetic control of this process and thence
about its evolutionary signiﬁcance.
Focusing on altriciality as a biologically recognisable human innovation,
offers the possibility of connecting cognition to the burgeoning information
sources offered by genomics. Perhaps genetic imprinting can offer a methodol-
ogy to identify some candidate genes for involvement in human speciation.
Another Source of Genetic Information on Brain Growth Certainly another re-
cent genetic method has already yielded dividends – the identiﬁcation of “hu-
man accelerated regions” in the genome. Now that the sequencing of the chim-
panzee’s genome has largely been completed, it is possible, though by no means
straightforward, to compare it to the human genome and to identify sites of di-
vergence. The basic problem is that most divergence is random, and it is only
functional divergence which is of interest. Previously, the only way of cir-
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cumventing this problem was to study only protein–coding genes which can
be screened for selection pressure, as noted above (page 150). But we believe,
for the reasons explained in chapter 6, that control genetic elements which are
typically non-protein–coding are likely to be of most interest in our speciation.
Pollard et al. [220] present a study of an “RNA gene” called HAR1F and
its twin HAR1R, whose identiﬁcation is the ﬁrst fruit of a new direct approach.
HAR stands for “human accelerated region.” The genomes of chimpanzee and
human are compared (along with several other more distantly related species),
ﬁrst to ﬁnd highly conserved regions which are assumed to be functionally im-
portant because preserved by selection pressure against genetic change. The
resulting collection of what we can think of as mammalian decelerated regions
is then screened for regions showing evidence of high rates of genetic change
between chimpanzee and human. Thus the argument is that although the re-
sulting HARs are functionally important (because of having been preserved
by selection pressure against change in a long line of mammals), their rapid
change between chimpanzee and human is indicative of a signiﬁcant evolution-
ary role in the speciation and evolution of Homo sapiens. Random variation
of highly conserved regions would not be tolerated because of their functional
signiﬁcance.
This technique identiﬁed forty-nine HARs ranked for the rapidity of their re-
cent evolutionary change. The ﬁrst-ranked HAR1 is a 118 base-pair region of
human chromosome 20 which is mostly the overlap between two previously un-
known RNA genes:30 HAR1F and HAR1R. This region is the top-ranked HAR
out of the 49, and the only one yet functionally analysed. A high proportion
of HARs (96% of the 49) are non-protein-coding elements. A high proportion
of adjacent genes are related to DNA binding or transcriptional regulation, and
24% are adjacent to neurodevelopmental genes. HAR1F and HAR1R are RNA
genes expressed in cortical development in Cajal-Retzius cells, a class of cells
which are probably involved in producing some of the cytoarchitecural pecu-
larities of human cortex.
HAR1F is strongly and speciﬁcally expressed in developing brain, starting
between 7 and 9 gestational weeks, in the dorsal telencephalon (the cortex pri-
mordium). These Cajal-Retzius cells are transient cells which do not survive
into adulthood, and are known to be involved in leading the migration and de-
velopment of other neocortical neurons. They form distinctive horizontal net-
works, chieﬂy in layer 1. Their function and differentiation from other cell
classes is currently under review [190]. We noted in our discussion of brain
growth (page 149) that layer 1 is the cortical layer most differentiated in hu-
mans. The gene expression patterns suggest that HAR1F and HAR1R may reg-
30. RNA genes are also a novel concept, arising from recent discoveries of “RNA interference,” the subject
of a Nobel Prize in 2006. RNAi is the phenomenon whereby RNA controls the expression of DNA genes,
thus leading to the notion of an RNA gene.
296 9 Coping with Nonmonotonicity in Autism
ulate each other through a sense-antisense relation,31 and it may be a shift in
the balance of control which is the human innovation. Diffuse expression of
the HAR1 genes in the adult brain is also observed, especially in forebrain, hip-
pocampus, cerebellum, thalamus, and hypothalamus. One speculation is that
HAR1R suppresses much adult expression of HAR1F. Outside the brain, ex-
pression of HAR1F and HAR1R also show up in testes, ovary, and placenta –
one classic pattern for speciation genes (page 291).
Just to give an idea of the disparities in evolutionary “speed” picked up by
this technique, in HAR1 only two base pairs are changed between chicken and
chimpanzee (diverged 310 million years ago), but eighteen are changed be-
tween chimpanzee and human (diverged about 6 million years). The HAR1
region has no orthologues in ﬁsh or invertebrates, so probably originates less
than 400 million years ago.
We describe this technique here to give further indication of how rich genetic
information can be and how rapidly techniques are developing, but also be-
cause the very ﬁrst information yielded by the technique supports Waddington’s
long–standing functional contention that control elements are all–important in
explaining macroevolution.
Conclusion
Embedding the example of autism inside the framework of altriciality as an or-
ganizing force in human cognitive evolution provides a good illustration of how
rich and complex a phenomenon autism is, and how many levels of analysis are
required for a full understanding. The details of our speculations are undoubt-
edly wrong, but nevertheless this is an inﬁnitely better biological model for
understanding at least one important aspect of human evolution than the adap-
tationism typical of evolutionary psychology. If the temporal proﬁle of human
head growth and its implications for obstetrics is one organizing selection pres-
sure of human evolution, then altriciality is at least partly an adaptation to this
pressure. This must have led to the exaptation of existing learning mechanisms
to the new environment in which the immature brain dealt with an external envi-
ronment, an environment organized overwhelmingly by the mother. Of course
there would also be myriad secondary adaptations (all the way from cognitive
and affective changes to social organizational ones) produced by the pressures
of surviving altriciality. Stenning [257] describes some of these, paying special
attention to the resulting shift in the balance of intentional and causal analysis
of the newborn’s environment.
31. DNA’s double helix unwinds into a sense and an antisense strand – the latter a “negative” of the former.
The former may code for a protein, but the antisense strand (transcribed into RNA) can inhibit such coding
by combining with the messenger RNA, in what is called RNA interference.
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10.1 Putting It All Back Together
The “psychology of reasoning” as a ﬁeld coalesced from studies of syllogistic
reasoning, but we have deliberately stood history on its head in leaving syllo-
gisms to the end.1 This choice reﬂects the fact that the syllogism requires just
about enough derivation to provide a microcosm for studying the integration
of several strands of our argument so far. The selection task and the suppres-
sion task present interpretation problems to subjects, but once an interpretation
is settled, barely any derivation is required. At least for some subjects, syl-
logisms evoke both interpretation processes of reasoning to an interpretation
and derivational processes of reasoning from the interpretation imposed. In-
deed, syllogisms are one area where substantial interpretational theories from
linguistics and philosophy have been applied by psychologists and, as we shall
see, have met with self-proclaimed failure.
This slightly greater role of derivation is sufﬁcient to introduce representa-
tional issues which do not play a large role in the selection task. In chapter
5, we expressed skepticism that the models vs. rules debate about mental rep-
resentations had been given any empirical substance, and we will revisit that
debate here on its home territory. But we are not at all skeptical that contrast-
ing external representations (for example, rule systems or diagrams) have real
impact on subjects’ reasoning, and especially on their conceptual learning, and
we review evidence to that effect here. Along with the variety of representation
strategies come individual differences in reasoning styles. Individual differ-
1. From a purely logical point of view, syllogisms are only special in being the ﬁrst logical system to be
presented formally. Apart from this, they just form a fragment of predicate logic; moreover, a fragment in
which the quantiﬁers ∀ and ∃ do not come into their own, because iteration is not allowed. It is therefore
not clear to what extent results of experiments on syllogistic reasoning extend to reasoning with quantiﬁers
generally. We have some anecdotal data on children’s reasoning which may be relevant in this respect. It has
been known since Piaget that children have nonstandard truth conditions for “all circles are blue,” judging
this sentence to be false if there are blue things which are not circles. Our data show that if one gives the
same child a sentence in which quantiﬁers are iterated (“All boxes contain a key which ﬁts the lock on all
boxes”), it has no trouble processing this according to the standard truth conditions.
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ences in interpretation were seen to underlie subjects’ decisions in the selection
task, but the range of available responses allowed to the subject was insufﬁ-
cient to tease them apart without resorting to Socratic dialogue, and there was
barely enough derivation from interpretations to approach issues of derivational
strategy. In the syllogism, with its requirement to integrate two propositions,
the differences in interpretation continue, but now there are also potential dif-
ferences in reasoning from interpretations. The problem set is now sufﬁciently
rich that data analysis becomes a more substantial task. For the reader coming
from a chieﬂy logical background, this is the ﬁrst encounter with the analy-
sis problems that occupy psychologists. For the psychologically based reader,
this material provides methodological issues for the standard hypothesis testing
approach, and some resolutions offered by a background of logical theory.
And ﬁnally, because the syllogism is blatantly intended to require classical
logical reasoning from a skeptical stance, it is a microcosm for examining the
“information–packaging” structures which are designed to assist the credulous
processing of natural language, and their effects on subjects’ reasoning. We
will argue that these structures are inherently part of credulous reasoning, but
produce interesting conﬂicts with the skeptical stance.
The chapter begins with a logical speciﬁcation of the syllogism, and the pre-
sentation of some alternative representations and methods of solution. Then
some studies of the interpretation of single syllogistic premises are described
which have been used to claim that premise interpretation cannot predict syllo-
gistic reasoning. With a view to establishing just such a relation, we describe
an exploratory analysis of interpretation data, and its use to build a syllogis-
tic reasoning model which incorporates interpretation differences. The results
give clear evidence of qualitative individual differences in subjects’ reasoning
as a function of their interpretations, and a simple process account, the source–
founding model, is presented. Finally, the chapter ends with a logical reap-
praisal of mental models theory, and an assessment of the appropriateness of its
goals given the evidence available for qualitative individual differences.
10.2 What is the Syllogistic Task?
One of the focal points for empirical studies of deductive reasoning is the syl-
logism. This is probably mainly because of the tractability for the experimenter
afforded by this domain – a ﬁnite number of problems, a wide range of dif-
ﬁculty for naive subjects, etc. But there is also the possibility that this is a
psychologically interesting fragment of logic for the empirical study of human
reasoning precisely because of its tractability for the reasoner – more on this
below. Another reason for the possible psychological importance of syllogisms
is that there is some evidence that monadic reasoning (reasoning about one-
place predicates) may have an important status due to its relation to discourse
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processing which will become clear in what follows. Since the syllogism deals
with monadic predicates only, it is perhaps helpful to think of the syllogism as
the logic of taxonomy whereby individuals are sorted into types deﬁned by the
possession (or not) of properties.
10.2.1 Syntax
A syllogism consists of two premises which relate three terms (a, b, and c), one
of which (the middle term, b) occurs in both premises, while the other two (the
end terms, a and c) each occur in only one premise – a is the end term in the
ﬁrst premise, and c is the end term in the second premise.
There are four moods or premise types, distinguished by the quantiﬁers “all,”
“some,” “none,” and “some. . . not.” The quantiﬁers all and none are universal.
The quantiﬁers some and some. . . not are existential. There are four possible
arrangements of terms in the two premises, known as ﬁgures, as shown in ta-
ble 10.1.2 We use the term diagonal ﬁgures to refer to the ﬁrst pair of ﬁgures
(ab/bc and ba/cb) and symmetric ﬁgures to refer to the second pair (ab/cb and
ba/bc). Since each premise can be in one of four moods, and each premise pair
can have one of four ﬁgures, there are 4× 4× 4 = 64 different syllogisms.
Table 10.1 The four ﬁgures of the syllogism
diagonal symmetric
Figure Number 1 2 3 4
1st premise a− b b− a a− b b− a
2nd premise b− c c− b c− b b− c
10.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of the syllogism concerns types of individuals deﬁned by combi-
nations of properties. Because there is no identity relation, it is never of logical
signiﬁcance how many of a type of individual exist – hence the talk of types.
Properties are denoted by the terms of the syllogism – given the term a, any
individual is either an a or not an a (¬a). Fully speciﬁed types are speciﬁed
with respect to all three properties, and there are eight such types: abc, ab¬c,
a¬bc, a¬b¬c, ¬abc, ¬ab¬c. ¬a¬bc, and ¬a¬b¬c.
Due to the restriction to monadic predicates, we can express the semantics of
syllogisms in terms of sets of types. This can be seen as follows. If we think
of predicates as denoting sets of individuals, then a model of a syllogism is an
interpretation of the predicates which makes both predicates true. In principle
2. Care is needed in reading the literature because different numbering schemes are used.
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there are a great many such models for a given syllogism, since the cardinality
of the domain can be varied. However, because the language contains monadic
predicates only and does not have the identity relation, individuals can only
be distinguished by the types which deﬁne them, and differences in cardinal-
ity therefore do not play any role. Thus, a model of the premise “some A
are B” can be given as any of the following sets of types: {ab}, {ab,¬ab},
{ab, a¬b}, . . . , {ab,¬ab, a¬b,¬a¬b}. A model of a syllogism is a set of fully
speciﬁed types whose existence is consistent with the truth of both premises.
Thus suppose the second premise of the syllogism is “all B are C.” To com-
pute the models of both the premises, ﬁrst the set of models of “some A are B”
is expanded so as to incorporate all the possibilities for the predicate C. This
yields as sets of types {ab¬c}, {abc}, . . . , {abc,¬abc, a¬bc,¬a¬bc}. These
sets are then pruned to take into account that all B are C, and we get {abc},
. . . , {abc, a¬bc}, . . . , {abc,¬abc, a¬bc,¬a¬bc}. Each set can be thought of
as a possible syllogistic world described at the level of abstraction with which
the syllogism deals; that is, with predicates rather than individuals. Erasing the
bs from the fully speciﬁed types then yields types which satisfy the conclusion
“some A are C.”
In the psychological literature, but not generally the modern logical literature,
the syllogism is conventionally interpreted under the assumption that none of
the three sets of things with the properties a, b, and c are empty.3 Sometimes
this assumption is explicitly included in the instructions to subjects, although as
we shall see, it is an open question whether they take this instruction on board.
It is a pity that there does not appear to be any empirical studies of this issue.
The no empty sets axiom reduces the number of possible models somewhat.
A modern logical treatment would make these existential assumptions explicit,
separately from its deﬁnition of the quantiﬁers.
Given this semantics, of the sixty-four syllogisms, twenty-seven have valid
conclusions which can be formulated by applying one of the four quantiﬁers to
the two end terms. The remaining thirty seven syllogisms do not allow any valid
conclusions of this form. As we shall see, an extension of the set of quantiﬁers
slightly extends the set of problems with valid conclusions (see ﬁgure 10.5).
3. This strong “no-empty-sets” assumption appears to stem from Strawson [274,p. 174] although even
he describes it as one that logicians have “hesitated to adopt.” For Aristotle, positive quantiﬁers carried
existential assumptions, but negative ones didn’t. There are interesting historical reasons for the adoption of
existential assumptions: the distinction between the domain of interpretation of an argument and the universal
domain (cf. the discussion in chapter 2) wasn’t clariﬁed until the twentieth century. See section 10.3.2 for
further discussion.
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10.3 Euler Circles
We choose to introduce this logical fragment diagrammatically, drawing on
Stenning and Oberlander [263], for two reasons. First, such a presentation
further dispels any illusion that logic is concerned only with reasoning about
sentences. Second, it helps us to explore some of the semantic properties of
diagrams which are particularly closely associated with models, to which, as
we mentioned above, we will return.
Most diagrammatic methods for solving syllogisms are based on the same
spatial analogy – the analogy between an item’s membership in a set and the
geometrical inclusion of a point within a closed curve in a plane. Euler took
this analogy, represented the ﬁrst premise as a pair of circles, represented the
second premise by adding a third circle; and ﬁnally read off the conclusion from
this construction. So, for example, ﬁgure 10.1 shows how one might solve the
syllogism All A are B. All C are B.
Figure 10.1 A syllogism and potential conclusion represented by Euler circles.
This is an interesting example illustrating the inexpressiveness of diagrams.
While we may feel that ﬁgure 10.1 is helpful in clarifying the reasoning, as
a method of reasoning it is obviously fallible. Even setting aside the several
different diagrams we could have chosen to exemplify the premises individu-
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ally, there are several ways of combining the two premise diagrams that we
could have chosen. The conclusion drawn here is true in the combination we
chose, but if we had only tried a different combination, we might have found
that the conclusion did not hold. Diagrams exhibit speciﬁcity. How are gen-
eralizations to be extracted from them? Figure 10.2 shows the mapping of the
Figure 10.2 The ﬁve spatial relations between two circles mapped onto the quantiﬁed sen-
tences they model – the Gergonne relations.
sentence forms onto primitive Euler diagrams. The problem of the explosion
of combinations of diagrammatic elements is particularly acute in the case of
some where four of the ﬁve spatial relations between two circles exemplify the
sentence. Imagine having to solve the syllogism Some A are B. Some B are
C by this method. There are four diagrams of the ﬁrst premise, four of the
second, and several ways of making each combination to derive a composite
diagram. There are about ﬁfty diagram combinations we should consider. In
many of these diagrams, it is true that some A are C (or, diagrammatically, that
circleA intersects circleC), but not in all. If we chanced to construct a diagram
where some A were C, we might make this conclusion without realizing that
it does not follow because there are other situations which made the premises
both true, but in which this conclusion was nevertheless false.
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This problem with diagrammatic methods of reasoning stems exactly from
the lack of abstraction inherent in diagrams. This problem has been used by
Johnson-Laird to argue for the hopelessness of diagrammatic methods. How
could a brilliant mathematician like Euler make such a fundamental mistake?
How did the poor German princess who was his original pupil gain anything
from this ﬂawed system?
10.3.1 Strategies for Combining Diagrams
The answers, of course, are to be found in what Euler taught about the strategy
for choosing which diagrams to use when. Euler taught that one should select
what we might think of as the “weakest” case. If we want to represent Some
A are B we do not choose a diagram where all A are B. If we want to add a
third circle to a diagram, we do so in the way that represents the most possibil-
ities – graphically we include the most circle intersections that are consistent
with the premises. Although Euler diagrams are usually presented without an
explicit notation for these strategies, it is rather simple to do so. Figure 10.3
shows four diagrams for representing the four premises. The crosses (intro-
Figure 10.3 The four quantiﬁers mapped onto their characteristic diagrams using the cross
notation for their smallest models.
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duced in Stenning and Oberlander [263]) mark smallest models.4 If there is a
cross in a minimal subregion of the diagram, then there must be something in
the world represented with the properties corresponding to that subregion. One
thing corresponding to a cross is the absolute minimal “furniture” there must
be in a world for the sentence to be true in that world. There may be more, but
this much there must be. If there is more than one cross, there is more than
one smallest model. It is an important property of the syllogism, that smallest
models are always single-element models.
The crosses help capture the right strategy for combining diagrams. Fig-
ure 10.4 shows the process of solving the syllogism All A are B. Some C
are not B. exploiting the cross notation. The two–premise representations are
combined by superposing the B circles (which are, after all, the same circle).
There is then a choice about the relation between the A and C circles. They
could be placed in one of three arrangements consistent with the premises. The
rule is that the arrangement which creates most subregions is chosen. A simple
rule determines whether the crosses persist or are eliminated during this com-
bination process. If a subregion containing a cross is bisected in combining the
diagrams, then its cross is eliminated. If not, then the cross persists.
Finally, we need to determine what if any conclusion follows from the rep-
resented syllogism. It turns out, as the reader might want to verify, that every
valid conclusion is based on the three-property description of a subregion con-
taining a cross. For example, in the case of ﬁgure 10.4, the subregion with a
cross in the ﬁnal three-circle diagram corresponds to Cs that are not A and not
B. No cross, no valid conclusion. Conversely, if there is a cross remaining in
the ﬁnal diagram, then, with a couple of interesting exceptions which we shall
come to directly, there is a valid conclusion. To generate a conclusion, ﬁrst de-
scribe the type of individual corresponding to the cross’s region and eliminate
the B term. In the case of ﬁgure 10.4 this yields “things that are C and not
A.” Now, if the subregion containing the cross is circular, its label becomes the
subject of a universal conclusion. Otherwise the conclusion is existential (with
some or some not). If the cross is outside one of the A and C circles, then the
conclusion will be negative; otherwise it will be positive. This algorithm will
generate all the valid conclusions of the sixty-four syllogisms. Try some!
The attentive reader will be asking why this graphical rigamarole leads to
the right answer. How is it any more insightful than the medieval logician’s
mnemonics about Barbara and her friends? Stenning [258] presents studies
which show that subjects differ greatly in their facility for learning from dia-
grams, but that at least for some subjects diagrammatic presentation makes real
differences in their learning. Be that as it may, a few hints might be helpful.
4. We use “smallest” to avoid confusion with the different sense of “minimal” which is important in chapter
7.
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Figure 10.4 An example syllogism solved by Euler’s method augmented by the cross notation.
Combining the circles to give the maximum number of subregions consistent
with the premises guarantees the exhaustiveness of the search for kinds of things
there may be in a world in which the premises are true. A cross’s subregion is
guaranteed to have something in it. If the region is bisected during the addition
of the third circle, then it is no longer clear which subregion the cross should
go in, and so neither of the new sub–subregions is guaranteed to have anything
in it. And so on for the rules about drawing conclusions. If there is no cross
left in the diagram there is no type of individual deﬁned for all three properties
which must exist. It turns out that the syllogism has the rather special metalog-
ical property that all its valid conclusions follow in respect of such maximally
deﬁned individuals. If there is such a cross, then its subregion deﬁnes the type
of thing that must exist. At least an existential conclusion is therefore justiﬁed.
The rules about when universal and negative conclusions are warranted are left
as homework.
The cross notation abruptly turns Euler’s method from one mired in up to
more than ﬁfty diagrams for a syllogism, to one which provides a one-pass
algorithm constructing a single diagram for solving any problem. The cross
notation is an abstraction trick. It allows exactly the abstractions required, but
little more. The result is a kind of mechanical calculating device. Imagine the
circles as wire hoops of variable size, and the crosses as thumbtacks. This me-
chanical device models the logical constraints of the premises. If a thumbtack
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prevents the A and C wire hoops from being pulled horizontally apart, then a
positive conclusion follows about the fact they must intersect. If the thumbtack
prevents the A and C hoops from being pushed into complete correspondence,
then a negative conclusion is justiﬁed by their non-correspondence. No thumb-
tack – no conclusion. Euler’s genius here was to appreciate this correspondence
between logical and mechanical constraints.
10.3.2 Metalogical Considerations
Euler’s method exposes metalogical properties of the syllogism which are im-
portant to their implementation in representation systems. As we just noted,
conclusions require there to be a cross in the ﬁnal diagram, and the cross cor-
responds to a completely described type of individual. The diagrammatic rep-
resentations make this especially easy to see. The geometrical properties of
closed connected areas (such as those of circles) mean that every point in a
plane is either inside or outside any closed area. Therefore any cross deﬁnes
its corresponding type of individual with regard to all three properties. Every
valid argument can be made in virtue of a cross in a ﬁnal diagram. We shall
call this property of the syllogism revealed by the diagrammatic system case
identiﬁability, there being always a single “case” that founds a valid argument.
Most logical systems do not have this property. A further obvious question is
whether the converse of this “no cross⇔ no conclusion’ generalization is also
true. Does every cross give us a valid conclusion?
For Aristotle’s system the answer is no. There are syllogisms which give rise
to ﬁnal diagrams containing crosses which do not allow any Aristotelian con-
clusion. Figure 10.5 shows two such syllogisms and their diagrams. If we think
for a moment about whether there should be a conclusion to these problems,
we can see that in all cases it is true that Some not-A is not C. However, this
would have failed to qualify as an Aristotelian syllogism because it contains a
fourth term not-A and extra reasoning is required to accommodate it, and also
because Aristotle would not have accepted ‘not-A’ as a subject term.
Since the conventional abbreviations for all, some, none, some not are re-
spectively a, e, i, o (from the Latin mnemonics), we shall abbreviate this new
quantiﬁer by the one remaining vowel, u.
The Deeper Meaning of u-Conclusions
Aristotle’s rejection of these arguments as syllogisms is on the one hand a su-
perﬁcial matter of form: extra reasoning is required to eliminate their fourth
term, and so they fail the syntactic deﬁnition of syllogism. But the reason why
this superﬁcial rejection was perhaps felt reasonable takes us near the heart of
one of the critical developments of twentieth–century logic.
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Figure 10.5 Syllogisms with valid conclusions Some not-A are not C – the “u-conclusions.”
For Aristotle, and indeed logicians up to the 19th century when mathematical
inﬂuence began to be felt, the concept of domain was not much discussed, and a
quantiﬁer’s domain was taken to be determined by the sentence in which it oc-
cured. Logicians were quite comfortable with discussions of empty properties
(such as square circle). From the modern point of view one might ask, whether
they would have been equally comfortable with primitive properties which were
empty—perhaps square circle can be accommodated because square and circle
both have instances? But it is not clear whether this discussion could or did
take place within the conceptualisation of the day.
The development of twentieth-century semantics occured when Frege gener-
alized the notion of domain to what we now mean by the universal domain – all
individuals, classes, functions, . . . – and it was rapidly noticed that this notion
is incoherent. Russell’s paradoxes thus brought it home that languages must
be interpreted on local domains and cleared away Frege’s objections to a for-
mal approach to semantics. This twentieth-century insight into the distinction
between local and universal domain is the logical motivation for our cognitive
focus on the importance of reasoning externally about logics, and choosing be-
tween them in the process of interpretation.
Quite apart from his formal or syntactic reasons, Aristotle might have had
some discomfort about admitting these u-conclusion syllogisms as valid be-
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cause they violated one of his two major metalogical generalizations about va-
lidity, namely:
1. for a syllogism to have a valid conclusion, at least one of the premises must
have a universal quantiﬁer;
2. for a syllogism to have a valid conclusion, at least one of the premises must
have a positive quantiﬁer.
The syllogisms with only valid u-conclusions (ﬁgure 10.5) violate this second
dictum. These logical observations are not merely historical curiosities. They
raise interesting psychological questions about whether logically untrained stu-
dents have any metalogical, if implicit, grasp of these principles. And does
their grasp agree with Aristotle, or with these more recent insights? We re-
turn to these questions when some data on how students reason allow logical
insights to be put to good psychological effect (section 10.4).
Consistency
A ﬁnal metalogical property of the syllogism that is emphasized by Euler’s sys-
tem is what we might call its self-consistency. Euler’s system is self-consistent
in that no single diagram can represent an inconsistent set of propositions – the
diagrams are models. Strictly speaking, we need to make some assumptions ex-
plicit before this statement is true. We have been assuming that Euler’s system
represents properties by continuous closed curves (those curves which are not
composed of separated regions); and that distinct closed curves in the same di-
agram represent different properties. For an example of a discontinuous closed
curve, imagine the two B circles in ﬁgure 10.4 interpreted as a single closed
curve labeled B. The possibility of discontinuous curves would be incompat-
ible with the reasoning algorithms. Similarly, in the same ﬁgure, if the two
circles C and B denoted the same property, then the diagram would express a
contradiction. Self-consistency is a consequence of the style of interpretation of
Euler diagrams – a mode of interpretation we have called direct (see Stenning
[258]).
The above observations of the concreteness of primitive diagrammatic sys-
tems, and the fact that in this little domain there are strategies for always se-
lecting a single diagram which can be an appropriate basis for reasoning, are
interestingly reminiscent of the contrast between credulous and skeptical rea-
soning that has been an important strand in this book. Constructing a single
diagram is like credulously seeking an intended model of a discourse. But this
domain has the very special property that if we choose our intended model
wisely, then it can sufﬁce to serve as the basis of reasoning which will fulﬁll the
more demanding skeptical goal of only producing classically valid conclusions
– ones true in all models of the premises. So here, the two stances of reasoning
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can collapse, though, as we shall see, they do not have to. So another interest
of the syllogism is that in this peculiar domain, the relation between credulous
and skeptical processing becomes very close.
10.4 Individual Differences in Interpretation
Nothing is apparently easier than to ask subjects to engage in syllogistic rea-
soning. One simply asks them to assume that the two premises are true, and
then asks whether it follows that the conclusion is true, or asks them to gen-
erate a conclusion that follows from the assumptions. However, as we shall
see presently, subjects do not universally construe these instructions as instruc-
tions to reason with a classical concept of “follows.” Lest there be any doubt
at this stage that this is a real possibility with subjects, there is evidence in the
literature that experimenters also sometimes adopt a different notion of valid-
ity. For example, in a pioneering study into the interpretation of syllogistic
premises which is our experimental setting–off point in this section, Newstead
[200] instructed subjects to assume single premises, and then used the following
instruction: “Now judge whether (1) the following candidate conclusion must
be true, or (2) whether it must be false.” Subjects were not given the chance
to respond (3) “the conclusion might be true or might be false” – the necessary
response to reﬂect any grasp they have of the concept of logical independence
between premise and conclusion. The construal of the task reﬂected in New-
stead’s response set is nearer to a credulous one than a classical skeptical one.
Later Newstead added the necessary third response option as what he called
a “more sensitive measure,” seemingly without realizing that this was a mea-
sure of a different concept of validity. If experimenters can have nonclassical
interpretations, it is hardly surprising that subjects turn out to have them too.
Although syllogistic premises are simple sentences which may appear stony
ground for growing multiple interpretations, our earlier discussions of the selec-
tion and suppression tasks are sufﬁcient to make it likely that multiple interpre-
tations will be possible simply because universal quantiﬁers invoke conditional
logical form. All A are B is analysed as If it’s an A then it’s a B.5 Here, then,
is another illustration that logical form is as much a function of the inferential
task we engage in, as of the sentences in the materials presented. Adopting a
credulous goal may lead to different interpretations than a skeptical one.
Newstead’s interest in syllogistic interpretation was sparked not by consid-
erations of credulous and skeptical processing, but by the very closely related
philosophical and linguistic literature on the theory of cooperative communica-
tion (Grice [108]; see also chapter 5). Just to remind the reader, in cooperative
5. As an historical aside, we note here that the representation of the universal sentence All A are B via a
bound variable (here “it”) seems to have originated with Kant. Longuenesse [175,p. 86ff] discusses why this
representation is important in Kant’s philosophy.
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communication, the hearer assumes that the speaker is being helpful, and will
tell the hearer exactly what he needs to know to construct the intended model
of the discourse. By contrast, in adversarial communication, the participants
adopt a skeptical stance of seeking countermodels.
As Grice pointed out, cooperative communication gives rise to implicatures,
inferences that can be made on the assumption that the speaker is helpful, al-
though not from their classical logical entailments. Thus, if the speaker says
“Some A are B,” the hearer generates the implicature “Some A are not B”: for
if the speaker actually knew that allA areB, he would have said so.6 Questions
about the exact relation between Grice’s account, and the distinction between
credulous and skeptical reasoning will arise in what follows.
We now summarise an experiment (Stenning and Cox [262]) which investi-
gated just what naive subjects’ interpretations of syllogistic quantiﬁers are like,
alongside Newstead’s analysis of his experiments.
10.4.1 Immediate Inferences and the Understanding of Deductive Tasks
Newstead dubbed his one-premise task, the “immediate inference task” to dis-
tinguish it from the “extended” inferences across the two premises of syllo-
gisms. Newstead presented his subjects with all thirty-two combinations of
assumptions (the four quantiﬁed forms) with candidate conclusions (the four
quantiﬁed forms, plus their four “conversions”). In his later experiments and
our subsequent ones, for each of the thirty-two items, subjects were asked
whether the conclusion was true, false, or could be either (see ﬁgure 10.6).
Thus there are 332 possible patterns of responses which subjects could make
– a large number. Newstead pursued the hypothesis that subjects’ reasoning
in the two-premise syllogistic task was inﬂuenced by their interpretations as
evidenced in the one-premise immediate inference task. This seems a highly
reasonable hypothesis. Indeed, if it were to turn out to be false, one might
question how that could be. Reasoning just has to be inﬂuenced by interpreta-
tion, though clearly there might be more to the two-sentence task than merely
multiplying sentences, and the range of possible inﬂuences is broad.
Newstead’s hypothesis testing approach was the conventional one. The con-
cept of Gricean implicature was operationalized in terms of particular responses
to four of the thirty-two questions in the immediate inference questionnaire.
These four questions include the some A are B and some A are not-B premises
(which would implicate each other, even if they do not logically entail each
other), but also all A are B (possibly “inconsistent” with some A are B) and
6. Note that to conclude some A are not B, the hearer also has to assume that the speaker knows what the
relations between A and B are. This goes beyond being helpful. The speaker may be helpful and not know
that all A are B, without knowing that some A are not B. In this case, the implicature generated is only “the
speaker does not know that all A are B.” These knowledge requirements are much neglected in discussions
of Grice.
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Figure 10.6 The instructions with example material from the immediate inference question-
naire.
no A are B (possibly “inconsistent” with some A are not-B). This measure
of “Gricean interpretation” was examined for internal correlations between the
drawing of implicatures to different questions in the immediate inference task,
and later correlated with conclusions drawn from syllogisms where different
conclusions would become valid if the Gricean implicature were added to the
premises.
Newtead’s results did produce high rates of Gricean interpretation in the im-
mediate inference task. About 80% of subjects produced Gricean implicatures
from at least some assumptions, but there was little correlation between drawing
one expected implicature and drawing the others. Newstead then turned to the
question whether these implicatures could predict subsequent reasoning. He in-
terpreted his results as resoundingly negative. Syllogistic conclusions were not
predicted by premise implicatures. Newstead concluded that there was no rela-
tion between what subjects did in the two tasks – presented with one premise
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they applied Grice, but presented with two premises they threw a switch and
applied mental models.
We applaud Newstead for adopting an extremely interesting large-scale ques-
tion informed by philosophical, logical, and linguistic literatures – can Grice’s
theory of cooperative communication contribute to an explanation why subjects
do not conform to classical logic when solving syllogisms? Since credulous
reasoning is so closely related to Grice’s theory, the authors of this book would
have to hope the answer is positive. Our argument is that the answer is positive,
but Newstead’s project was derailed by conventional experimental psychology
hypothesis testing methodology. Instead of ﬁrst asking exploratory questions
such as “What are undergraduate subjects’ interpretations of syllogistic quanti-
ﬁers like?” the standard psychological approach is to operationalise on a narrow
base of speciﬁc stimuli and responses, and then to test the operationalization’s
ability to make predictions of another narrow range of responses identiﬁed by
another operationalization. Of course, in order to explore, one needs some guid-
ance as to how to condense the 332 response patterns into a description of “what
naive logical intuitions are like,” but there is plenty of guidance available from
elementary logical concerns.
10.4.2 A New Experiment on Immediate Inference
We will pay rather more attention to the sequence by which our ﬁndings were
arrived at than is normal in reporting experimental results. Exploration is not
much taught as a psychological method, but it is an important one for progress
in this area.
The ﬁrst principle employed in our ﬁshing expedition into the interpretation
data was: pay close attention to the “could be either” responses. These re-
sponses are judgments to the effect that assumption and conclusion sentences
are logically independent. Logical independence is transformed in going from
credulous to skeptical reasoning. Many premise-conclusion pairs that are valid
credulously become logically independent once viewed classically. Of course,
exploration is aided by a rough guide, and it is very useful to bear in mind what
one’s guide is, because it certainly will affect what is found. But rough guides
are not hard to come by, and if one doesn’t ﬁnd much with one guide, then one
can resort to another.
Rashness and Hesitancy
There are therefore two classes of cases of particular interest – cases where
classical logic tells us that assumption and conclusion are logically indepen-
dent, but signiﬁcant numbers of subjects respond that either the conclusion or
its negation does follow. We will call this general kind of response “rash” – sub-
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jects are rashly overinferring (by a classical logical criterion). The second kind
of case is where classical logic tells us that something does validly follow, but
subjects respond that the conclusion could be either true or false. We will call
these responses “hesitant” – subjects hesitate to draw a valid conclusion. The
rash case is generally to be expected if the interpretation is credulous. The hes-
itant case is more puzzling, since classically valid conclusions tend to be valid
under at least some credulous interpretations. Many cases of the former (rash)
kind are already well known to logic teachers down the ages as fallacies, and
observed in the history of experimental investigation of syllogistic reasoning.
The most prominent example is the fallacy known as “illicit conversion” [34]:
from All A are B it follows that All B are A. The second kind of response,
as far as we are aware, has not been reported, but asking whether it occurs is
an obvious initial exploratory question which is at the very least an important
backdrop to interpreting rash responses.
As an aside to be picked up later, it is important to realise that conversion, at
least of conditionals, can be related to closed-world reasoning and is therefore
another case of credulous reasoning. It isn’t hard to see informally that closed–
world reasoning in discourse can lead to “conversion.” The rough principle is:
“only add to the model what is necessary to understand what has been said.”
So, if a discourse begins “All A are B,” then at this stage we get a model in
which the only way that something can get to be B is because it is A, and in
such a model it will be true that “All B are A.”
Examination of the data quickly revealed some striking cases of rashness and
hesitancy. For example, there was a substantial minority (about 20%) of sub-
jects who refused to draw the conclusion Some B are A from the assumption
that Some A are B where subject and predicate of the premise are inverted in
the conclusion. Our logically sophisticated colleagues, even those who teach
logic, often react to these responses by saying they must just be random noise –
how could anyone possibly refuse this inference? A little further eyeballing of
the data demonstrates that it is not random noise. When all the questions that
are cases of classical logical dependence are tabulated (N=12), it turns out that
there are quite a few of them that produce similarly large proportions of hesitant
responses. The next observation is that this is only the case when the conclu-
sion has subject and predicate “inverted” from their positions in the assumption
(N=8), as in our example.
The third observation is that subjects who make these hesitant responses on
one inverted question tend to make them on other inverted questions. In fact
when a histogram is drawn up tabulating the number of subjects who make 0,
1, 2, . . . 8 hesitant responses, the distribution is bimodal. Most subjects make
none or few, but there is a substantial tail of subjects who make every, or nearly
every, possible hesitant response (ﬁgure 10.7). Without any statistical testing,
or better, with only the simplest of intuitive models of what might be expected,
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this is pretty strongly ﬂavored stuff.
The fourth observation is that subjects who make several of these hesitant re-
sponses to inverted conclusions, are disjoint from the subjects who make several
rash responses to inverted conclusions. There are about a quarter of subjects in
each category, but there is no overlap. Random this is not. Wonderful thing
following one’s nose, especially when kept pointing forward. These obviously
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Figure 10.7 The number of subjects responding to N out of eight questions that invert subject
and predicate with the answer “Neither conclusion follows,” when this is incorrect.
intriguing observations suggest a scheme for classifying subjects’ answer pat-
terns on a small number of dimensions. Let “T ,” “F ,”“CE” abbreviate the
responses “true,” “false” and “could be either.” Above we dubbed subjects who
tend to answer T or F when the answer should be CE: rash, and subjects who
tend to answer CE when the answer should be T or F , hesitant. As mentioned
above, the rash subjects are the ones who tend to apply a cooperative model of
communication.
Immediate Inference and Information Packaging
Now consider a speciﬁc structural feature of an immediate inference, namely
whether it conserves the structure of subject and predicate (henceforth an in–
place inference), or whether that structure is reversed (an inverted inference).
Both rashness and hesitancy can be further evaluated along the in-place/inverted
dimension. Thus, a subject who is rash on in-place inferences is one who tends
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to answer T or F instead of the correct CE on immediate inferences which
preserve subject/predicate structure; cf. the classical examples of Grice’s im-
plicatures. It turns out that no subjects were hesitant on in-place questions,
which leaves three combinations of properties: hesitant on inverted inferences,
rash on in-place inferences, and rash on inverted inferences. Interestingly, 94%
of subjects fall into one of the following four groups: neither rash nor hesitant
on any inference (17%); rash on in-place questions but neither rash nor hesitant
on inverted inferences (22%); rash on both kind of inferences, but not hesi-
tant (35%); and hesitant on inverted inferences plus rash on in-place inferences
(20%). It is also striking how many subjects are rash on in-place inferences:
80%! Thus there is, as Newstead already remarked, good evidence for the
prevalence of a Gricean model of communication (or credulous interpretation)
in this task.
What intuitions are available to explain what hesitancy might reﬂect? “Some
A are B” is different from “Some B are A”: about a quarter of subjects deny
that the latter sentence follows from the former.7 Linguists employ the metaphor
of “information packaging”: the same information is realized (packaged) lin-
guistically in different ways, and this because each packaging serves a different
communicative function.8 For example, the two sentences are natural answers
to different questions. While linguists would not normally use this term for
describing the subject/predicate structural difference between these two sen-
tences, in the very restricted class of abstract syllogistic materials this metaphor
applies. If a logically naive subject is asked whether “Some B are A” follows
from “Some A are B,” he may not realise that he should strip the sentences of
their information packaging, nor that that is what the graphical representation
using Euler circles does. Information–packaging is related to credulous inter-
pretation because speakers use appropriate packagings to help hearers arrive at
the intended model. To take a skeptical attitude one often needs to strip off the
packaging to ﬁnd possible counterexamples. Syllogisms can be divided into
those whose information packaging points toward valid conclusions, and those
where it obscures them. The latter are sometimes called “counterﬁgural,” and
they produce a lot of “no valid conclusion” responses.
Subjects who are rash on in-place questions (Some A are B. Are all A B?),
but not on inverted inferences (All A are B. Are all B A?), are plausibly pro-
cessing credulously but are held in check from making inverted conclusions by
information packaging which points them away from these conclusions. Many
though by no means all of these subjects will be hesitant subjects who may be
completely spellbound by information packaging. It is difﬁcult to say whether
7. For the logically sophisticated it can be hard to recover lost innocence, but the following example may
help. The judge in a famous UK comedian’s tax avoidance trial summed up by stating that while it was clear
that no comedians are accountants, it was equally clear that some accountants are comedians.
8. For an interesting argument to the effect that information packaging is precisely the purpose of “object
orientation” in programming, see Kowalski [162], especially section 3.3.
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they have any idea of logical validity, since 80% of hesitant subjects are rash on
in-place questions.
In conclusion, what is perhaps most surprising about this exploration is that
major patterns of interpretation emerge which don’t even refer to the identity
of particular quantiﬁers in their speciﬁcation. The quantiﬁers are involved be-
cause they are involved in our speciﬁcation of which questions are classiﬁed as
expecting which answers, but the patterns that emerge are rashness and hesi-
tancy on in-place and inverted questions. We may say that subjects’ inference
patterns are determined less by the logical notion of classical validity than by
various aspects of the communicative situation, as hypothesized by the subject.
This is perhaps hardly surprising, since they nowhere have had the classical
concept of deductive validity explained to them. There is plenty of evidence of
credulous interpretation, but there are other effects as well.
Can this classiﬁcation of interpretations be related to subjects’ syllogistic rea-
soning, thus resolving Newstead’s failure to relate interpretation and reasoning?
10.5 Syllogistic Reasoning
When we move from immediate inference tasks to full syllogistic reasoning,
the task changes and it is an open question when to expect transfer. That is, for
example, one cannot necessarily expect that in a syllogism with premises
All A are B.
All B are C.
and with a subject who shows “illicit conversion” in his immediate inference
task responses, the premises are still taken to imply
All B are A.
All C are B.
Thus, we should predict offhand that a sizable proportion of such subjects will
draw the conclusion
All C are A.
One reason that this prediction may fail is that the presence of two premises
leads to an additional complication, namely the grammatical status of the mid-
dle term (B) and the end terms (A and C). In the example above, the end term
A is in subject position in the premise but in predicate position in the conclu-
sion, whereas for C it is the other way around. As we have seen, there is a
tendency on the part of a subset of subjects to ﬁnd such reorderings counterin-
tuitive (i.e., violating normal discourse structure), so that in fact a subject may
be saved from committing a logical error by committing another logical error!
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We now turn to the empirical question whether subjects’ choices in the imme-
diate inference task predict their reasoning in the syllogistic task. How should
we address this exploratory question?
10.5.1 Individual Factors Inﬂuencing Reasoning
In this subsection we introduce kinds of modeling to add to the logical model-
ing of earlier chapters: statistical modeling of data, and the modeling of mental
structures and processes involved in task performance. The statistical modeling
we outline yields a regression equation: a set of weighted factors which can be
shown to affect the likelihood of a certain feature of conclusions drawn from
syllogistic premises. Such modeling is a bottom–up data-driven exercise which
produces prima facie evidence that a relation between a factor and the process
exists. The resulting model is large and messy and hard to interpret as a mental
process. The process modeling presented here takes an earlier theoretical pro-
cess model developed on group data and extends it so that different subgroups
of subjects (deﬁned by their interpretation patterns) are predicted to engage in
rather different reasoning processes. Process models cannot generally be de-
rived directly from data, but they are interpretable as psychological processes.
Both theoretical process model and statistical data model are related to the log-
ical models of earlier chapters – credulous vs. skeptical interpretation of the
task is an important feature in both the statistical model and the process one.
So the situation is typical of scientiﬁc analysis – multiple models at different
levels, either closer or farther from the data, play their roles in analysis.
In the analysis of immediate inference we identiﬁed several factors, such as
rashness (both on in-place and inverted questions) and hesitancy (on inverted
questions) which systematically inﬂuence interpretations in the immediate in-
ference task. The syllogism leads to additional factors of possible importance,
such as grammar (whether the end terms have different or identical grammati-
cal category), the distribution of the quantiﬁers over the premises, and the order
of premises. For example, one may distinguish the case where an existential
quantiﬁer (either some or some. . . not) occurs in the ﬁrst or the second premise,
in both, or in none; and similarly for the other quantiﬁers.
One may now try to analyse empirically the inﬂuence of these factors on
various aspects of syllogistic reasoning performance. An interesting aspect is
whether subjects choose an AC ordering or a CA ordering of the end terms
A and C in the conclusion of the syllogism. We choose to initially model
conclusion term order rather than accuracy because we believe subjects adopt
different interpretations which deﬁne different concepts of accuracy. We return
to accuracy when we have built a model of conclusion term ordering which is
sensitive to individual differences of interpretation.
The exploratory statistical technique used is called logistic regression. A
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heuristic searches a space of possible factors in trying to construct the best
regression equation which can predict whether an AC or a CA conclusion will
be drawn as a function of different structures of syllogism, and as a function of
subjects’ different patterns of immediate inference response. The best model
shows that classical validity plays only a marginal role in this choice!
10.5.2 Statistical analysis
The original statistical model of this data and its development are described
in [262]. A number of structural asymmetries of syllogistic problems which
could potentially affect premise ordering, along with a number of features of
each subject’s immediate inference data, together with a large number of pos-
sible interactions between all of these factors are deﬁned. An algorithm in the
statistical package (backwards elimination) then searches the space of logistic
regression equations that can use subsets of these factors to predict the order of
the terms (AC vs CA) in the conclusions (if any) that the subject drew for a
given problem. The algorithm balances the number of factors in the equation
with amount of the variance the equation can explain and identiﬁes a “best”
equation. As with all regression modelling, the equation is developed on a
“development” dataset prior to being tested on a new “test” dataset, so that
accidental regularities can be discarded and predictive regularities retained.
The ﬁrst empirical result of this statistical analysis is that the best equation
ﬁts very much better than by chance. It explains the term orders of about 70%
of conclusions, where 50% is chance. This leaves a lot of variance unexplained,
but then there may be substantial pure noise in the data (factors such as slips of
attention, memory, etc. which we have no measures to predict). Unfortunately
we cannot estimate the amount of this noise with logistic regression in the way
we would be able to with linear regression.
The second empirical conclusion we can draw from the terms that appear in
the model is that individual differences in immediate inference patterns do sig-
niﬁcantly predict syllogistic conclusion term order. We have at least partially
overcome Newstead’s failure to ﬁnd a relation, although the exploratory statis-
tical model yields no immediately insightful statement of the relation. To ﬁnd
one is our next task.
The best resulting statistical model of the factors affecting conclusion term
order shows that the more substantial determinants, in no partiuclar order, in-
clude:
1. when the two end terms have different grammatical categories, those cate-
gories tend to be preserved in the conclusion;
2. existential quantiﬁers tend to put their end terms into subject position;
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3. there is a weak but general tendency for the premise 1 term to be subject
(i.e., AC order is preferred);
4. each quantiﬁer except No tends to varying degrees to put its end term into
subject position, but quantiﬁers have greatest inﬂuence when in premise 2;
Some not especially has no inﬂuence in the ﬁrst premise, but a large inﬂu-
ence in the second premise;
5. hesitant subjects have a general tendency to respond with an AC ordering
throughout; by contrast, rash subjects have no such special tendency;
6. there are complex interactions between hesitancy, grammar, and No and be-
tween rashness-in-place, grammar, and Some. . . not.
The ﬁrst four regularities are general properties of all subjects: the last two are
differences in reasoning by groups of subjects with different immediate infer-
ence patterns. Some of these regularities are well-known from the literature.
The effect of the grammatical organization of the ﬁrst two “diagonal” ﬁgures
has been observed in every experiment reported. The weak general preference
forAC over CA is also common. But we know of no systematic study of quan-
tiﬁer effects on term ordering. The strong effect of existentials on term ordering
(the second largest contribution to the equation’s ﬁt) has not been noticed, and
similarly the differential effects of the negative quantiﬁers, and certainly not
the individual differences in these. So even if we couldn’t ﬁnd an insightful
model which integrates all these observations, exploration has already yielded
new empirical observations.
The actual statistical model is appreciably more complicated than this – it is
after all the result of a ﬁshing expedition. It tells us what factors and interactions
between them play a signiﬁcant role in determining conclusion term order. It
is hard to integrate its parameters into an understanding at the level which we
seek. So, as part of the process of constructing such an understanding, we will
now give an informal description of the relation of the statistical model to the
source-founding model originally put forward by Stenning and Yule [269] to
model group data.
10.5.3 From Data Description to a Psychological Model
Stenning and Yule [269] presented a general model of how subjects go about
syllogistic reasoning – the source-founding model.9 The intuition behind the
term “source premise” comes from discourse processing. The source is the
9. Guy Politzer [219] points out that a great deal of Stenning and Yule’s analysis is preﬁgured in a 1908
paper by Sto¨rring [273].
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premise which supplies the discourse antecedent on which can be built a de-
scription of a fully speciﬁed kind of indvidual. With slight adjustment of heuris-
tics, this model can serve either as a normative competence model (i.e., it can
generate all and only the valid conclusions according to classical logic), or as
a descriptive performance model for analyzing subjects’ reasoning. In fact, the
same framework also shows how credulous and skeptical reasoning are unusu-
ally closely related in this restricted domain. These close relations are desirable
because they allow explanation of errors as divergences from norms.
The model has the virtue that it is completely abstract about the particular
representations which subjects use (e.g., diagrams vs. sentences), but it never-
theless provides the best explanation of conclusion term ordering that is avail-
able in the literature. We ﬁrst describe the model as it was developed for group
data, and then show how it can be extended to incorporate the individual dif-
ferences in reasoning as a function of quantiﬁer interpretation which are our
current concern. We hope the reader will forgive a greater than usual emphasis
on methodology in what follows. We seek to illustrate the relation between a
theoretical model, raw data for its extension, exploratory statistical modelling of
the raw data, and a reﬁned theoretical model incoporating individual interpreta-
tion factors, alongside problems structural factors, into predictions of reasoning
behaviour.
The source–founding model is represented in ﬁgure 10.8. The model has
two parts: a speciﬁcation of how premises are designated as having the status
of source and nonsource premise, and some simple operations which are then
applied on the basis of this categorization to draw conclusions. The top half
represents the weighing of factors in choosing between designating the ﬁrst or
second premise as source: the bottom half illustrates the alternative processes of
drawing a conclusion, conditioned on this choice. Modulations on the factors
which go into the choice of source premise are what will be used to model
individual differences.
Source and non-source premises are deﬁned using the concept of a critical
individual. So, for example, for the syllogism
(1) All B are A. Some C are B. Therefore some C are A.
the critical individual is an A that is B and C. This idea is closely related to
Aristotle’s concept of ecthesis. The source premise deﬁned by the classical log-
ical competence model is the premise which establishes the critical individual –
in this case the second premise. In the Euler diagram system described above,
source premises contribute the crosses which mark the critical individuals in
completed problem diagrams. Problems with valid conclusions always have at
least one source premise (sometimes both premises are potential sources).
The source-founding model of syllogism solution connects with the concerns
of earlier chapters by the simple observation that the introduction of discourse
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Figure 10.8 The source–founding model of syllogism solution applied to the syllogism Some
B are A. No C are B. The upper part represents the various structural factors and their bias
toward choosing either premise 1 or 2 as source. The lower part shows the possible conclusions
resulting from the alternative assignments of source premise.
referents into representations of discourses is the key operation of discourse
processing. The source premise performs such an introduction. Paradigmati-
cally this would be by an existential premise, but the no-empty-sets interpreta-
tion allows universals to also make these introductions.
A general algorithm for determining which premise is classically a valid
source is fairly complicated, but some very simple heuristics get most cases.
First, for problems with valid conclusions, existential premises are always
source. (note that problems with valid conclusions only ever have single ex-
istential premises; cf. Aristotle’s generalization mentioned above on page 308).
Second, if this principle fails to choose a source (i.e.. there are two univer-
sal premises), positive premises should be preferred as source over negative
ones. This then leaves only two possibilities. As we have seen, problems
with two negative universal premises have no valid Aristotelean conclusion,
so all remaining problems have two positive universal conclusions. If there is a
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unique end-term subject, then the premise in which it occurs becomes source.
If not, then the ﬁrst premise’s end term is chosen as source. This may sound all
rather complicated and ad hoc but these heuristics are closely related to a num-
ber of principles of discourse processing and to a competence model for clas-
sical logic.10Modulations of these heuristics can explain differences between
subject–groups.
Once a source premise has been chosen, a conclusion is drawn. Again the
general algorithm to model classical logic is quite complicated but a very simple
method gets most problems right. Simply attach the end term of the nonsource
premise to the source premise’s end, and delete the middle term. So for the
example (1) above, choose the existential premise as source, attach the end
term of the nonsource premise to the end of the source premise (yielding Some
C are B and A), and delete the B.
Obviously this method applied to invalid syllogisms will generate invalid
conclusions. It will also generate invalid conclusions for any problem for which
the only valid conclusions have quantiﬁers other than those in the source prem-
ise. So it is an important question how “no valid conclusion” responses are
generated (not a problem tackled here, though the heuristics for identifying
source strongly suggest a method related to the medieval “sieve”; see [258,p.
111]), but it is important to remember that what follows is only a model of how
conclusions other than “no valid conclusion” are generated.
Stenning and Yule [269] present evidence from a task where subjects have
to describe critical individuals and thereby produce an ordering of all three
terms. The task was designed to yield richer evidence (because we now have
three terms, there are six orderings instead of just AC and CA, and these are
completely independent of validity). The source–founding model predicts that
the middle term should often come ﬁrst in a description of the critical individual
for a problem. This is the pattern Stenning and Yule observed – in fact the
commonest term order of all is BAC.
Mental models theory predicts, on the basis of some claims about “ﬁrst-
in, ﬁrst-out” memory, that middle terms always should come between the end
terms. As we shall see, this aspect of the theory is a covert incorporation of syn-
tactic information into the supposedly purely semantic representations. Though
mental model theory never sought any evidence that this kind of memory was
involved, it explained the ordering on the basis of memory theories. In fact,
the term order regularity predicted (with B in the middle) turns out not to be
observed in the individuals task data, so the task requiring the description of
critical individuals provides evidence that this kind of memory is not involved
in holding term order. More generally, the fact that subjects readily adapt to the
“individual identiﬁcation task” provides empirical support for the cognitive rel-
10. The connection to discourse processing will be elaborated on page 329.
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evance of the logical analysis of how syllogisms relate to discourse processing
– the underlying basis for the source-founding model. Furthermore, the new
task shows that at least a substantial minority of subjects are capable of iden-
tifying the critical individuals which underlie the nonstandard u-conclusions
from two negative premises, discussed earlier. This shows remarkable ﬂexibil-
ity. Although subjects in the standard task appear to be able to exploit some
implicit knowledge of Aristotle’s principle that two negative premises gener-
ate no valid conclusion (i.e., subjects ﬁnd these easier problems than problems
with one positive premise), subjects nevertheless can identify these nonstandard
inferences when they are given the novel individual-identiﬁcation task.
So the Stenning and Yule model conceives of syllogistic reasoning as subjects
choosing a source premise which founds a description of a critical individual.
It is this model which we now expand in order to capture the individual differ-
ences observed with regard to how interpretation determines reasoning.
10.5.4 Incorporating Interpretation Factors into the Reasoning Model
The individual differences particularly revolve around grammar, premise order,
and the negative quantiﬁers Some not and No, particularly the latter quantiﬁer.
In the statistical model of term order, all subjects have a tendency to make AC
conclusions, but hesitant subjects have a stronger tendency. All subjects have
a strong tendency to preserve the grammatical status of the end terms from
the premises in their conclusions, but hesitant subjects have a much stronger
such tendency, especially in the second syllogistic ﬁgure11 (where it operates
against premise order). These observations can be directly accommodated in
the source–founding model – hesitant subjects simply weigh these factors in
their decisions about which premise to choose as source, and that makes sense
because grammar and premise order are forms of information packaging, and
hesitant subjects are especially sensitive to that. But these tendencies also in-
teract with the negative quantiﬁers. So the tendency for hesitant subjects to be
especially guided by grammar in the second syllogistic ﬁgure, interacts with No
so that they have a stronger tendency to keep the end term of the No premise
in predicate position, in the second ﬁgure. Rash-on-inverted subjects have the
opposite tendency to treat No less differently than the other quantiﬁers, and
rash-in-place subjects treat Some not less differently. As far as we know these
observations about negative quantiﬁers are novel.
Why should the individual differences affect these negative quantiﬁers? First,
there is the general fact that negative information is more easily processed when
it is preceded by a positive frame (see, e.g., Wason [294]). There is also an in-
teresting duality in the way that Some not can be encoded. One can think of
it positively as an existential assertion of a predicate’s complement; or nega-
11. For the syllogistic ﬁgures, see table 10.1.
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tively as the denial of a universal assertion of the predicate. It is possible that
the former is preferred by rash-on-inverted subjects, and the latter by hesitant
subjects, who would then prefer to keep the negative information late in the
sentence. Which brings us to the interactions with No. Here there are logically
special circumstances: in the classical competence model No premises never
obligatorily contribute subject terms to valid conclusions, and this is reﬂected
in the source–founding model by the fact that it never makes No premises’
end terms into subjects. It seems that hesitant subjects are especially attuned
to these logical regularities. So all these factors can be incorporated into the
heuristics in the source–founding model and thereby affect the conclusion term
orders observed in different groups of subjects. The model extended by some
individual difference factors is represented in ﬁgure 10.9.
Figure 10.9 Interpretation factors incorporated into source premise choice. The named inter-
pretation factor (hesitant, Rash-I) intensiﬁes the effect of the arrow. The effects of source premise
choice once made play out as before.
But we can go further and see whether these ordering phenomena are causally
connected with reasoning accuracy (as deﬁned classically) or whether they are
just information packaging, epiphenomenal to the real conclusion drawing pro-
cess. We can go back to the conclusion data and analyse subsets of subjects and
problems where the source-founding model tells us there should be particularly
illuminating effects on accuracy if the model is really about reasoning and not
just about packaging one’s conclusions once one has drawn them.
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In order to get a better handle on the complex data, we classiﬁed pairs of
syllogistic problems which are identical, save for their premise ordering (e.g.,
All A are B. All B are C. and All B are A. All C are B. are such a pair).
The twenty-seven problems with valid conclusions are composed of thirteen
such pairs and one singleton which is symmetric about this ordering. The
source-founding model now provides a criterion for deﬁning a canonical and
noncanonical ordering of each pair: source premises come ﬁrst in canonical
pairs; nonsource in noncanonical pairs. The intuition is that getting ﬁrst the
premise on which a representation is going to be built should be easier. The one
All/All problem symmetric about reordering (namely All A are B. All B are C)
is canonical. Note that this deﬁnition of canonical problems according to the
source-founding model means that No premises are always second premises in
canonical problems. This observation helps greatly in understanding what the
statistical model means, because the effects of No in the statistical model are
much greater when it is in premise 2. Now to an analysis of reasoning accuracy.
We can ask for any pair of problems and any group of subjects whether they
ﬁnd the canonical problem or its noncanonical counterpart easier (in the sense
of getting a higher proportion of problems classically correct). Since the only
difference between these pairs of problems is the ordering of the premises, if
there is an effect of canonicality on accuracy of reasoning, then premise order is
playing a role in subjects’ strategies for ﬁnding source premises and construct-
ing conclusions. The obvious two subject groups to explore ﬁrst are hesitant
subjects and rash-on-inverted subjects, since these two groups are essentially
disjoint, and at opposite extremes with regard to their sensitivity to informa-
tion packaging. The critical problems that should be particularly revealing are
problems where the simple source-founding algorithm tries to put negated pred-
icates into subject position – these are the problems where the classical logical
competence model needs to make complex adjustments to get the right conclu-
sions.
There is just one problem pair (out of thirteen) for which the heuristic of
adding the end term of the nonsource premise to the end of the source-premise,
rules out drawing a valid conclusion. This is the fourth ﬁgure pair Some B
are not A. All B are C. (canonical) and All B are A. Some B are not C.
(noncanonical). The conclusion–drawing heuristic (attach the end term of the
nonsource premise to the end of the source premise, and remove the middle
term) applied to these problems yields the conclusion Some A are not C. for
the canonical problem and Some C are not A. for noncanonical, whereas the
valid conclusions are the other way round.
This pair of problems therefore provides an interesting test case for interac-
tions between interpretation patterns and reasoning accuracy, as mediated by
conclusion term ordering. We can usefully compare this problem pair with two
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other pairs. The problem of the third ﬁgure that has the same quantiﬁers and
has valid conclusions which are found by the source–founding and conclusion–
drawing heuristics is Some A are not B. All C are B. (canonical) and All A
are B. Some C are not B. (noncanonical). The simple heuristics work on these
problems because the end terms are both subjects, just as they fail to work in
the earlier example from the fourth ﬁgure because the end terms are both pred-
icates. The second insightful comparison is with the pairs from the ﬁrst and
second ﬁgures where canonicality is resolved only by grammar: All A are B.
All B are C. (canonical) and All B are A. All C are B. (noncanonical). Since
grammar is a powerful resolver of conclusion term order for all interpretation
groups, and it does not interact with All, this problem pair provides a control.12
Predictions Canonicality interacting with the source–founding heuristics
makes rather precise predictions about hesitant and rash-on-inverted questions
subjects’ reasoning accuracy for these three pairs of problems. TheAll/All prob-
lem pair should show a reasoning accuracy advantage for the canonical problem
over the noncanonical problem for both interpretation groups, because grammar
overrides premise order in determining choice of source.
Hesitant subjects for whom premise order has a strong inﬂuence on choice
of source should show a strong canonicality advantage for the Some not/All
problem pair in the third ﬁgure. Rash-on-inverted questions subjects, who are
not much inﬂuenced by premise order, should show little canonicality effect
on this pair of problems. But for the Some not/All problem pair in the fourth
ﬁgure, hesitant subjects should show a reverse canonicality effect because de-
termining source by premise order gives the right conclusion term order in the
anticanonical problem, and the wrong one in the canonical problem. Again,
rash-on-inverted subjects should show little canonicality effect here.
Statistical Analysis Stenning and Cox’s data set yielded seventeen hesitant
subjects, forty-three rash-on-inverted subjects, and forty-two subjects who were
neither, as controls. Inferential statistics tested for signiﬁcant relationships be-
tween 1) which of the three pairs of problems was posed, 2) the order of pre-
sentation of the premises (i.e. canonicality), and 3) the subject’s interpretation
style (hesitant vs. rash-on-inverted problems), in determining whether the sub-
ject drew classically correct conclusions, or not. The tests showed that while
there were no ﬁrst order or “main” effects, there were signiﬁcant interactions
between 1) type of subject and canonicality, and 2) between all three factors
12. In a paper we did not know about when [262] was written, [7,p. 156] ﬁnd that this same subset of
syllogisms is the only one to distinguish their “visual” and “verbal” subjects: “With the exception of the four
same-form, multi-model syllogisms discussed previously, neither the present study, nor that of Ford, found
any signiﬁcant difference in overall performance across different strategy types . . . ”
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in determining reasoning accuracy. The means for the three-way interaction
appear in table 10.2.
Table 10.2 Combined experiments 1 and 2 data: Mean canonicality advantage on reasoning
accuracy scores adjusted for nonhesitant non-rash-on-inverted mean scores, for three canoni-
cal/noncanonical problem-pairs and for hesitant and rash-on-inverted subject groups: the top
member of each problem-pair is canonical. A positive value means the subjects are more accu-
rate than nonhesitant, non-rash-on-inverted subjects: a negative one means they are less accurate
Subject Group Hesitant Rash-on-inverted
Problem Pair Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
All AB. All BC. So, All AC -.02 .09 -.09 .06
All BA. All CB. So, All CA -.23 .12 -.22 .08
Some A not B. All CB. So, Some A not C +.11 .12 -.16 .08
All AB. Some C not B. So, Some C not A -.16 .12 -.19 .08
Some B not A. All BC. So, Some C not A -.22 .12 -.10 .08
All BA. Some B not C. So, Some A not C +.12 .12 -.17 .08
The interaction is of the form that when grammar identiﬁes source premise,
both hesitant and rash subjects are equal to their nonhesitant nonrash peers
for the canonically ordered problem, but both suffer roughly equally when
the premise order is anticanonical. When grammar does not identify source,
rash subjects suffer relative to their nonrash nonhesitant peers regardless of the
premise order. But now hesitant subjects show a sensitivity to whether premise
order deﬁnes source accurately. In the standard problem where the source iden-
tiﬁed by the model’s heuristics can be used to make the simple construction of
the correct conclusion, hesitant subjects actually outperform their nonhesitant
nonrash peers on the canonically ordered member of the pair, but underper-
form them on the noncanonical member. In the exceptional problem where the
source identiﬁed by the heuristic cannot be so used, they underperform their
peers on the canonically ordered problem but outperform them on the non-
canonical member of the pair. These results are consistent with the idea that
hesitant subjects tend to identify premise 1 as source, whereas rash-on-inverted
subjects are less affected by premise order, and more by grammar and the quan-
tiﬁer attributes that drive the heuristics. Note that whereas there are no global
differences in accuracy, there are large and opposite effects on groups of prob-
lems for different subject groups.
The Source-Founding Model and Individual Differences In summary of the ex-
tensions to the source–founding model, we have shown that effects revealed
by the exploratory statistical model can be incorporated intelligibly into the
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source–founding model as weightings of factors for choosing the source premise.
Hesitant subjects always show greater effects of information packaging: rash-
on-inverted subjects always show more indifference to information packaging.
But we can go further and show that the processes which determine conclu-
sion term order are also instrumental in determining reasoning accuracy. These
ﬁndings are quite dramatic: groups of subjects classiﬁed by their interpretation
patterns exhibit radically different patterns of term ordering, and their ordering
of the difﬁculty of some subsets of problems is quite different. Even if we take
some of the most powerful effects known in the syllogistic reasoning literature
(such as the effect of grammar) the model allows us to ﬁnd subgroups of sub-
jects and subgroups of problems which systematically fail to show these effects,
or even show reversals of them. Group data, in fact, are highly misleading here.
At their worst, they can ﬁt everyone by ﬁtting no one.
One obvious speculation emerging from this work is that hesitant subjects are
using “verbal” representations and rash-on-inverted subjects are using “visual”
representations (such as Euler circles which strip out information packaging).
Ford [84] studied subjects whose reasoning protocols indicate verbal’or visual
strategies for syllogism use. We can reanalyse her summary data on the differ-
ent ordering of problem difﬁculty for these two groups. This analysis shows
that, as one would predict, her visual subjects are less affected by the contrast
between canonical and noncanonical problems than her verbal subjects. The
result approaches signiﬁcance, but it is an analysis with lower power because
there are only twenty-seven problems to be ordered (Ford gives data only for
problems with valid conclusions). Our raw data await further analysis.
However, when we compare our hesitant and rash-on-inverted subjects’ pro-
ﬁles of problem accuracy with her subjects’ proﬁles, the patterns are obscure.
Her subject groups show strong contrasts with both our groups. So there is
some evidence that canonicality plays the predicted roles in visual and verbal
thinking, but there is more to our interpretation differences than visual and ver-
bal representations (which is not surprising). It is perfectly possible to vary
cooperativeness of model with type of representation. It will take further work
to resolve the relation between the interpretation variables and the modality of
representation involved.
Reasoning to an Interpretation Revisited To tie this back to the relation be-
tween interpretation and reasoning, we have shown that there are highly sys-
tematic patterns of naive interpretation of quantiﬁers which can be understood
as affected by the choice of cooperative or adversarial models of communica-
tion in the task, and by differences in susceptibility to information packaging
of propositions. These systematic patterns of interpretation can be shown to be
instrumental in determining subsequent patterns of reasoning provided they are
interpreted in terms of a theory of the relation between models of communica-
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tion and of information packaging.
It is an open question to what extent what we have here discussed under the
heading of “information packaging” includes patterns of inference which are
valid in default logics. As mentioned earlier, the illicit conversion of condi-
tionals is a case of closed–world reasoning. One recent exhaustive attempt to
ﬁt alternative models to syllogistic data (Roberts, Newstead, and Griggs [230]
actually contrasts “conversion” based models with Gricean models, and rejects
the latter. But conversion is Gricean in any larger view. It is very odd to con-
trast conversion theories with Gricean theories. Certainly closed-world reason-
ing offers an interesting framework for exploring the changes brought about in
interpretation and reasoning by moving from a single premise to two premises.
Another aspect of the syllogism that requires elucidation is the role of anaph-
ora in subjects’ processing. The source–founding model emphasizes that syl-
logistic reasoning is discourse processing. Consider a subject disposed to con-
struct a single intended model for the discourse Some A are B. Some B are C.
The speaker constructs a model of the ﬁrst sentence in which some As are Bs.
When the second sentence arrives, what anaphoric relations is such a speaker
likely to impose? The example immediately makes it clear that such syllogisms
are anaphorically problematic, because the only shared term is ﬁrst used as a
predicate and then as a subject. The second sentence’s subject has the indeﬁ-
nite quantiﬁer “some,” and two indeﬁnite phrases in a discourse are prone to be
interpreted as introducing nonidentical referents. This line of reasoning might
yield the response that “it’s different Bs that are C than the ones that are A,”
indicating that the subject has constructed a model with some As that are B
and some other Bs that are C, and so nothing may follow about the relation
between A and C. On the other hand, the general pragmatic forces toward in-
tegration in credulous processing of the only information available pulls in the
other direction toward the response “since there is a shared reference to B and
the speaker intends me to ﬁnd some connection, then the Bs that are C must
be intended to be the same Bs as the ones that are A.” Such reasoning leads to
an intended model in which some As are Cs. So even within a generally cred-
ulous “construct-the-intended-model” construal of the task, subjects may draw
a variety of conclusions. One might object that it is unnatural to treat these
premises as having anaphoric relations. The subjects would undoubtedly agree.
However, if they have a credulous interpretation of the task, resolving these re-
lations is a goal that is forced upon them, and a little subject debrieﬁng does
elicit exactly these kinds of commentaries. Of course, more work is needed to
understand how conversion relates to these anaphoric inferences about existen-
tials.
We noted as a consequence of the existence of critical individuals for valid
syllogisms, that this domain has the peculiar property that, with perfect strategic
choice of model construction and read-off, a reasoner can process credulously
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(i.e. with the goal of deriving a single intended model) yet achieve skeptical
goals (drawing all and only classically valid conclusions). Our data shows that
a high proportion of subjects (80%) show at least some signs of credulous in-
terpretation in the immediate inference task, though the two-premise task then
obscures some of this because “conversion” repackages propositions in such
a way that a substantial minority of subjects now refuse to accept inferences
which are credulously (and sometimes even classically) valid. So the domain is
calculated to make differentiation particularly difﬁcult. Our own hunch is that
empirically what really needs study is the learning process which leads subjects
to differentiate the two stances in this domain. Monaghan and Stenning [195]
make a start on this issue.
These results also raise important questions for pragmatic theories such as
Grice’s, and for the relation between information packaging and language use
more generally. The topic of information packaging does not arise in Grice’s
theorizing. He does not consider whether a statement such as “Some A are
B” generates the implicature that “Some B are not A” (the inverted implica-
ture). If we ask why not, it is obvious that in typical decontextualized natural
language examples, the propositions are already packaged into referring ex-
pressions and properties. Learning elementary logic is learning to stand back
from this prepackaging and think in terms of local interpretations in which both
quantiﬁed expressions and predicates designate sets. When this is done, both in-
place and inverted implicatures become relevant. Standard linguistic methodol-
ogy only studies how information is distributed across grammatical structures
after decisions about subject and predicate terms etc. have been imposed.
As mentioned above (section10.4), the results also raise questions we cannot
settle here about what is to choose between Grice’s approach to pragmatics, and
the defeasible logical approach to credulous processing developed here. There
is much overlap and some contrast. Grice’s approach was not intended to be
computational and employs an indeﬁnitely expressive metalanguage, but might
claim to be comprehensive. Our approach is computational and chooses to
start out from an inexpressive base to account for speciﬁc phenomena, though
without claims to comprehensiveness. Our approach makes some phenomena
treated by Grice as pragmatic into semantic phenomena. It is an open ques-
tion whether the kind of reasoning about epistemic states of speakers described
by Grice actually does go on in language interpretation. Grice himself was
clear that he was not proposing a process model.13 The proposal made above
that theory–of–mind reasoning might be performed in closed–world reasoning
(section 9.4) offers a rather different perspective on this issue. To the extent that
Gricean reasoning can be implemented in such systems it would be expected to
be fast, automatic, and effortless. Just as with system 1 processes in general,
13. For some arguments against too literal a process interpretation see, [25]. For developments of pragmatics
in default frameworks, see [283, 284].
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treatment in these logics rather changes our estimation of their possible content.
Undoubtedly both the devil and the interest reside in the detail.
10.6 Mental Models
As mentioned in chapter 1, and again in chapter 5, the psychology of reasoning
has been dominated by competing claims about a single fundamental reasoning
mechanism employed by all subjects to solve deductive tasks. The results on
the variability of interpretation and its instrumentality in reasoning casts doubt
on this research agenda. Further doubt is cast by the dubious computational
distinguishability of the competing proposals.
Mental models theory can be seen as a development of the founding idea of
Kamp’s “Discourse Representation Theory” [152, 154]: a piece of discourse is
interpreted in a mental representation (“model”), which is itself embedded in
“the world.” Conversely, mental models can be generated by perception, and
can be used as conceptual structure underlying language.
10.6.1 Experimental Evidence
It is possible to investigate experimentally whether a particular piece of dis-
course is stored in memory verbatim or in the form of a situation described by
the discourse. We give two examples.
Bransford, Barclay and Franks [24] provide evidence that recalled sentences
are inferences from explicitly presented material–this can easily be explained if
people construct a model of discourse, and “read off” what is true there. e.g.,
when given the sentence
Three turtles rested on a ﬂoating log and a ﬁsh swam beneath them
subjects later confused it with
Three turtles rested on a ﬂoating log and a ﬁsh swam beneath it.
Secondly, recall of a piece of discourse is facilitated if the discourse deter-
mines a unique model. Compare for instance
The spoon is to the left of the knife.
The plate is to the right of the knife.
The fork is in front of the spoon.
The cup is in front of the knife.
and
The spoon is to the left of the knife.
The plate is to the right of the spoon.
The fork is in front of the spoon.
The cup is in front of the knife.
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The difference between these two sets is that the ﬁrst determines a unique
model, whereas the second doesn’t. Stenning [259, 260] andMani and Johnson-
Laird [179] found in several experiments that (a) the verbal recall of indetermi-
nate description is better than that for determinate description, and (b) the gist
of a determinate description can be recalled much more accurately than that of
an indeterminate description. These results lend support to the conclusion that
memory stores representations of models (for determinate descriptions) and of
verbal material (for indeterminate descriptions).
10.6.2 What Is a Mental Model?
That is, does there exist a principled way to distinguish between mental mod-
els and linguistic representations? Stenning [258] makes a distinction between
direct and indirect representations, where the former do not have syntax. The
distinction can be illustrated using the concept of a ﬁrst–order model. Such
a model can be completely speciﬁed by indicating which tuples of elements
belong to which predicates. Another way of thinking about this form of spec-
iﬁcation is this: introduce names for all elements in the domain of the model,
and construct the atomic diagram, the set of atomic sentences true on the model.
Atomic sentences without further syntactic structure beyond that of predication:
this is typical for a direct representation, where no further parsing is necessary.
Alternatively, a (ﬁnite) model could be completely speciﬁed by a single ﬁrst–
order sentence. To construct the model of this sentence, the latter has to be
decomposed syntactically and the truth deﬁnition has to be applied to the com-
ponents. This is typical of indirect representation: all the information is given
in the representation, but not in transparent form. It is the aim of mental mod-
els to provide a direct representation, but as will be seen we have some doubts
about the success of this enterprise.
10.6.3 The “Algorithm” of the Mental Models Theory
The theory tries to steer a midcourse between rule theories, which purportedly
fail because of content effects such as discussed in chapters 3 and 7, and “no
logic” theories, which go counter to the observation that subjects are able to
make valid deductions when pressed. Johnson-Laird claims that the process of
deduction goes through the following stages:
1. Reasoners use general knowledge to interpret the premises given and as a
result come up with an internal model.
2. The model is scanned for interesting information not yet explicitly contained
in the premises; if there is such information, this is offered as a putative
conclusion, if not, the conclusion is that nothing follows.
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3. Reasoners now try to validate the putative conclusion by looking for alter-
native models of the premises where that conclusion is false.
If there is such a model, the prudent reasoners will return to the second stage to try
to discover whether there is any conclusion true in all the models they have so far
constructed. If so, then it is necessary to search for counterexamples to it, and so on,
until the set of possible models has been exhausted. Because the number of possible
mental models is ﬁnite for deductions that depend on quantiﬁers and connectives, the
search can in principle be exhaustive. (Johnson-Laird and Byrne [144,pp. 35-6])
The reference to ﬁniteness here is incomprehensible, at least when iterations
of quantiﬁers are allowed. This is because the set of ﬁrst–order sentences true
on all ﬁnite models is strictly larger than those true on all models: the logic of
ﬁnite models is nonclassical.14 So we must assume the authors want to restrict
themselves to syllogistic reasoning, for which small models sufﬁce. Taken in
this way, it highlights one of the aims of mental models theory: to construct a
“psychologically viable” alternative to logic by eliminating the latter’s inﬁni-
ties. Johnson-Laird likes to quote a remark due to Barbara Partee to the effect
that “an inﬁnite set is far too big to ﬁt inside anyone’s head.” This depends, of
course: most inﬁnite sets of interest have compact ﬁnite descriptions. In any
case
The psychological theory therefore assumes that people construct a minimum of models:
they try to work with just a single representative sample from the set of possible models,
until they are forced to consider alternatives. (Johnson-Laird and Byrne [144,p. 36])
It remains to come up with an algorithm that chooses the “single representative
sample” and that guides the search for alternatives. Presentations of this subject
are notoriously hazy (see Hodges’ criticism of mental models in [128];[129]),
but we will try to be charitable.
We consider the mental models approach to syllogisms only. Take a premise
like “all of the athletes are bakers.” The “initial model” would be a partial
structure containing elements a, b (for athletes and bakers, respectively), to-
gether with some indication of which predicates can be further extended, and
which cannot. Johnson-Laird and Byrne use the notation
a b
to mean that a is also a b, and
[a] b
[a] b
. . .
for the situation in which the predicate “athlete” cannot be further extended
(beyond the two athletes explicitly listed), in contrast to “baker” or indeed any
14. This is known as Trahktenbrot’s theorem. See, for instance, Boolos, Jeffrey, and Burgess [21,p. 135].
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other predicate. Such a partial structure (called an implicit model by Johnson–
Laird and Byrne) can be ﬂeshed out to obtain a fully classical structure (called
an explicit model). For example, the above partial structure could be ﬂeshed
out to
[a] [b]
[a] [b]
[¬a] [b]
[¬a] [¬b]
By ¬a an element is meant that is not an athlete.
On the basis of the partial model, a conclusion is formulated, which (ideally)
is then tested for validity by searching for counterexamples. This can be done
either by ﬂeshing out the initial partial model, or by moving to a different ini-
tial model. For example, although the initial model validates “all the bakers
are athletes,” the ﬂeshed–out model refutes this. The claim is that the assump-
tion of this procedure explains all aspects of reasoning performance, including
common errors and response times.
We proceed to give a few initial, implicit models for other syllogistic premises
(taken from Johnson-Laird and Byrne [144]).
Some of the athletes are bakers.
a b
a b
. . .
None of the athletes is a baker.
[a]
[a]
[b]
[b]
Here, the empty space to the right of the a indicates that there is no b such that
a is b; and likewise for the empty space to the left of the b.
Some of the athletes are not bakers.
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a
a
a [b]
[b]
. . .
The principles guiding the construction of these smallest models are some-
what unclear. Note that the implicit model for the ﬁrst sentence is compatible
with “all athletes are bakers,” whereas the implicit model for the third sentence
is not compatible with “none of the athletes are bakers.” No reason for this
asymmetry is given. It is also unclear why some of the lines are reduplicated.
We so far considered arguments with a single premise only. When two
premises have to be combined, complications arise. Consider
All the athletes are bakers.
All the bakers are canoeists.
A partial model for the ﬁrst premise is
[a] b
[a] b
. . .
and for the second premise
[b] c
[b] c
. . .
How are these to be combined? The intended meaning of the square brackets
excludes the fused partial structure
[a] [b] c
[a] [b] c
. . .
because then suddenly “all bakers are athletes” would be true in all ﬂeshed–out
models. Johnson-Laird and Byrne opt for the representation
[[a] b] c
[[a] b] c
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. . .
which is supposed to mean that all pairs [[a] b] have been listed explicitly.
Notice, however, that we have now moved to pure syntax. Whereas [a] could
be interpreted as a metalanguage device to indicate that all elements a are ex-
plicitly listed, the iteration of the square brackets requires their presence in
the object language, and even then their interpretation is not very perspicu-
ous. Johnson-Laird and Byrne offer the interpretation “a is exhausted with
respect to b, and b is exhausted with respect to c,” but this gloss destroys the
original meaning of [a] as being exhausted tout court. In logical terms, the
difﬁculty can be put thus. If we read the collection of [a] b as an abbre-
viation for ∀x(Ax → Bx), then the collection of [a] [b] c would proba-
bly mean something like ∀y(∀x(Ax → Bx) → Cy), which is equivalent to
∀x(Ax→ Bx) → ∀yCy, and this is not what we want. It almost goes without
saying that formation rules for the [. . . ]–construct are not given.
It is perhaps best to think of the square bracket notation in graphical terms.
Consider the expression [[a] b] c. This is analogous to an Euler circle repre-
sentation of sets A,B,C, with A ⊆ B ⊆ C and distinguished elements (i.e.,
crosses) a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C. The added twist is that extensions of the
predicates must leave the arrangement of the Euler circles intact. Interestingly,
however, it is much less natural to think of Euler circles as representing a par-
tial model, since the circles neatly abstract from the number of elements in the
model.
The next question is how to read off a conclusion concerning athletes and
canoeists from the combined model. This is done by stripping the model of its
square brackets; we then see that all athletes are canoeists, and no extension of
the partial model can invalidate this conclusion. Let us see how this works in a
more difﬁcult case.
All of the bakers are athletes.
None of the bakers is a canoeist.
A partial model for the ﬁrst premise is
[b] a
[b] a
. . .
and for the second premise we get
[b]
[b]
[c]
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[c]
The combined model is something like
[a [b][
[a [b]]
[c]
[c]
. . .
which is meant to suggest that triples like
a b c
are excluded. This model supports the conclusion
None of the canoeists is an athlete.
which is apparently not uncommon. A ﬂeshed–out model such as
[a [b]]
[a [b]]
a [c]
a [c]
. . .
invalidates this conclusion, and supports
Some of the athletes are not canoeists.
It will be clear from the above exposition that Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s
claim to have provided an ‘algorithm’ for deduction should be taken with a
grain of salt. The choice of the initial implicit model is not completely deter-
mined; neither is the ﬂeshing out. However, with a number of more or less
arbitrary assumptions added, the above can be cast in the form of a computer
program, for which see Bara et al. [11].
338 10 Syllogisms and Beyond
10.6.4 Predictions
It is the aim of mental models theory to be able to predict both correct perfor-
mance when it occurs, and frequently occurring errors. One important determi-
nant of successful performance is taken to be the number of models that must
be constructed before a valid conclusion is obtained. Thus, for example, the
syllogism with premises
All the athletes are bakers.
All the bakers are canoeists.
is supposed to require only one model, in the sense that ﬂeshing out does not
change the conclusion read off from the implicit model. This is supposed to be
in contrast to the situation for the syllogism
All of the bakers are athletes.
None of the bakers is a canoeist.
As indicated above, Johnson-Laird and Byrne claim that the conclusion read
off from the implicit model is
None of the canoeists is an athlete.
However, the valid conclusion
Some of the athletes are not canoeists.
can also be read off from the implicit model. It will also not do to say that people
read off the strongest possible conclusion from an implicit model, because in
that case the premises
All the athletes are bakers.
All the bakers are canoeists.
would lead to the initial conclusion
Athletes are bakers and conversely.
This conclusion would of course be invalidated by the ﬂeshing out of the im-
plicit model, but then it is difﬁcult to see what is meant by saying that this
syllogism needs only one model.
The consequences of the fact that mental models, unlike logical models, con-
tain syntactic structure (the square brackets) are of two kinds. First, the syntac-
tic structure of the input premises has to be maintained somehow in order for
mental models to make the required behavioral predictions, for example, of con-
clusion term order. As we saw in the previous sections, grammatical structure
is actually the most heavily weighted factor in the determination of conclusion
term order. Mental models theory’s appeal to ﬁrst-in, ﬁrst-out working memory
and “cancellation operations” to remove the middle term is a covert attempt to
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carry through this information into the conclusion through the sequential struc-
ture of the models. But we saw that the predicted conclusion term orders (with
B central) are not the commonest orders observed in the individuals task. Sec-
ond, these issues – syntactic components and sequential structure in the models
– become critical when cognitive scientists attempt to map reasoning processes
onto the brain. Sometimes considerations of neural representation are even in-
voked to adjudicate between mental rules and mental models, as in the work of
Goel and colleagues (see quotes above 119 and 119). It then seems possible to
set up an experiment to distinguish between the two theories, by using exper-
imental evidence that language processing is localized in the left hemisphere,
and spatial processing in the parietal cortex (chieﬂy on the right). If a subject
shows no activation in the parietal cortex while reasoning, this is taken to be
evidence against the involvement of spatial processing, and hence ultimately
against mental models. A result of this kind was indeed obtained by Goel and
his colleagues [100]. However, if mental models contain linguistic components
after all, the hypothesis that their neural correlate must be situated in the right
parietal cortex becomes much less plausible.
10.6.5 Conclusion: The Logic of Mental Models
The confusions inherent in mental models theory are nicely illustrated (albeit
unwittingly) in the following quotation from Ruth Byrne [28,p. 78]:
The model-based theory assumes that once one has an adequate explanation of compre-
hension, there is no need for the mobilization of any elaborate machinery for reason-
ing, neither of syntactic rules proposed by formal theories, nor of domain-speciﬁc rules
favoured by pragmatic theories. On the contrary, reasoning depends on a search for coun-
terexamples to conclusions, but ordinary individuals do not have a simple deterministic
procedure for making such a search. (cf. Newell and Simon [199]).
The claim is thus that mental models theory is “semantic” in the sense that it
rests completely on a theory of natural language understanding; this would ren-
der the application of rules superﬂuous. But then, what is involved in natural
language comprehension? The assignment of an implicit mental model obvi-
ously does not depend on the full semantic content of a sentence such as “all
athletes are bakers,” but it depends on the logical form of this sentence. This is
what allows Johnson-Laird to represent the sentence “all athletes are bakers” in
the form
[a] b
[a] b
. . .
abstracting from all other information.
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In fact, an important component of comprehension is precisely assigning log-
ical form. Once a logical form has been chosen, representing this as a mental
model in the sense of Johnson-Laird is a triviality, because, due to the incor-
poration of logical devices such as negation and the universal quantiﬁer, such a
mental model is a notational variant of a sentence of predicate logic. Thus, there
is nothing inherently semantic in this notion of a mental model. In this respect
it should be sharply distinguished from ordinary ﬁrst–order models, which can
be characterized by sets of atomic sentences.
A reasoner now supposedly reads off a purported conclusion from a mental
model constructed from the premises. Since the mental model is essentially
a sentence in a formal language, this involves checking whether one sentence
follows from another, and this is deﬁnitely not reading off when the sentences
involved are complex. Similarly, checking whether the conclusion is true in
other models of the premises again involves determining whether one sentence
follows from another. Thus, reasoning processes are involved which are not
described by the mental models theory.
All this can be illustrated in a more perspicuous manner with the help of se-
mantic tableaux, which avoid the various red herrings of mental models theory.
This proof procedure is semantic in the sense that it provides a systematic way
to construct a ﬁrst–order model which veriﬁes the premises and falsiﬁes the
conclusion of an argument, if such a model exists. Models constructed in this
manner are true models in that they are fully speciﬁed by a domain and relations
(and/or functions) on that domain; the model does not incorporate syntax. But
the construction itself proceeds stepwise and is fully guided by logical rules of
the type “if ∀xϕ(x) is false, then there must be some new individual a such
that ϕ(a) is false.” These rules are very similar to the rules proposed by the
rule theorists; indeed, there exists a canonical way to transform a tableau proof
into a natural deduction proof. A mental models theorist might object that even
so, there still is a distinction between rules operating on formulas, and rules
guiding the construction of representations or models. This distinction is spu-
rious, however, because semantic tableaux can be viewed equivalently as fully
syntactic procedures, by treating the elements introduced in the course of the
construction simply as constants of the language.
It will be clear from the above exposition that Johnson-Laird and Byrne have
inadvertently tried to reinvent logic, while claiming to provide an alternative. In
itself that is already an interesting result. Stripped of its extravagant claims and
notational muddle, the mental models theory embodies a simple logical point.
What the mental models theory has in common with Kamp’s Discourse repre-
sentation theory ([155, 152]) is the emphasis on partial models. Now partial
models do not seem to be very helpful in the case of syllogisms, because the
full models are so small in any case, but they may be helpful for more advanced
arguments.
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10.6.6 Morals from Syllogisms?
Once one drops the idea that the data presented in the psychological literature
bear on the rules vs. models debate, several important conclusions can be drawn
from the data of syllogistic reasoning, both theoretical and methodological.
The results demonstrate once again the importance of interpretation in un-
derstanding tasks which have generally been taken to be about derivation from
interpretations. The source–founding model
is designed to capitalize on the logical peculiarities of the domain, which
make credulous processing of discourse come so close to skeptical classical rea-
soning. Thus the full panoply of discourse representation theory is transferred
to the problem of understanding interpretation in these tasks. Exploration of
the data from the immediate inference task reveals just how strong credulous
interpretation still is in this task, and how it is intimately connected to subject-
predicate structure. This in turn highlights how both forward implicature and
“conversion” are closely related credulous patterns of reasoning, rather than op-
posed psychological theories. The combination of bottom-up statistical model-
ing with top-down process modeling illustrates how the two complement each
other in an exploratory empirical program of research which links experiment
to theories from outside psychology. It does this in an area where there had
been an explicit failed attempt to link through the usual methods of operational-
ization ([201]). Empirically, an important gain is the unearthing of qualitative
individual differences in interpretation. The last chapter will examine what this
means for the vexed question of rationality in reasoning.

P A R T I I I
Is Psychology Hard or
Impossible?

345
Whenever anybody interprets evidence from any source, and his interpretation
contains characteristics that cannot be referred wholly to direct sensory
observation or perception, this person thinks. The bother is that nobody has
ever been able to ﬁnd any case of the human use of evidence which does not
include characters that run beyond what is directly observed by the senses. So,
according to this, people think whenever they do anything at all with evidence.
If we adopt that view we very soon ﬁnd ourselves looking out upon a
boundless and turbulent ocean of problems. (F.C. Bartlett, Thinking [13,p. 1])

11 Rationality Revisited
11.1 Logic and Information–Processing
Logic plays several roles in this book. We studied overt reasoning, and found
that classical logic is not always adhered to, nor need it be, because there are
many domains in which it is not a reasonable competence model. Instead we
found that the domain of discourse processing is governed by a form of non-
monotonic logic as a competence model, namely closed–world reasoning; if
subjects approach a reasoning task in “discourse processing mode” they are
therefore quite likely to apply closed–world reasoning to it. This explained the
pattern of performance in, for instance, the suppression task (chapter 7). Chap-
ters 8 and 9 bring a subtle shift in perspective, in that the exclusive association
between logic and overt reasoning is loosened. In chapter 8 we emphasized
the automatic aspect of closed world reasoning by exhibiting a class of neural
networks capable of executing closed–world computations. In chapter 9 we
went one step further and established a formal link between performance on a
nonverbal task (the box task) and the suppression task – both can be seen as
instances of closed–world reasoning about possible exceptions – and showed
that autistic subjects’ behavior on the suppression task is as predicted by their
performance on the box task. Both patterns of performance were then related
to deﬁciencies in inhibition for which neurological evidence has been found.1
What conception of logic emerges from these considerations? Evidently we
claim for logic a much wider role in cognition than is customarily assumed, in
a complete reversal of the tendency to push logic to the fringes, in the wake of
results allegedly establishing its irrelevance to human reasoning.2
1. Our paper [267] applies the same method to ADHD. We analyse the formal structure of a task where
performance of children with ADHD is impaired (the Go/No Go task) and ﬁnd the same structure in a story-
telling task. As a consequence we can predict aberrations in narrative performance (e.g., uses of verb tense),
for which there indeed turns out to be evidence.
2. This chapter owes much to conversations with Theodora Achourioti, who drew our attention to the philo-
sophical distinction between regulative and constitutive norms. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that
logic is normative in the latter sense.
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11.1.1 Information Processing
The common denominator of all the applications of logic that we studied is that
logic allows one to extract information from given data – and that constraints
have to be added to these data to allow information extraction to take place. In
itself this characterization of logic is not very distinctive, since this is what all
information–processing is about, as we will see shortly. Nevertheless, a closer
look at what information–processing consists in will give us many clues to a
more mature view of logical reasoning.
As a starting point we look again at David Marr’s three levels of cognitive
inquiry
1. identiﬁcation of the information–processing task as an input–output func-
tion;
2. speciﬁcation of an algorithm which computes that function;
3. neural implementation of the algorithm speciﬁed.
We will now look in more detail at the ﬁrst two levels, using the example of
vision. As is well-known, Marr [183] characterized vision as the extraction of
3D shapes from 2D retinal arrays, and his work is concerned with the various
processes that are necessary to this end. For example, in a ﬁrst step edges are
extracted from the retinal array by computing second derivatives of the inten-
sity distribution: sharp changes in intensity indicate the presence of an edge.3
The most important deﬁning feature of the information processing task is the
choice of representation languages for input and output. These are mathemati-
cal languages, and the algorithm deﬁned in the second level operates on entities
expressible in these languages. It follows that the information–processing task
as conceived at the ﬁrst level is an ideal construct only. The identiﬁcation of
a particular information–processing task can be viewed as the stipulation of a
competence model, but only if it is ﬁrmly kept in mind that even optimal perfor-
mance can only approximate the competence model, because the actual input
will only be an approximation to the idealized input postulated by the com-
petence model (in this case a twice differentiable intensity function). A good
algorithm will allow “graceful degradation”: the closer the actual input is to the
input required for the competence model, the closer will be the output. That is,
since the actual input will never fully satisfy the input requirements for the com-
petence model, the algorithm must be able to cope with deviations from those
requirements. Performance is optimal if it proceeds in accordance with such
a “graceful” algorithm. The neural implementation of the algorithm (the third
3. We must note here that the standard phrase “extract information” has the unfortunate connotation of
information already being present in the data, albeit perhaps in hidden form. This is not what we mean; even
in such a mundane case as vision, there is no sense in which the information sought, e.g., the edge, is fully
present in the data. In logical reasoning this is even less true, as we shall see in section 11.1.2.
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level) may be such, however, that optimal performance cannot be achieved.
Performance may also be optimal, even though its results are way off the mark,
when the algorithm works only under certain constraints on the world or on the
relation between viewer and world.
This can be seen most clearly at higher levels of processing, for instance in
deriving surface geometry from an image, the problem of how to determine a
3D shape from surface information. Marr writes [183,p. 265-6]
[An] interesting aspect of all these processes is that . . . they all involve slightly different
assumptions about the world in order to work satisfactorily. As we have seen, in each case
the surface structure is strictly underdetermined from the information in images alone,
and the secret of formulating the processes accurately lies in discovering precisely what
additional information can safely be assumed about the world that provides powerful
enough constraints for the processes to run – for example, uniqueness and continuity in
stereopsis, rigidity in [structure from] motion, and so forth.
These “powerful constraints” are not present in the data to be processed them-
selves. One very good reason for this is that the constraints often concern the
relation between the viewer and the world. For instance, one of Marr’s assump-
tions is that (very roughly speaking) nearby points in an image correspond to
nearby points on the viewed object. A different type of constraint is concerned
with the world, in this case, for instance, that real-world surfaces can be de-
scribed as smooth manifolds in the mathematical sense. Given these constraints
(and several others) it is possible to extract information about the shape gener-
ating a retinal image; it is now a mathematical theorem that such a shape must
be a “generalized cone.”4 More generally, if the surface is composed of several
smooth pieces, it must be generated by an object consisting of several gener-
alized cones. This mathematical result provides the competence model, the
ideal norm against which performance must be judged. Possible performance
is described by the algorithm (Marr’s second level) which corresponds to the
competence model. The algorithm can be deﬁned only on the basis of the the-
orem, because it determines what the inputs and outputs are; however, it must
do more than transform information about the idealized surface assumed in the
condition of the theorem into a generalized cone. It must allow graceful degra-
dation and also give meaningful results on surfaces which satisfy the constraints
only approximately. The algorithm ‘appeals to’ the (ideal) competence in this
sense.
This brief description of information–processing in a concrete case has high-
lighted several issues of signiﬁcance also for logic.
1. The competence model (Marr’s top level) is relative to the information–
processing task considered.
4. The shape generated by a cross-section moving along an axis, where the cross-section may change in size
continuously.
350 11 Rationality Revisited
2. The competence model is stated in terms of ideal, mathematical entities and
is as such not directly applicable to the real world.
3. Possible performance is described by an algorithm allowing graceful degra-
dation, thus bringing the competence model in closer contact with the world.
4. The information sought is strictly underdetermined by the information present
in the data.
5. Constraints, that is, hypotheses about the world and about the process gen-
erating the data, are needed to further determine the information ‘extracted’
from the data.
11.1.2 Logic as Information–Processing
We view logic as continuous with information–processing in the above sense,
distinguished from the examples discussed above only by a different choice of
representation languages for input and output. But the commonalities leap to
the eye.
Logic is very much task-relative. Consider a mathematical example: if the
task is to prove existence theorems with algorithmic content, one uses intu-
itionistic logic; however, if one is satisﬁed with abstract existence, classical
logic sufﬁces.
A logical formalism, taken as a norm, should be viewed as a competence
model in the sense deﬁned above. It is ideal in two different senses of the term:
ﬁrst because it operates with idealized input and output, and second because it
gives an ideal norm as a mapping from (idealized) input to (idealized) output.
There is no reason to expect that actual performance, even when optimal, will
always conform to the norm set by the competence model. For example, one
idealization in the deﬁnition of the competence model is the use of deﬁnite
premise sets to draw conclusions from. This is a situation one seldom meets in
practice, where usually any available evidence is used to draw conclusions. The
big question raised by this observation is how to deﬁne a notion of “graceful
degradation” that makes performance an approximation to the ideal norm.
As in vision, the data (here: the premises) vastly underdetermine the infor-
mation to be extracted (a conclusion). We have observed throughout the course
of this book that the psychology of reasoning has suffered as a consequence of
its neglect of this fundamental fact. We have termed the combination of (2) and
(5) in the list given in section 11.1.1, which jointly allow determinate informa-
tion to be extracted, logical form, and the process of arriving at a logical form,
reasoning to an interpretation.5 Here, the term reasoning should not be read as
necessarily implying awareness.
5. The role assigned here to logical form is reminiscent of what Bruner in his famous book Beyond the
information given called a coding system: “We propose that when one goes beyond the information given,
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Logical form starts with the choice of representation languages for input
(premises) and output (conclusion).6 Another component of logical form is
a mathematically deﬁned class of structures; this idealization is the analogue of
the smoothness assumption for surfaces considered above. The deﬁnitions of
satisfaction and truth for the languages are the analogues of Marr’s constraint
linking viewer and world.
One very important role of logical form is facilitating the integration of prem-
ises into the joint representation that is necessary before any conclusion can be
drawn. For example, one could say that in propositional closed–world rea-
soning, the premises are integrated through the completion (cf. deﬁnition 5 in
chapter 7) before a conclusion is drawn. By contrast, in classical propositional
logic, integration involves the set of all truth–value assignments which make the
premises true, or, syntactically speaking, a suitable disjunctive normal form. In
both cases it is pertinent, although trivial, to note that two key ingredients in
logical form – the formal language and the semantics – have recursive deﬁni-
tions, thus allowing the representation of the premises in a common format. For
a (trivial) example, consider MP: of course the inference of “She will study late
in the library” from (1) “She has an essay” and (2) “If she has an essay she
will study late in the library” is possible only if (1) and (2) can be represented
in a common formal language with common semantics. We shall see another
instance of this type of integration in syllogisms.
In Kantian terms, we may think of the activity of imposing logical form and
integrating the premises in a single representation as synthesis; this synthesis is
a priori since the logical form imposed is not determined by experience, but a
constraint contributed by cognition. One needs logical form in order to be able
to extract information, but it is as little given in the data as an edge is given
in the retinal array. Both the formal language and the semantics are deﬁned
recursively so are mathematical constructs. We may thus say that inferences in
reasoning are synthetic a priori, because they depend on the synthesis a priori
just outlined. To give a concrete example: if in the suppression task the sub-
ject draws an MP inference, this is based on the assignment of a logical form
(including integration of the premises) which could have been different.
Note that on the view outlined here, logical reasoning does not require aware-
ness; whether or not reasoning is accompanied by awareness depends entirely
on the algorithms imposing the logical form (“reasoning to an interpretation”)
and those performing the information extraction on the joint representation of
the data (“reasoning from an interpretation”). For example, reasoning in the
suppression task proceeds unconsciously (at least for the forward inferences
one does so by being able to place the present given in a more generic coding system and that one essentially
reads off from the coding system additional information.” [26,p. 224].
6. These languages can be different, as in logic programming, where formulas in the input may contain→,
but not so formulas in the output.
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MP and DA) because here the algorithm imposing logical form on the premises
is in fact the algorithm for integrating discourse generally, and the implementa-
tion of the algorithm doing the information extraction is the relaxation toward
a stable state of a neural network.7 Since classical (predicate) logic is undecid-
able, no such automatic procedure for reasoning from an already chosen classi-
cal logical form is possible there, and a control process of which the subject is
aware is necessary to correct false moves in attempts to establish a conclusion.
This means that for all practical purposes the proof of a conclusion from given
premises is itself a separate source of information, not in any meaningful sense
already present in the set of premises.
11.1.3 On Why We are Not Postmodern Relativists
The foregoing analysis should have dispelled the impression that we believe
anything goes in matters of logical reasoning. The theorist’s decision to apply
closed–world reasoning in the analysis of the suppression task is not arbitrary:
it is dictated by a hypothesis about the real-world task – in this case credu-
lous discourse understanding – that the subject assimilates the suppression task
to. Once that real-world task has been determined, the logical form is more or
less ﬁxed as the competence model for that task. The logical form is an ideal
construct, and the subject is perhaps not capable of imposing it in full, so actual
performance may deviate; but the logical form should grosso modo be recognis-
able in performance. Thus logical reasoning is relative to a particular cognitive
task, but once a subject is engaged in that task, the task imposes a norm upon
the subject. In other words, it is a general norm of rationality that the subject
should try to perform a task as well she can, consistent with reasonable costs.
What this means for a concrete task has to be determined from the competence
model for that task. Thus we end up with a picture of the normative status of
logic which is very much like the one sketched by Husserl (for which see chap-
ter 1): logic itself is a theoretical discipline, proving consequences of choices
of parameters, and norms come from the outside, by the choice of a particular
logical form.
11.1.4 Logic as Information Extraction: Examples
Let us now run through some of our experimental paradigms to illustrate these
ideas.
We saw a clear instance of the ideas just outlined in chapter 10, on syllo-
gistics, where we discussed an assignment of logical form consisting in the
construction of Euler circles with crosses. The syllogism itself contributes the
7. Assuming, of course, that our analysis of the suppression task is correct.
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ﬁrst component of logical form in the sense of surface syntax; the Euler dia-
grams together with the assignment of sets to predicates and the interpretation
of → as ⊆ and ∧ as ∩ constitute the semantics. An interesting feature of this
construction is that integration of the premises is nontrivial: Euler diagrams
are in principle deﬁned only for binary quantiﬁers (“all A are B,” “some A are
B,” etc.), and thus need combination rules like the ones, involving the crosses,
given in section 10.3.1 to represent the Euler diagrams corresponding to the two
premises of a syllogism in one joint representation. This is in contrast to a solu-
tion method for classical logic like semantic tableaux, where the integration of
premises proceeds by the simple addition of suitable atomic sentences, since in
classical predicate logic a model can be deﬁned as a set of atomic sentences.8
In the selection task the data presented to the subjects consist of the form
administered by the experimenter; the information to be extracted, at least ac-
cording to the experimenter, is the subset of selected cards. We have seen that
very considerable preprocessing of these data is necessary – e.g., ﬁxing a mean-
ing for the conditional, determining what “true” and “false” mean, accepting the
background rule as given while leaving the truth–value of the foreground rule
open – which we have conceptualized as imposing logical form on the data.
All components of logical form play an important role. Validity reﬂects task
understanding, the nature of the information to be extracted. Some subjects be-
lieve that the information to be extracted is a reactive plan, where the actions
to be performed depend on observations of the back of the cards. Note fur-
thermore that it is the very indeterminacy of natural language meaning which
makes imposition of logical form necessary: the assignment of logical form is
constitutive of meaning. For example, the conditional can have many different
meanings9 depending upon context; and the sparser the context is, the fewer
clues one has about the intended meaning. This is therefore a task in which
reasoning to an interpretation needs control (often accompanied by awareness):
because of the extreme indeterminacy of meaning, and also because there are so
many elements to integrate. In the end, if all goes well, the subject will have in-
tegrated all this information in a joint representation like the one given in chap-
ter 3, section 3.4, and proceed from there. In practice, hardly anybody achieves
full integration in this task. The various experimental manipulations discussed
in chapter 4 all aim to bring out the intended logical form more clearly, and as
we have seen these lead to a signiﬁcant increase in (intended) performance.
In the suppression task, a considerable number of subjects impose a logical
form consisting of a ternary connective to correspond to the natural language
conditional (involving the extra propositional variable ab), and integrate the
8. The source-founding model presented in chapter 10 provides an interesting example of a different logical
form imposed on syllogisms. The problems surrounding the integration of the premises are discussed on
page 329.
9. The phrase “many different meanings” suggests that meanings can be counted; but this image is still too
discrete.
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premises through a condition on ab, then forming the completion. Since this
assignment of logical form corresponds to natural processes for discourse re-
pair (the additional conditional is read as correcting, or as strengthening the
ﬁrst), it may be almost automatic in normal readers. This can be seen in the
dialogues, which are much less concerned with task interpretation than those
of the selection task. Once the logical form is ﬁxed, information extraction
then proceeds algorithmically through closed–world reasoning, that is, by con-
structing the minimal model of the preprocessed premises and reading off a
conclusion.10 In the case of the suppression task we could go down to Marr’s
third level and propose both a mechanism for the encoding of the logical form
into a neural network and the shape of the neural computations implementing
the information-extraction algorithm.
In the false–belief task the preprocessing of the data involves understanding
the task instruction, and recruiting information concerning the relation between
perception and belief, and of general causal knowledge. Information extraction
is performed by an algorithm simulating the temporal evolution of the initial
model up to the time that Maxi returns to the room and starts looking for the
chocolate, using the principle of inertia applied to both beliefs and the world.
The counterfactual task elicits the same process of information extraction, ex-
cept that inertia is applied to the world only.
Nonverbal tasks will be discussed in the next section.
11.1.5 Some Information–Processing is Best Viewed as Logic
Above we have argued that (real-life) logical reasoning should be seen as
information–processing. From this it follows that some information processing
is logical reasoning, but the section heading is intended to convey something
more: that logic is a good format in which to represent information–processing
tasks which are not traditionally conceived of as logical. The ﬁrst step of the
argument is that in the description and explanation of a cognitive task, consid-
eration of Marr’s top level – the speciﬁcation of what is to be computed – is
indispensable, for instance because it gives rise to predictions which cannot be
obtained otherwise. An example is furnished by chapter 9, where we found the
common information–processing core in three very different tasks (false–belief
task, counterfactual task, box task) and tested autistic subjects on the suppres-
sion task, which was argued to embody this common core in rather pure form.
A more fundamental reason for the incorporation of the top level is that directly
moving to the algorithmic level may lead to features of the algorithm being in-
cluded as part of the cognitive task, even though these are inessential, and one
may then agonise over how to ﬁnd a neural implementation for those features.
An example of this is furnished by the attempted probabilistic analyses of the
10. This description of information extraction applies to the forward inferences MP and DA.
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suppression task (chapter 7), which introduce a needlessly precise quantitative
probabilistic language, and thus set the authors worrying about its relevance to
the actual computations going on in the brain.
The second step is that logical languages are well suited to serve as repre-
sentation languages for the input and output of the competence model. Logic
is open to a wide range of content. Cognition is about intentional phenomena,
i.e., is concerned with setting goals and achieving them. But in order to achieve
a goal a plan must be computed, and for this one needs causal information con-
cerning the consequences and preconditions of one’s actions. Each of these is
naturally formulated in a logical language, and the attainment of a goal can be
viewed as a derivation in a suitable nonmonotonic logic. That is why also the
competence models for nonverbal tasks, such as the box task, the tubes task
and behavioral variants of the false–belief task (all from chapter 9) can be for-
mulated using logical notions. This last phrase – “using logical notions” – was
chosen to reﬂect the fact that in, for instance, the box task the input seems only
partially formalisable in logical terms, since the essential logical features have
to be abstracted from the visual image of the box (the visual input). The logical
form of discourse seems slightly more transparent.
11.1.6 Nonmonotonic Logic and the Competence/Performance Distinc-
tion
As an aside, we would like to mention that the possibility to choose between
classical and nonmonotonic logics affects the very formulation of what the
information–processing task corresponding to a given cognitive capacity is.
We illustrate this by means of language comprehension. At the competence
level, language comprehension can be viewed as the information–processing
task whose output is an internal model for a discourse, with representations for
the individuals, relations, and events mentioned in the discourse (see Kamp and
Reyle [154] for an exposition of this view from linguistics, and Gernsbacher
[93] from psycholinguistics). While the output is relatively clear, the input is
a matter of debate. In fact, this debate can be viewed as being about what
properly belongs to competence, and what to performance.
At the level of performance or processing, the main issue is whether language
comprehension is a one-step or two-step process, in the following sense. In a
two-step process, ﬁrst the meaning of a sentence is computed, which may then
have to be recomputed in the next step to take into account pragmatic infor-
mation, which can be both verbal and nonverbal (e.g., gesture). In a one-step
process, all the available information is immediately brought to bear on the
computation of the meaning, and sentence boundaries do not have a privileged
role. Hence, whereas in the two-step model the input to the comprehension al-
gorithm consists of sentences, it consists of lexical items in the one-step model.
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Current evidence from neuroimaging seems to point to a one-step model (see
Hagoort and van Berkum [112] for an overview).
Returning to the competence level, we may deﬁne the input of the compre-
hension task as a complete piece of discourse, supposed to be given in its en-
tirety. The fact that the elements of the discourse arrive sequentially is then
taken to be a performance factor. As a consequence of this decision, the compe-
tence model can be taken to be a monotonic operation: no revision is necessary
after the discourse model has been constructed. This is the point of view taken
in Kamp and Reyle [154]. To take a concrete example, if a discourse model is
constructed for
(1) The girl was writing a letter, when her friend spilled coffee on the
paper.
according to this view it will be constructed after the sentence boundary, when
it has already become clear that the writing most likely has not produced a
mailable letter due to coffee stains on the paper.
An alternative option is to ﬁt the competence model more closely to the actual
information available to the listener, and thus view the task (i.e., language com-
prehension) as sequentially constructing a discourse model, as it were shadow-
ing the incoming information. The discourse model thus constructed may have
to be revised. For instance, in sentence (1) the main clause generates the ex-
pectation that a letter has been written, thus introducing a referent for this letter
in the discourse model. This default expectation is then canceled by the sub-
ordinate clause, which means that the original model has to be recomputed. In
van Lambalgen and Hamm [282] a nonmonotonic computational formalism is
presented which allows such recomputations in midsentence.11 Thus we claim
that the use of nonmonotonic logic allows the formulation of competence mod-
els which are much closer to the actual informational situation that humans ﬁnd
themselves in.
11.2 The Bottom Line
What sort of picture emerges from the preceding considerations of the goings
on in the psychology of reasoning laboratory? What is our take on our student
subjects, and on reasoning experiments themselves? What is our take on Homo
sapiens? And how does our picture join up with the rest of cognitive science?
11. This brief description will undoubtedly raise a number of questions. The interested reader is also referred
to [9], and references given therein, for a discussion of processing aspects of the progressive in examples
like (1), together with evidence from event-related potentials to support the interpretation given here.
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11.2.1 Subjects and Experiments
Starting with subjects, we have acquitted them of most of the accusations of
irrationality that most other approaches have laid at their door. Our acquittal is
on somewhat different grounds than some others. We do think that students’
struggles in the selection task are not far beneath the surface, and that they are
less than ideal interpreters of the confusing messages the task presents. From
the student subjects’ point of view, the competence models used to convict are
not the ones they could reasonably be expected to initially apply. We see them
as faced with a multiplicity of possibilities and being engaged in trying to ﬁnd
out what the experimenter means, even if they are not well aware of the explicit
catalogue of possibilities. They are skillful credulous reasoners endowed with
enormous databases of subtly defeasible, contextually sensitive, rules. They
may also be able to invoke a skeptical stance in supportive contexts, but these
are not supportive contexts. Above all they lack the awareness of their interpre-
tive situation (concepts, terminology, or the experimenter’s intentions) which
might allow them to control their decisions about what interpretations to adopt.
Here is the scope for educational intervention. We do believe that education
can have profound effects on students’ control and ﬂexibility of interpretation
in situations where little past experience is available to guide. In fact we be-
lieve this added control of interpretation is one of the main tools students need
to learn in whatever domains they come to specialise in. And we can agree that
the small proportion of students who do identify the skeptical classical logical
models often unwittingly intended by experimenters are the students who have
already come farthest along this road to interpretive control. So, while our stu-
dents stand acquitted as charged, we still want to send them off with homework
to develop their awareness of interpretive processes and possibilities. We still
have only blood, sweat, and tears to offer.
Exactly what exercises these should be will vary with the students and their
intended destination. Empirical research (Stenning [258]) has shown that con-
trary to common belief (see, e.g., Cheng et al. [38]) quite formal logical teach-
ing can beneﬁt students’ general reasoning capacities. Others among them
might be better served by different curricula, and there are important issues
about how formal teaching has to be focused. Of course, civilization has its dis-
contents. Teaching the centipede about walking may disturb its habits, and
teaching students how to reﬂect on their interpretive processes can perhaps
sometimes forestall necessary action in the world. So alongside a curriculum
for reﬂection, there also needs to be curricula for application. However, the
latter seem to us in good shape compared to the former.
What of experiments? Are we advocating the abandonment of the labora-
tory for the arm-chair? Far from it! As should be clear, we don’t think formal
models can explain cognitive phenomena, any more than experimental data are
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interpretable without explicit models. But we are also advocating a much more
subtle shift than merely a shift of the balance toward logical analysis, and that
subtle shift has to do with the balance between syntactic and semantic data.
Psychologists are taught that content has to be circumvented to make progress.
Classical cases are the invention of the nonsense syllable in the memory lab-
oratory to eradicate meanings that subjects insist on bringing with them. As
it turns out, we can learn some things about memory from such material, but
it still remains true that it excludes most of what we want to study as human
memory – what Bartlett [12] called “the effort after meaning.”
Psycholinguistics is another ﬁeld that has been dominated by the avoidance
of content. Far more effort has gone into understanding syntactic parsing, than
into understanding the representation of meaning and the conduct of inference
in discourse. Yet we know that the bulk of the variance in human processing
is driven by meanings. The cognitive revolution was founded on observations
that subjects’ interpretations were the determiner of psychological capacities,
perhaps most famously in memory.
This conundrum is usually seen as being driven by methodological necessity.
We propose that our use of nonmonotonic logics removes this methodological
necessity. A logic that forces us to represent a long term memory database and
a working memory processor for current discourse materials faces this method-
ological chasm head-on. Of course we don’t represent the whole of a subject’s
long–term memory, nor the full process which leads to activation of the cur-
rently active part of long–term memory. But for any given discourse, univer-
sality is not necessary. Of course, formalization of particular materials is often
post hoc. But as long as the resultant formalizations make enough predictions,
they remain empirical hypotheses. The status of form changes with multiplic-
ity of logics. Finding form is now as much about setting semantic parameters
as about syntactic ones, and we (and our subjects) have access to the output
meanings in a way that we do not have access to intermediate syntactic stages.
Psychology doesn’t need to tiptoe around content anymore. Its main data can
be judgments of meanings in context.
However, one cannot escape the feeling that it will take more than a few log-
ical tools to reinstate the processes of interpretation at center stage in cognitive
psychology. This issue is at the heart of problems about the boundaries between
the humanities and sciences. Interpretation is often seen as the boundary fence.
But that itself doesn’t really bear inspection. The psychology laboratory hap-
pily studies interpretive processes in lots of areas: visual perception is perhaps
the most obvious. Psycholinguistics is another. So what is supposed to be the
difference between admissible ranges of interpretation which the psychology
of reasoning (and other areas of psychology) can admit and still remain empiri-
cal science, and the ranges of interpretation which take us irretrievably beyond
the scientiﬁc pale into the postmodernist desert? One possible explanation why
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interpretation is seen as problematic in reasoning but not in perception or psy-
cholinguistics is that the ﬁeld of reasoning invites evaluations of rationality;
whereas the other ﬁelds do not.
What Role Rationality?
Once rationality comes under inspection, we get drawn ineluctably to the hard
cases: legal, scientiﬁc, religious, political, or moral. Rationality is the human-
ities’ Trojan horse invited within the scientiﬁc walls because rationality soon
reveals the need for the speciﬁcation of values.
First, it should be said, there are hard cases, and these ﬁelds of enquiry are
pretty well deﬁned in terms of their capacities for generation of hard cases by
the misalignment of interests of the parties concerned. On the other hand, quick
inspection of the literature on the psychology of reasoning reveals that none of
these ﬁelds are the sources of the problematic cases we have encountered in
this book from the psychology of reasoning lab. One can doubt that science
(psychology or any other) may ever deliver resolutions of the kinds of inter-
pretive problems that arise in extremis in these ﬁelds, without thereby seeing
the business of the psychology of reasoning threatened, for example, by the
observation that there is more than one logic in which the natural language con-
ditional has to be interpreted. Within the psychology of reasoning, if anything,
the current ﬂows the other way. Once we take alternative interpretations seri-
ously, we can often get sufﬁcient evidence of subjects’ interpretations to make
conﬁdent empirical judgments of correct or erroneous reasoning, as we hope
we persuaded the reader above. Encompassing a wider range of interpretations
purchases empirical bite.
Of course, we have seen areas in which this subﬁeld is drawn into contentious
issues of interpretation which deﬁnitely would take us beyond what is locally
scientiﬁcally resolvable were we to follow their siren calls. One example is
where we observed differences in reasoning as a function of differences in
culture. The discussion of literacy and its effects on reasoning (on page 131)
touched on the ethical feelings of eye witness and hearsay testimony in unde-
veloped societies, and the consequences for whether these subjects were willing
to engage with the decontextualized classical model. The literature on cross-
cultural differences in reasoning certainly becomes a hard case once it ventures
on the subject of the reasonableness of this move. Another example was where
assessments were made about the relative values of different students’ inter-
pretations. So, for example, when Stanovich observed that the 5% of subjects
selecting A and 7 in the selection task, tend to be those with high SAT scores,
and concluded from this observation that Wason must have been right about his
criterion of correct reasoning, then we entered at least the fringes of the terri-
tory of social engineering and the politics of education. Recall that Stanovich
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quoted on page 6 does believe that resolving the problems students reveal in
the reasoning laboratory will contribute to solving the world’s conﬂicts. But
the border we need is here rather well marked. We can agree with Stanovich
that there are simple internal explanations as to why his correlation should be
expected on scientiﬁc grounds in our culture (see discussion on pp. 91, and
112, 115), and leave aside issues as to whether current educational arrange-
ments which guarantee the correlation are educationally, morally, politically, or
ethically defensible. This still leaves us free to reject Wason’s and Stanovich’s
conclusion that the criterion of classical logic is scientiﬁcally uniquely correct.
Their conclusion surely does wander over the boundary between science and
cultural values, but more importantly, it fails to explain why students do what
they do in the laboratory. Although we are optimistic about educational inter-
ventions to solve these reasoning problems, and we believe resolution can have
important consequences for students’ learning, we are much more modest about
the resulting contribution to solving humanity’s conﬂicts. Those conﬂicts arise
above all because of conﬂicting values and interests. Raising the standard of
debate is important, but we have no illusions that this will itself be enough.
Decision Theory
Logical reasoning and decision making should be closely related topics. Rea-
soning and interpretation are intimately involved in setting up our conceptu-
alization of our decisions, and interpreting and reasoning from information is
a matter, among other things, of making decisions about how to interpret and
what to conclude. In recent years a tension has grown up between decision
and reasoning, with some psychological researchers alienated by the state of
the deductive reasoning literature, even arguing that humans don’t reason very
much—they simply make decisions. Meantime, economists have become more
aware of the need of accounts of interpretation and reasoning in framing deci-
sions. So a natural question is: where does our program place us with regard to
the “heuristics and biases” approach to decision making?
In some ways that ﬁeld is strongly analogous to the psychology of reason-
ing. A classical competence theory (here usually classical probability theory12)
provides a competence model and standard of good decision (or probability
estimation) which blatantly does not ﬁt subjects’ performances in abstract lab-
oratory tasks (for instance the “Linda,” Asian disease, and taxi problems). Peo-
ple disobey transitivity axioms, exhibit “framing effects” and ignore base rates.
Tversky and Kahneman [279], with whom these tasks originate, are more sen-
sitive to subjects’ dilemmas than Wason was – that is, to the impossibility of
12. It may not be superﬂuous to remark that classical probability theory is wedded to an underlying Boolean
structure of events, i.e., to classical logic. Therefore objections to the appropriateness of classical logic in a
given context ipso facto apply to probability theory.
11.2 The Bottom Line 361
calculating the classical theory in most circumstances – and view the heuristics
that they ascribe to people as necessary and reasonable ways of satisﬁcing in
the circumstances of natural decision, in contrast to Wason’s conﬁdent assertion
of the irrationality of subjects caused by failure to attempt falsiﬁcation. Their
critics (e.g., Gigerenzer [95]) have rejected their approach, claiming that classi-
cal probability theory does not give a sensible characterization of what people
are trying to compute, let alone how they compute it, going on to specify “fast
and frugal” heuristics for making decisions in natural settings, which actually
sometimes outperform the intractable classical theory. On this basis they reject
entirely the need for or existence of a competence model of what people are
trying to do. They argue that people do not reason, they decide.
This disagreement may be more apparent than real, or at least take more
careful formulation. The proponents of heuristics and biases can be read as as-
suming that classical probability theory is the single normative characterization
of the decisions involved in these tasks—corresponding to a speciﬁcation of
Marr’s “computational” level function. But they also have to be read as regard-
ing that competence theory as distantly related to the methods of computation
and approximation achievable in practice. Their admittedly rudimentary char-
acterization of heuristics (e.g., availability, representativeness, etc.) can rea-
sonably be read as a down payment toward a heuristic toolkit. Of course, when
the distance between competence speciﬁcation of the function and performance
calculations of its values is so great, it becomes hard to tell what status the com-
petence theory has beyond a theorist’s tool. This gap is highly reminiscent of
the gap that we have opened up between classical logic and what people are
doing in the psychology of reasoning laboratory.
So an exciting possibility is that there might be a way of abstractly speci-
fying what constitutes “intuitive” reasoning in these decision tasks, in a way
analogous to what we have proposed here as default logical competence mod-
els specifying the credulous interpretation of discourses. This would shift the
problem substantially in a direction othogonal to both the heuristics and biases
position and the attacks on it from those who reject classical probability as a
competence model. The move would be exactly analogous to the move made in
this book in logical reasoning. Instead of a single competence model (classical
probability) and a set of heuristics, which are the best people can do to approxi-
mate it in the circumstances, or on the other hand, a toolbox which is applied to
some tasks which have no characterization save in terms of the tools applied to
them, we would then have two competence theories of two (sets of) tasks, each
requiring its own performance theory or theories, and each contributing differ-
ent functions to humans’ broader aims. “Intuitive decision” need then not be
viewed as poor approximation, just as we have argued that deductive reasoning
theorists shouldn’t view system 1 processes of interpretation as “illogical even
if often effective.”
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Let us illustrate what such a program might look like with one of the heuris-
tics and biases tasks – the Linda problem. What is it that subjects are judging
when they judge likelihood here, and how do they make these judgments? Tver-
sky and Kahneman’s subjects read a description of Linda:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As
a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations [279,p. 297]
Here is a credulous discourse processing task. The experimenter tells a story
and we, as subjects, try to construct the intended model of the heroine. We use
any available general knowledge and speciﬁc cues to come to some represen-
tation of the kind of person she is (that is, the range of people under consider-
ation, say, female twentieth century Americans in their 30s with Anglo-Saxon
forenames?), and within that domain, where she stands (say, at the liberal pro-
gressive end of the spectrum of American social attitudes). We then read some
more information:
“Which, dear reader, do you feel is more likely?
(1) Linda is a bank teller or (2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist move-
ment.
How are we to conceive of our task in answering this question? Tversky
and Kahneman assume that we should take an extensional approach: within the
domain of female twentieth century Americans in their 30s with Anglo-Saxon
forenames, we are supposed to estimate the size of the sets: bank teller vs.
bank teller active in the feminist movement, and to respond with option (1) as
clearly the larger set, or at worst a set equal in size to the other. As far as the
extensional formulation of the task is concerned, note that Gigerenzer does not
disagree thus far. He may disagree about how the alternatives presented are
interpreted or what information is available to make the decision but he does
not argue with the extensional formulation of the problem as such.
The Linda problem is rather reminiscent of the following puzzle beloved of
7-year-olds:
A captain set to sea with numerous animals aboard his ship. All the animals were in
opposite sex pairs. He had a brace of ecstatic elephants, a pair of agreeable aardvarks,
and two quarrelsome quagga. How do you spell captain Noah’s name? 13
Similarly, with the Linda problem one has to realise that one is supposed to
answer without any recourse to the information in the initial description. Only
the two numbered descriptions in the second installment of information are
relevant in reasoning to the conclusion that the latter set cannot be larger than
the former.
13. The problem is no harder presented orally: the answer is, of course, that it depends on whether the
questioner intends his forename or his surname.
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We would of course argue that this extensional view is already the wrong
formulation of what the subject takes the Linda problem to be. So what task did
the subjects attempt? Did they attempt this extensional task but for some reason
fail at it? Or is there some other speciﬁable task which they were attempting?
And if so, can we both specify what that information–processing task was, and
perhaps analyse how they performed it? And if we can specify such another
task, did they get that task right?
Suppose the task they adopted was credulous discourse interpretation. On
the basis of what the ﬁrst set of information invokes from their general knowl-
edge, they choose a domain of interpretation. This will be a set of constraints
as to who will count as in the domain (perhaps along the lines listed above)
along with a database of active default conditionals describing relations be-
tween properties of people in this domain. In addition, a representation of Linda
using the speciﬁc information provided is established in working memory. Now
the two alternatives in the second lot of information become a single continua-
tion. First we are told to our surprise that Linda is a bankteller. Then we are told
that she is an active member of the feminist movement and we gain some release
from our surprise. Presented with a clash between the personality traits hitherto
described and our stereotype of banktellers, we recruit some new relevant infor-
mation from long–term memory. People frequently have to take jobs which are
less than ideal matches to their temperaments perhaps, especially women with
family constraints. People may still choose to pursue outside activities which
may be a better match to their temperaments because of being less constrained.
We then construe the question about likelihoods as answerable in terms of how
surprising the discourse is at various points in its development, and we judge
(2) to be a less surprising state than (1).
Now, if this is a reasonable conjecture about some subjects’ mental processes,
it will serve to illustrate the alternative construals of the task which are still pos-
sible. We believe Tversky and Kahneman would say of such a construal by the
subject, that they are using something like the representativeness heuristic to
approximate judgments about extensionally construed sets of people in their
model of the domain. In contrast, we would say that in this construal of the
task, subjects are reasonably understanding the task as one of credulous dis-
course interpretation and not unreasonably then construing the question as one
about how surprising various continuations are. Option (1) increases surprise,
whereas (2) resolves it. Needless to remind the reader, we have claimed to give
a logical theory of this credulous task and so there is the possibility that an ab-
stract logical characterization of “intuitive decision” can be given, and that the
subjects may, moreover, be succeeding at this logical task.
This is perhaps so obvious that its implications are easily missed. We do
have evaluative standards for the credulous interpretation of narratives such as
the paragraph about Linda. They are of course as complex in full detail as the
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databases of general knowledge from which interpretations are recruited, but
there are many contexts in which we do not hesitate to wade in with judgments
about what is a good interpretation and what is not. Along with our colleagues
we spend much time “marking essays” which are kinds of expositions, and we
have little hesitation in assigning partial orderings to the reasonableness of their
interpretations of whatever information and task has been set. Of course it is
hard for subjects, and indeed experimenters, to know how to apply these stan-
dards in the laboratory. We do not know why we are being told this story about
Linda: whether, for example, it is a preamble to being a member of a jury, or a
job interview we are about to be asked to conduct, or a retelling of last night’s
soap. But any of these contexts would bring with it canons of good, bad, and
indifferent interpretation, sometimes arguable, but equally often agreed upon
within our culture. This “intuitive judgment” business is not to be taken lightly
as a life task. We don’t all mark essays for a living but we all live by sizing
up the reasonableness of expositions for the multifarious purposes of different
contexts. It hardly needs to be proposed that the Linda task is more likely to
be taken as a case of exercising this skill than of making a judgment about the
sizes of two sets. All real judgments have to be based on interpretations of the
evidence, purpose, and context, so there is an inescapable element of informal
interpretation that sets the scene for decision.
Of course these intimate interactions in decision making between the pro-
cesses of credulous interpretation, and the exercise of extensional judgment are
just like the ones we have urged between credulous interpretation and skepti-
cal derivation. We would take just the same stance with regard to decision as
we have taken with regard to reasoning: subjects experience very considerable
difﬁculty in learning to ﬂexibly and appropriately switch between these stances
in abstracted situations, and much of tertiary education is about honing these
skills. On the other hand, the literature generally supports the view that peo-
ple are much better (though by no means error–free) at switching appropriately
between stances when they are in the contexts in which they regularly make de-
cisions. We would also emphasize that many, especially professional, contexts
demand reasoning and decision making in rather decontextualized situations
which are not as far from the laboratory as might at ﬁrst be thought. Hence the
educational justiﬁcation for forcing students to learn to interpret and reason in
vacuo.
Of course, much remains to be done to turn this conjecture into a theory of
decision. Most notably, some method of estimating probably qualitative like-
lihood from the state of an interpretation relative to a database of knowledge
would have to be speciﬁed. Some psychologists have operationalized some-
thing like this estimation of likelihood by eliciting the availability of counterex-
amples from subjects’ interpreting defeasible conditionals (e.g.,[106]). One
does not have to believe that probability is the right underlying competence
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theory to note that “counterexamples” as used here are closely related to the ﬁr-
ing of abnormality conditions in a default logic, and recruitment of abnormality
conditions from a long–term memory detabase might be a good place to start
looking to produce the theory required.
If the conjecture could be turned into a theory of decision it would substan-
tially develop what we take to be the spirit of the heuristics and biases program,
namely that informal reasoning lies at the heart of decision making of even more
formal kinds. We might sloganise in terms of having provided just the fast and
frugal logic which is required. This would show that there are formalizations of
“intuitive” reasoning which make rational sense of what is an extremely impor-
tant human skill of discourse interpretation. These formalizations are, unlike
their classical logical and classical probability theory interpretations, demon-
strably computationally tractable, and at least at their core, algorithmic rather
than heuristic. It would place the spotlight on confusion between which of these
tasks (the extensional vs. the intuitive) is appropriate in a given context as per-
haps a major source of human error. And it would open up the possibility that
when people do succeed at successful estimations in the extensional task, that
their means of getting there in fact rests on strategically guided use of the de-
feasible machinery of discourse comprehension. If this program can be carried
through it would also draw a strong analogy between the ﬁndings of framing
problems in decision tasks such as this, and ﬁndings in the deductive reasoning
literature.
11.2.2 Homo sapiens sapiens
Enough of the subjects and the laboratory! What about the species? What are
the prospects there? And the prospects for our understanding of how the species
got to be how it cognitively is? We have presented a lot more biology in this
book than is conventional for a book on human reasoning. Our proposal is that
an important ingredient of the species’ cognitive characteristics has to be under-
stood in terms of its radical altriciality. This large–scale reorganization of the
timing of development must have tweaked a large number of biological mod-
ules, leading to many exaptations, as well as many secondary adaptations to
cope with them. This upheaval has patently led to novel social economics and
novel microcognitive capacities and much in between. The intense pressures to-
ward cooperation in the environment of the resulting mother-infant dependency
were probably the crucible of human cognitive innovations of cooperative com-
munication. Our planning capacities had already been expanded by a million or
two years of tool manufacture and use, before they were exapted for the plan-
ning of discourse and the expansion of the potential interpretive gap between
our current situation and the current contents of our working memory.
This picture is extremely broad-brush, and by no means original with us. So
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why paint it here? It seems necessary because it is a picture so radically differ-
ent from those that have most currency in psychology. This picture makes clear
that the prevalence of exaptation guarantees that identifying originating selec-
tion pressures for behavioral phenotypes is the hard part of explaining cognitive
evolution. And innovation is not achieved by adding new modules. However,
it is not dreary necessity that led us to such a heavy dose of biology, but rather
excitement. Over the next ten or ﬁfteen years unprecedented biological evi-
dence about human evolution will become available. This is irresistible—in
both senses. It will happen, like it or not, and it will be highly desirable, pro-
vided cognitive scientists appreciate that it need not have the dire reductionist
implications that are so often attributed to it. The ﬁeld is so fast–moving that
even our dippings in it have had to be revised several times in the light of new
developments during the process of writing this book. Perhaps we should wait
until the textbooks are out instead of bothering the reader with our amateur in-
terpretations. We decided not to because a lot of the message is the lability
of the surface and the enduring nature of the underlying concepts. What are
important for the cognitive scientist interested in human reasoning are the fun-
damental concepts: heritability,, variability, modularity, genetic control, exap-
tation, adaptation, or epigenesis, as well as how they play out in the detailed
analyses of the ever–changing surfaces.
In ﬁfteen years we predict that a book on human reasoning will be able to
explain, for example, how what we call autism (a disorder multiply reclassi-
ﬁed by then, no doubt) is related to the expression of multiple genes at various
stages of development, interacting with environmental factors such as the inter-
nal circumstances of brain growth, as well as more conventionally experiential
inﬂuences, to ﬁnd expression in a range of reasoning styles across clinical and
normal populations. Such a book may even be able to explain what selection
pressures maintain the clinical extremes in the population through the evolu-
tionary beneﬁts of the lesser doses. This understanding of why it “takes all
types” (of people, to use a vernacular expression) might even contribute some
much needed motivation for rubbing along with each other. If we are right in
this, then we are even more conﬁdent that the explanations will rest on analy-
ses of behavioral capacities in terms of logical information systems and their
implementations in brain, body, and community.
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